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PART 1: The Large Commercial Aircraft Duopoly 
I The air travel market 
I-  The beginning of air travel: From s Safety First to today s Kingfisher 
Airlines 
 
The most important developments in air travel were: (1) the first airline, (2) the 
first large and safe piston engines airliners, (3) the jet age, (4) the deregulation, (5) 
the development of the hub-spoke system, (6) the low costs airlines, and (7) the new 
emerging markets. While the first two have come and gone, deregulation is still 
ongoing in some markets such as India and even looming in others such as China. 
The low cost airlines (LCC) are still in their development stage except in Europe and 
North America. 
 
Figure 1: World air traffic development 1914-2010 
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I-1-1-A First major development: The first airline  
 The first commercial airline named Safety First  was created in December  in 
Tampa Florida, only 10 years after the Wright Brothers first flight1. On January 1, 
1914, Safety First started the true first commercial flight between Tampa and St. 
Petersburg  on a Benoist airboat, a 34km trip across the Bay  of Tampa that took 23 
mn instead of the hours long trip by boat. The Ex-mayor of St. Petersburg, A. C. Pheil, 
became the world's first scheduled airline passenger when he bid $400 for the first 
flight. Mr. Noel E. Mitchell was second, with a $175 bid2. 
 
Figure 2: Benoist Airboat from St Petersbourg Historical Museum 
 
 
The line which was subsidized by Florida business men, made two daily flights, six 
days a week. The regular fare was $5 per person and $5 per one hundred pounds of 
freight or express carried. Shortly after the opening of the line, a new Benoist 
airboat was added which had an improved front on the hull that protected its 
occupants from water spray during take offs and landings. The line then extended 
and flights made to Manatee, Bradenton and Sarasota. Most passengers were either 
local businessman or celebrities from the entertainment industry.  A total of 1,205 
                                                     
1 Mousseau J (2003), Conquering the sky, 1903 to 1933, Perrin, Paris 
2 Clark James, (2000) A quick look at Florida History  
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passengers were carried without injury and while the line did not make any money, 
the airline idea proved sound. 
Besides Safety First, there were very few passenger services in the early 1920s. 
Most airlines at that time were carrying mail. The limited payload of the aircraft of 
the time was too small to develop a profitable passenger service business3. 
The world first civil airplane is considered to be the Junker F134, an all-metal low 
wing, mono-engine German airplane capable of carrying 4 passengers that first flew 
in June 25th, 1919. It became the world's first all-metal airliner and it seems to be 
the first aircraft, which was fully designed as a passenger aircraft. A total of 322 
Junker F13s were produced between 1919 and 1932 and delivered to 70 airlines 
outside Germany. The highest annual production rate was reached in 1925 with a 
total of 68 aircraft built during that year (geocities). The main airlines that operated 
the Junkers F13 included AB Aerotransport (Sweden), Ad Astra Aero (Switzerland), 
Aero-Express (Hungary), Aerolot (Poland), Aeronaut (Estonia), Aero O/Y (Finland), 
Aero Traffic (Switzerkand), CSA (Tchekoslovakia), Deruluft , Deutsche Aero Llyod, 
Deutsche Luft Hansa (Germany), Dobrolet (URSS), Junkers Luftverkehr (Germany), 
LARES (Romania), Lloyd Aero Boliviano, Ölag (Autria), Pacific Airways (Canada), 
Sabena (Belgium), SAM (Italia), SAP (Portugal), SCADTA (Colombia), Sindicato 
Condor (Brazil), Transadriatica (Italia), UAE (Spain), Union Airways/South African 
Airways, Varig (Brazil) and  Western Canada Airways. The Junker F-13a (wing 
extended 2.9m vs F-13) were capable of flying at 195km/h with 4 passengers over 
930kms.  
                                                     
3 Blowers P (1966) Boeing aircraft since 1916, Putman, London 




Figure 3: Junker F-13 in 1926 
 
The Junker was soon followed by the Fokker monoplane high wing aircraft that was 
capable of flying 5 passengers. Although, these two aircraft were principally used for 
mail service, their technology definitely led the way towards the first breakthrough 
in civil air transport: the tri-engine aircraft. The tri-engine aircraft were bigger, 
capable of carrying up to 9-12 passengers, faster and much more robust than their 
predecessors. In 1924, Junker flew its first tri-engine low wing airplane, the JU-
52/3m, followed  year later by Fokker s tri-engine high wing aircraft, the Fokker 
F.VII.  
 
Fokker Tri-motor F.VII 1925                                  Junker 52 in Lufthansa livery 
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In 1926, Ford used the metal structure of the Junker and the high wing concept of 
the Fokker F.VII to build the Ford Trimotor 4-AT and 5-AT. The Ford Trimotor was 
an all aluminum corrugated sheet metal body and wing with fabric covered control 
surfaces. The Ford 4-4T were capable of flying a crew of 3 and 8 to 9 passengers. A 
total of 199 Ford Tri-motors were built between 1926 and 1933, including 79 of the 
4-AT variant, and 117 of the 5-AT variant, plus some experimental aircraft. Well 
over 100 airlines in the world flew the Ford Tri-motor. The 5-AT had the more 
powerful Pratt&Whitney engine equipped with 12 seats with a cruise speed of 115 
mph, a -13,500 lb. maximum gross take-off weight and a range of 560 miles.5 The 
Ford Trimotor was popular with the military and is considered as the aircraft that 
launched modern civil air travel. Like the cars and tractors, these Ford aircraft were 
well designed, relatively inexpensive, and reliable. While Ford did not make a profit 
on its aviation business, Ford's reputation leant credibility to the infant aviation 
industry, and Ford helped introduce many aspects of the modern aviation 
infrastructure, including paved runways, passenger terminals, hangars, airmail, and 
radio navigation. Transcontinental Air Transport, which later became part of Trans 
World Airlines, used the Ford Trimotor to begin its transcontinental air service from 
San Diego to New York in 1929. 
Figure 4: Ford5-AT 
 
                                                     
5 Jane 51970), All the world aircraft 
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Figure 5: Interior of a Ford5-AT 
 
Table 1: Ford Trimotor specification 
Crew: 3 ( 1 Flight Attendant) 
Capacity: Eight passengers  
Cost: US$42,000 in 1933  
Maximum take-off weight: 13,500 lb (6,120 kg)  
Powerplant: 3×  Pratt & Whitney  9-cylinder, 420 hp Performance 
Maximum speed: 150 mph (241 km/h)  
Cruise speed 90 mph (145 km/h)  
Range 550 mi (885 km)  
Ceiling 18,500 ft (5,640 m)  
 
In Europe, the first airline was KLM, the oldest international airline of the world still 
in operation. The first KLM commercial flight transported two English passengers 
from London to Amsterdam on May 17th 1920 with a De Havilland DH-16 aircraft. 
From 1920, KLM development was essentially due to the need to link its extensive 
colonies settlements. KLM 1st intercontinental flight took off from Amsterdam for a 
2 weeks journey to Batavia (now Jakarta) on a Fokker F.VII. Regular Amsterdam-
Batavia service started as early as 1929.  
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Figure 6: 1st KLM flight London-Amsterdam 1920  
 )n Britain, the airline Aircraft Transport and Travel started the world s first regular 
international flight between London to Paris on August 1919. New routes opened to 
Brussels and Amsterdam but the companies struggled without government support 
while across the channel continental competitors received generous help. 
In December 1920, Air Transport and Travel ceased operations, and in February 
1921 all British airlines ceased operations due to subsidized European competition. 
In March 1921, a temporary Government subsidy was granted and British air 
services restarted with Handley Page Transport operating the first subsidized 
London-Paris service. )n , )mperial Airways was created as the chosen instrument  of the British government with the mission of developing British 
commercial air transport on an economic basis. Imperial Airways received a 
government subsidy of £1 million spread over ten years on the basis that they 
would be required to develop routes to the Empire to South Africa, India and 
ultimately Australia particularly for the carriage of mail.   
 
 In Asia, it is only in 1941 that the first airline, Philippine Airlines founded in 1941, 
started daily service with a Beech Model 18 aircraft between Manila and Baguio.   Philippines Airlines were credited with a number of first  in the Asia aviation 
history, most notably the first transpacific charter flight on July 31 1946 and regular 
transpacific service between Manila to San Francisco in December of the same year. 




I-1-2-The second major development: The first large and safe piston engines 
airliners and the start of competition in airline service 
The Ford Trimotor can arguably be consider as the first airliner, however, only a few 
were developed. As in most subsequent commercial aircraft programs throughout 
history, the first successful US  commercial aircraft program came from the US 
government stimulation from its military requirement that manufacture use as an 
opportunity to develop commercial application. In 1929, the US Army awarded The 
Boeing Company a contract to build the new B-9 twin engine bomber aircraft. The 
design was converted into the Boeing 247 with two new Pratt & Whitney engine. 
The much improved performance, comfort level, payload and safety quickly 
established the B-247 as the first modern airliner. The first prototype flew on 
February 8th 1933. With a range of  745miles, the Model-247 was able to fly from 
New York to Los Angeles in under 20 hours with as many as 7 stops, a real progress 
considering the 70 hours journey by train.  
Table 2: Boeing Model 247 Specifications 
First flight: Feb. 8, 1933 
Model number: 247 
Classification: Commercial transport 
Span: 74 feet 
Length: 51 feet 7 inches 
Gross weight: 13,650 pounds 
Top speed: 200 mph 
Cruising speed: 189 mph 
Range: 745 miles 
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Ceiling: 25,400 feet 
Power: Two 500-horsepower P&W Wasp engines 
Accommodation: 3 crew, 10 passengers, 400 pounds of mail 
 
The subsequent modern airliner came to life as a combination of 2 factors: (1) the 
spectacular and much publicized crash of a TWA Fokker F-10A trimotor monoplane 
in a thunderstorm over Kansas on March 31st 1931 and (2) the exclusivity 
arrangement Boeing had with the first operator of its Model-247 (Jane's): United 
Aircraft and Transport (now United Airlines.).6  
Figure 7: Boeing Model 247 
 
The crash obtained much media attention at that time as it killed everyone onboard, 
and in particular, a famous American football coach, a last minute passenger that 
replaced another passenger that was a witness in a gang related crime in Chicago. 
Structural failure of the wing was listed as the probable cause of the crash.  
Shortly after the conversion of the B-9 bomber into a dual military – commercial 
program with the Model-247, Boeing received an order for 60 passenger transport 
aircraft from Boeing wholly owned airline: United Aircraft and Transport, one of the 
                                                     
6 Jane (1970),  All the world aircraft, 1970 
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first US airline (United Airlines remained a subsidiary of Boeing until 1934). 
Because of the Model 247 significant advance in technology compared to the Ford 
ad Fokker previous model, the exclusivity arrangement with United conferred a 
tremendous competitive advantage to the airline vs. TWA, its main competitor at the 
time. Boeing had rejected a demand from TWA to purchase its Model-247, an 
unthinkable practice in today s market conditions. 
The Model 247 was clearly seen as a breakthrough in the development of civil air 
transport. It allowed the realization of its potential as a new form of efficient long 
distance transportation throughout the US. United Airlines competitors understood 
that the airlines with the best equipment could generate huge profits. This pushed 
TWA, under the initiative of Jack Freye, TWA Vice President Operations, to ask in 
1932 for a major American airplane manufacturer included Consolidated, Curtis 
Wright, General Aviation, Glenn Martin and Douglas Aircraft Corporation to build a 
competitor to the Boeing 247.7 
TWA specifications for the airplane was already a step change compared to the 
Model   247. TWA needed a fast plane and a safe plane but also a plane that could 
maintain sufficient altitude to cross the high mountains of the Rockies. Passenger 
comfort  was also a high priority including the issue of interior noise control and 
cabin temperature. Because of its competitor advance, TWA was also in a hurry 
Douglas Aircraft Corporation was a small military aircraft manufacturer that started 
only 11 years before with small military aircraft, with no experience in the civil 
market. However, Donald Douglas 8was determined to outstrip the model-247 in 
size and range. In less than 2 months, Douglas submitted a design to TWA that the 
airline accepted The contract called for a payment of $125,000 in gold for 
development of the first prototype and $58,000 for each of the production airframe 
(without the engines). Douglas designed the DC-1 prototype, a multicellular wing 
                                                     
7 McDonnell Douglas (1990), A tale of two giants,  




and a monocoque fuselage powered by 2 Wright Cyclone engine fitted with a 
Hamilton Standard variable-pitch propeller. In June 1933, less than one year after 
TWA contacted Douglas Aircraft Corporation, the DC-1 prototype rolled out of 
Douglas hangars of Santa Monica California and completed its first flight on July 1st 
1933. The 1st DC-1 was delivered to TWA in December 1933. All TWA specifications 
were met with the DC-1 bringing a step change in terms of passenger comfort. TWA 
promptly gave Douglas a $1,625,000 contract for 25 additional airplanes that will be 
called the DC-2. In 1935, the DC-1 in TWA operation set a new transcontinental US 
record, covering the Los Angeles to New York distance in 11 hours and 5 mn. 
Figure 8: Douglas DC-1 in TWA livery 
 
Table 3: Specification of Douglas DC-1 
First flight: July 1, 1933 
Wingspan: 56 feet 
Length: 60 feet 
Height: 16 feet 
Ceiling: 23,000 feet 
Range: 1,000 miles 
Weight: 17,500 Pounds 
Power plant: Two 710-horsepower Wright engines 
Speed: 190 mph 




Figure 9: Interior of a DC-2 
 
The speed, comfort, and reliability of the DC-2 brought air transport acceptance by 
the general public to a new level. Air travel was no longer considered as a risky 
luxury but as a serious means of transportation. Anthony Fokker, one of the greatest 
European aircraft designers of that time, bought a license to sell DC-2 in Europe. 
KLM was the first European airline to fly the DC-2 between Amsterdam and Djakarta 
of the Netherland East Indies at the time. A total of 156 DC-2 were manufactured. 
More importantly, the DC-2 was the precursor of what is still seen today as one of 
the most successful civil program: the DC-3. The DC-3 was capable of flying up to 28 
passengers over 1,495 miles in even greater comfort than of the DC-2. Quickly, the 
DC-3 performance brought commercial success and superseded the Boeing Model-
247. Even, United Airlines, the exclusive Model-247 customer, saw the advantage of 
the DC-3 and become the second US operator. By , % of the world s air traffic 
was performed on DC3s. World War II pushed the DC-3 program to military 
application. More than 10,000 DC-3s would be manufactured, better than any 





I-1-3  The  third  major development: the jet age 
The technology principle of jet engines was known as early as 1928 by Frank 
Whittle but the metal that a jet engine would have required had not been developed 
at the time. Whittle were able to build his engine in 1937 when he was supplied with 
Stayblade steel and a new nickel-chrome alloy. 9 
At about the same time in Germany, Pabst von Ohain, a student, brought a similar 
idea to airplane builder Ernst Heinkel. A few years later, the first test of a jet-driven 
airplane took place on July 3, 1939, when the Heinkel He- 176 jet plane flew in front 
of Hitler and Goring, and the entire Luftwaffe top Command.  
The war was instrumental in bringing jet engine to air transport. The first airliner 
application of the jet engine was done by the British on a turboprop-powered 
aircraft, the Vickers Viscount, which flew for the first time in 1948. In a turboprop, 
the propulsion is provided by a propeller that is not driven by a combustion engine, 
but by a jet engine that turns a turbine connected to a propeller shaft. British 
European Airways was the first operator of the Vickers Viscount that began service 
in July 1950. The Vickers Viscount type 700 could transport up to forty-eight 
passengers, at a cruising speed of 308 mph (496 km/h). A total of 445 Vickers 
Viscounts would be built.  
The turbojet engine is the basic engine of the jet age. It works by compressing air, 
forcing it into a combustor, which sprays fuel on it and ignites it. The air burns 
continuously like a blow torch, through the turbine, which extracts energy to work 
the compressor, and out the back to thrust the aircraft forward. 
 
                                                     
9 Allen Roy, (1961), Pioneering the big eight, Aeronautics 
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Figure 10: De Havilland Comet 1 
 
The supremacy of British jet engine technology brought the first jet airliner shortly 
after. While American plane makers such as Lockheed, Douglas and Boeing were 
still producing piston engine airplanes, the British had the lead in jet propulsion 
technology. In 1949, the De Havilland flew the first jet airliner: the Comet 1. The 
Comet 1 could carry 36 to 44 passengers in great comfort, fly above the turbulent 
area at 35,000 feet, 50% faster than the most rapid piston engine powered aircraft 
such as the DC-6 (490 mph for the Comet compared to 315 mph for the DC-6B).  
New York was only twelve hours flying time away from London instead of the 
eighteen hours it took piston-engine planes. The world's first commercial jetliner, 
the Comet, began service on May 2, 1952 between London and Johannesburg. The 
clean design, the great comfort and speed made the Comet an instant success to the 
flying public. The Comet 1 had three developments each bringing higher thrust 
engine, higher take-off weight and longer fuselage to accommodate more payload. 
The Comet 4 was able to fly up to  passengers.  (owever, the public and airlines  
enthusiasm for the Comet stopped after a series of fatal crashes. In 1954 two Comets 
crashed in the Mediterranean and service on the plane was suspended. Extensive 
investigation revealed that metal fatigue was the cause of the crashes.  The repeated 
re-pressurization would weaken the Comet's square-shaped windows, causing high 
pressure cabin air to burst through the slightest fracture, ripping a large slice in the 
aircraft's wall. Of the thirteen aircraft lost in fatal accidents, five were considered to 
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have been caused by aircraft design or fatigue problems. In 1954, all Comets were 
grounded until the line of jets could be redesigned. The redesign of the Comet was 
completed in 1958, but De Havilland would never recover from the public 
perception created by the previous crashes. A total of 114 aircraft were completed 
and flown: 12 Comet 1s, ten Comet 1As, 15 Comet 2s, one Comet 3, 74 Comet 4, and 
two maritime patrol versions. 10 
After the Comet accidents, the Soviets were the fastest to develop a jet airliner. 
Stalin ordered its aircraft industry to produce a jet airliner to match the Comet for 
prestige reasons and to reduce travel times across the immense 11-time-zone 
country. Quickly, Tupolev produced a simple airliner, called the TU-104, based on its 
Tu-16 Badger twin jet bomber. The Tu-104 flew for the first time in 1955, a year 
after the 707 prototype, but beat the 707 entry into service by 2 years, beginning in 
1956.  
However, the unfortunate design problem of the Comet allowed the American 
manufactures to regain some of the lost ground in jet engine technology in the early 
1950s to become the undisputed leader of the jet airliner age. As many of the Boeing 
commercial programs, the development of its first jet airliner was closely linked to 
its military program.  
Boeing developed its jet engine aircraft experience with 2 military contracts: (1) the 
B-47, and (2) the B-52. The origin of the B-47 Stratojet can be traced back to the 
Second World War. In June of 1943, an informal USAAF request led several aircraft 
manufacturers to begin studies of multi-jet aircraft for fast photographic 
reconnaissance or medium bombing missions. On November 17, 1944, the USAAF 
issued formal requirements for a jet-powered medium bomber with a range of 
3,500 miles, a service ceiling of 45,000 feet, and a maximum speed of 550 mph.  
                                                     
10 DMS market intelligence report(1965), The Comet, February  
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Even before the end of World War II, the US Army Air Forces (USAAF) was also 
looking forward to a next-generation strategic bomber to follow the huge Convair B-
36, then in development. In late 1945, the USAAF began evaluating their 
requirements for such a new bomber, and in 1946 issued a formal specification for 
it, specifying greater speed than the B-36 and an operational radius of 8,050 
kilometers (5,000 miles) Boeing responded with a six Wright "T35" Typhoon 
turboprop engines aircraft.  USAAF liked the idea, and on 5 June 1946 awarded 
Boeing a study contract for the machine, which was presently given the military 
designation "XB-52". However, after several version of full size mock-up the USAAF 
were on the verge of cancelling the project. In June 1948, Stalin imposed a blockade 
on Berlin, bringing the Cold War on in earnest. The Air Force immediately brought 
the B-52 project back to the front burner, awarding a contract for a mock-up and 
two flying prototypes, with the first prototype to be ready by early 1951. 
Government funding began to ramp up. USAF was no longer interested in turboprop 
propulsion, as it couldn't provide adequate performance. The Air Force wanted now 
a jet-powered aircraft. 11 
The insight, the skills and the facilities derived from the development of the B-47 
and B-52 were most directly applied by Boeing to develop its first commercial jet, 
the 707. 
Boeing plan was to develop an aircraft with dual military/commercial use, satisfying 
the Air Force requirement for a jet-powered air-refueling tanker and the airline with 
a large jet airliner. The Air Force development funding will help defray costs, and to 
economize by building both types on the same assembly line. The prototype first 
(Boeing Model 367-80) flew on 15 July 1954, and the initial aircraft off the 
production line were military KC-135A flight refueling tanker/transports. The 
Model 367-80 or Model 80 (that became the 707 in its airliner version used the 
same basic design specifications (aerodynamic and structural features) as the B-47 
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and B-52 bomber. The Air Force ordered a first batch of 29 KC-135 Stratotankers to 
replace its propeller-driven tankers. 
Figure 11: Boeing 707 
 
 
Meanwhile, Douglas with its solid reputation as commercial aircraft builder with the 
successes of the piston engined DC series, started to offer its first jet airliner, the DC-
8.12 The DC-8 was faster, larger in length and a wider fuselage of 147 inches capable 
of accommodating comfortably six seats per row. PAA and American Airlines initial 
response to the 707 was that they wanted six-across passenger seating, longer 
range, and more powerful engines. Because of competitive pressure, Boeing decided 
to widen the 707 for six-across seating to 148 inches, 1 inches wider that the DC-8. 
Similarly, to compete against the more capable DC-8, Boeing offered several fuselage 
lengths, larger wings for more range, and more powerful engines. Pushed by 
competitive pressure, Boeing had to develop a family of 707 models, that 
unknowingly will lead them to the 707 great successes. The first production 
airplane of the Boeing 707 commercial jet series made its maiden flight December 
20, 1957, with Pan American World Airways putting the airplane into transoceanic 
flight, from New York City to Paris, on October 26, 1958, and American Airlines 
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following with transcontinental service January 25, 1959. A total of 1010 Boeing 
707 will be produced, installing Boeing as the prime airliner manufacture in the jet 
age. 
























































































Source: Boeing, Douglas, Laurent Rouaud
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Table 4: Specification of Boeing 707 
Wingspan  145 feet 9 inches (44.42 m) 
Length  152 feet 11 inches (46.6 m) 
Wing Area  3,010 square feet (280 m2) 
Gross Weight  336,000 pounds (152,400 kg) 
Cruising 
Speed  
607 mph (977 km/h) 
Range  6,160 miles (9,913 km) 
Service 
Ceiling  
36,000 feet (10,973 m) 
Power Four Pratt & Whitney JT3D turbofans of 
18,000 pounds thrust each 
Passenger 
Cabin  
141 passengers mixed class or a maximum 




Air travel in its modern form took off following the availability of jet aircraft. As for 
the Benoist aircraft in 1919, the Junkers, the Fokker F.13, the Ford Trimotor and the 
DC3, the 707, and the DC-8, the supply of aircraft that brought step changes in 
aircraft technology, efficiency and comfort resulted in demand for air travel. After 
the jet age though, it is the demand for air travel and competition between 
manufacturers that brought the availability of new aircraft, a more logical market 
relationship. The jet age contributed to bring air travel to a wide range of socio-
economic population and most importantly the ease of international long-haul 
travel. Worldwide air traffic almost quadruple in the 10 years following the jet age, typical of today s emerging market.   
I-1-4-The fourth major development:  the US deregulation of 1978 
In the 5 years prior to the US deregulation, air traffic growth decrease slightly to 9% 
per year. In 1978, only about 30 airlines were operating in the US. In the 40 years 
prior to deregulation, the federal government set fares and determined which 
carriers served which markets. The US airlines deregulation was a crucial 
development not only for the air transport industry but was also the precursor of 
deregulation of the entire US industry such as the US railroads,13 banking, and 
telecommunications. It was also important because it set the motion and model for 
deregulation in other countries.  
Prior to deregulation 
Regulation of airline passenger service started in the US with the creation of the 
Civil Aeronautics (CAA) in 1938 and reorganized into the Civil Aeronautics Board 
(CAB) in 1940 14. At that time, an airline had to demonstrate that its entry was required by Public Convenience and Necessity  before offering scheduled service. 
There were 16 airlines in the US before the 1938 regulation. Those 16 airlines 
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Spring Vol. 11, Number 1  
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evolved through merger and acquisition into only 10 airlines by 1976. The high 
growth of air travel resulted in many application from potential airlines to enter the 
market, however only one airline were allowed to start operation during the 1938-
1978 regulation period (Northeast Airlines). The CAB was also not so permissive 
regarding new services for existing airlines. The certificate to open new route for 
existing carrier was not granted if the same route was already served by another 
airline if the incumbent carrier were to object on the ground that it would cause financial hardship .15 Most routes were in monopoly situation. Furthermore, 
regulation was also controlling fares through two mechanisms: (1) approving, 
modifying or rejecting fares changes requested by airlines and (2) by setting directly 
the fare or a range of fare allowed. Although route and fare were regulated, the 
number of frequencies and the quality of service or amenities were not regulated. As 
a result, airlines could only engage in non-pricing competition through frequency 
and quality of service.  Only limited opportunities existed for new carriers except 
through (1) very local service, (2) non-scheduled carrier or jet services and (3) 
intra-state carrier that was free from the CAB regulation. The local service airline 
became commuter airlines that later took advantage of the new small jet aircraft 
such as the ERJs or CRJs of Embraer and Bombardier in the 1990s. The non-
scheduled airlines became the competitors of the trunk airlines on international 
routes.16 The intra-state carrier such as Southwest, were able to experiment with 
different level of fare and service and to become the new entrant of the post 
deregulation era as they evolved into interstate carriers. Southwest Airlines, which 
started in Texas, was an intrastate airline that had the freedom of setting its own 
fares. Southwest Airlines fares level depended on peak and off-peak timing of 
demand, charging more in peak and less in off-peak demand. Southwest Airlines, in 
particular, has become the most profitable airlines of all the US airlines ever. 
Intrastate airlines started to draw passengers that would have otherwise travelled 
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by car. Because it used mostly secondary airports, were flying their equipment back 
and forth on the same route with high utilization, fast turnaround service, simplified 
scheduling and maintenance, the intrastate airline developed themselves as the low 
cost operators of the regulated era. They used the same equipment of the larger 
interstates regulated airlines, with a denser seating configuration, higher load factor 
and much higher aircraft productivity. There also had low labor and operating costs 
which contributed to higher profitability than any of the larger inter-state carriers. 
Not only did Southwest become a model for the post deregulation era in the US, but 
it also inspired new low coasts airline that came in the US starting in the mid 1990s 
and in Europe in the late 1990s (Easy jet, Ryanair for example) up to today and the 
foreseeable future.  
US Deregulation of 1978: the new rules  
Classic Schumpeterian 17 suggests that capitalistic innovations from 
entrepreneurship contribute to expand general economic welfare and that 
regulations prevented the introduction of new or different market concepts from 
entrepreneurs.Very few market meaningful initiatives were taken during the period 
of regulations, and certainly none in providing a better product at a better price. 
Deregulation, however, quickly unleashed a lot of airline entrepreneurs in the 
Schumpeterian sense as it can be judged but the number of airline in operation in 
the US after 1978.  
From 1979 to 1981, the entering airlines were not required to demonstrate that its entry was required by public convenience and necessity  as it was prior to . 
Instead, the opposing party was required to demonstrate that the entry were not consistent with public convenience and interest . After 1982, entry has been granted to all new carriers that were fit, willing and able.   On January st 1983, all 
regulations on fare were eliminated. Quickly, entrepreneurs took advantage of the 
deregulation. In the 5 years following the deregulation, as many as 20 airlines were 
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created in the US. From a few dozen of airlines in 1978, the US counted 45 airlines in 
1983 and as many as 160 in 1990. In the 1990s, a wave of consolidation reduced the 
number of airlines, some big brand name such as TWA and Pan Am disappeared. 
Figure 13: Airline consolidation in the US after 1990 
Source : OAG, Laurent Rouaud
Number of airlines
 
Morrison and Winston (1989) showed that the short terms welfare effect on the 
merger between competitors was negative, and that the production efficiently that 
the merger may have permitted did not seems to have been reflected in price. The 
merger did provide market power.18  Howard (1988)19 indicated that the top 10 
airlines in the US had a market share of 93% prior to deregulation. Deregulation 
had some short terms effect in reducing the concentration to 85% in 1984, but the 
mergers brought it back to 95%; higher level than prior to deregulation. 
 
                                                     
18 Morrisson Steven and Winston Clifford,(1989), Enhancing the performance of the deregulated air 
transport system, Brooking papers on Economics Activity: Microeconomics, page 61-112 
19 Howard, L. (1988). 'The Changing US Airline Picture in Transport Research', Washington, The 
Future of Aviation, circular no. 329 
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The effects of airline deregulation in the US  
The deregulation effect on the US air transport system has been extensively 
researched. Generally, it is recognized that the US liberalization has led to (1) 
traveler welfare through lower fare and more flight frequencies, (2) greater airline 
profitability, (3) greater efficiency of labor and equipment and (4) more convenient 
service20 and (5) increase of entrepreneurship that introduced low-frills , low-fares 
service in the short to medium haul market of the US.   
Traveler welfare  
Among the most valuable post deregulation studies that measure the benefits of 
deregulation, the work from Morrisson and Winston (1986) is probably the most 
thorough of all. Their study, published in a book called The Economic Effects of the 
Airline Deregulation, shows that travelers on every market experience a net welfare 
gain from deregulation on average through lower fares and higher service through 
additional flight frequency. However, the benefit is subject to a large variability by 
route. The welfare gain seems to be the highest in large markets from hub to hub 
and the lowest in small secondary city to secondary city type of routes. The loss in 
small markets, though, was generally compensated for by a gain from an increase in 
flight departure available to the travelers and therefore more convenience. This 
tends to contradict some pre-deregulation research and general consensus that 
deregulation would bring lower fares but will translate into lower quality of service. 
Business travelers seem to have gained in all markets with a decrease of fares in 
most markets and the benefit of better departure choice from the development of 
hubs and spoke network that is directly attributable to the effect of deregulation. 
Morrisson and Winston (1989) demonstrated that the traveler net gain in terms of 
travelers welfare was on average $10.6 per trip and distributed by a fare decrease 
that counted for 30%, a better travel time that contributed to 8% and the value of 
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having better frequency contributing to 62%. On the total network, it was estimated 
that the gain in welfare was 5.7 billion of USD, or 35% of the actual 1977 US airline 
revenues. 
Greater airline profitability 
Morrisson and Winston (1989) measure the efficiency that deregulation brought to 
airline by looking at the financial performance of carriers before and after 
deregulation. They estimated the gain in airline operating profit to be $2.5 billion for 
1977 alone, on total revenue of $16.3 billion. The higher profit margin were the 
result of airlines being able to (i) increase load factors through the use of yield 
management in establishing fares and (ii) to increase the productivity of their 
aircraft from the efficiency of the hub and spoke system.  
Greater efficiency of airlines  equipment 
The adoption of the hub and spoke system by the major US carriers have resulted in 
significant better utilization of their most expensive assets which are (i) the aircraft 
fleet and (ii) their flight crews.21 
Hub and spoke network was developed extensively after deregulation since airlines 
were free to start any routes and because it was a way to maximize profit by 
lowering cost through economy of scope.22  
To illustrate the economy created by a hub-and-spoke route network vs. a pure 
point-to-point network, let s consider an airline network with  hub airports and  
secondary airports. To link all airports together, a hub-and-spoke network will only 
require 11 flights, where the pure-to-point network will require as many as 66 
flights.  
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22 Levine M, (1987), Airline competition in deregulated markets; Theory, firm, strategy and public 
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Figure 14: Hub and spoke system 
 
The benefit of hub-spoke network from an economy of scope standpoint comes from 
the use of larger more efficient aircraft in term of operating cost.23 To satisfy the 
demand of travelers and regulatory authorities for minimal service in the pre-
deregulation, airlines had to dispatch small aircraft with often little load factors 
between secondary cities. One of the effects was that the non-stop route did not 
grow as fast as traffic grew. Gordon (1992)24 showed that although non-stop service 
has increased on the top 500 routes, the number of non-stop routes have not kept 
up with traffic growth.  
The hub and spoke system had an effect on aircraft size. Small aircraft are much less 
efficient in carrying the same output than a larger aircraft. A typical 50 eater jet such 
as the Bombardier CRJ for example will typically cost 8 cents per available seat 
miles (ASM) to operate, vs. 5.8 cents for a typical 100 seater such as the MD80 and 
less than 5 cents per ASM for a 150 seater such as the 737-700 or A320. By linking 
secondary cities to a hub with larger aircraft while carrying the same demand 
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overall, airline were able to derive substantial cost reduction.25 Brown [1991]26 
showed the clear relationship between fleet composition and route structure in both 
the pre- and post-deregulation periods. Douglas and Miller's also showed that 
deregulation resulted in larger aircraft at the hubs. 27 
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The hub and spoke system was made possible by deregulation. It brought efficiency 
in term of quality of service and airline profitability.28 It also re-enforced the 
incumbent carriers position at their natural hubs by increasing the economy of scale 
and prevent potential entrant to start operation. Francis McGowan and Paul 
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Seabright  (1989) commented that the mergers in the US  following deregulation 
created economy of scale from economies of aircraft size  and route density.29 
In summary, both travelers and airlines have gain substantial welfare benefits with 
deregulation. If those gains are certain, it has not come as a result of increase 
competition as the idea of deregulation. The following chapter examine why the idea 
of contestability and the argument that potential competition affect incumbent 
behavior , although attractive at the time, has (1) failed to occurred and (2) that free 
entry and free exit in the airline industry is a myth.  
I-1-5 Is the airline market a contestable market? 
The notion of contestable30 market is one of the pillars of the justification for 
deregulation.31 It suggests that the potential threat of market entry of new entrants 
is sufficient to keep the incumbents behave. To be perfectly contestable, the market 
must satisfy several conditions: (1) absence of entry barriers32, (2) no sunk cost at 
the exit, (3) the potential entrant should be able to enter and exit before the 
incumbent could react in decreasing fares and (4) the number of actual competitors 
on a particular route does not affect prices.  
Entry barrier  
The hub-spoke network described below resulting from deregulation provided a 
efficiency gain for the installed airlines and will generally lead to a dominant carrier 
at a particular hub.33  
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Figure 16: Market power at the hub 

















Brueckner and Spiller (1992) 34 showed that there is a strong link between marginal 
cost and fares to traffic densities on the spoke of an airline network. They confirm 
the existence of economies of density identified first by Cave 35(1984)  They 
succeeded in showing that the gains from density are partially passed on to the 
passengers in lower fares, and therefore highlighted the potential benefit of 
deregulation. As the airlines organize their route structures to increase traffic 
density, they also lower their costs and possibly their fares. They also show that 
carriers with large networks have a significant cost advantage over their smaller 
competitor unable to achieve significant density.  
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Eight out of the ten major US cities are largely dominated by 1 or 2 carriers. United 
for example, controls 48% of the total traffic from and to Chicago, 54% from San 
Franscisco and  63% from Denver. The only 2 major hub cities where the 
concentration is much lower than the average are New York JFK and Los Angeles. 
The concentration of airline at their hubs confers a significant market power. The 
hub dominant airline is able to provide more frequencies to other hubs and spokes 
of its network and therefore is able to provide a more convenient schedule for its 
customers and charge higher price.  
It is only in the late 1990 that the barrier of entry proved to be more elusive with 
the entree of jetBlue, Airtran, Frontier, Spirit, and other successful low cost airlines. 
As seen earlier, their business model avoided the head to head competition at the 
hub by flying from and to secondary airports. These airlines are operating in a low 
cost culture across their operation, some 50% lower than their legacy competitors.  
Just after deregulation, the extensive route network of airlines allow their 
customers to take advantage of the dominant airline frequent flyer program and use 
its rewards throughout the larger dominant airline network of routes. This alone is a 
powerful tool to keep its customers captive. It is even more so for the business 
traveler from which the dominant airline will be able to retain and capture the high 
yield revenues that an entrant would not be able to capture.  
The US Department of Commerce Survey of International air travelers 36 shows that 
the first criteria for selecting an airline is pricing for both tourists and business 
passengers , convenient schedules and frequent flyer programs are also very 
important in the selection of airline for a particular trip.  
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Figure 17: Airline criteria of choice 
 
An airline frequent flyer program is an efficient tool to make the passenger living 
around the airline home hub captive. Frequent mileage passenger will prefer to take 
their local hub airlines as their offer more connection at their home city hub.37 The 
local airline will control a majority of slots at its hubs would sometimes lease 
contract that would allow the dominant airline to prevent additional gate 
construction. Banerjee and Summers  (1987) showed that frequent flyer programs 
lower the cross eleasticity of demand between products reducing the incentive for 
competitive price cutting.38 
No sunk cost at exit 
Peteraf 39 argued that there are little evidence of sunk cost influencing monopoly 
pricing behavior in the airlines. She shows that price costs margins drop an 
additional 6% to 13% in the presence of price cutting potential entrant. She 
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suggests that sunk costs in monopoly airlines are not low enough to constrain 
prices. Furthermore, Morrisson and Winston (1987) 40showed that a potential 
competitor in a market has from one tenth to one third competitive impact on 
incumbents. It appears that if the sunk costs are small then an incumbent can 
respond in price and quantity as quickly as a competitor can enter. The incumbent 
will have therefore no incentive to respond ahead of time of the start-up airline 
entry 41 and enjoy full incumbency rents without fear of hit-and-run entry. 42 
Large incumbent airlines established prior to deregulation had established a 
complex computer reservation system that allowed them to optimize their fare and 
share fare information with the travel agents in real time.  In 1984, Delta Air Lines 
employed 150 people in their reservation system that would adjust price daily to 
maximize the airline profitability to adapt in real time  its fare to its other 
competitor that share their fare in the system. Before deregulation each carrier had 
its own reservation system. The development of the reservation system led to 3 
giant of the CRS: Sabre, Apollo and System One that controlled 80% of ticket sales. 
The CRS accelerated the concentration of the airline post deregulation.  The CRS has 
also led to another management of the airline bottom line. CRS allowed yield 
management that seeks to maximize revenues on each flight rather than the total 
traffic of an airline. The airlines that were member of a CRS had the possibility to do 
yield management The yield management optimizes the fare class distribution to 
maximize the high contribution passengers.  In the case of potential competition, the 
technique of yield management allows the carriers that master them to attract more 
high contribution passenger through its CRS. The new entrant, with no access to the 
CRS will therefore be doomed to access the low contribution passengers. The carrier 
strongly present at a particular hub, controlling the CRS, can protect himself against 
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entrant even if the potential competitor is more efficient. Although United Airlines  
costs were 33% higher than its new entrant and competitor People Express with 
17% higher revenues per mile, it succeeded in protecting itself against more 
productive competitor.  It will be therefore not possible for a potential entrant to 
enter and exit before the incumbent could react by decreasing its fare. Because of 
the CRS, the incumbent can answer almost immediately. The CRS system of the 
1980s and 1990s made collusion among airline possible. The system could show on 
the CRS that it was planning to increase its price sometime in the future. If the other 
airlines implemented the same price then the airline will implement the price 
change. If none of the airlines followed, then the first airline that proposed the price 
increase will not implement it.  Evans and Kessides (1991) showed that CRS, with its 
multimarket contact had a significant effect on price. They find that it raised a round 
trip ticket price on domestic route by more than 20$. 43 
Because of the CRS barriers, the post deregulation has not been kind to the start up 
carriers in the US. Many went out of business within a few years they started 
operations. Western Pacific, Jet train, Air South, Nation Air Sunjet and Air 21 are a 
few example.  
In Europe, McGowan and Seabright (1989)44 showed that the airlines prior to the 
European deregulation faced the same issue regarding CRS. Some 80% of all 
European airline booking were made at that time through travel agent, and 80% of all travel agents  booking were made through CRSs. Levine 45 showed that the 
asymmetric information in combination with market power at the hub was very 
costly to startup airline prior to deregulation.  
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Start up carriers faced many other costs disadvantages. The major airlines have 
lower costs for fuel, insurance, capital and airport facilities  in addition to the 
economy of scale associated with the fixed overhead needed to run an airline. The 
only advantage the start ups had at that time was that the cost of labor was 
significantly lower than established carrier whose salaries and benefits have 
increased steadily over the years as more employees achieved higher level of 
seniority. In addition established carriers were burdened by unproductive union 
contracts that have carried from the pre-deregulation era.  
The most basic problem preventing start up carriers from operating efficiently was 
their lack of significant capital. Even though the airline business is capital extensive, 
new carriers typically were beginning operations with only about $10 – 25 million 
in initial capital. As a result, the start ups were forced to take very short term 
approach in making business decisions. Their primary goal were to preserve their 
limited cash rather than making the long term investments necessary to create an 
efficient, low cost operation for the long term. The short term focus led to higher 
costs, poor customer service, low branding and marketing position. The new entrant 
will have typically started operation with older equipments acquired through the 
use of operating leases. This was usually the only possible option because of their 
low capital. Over the long run, this type of leasing is a more expensive option, 
because leasing companies charged higher lease rental to cover the greater credit 
risk of start ups. In addition, leasing companies generally required start up carriers 
to make security deposit and pay engine and airframe maintenance reserves well in 
excess of the actual amounts that will be required for maintenance. The additional 
maintenance reserve would be an additional monthly cash burden while the security deposits further tie up the airline s already limited capital. The initial 
capital constraint that led to lease older equipment will also burden the airline in 
higher fuel costs, noise charges, and especially poor reliability that will result in 
flight delays and low customer satisfaction. Furthermore, the limited use and 
investment in technology resulted in considerable computer downtime in the start 
up reservation center and airport check-in counters.  
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As a result, immediately after the deregulation and up until the late 1990, the idea of 
the airline industry as a contestable market proved to be false.  
In the late 1990s and the early 2000s, however, the airline industry re-invented 
itself through the successful entry of many start up low cost carriers. Finally, the 
great idea of contestability at the base of the deregulation finally verified itself. It 
succeeded then, essentially because of the new available technology that overcame 
the CRS barrier and because of a radically different business model. At the core of 
the new business model was the high initial capital that the new entrant will be able 
to raise. It would further confirm that the sunk costs are high but do not constitute a 
barrier to entry.  
I-1-6 The fifth major development: the Low Cost Carriers emergence 
All low cost airlines (LCC) emergence are the result of markets deregulation. 
However, as the previous chapter indicated, deregulation alone was not a sufficient 
condition to make them successful.  It is only 10 years after deregulation that the 
internet, the secondary airport strategy, the access to capital, and the new aircraft 
fleet made the entry of LCC successful. Technology made it possible. The first low 
cost airline were Southwest that started as a small regional and evolved after the US 
deregulation to become an airline offering extensive network all over the US. In fact, 
Southwest Airlines is today the largest airline in term of aircraft demand In Europe, 
the first LCC was Ryanair. Today, with Europe open sky, Ryanair network extends 
over Western and Eastern Europe In the 1990, LCC expanded rapidly throughout 
Europe as the European market were deregulating. The final stage of global LCC 
development is currently happening in Asia/Pacific. The domestic Australian 
market is already 60% LCC. Airlines such as Air Asia in Malaysia are rapidly 
expanding beyond its country border, but at the pace of bilateral country 
deregulation. Other low cost airlines in Asia include the Singapore highly 
competitive segment. The LCC airline model is still in its developing phase in Asia 
with about 12% of the total market. However, the pace of its development will stay 
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steady as more market deregulate especially in the very dynamic 12 countries of the 
ASEAN46 association.  
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There is not a unique LLC business model across the globe or even across a market. 
In the US, there are mostly 3 models of LCCs. The oldest one is the Southwest model 
that flies almost exclusively to secondary airports of main cities. Southwest network 
is made of mini-hubs. Their entire enterprise culture is based on low cost principle 
throughout their operation and focuses on the leisure market. The second US model 
of LCC focuses on short haul traffic from one or a few strong hub. Airtran based in 
Atlanta is an example of this type of model. These LCCs will typically have a 2 class 
cabin with a business class of up to 12 seats. It selects its route opening based on 
pricing and type of demand on a particular city-pair. It will particularly choose city-
pairs that have a high price business or leisure traffic. The third LCC model in the US 
                                                     
46 ASEAN countries include Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore , Thailand, Brunei, Burma 
(Myanmar), Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam 
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will typically be the jetBlue model. Such a model, focuses on a few secondary hubs, 
but fly longer distances across the US. Its branding is generally very strong, well 
financed and with 2-class of service.  





















• Focused on 1 or a few hubs















































• 1 strong hub
• Mix class (up to 12 bus. class seats)
• Primary and secondary airports
• Enter large business 
center ``suffering from 
high business fare
• Strong low cost culture (a 
lot of 1person dpt)


























































• Multi mini hubs
• Point to point
• Short & long haul
• Focus on high density
route to secondary airport
• Strong low cost culture
• Focus on leisure traffic 
Source: Laurent Rouaud
 
These three models will be able to propose low fare to their markets because of 
their very low cost culture. They will fly one single type of aircraft to minimize their 
training and reduce their maintenance costs. They will generally fly shorter 
segments than their legacy airline competitors. They will operate from secondary 
airport to drive airport costs to a minimum. They will have a very engaged and 
productive staff. Finally, they will grow quickly in their first 5 to 8 years of operation 

























Other Southwest % Southwest
Source : OAG September
Arrival of a LCC on a route stimulates traffic




As it can be expected from a contestable market such as the airline business, the low 
entry cost, and the better offering stimulates traffic and increases the public choice 
for service. The example above shows Southwest airline penetration of the San 
Diego to San Jose route in 1993. At that time there was one incumbent airline on this 
route that was not compelled to offer additional service as it enjoyed a monopolistic 
market price. The traffic was relatively stable, even decreasing as alternative routing 
using a multistep route became available and cheaper. The incumbent airlines were 
offering 60,000 seats per month in 1992. One year after entering the route, 
Southwest stimulated the traffic by a factor of 2, grew its market share to 76% while 
offering more service and better price. It has been established that in Europe, the 

























Other Easyjet % Easyjet
Source : OAG September




The Easyjet example on the Belfast to Liverpool route is even more dramatic. The 
incumbent airline traffic had been fairly constant offering 10,000 seats per month at 
premium price. In 1998, Easyjet decided to enter the under supply, over priced 
Belfast market with a very competitive pricing of 50$ per trip. Shortly after, Ryanair 
steadily increased its market share to 100% by 2001 and stimulated the traffic, 




Figure 22: New entrant created new demand by lowering fares 




















Source: NFO infratest, 2002, Monitor Group Analysis, Laurent Rouaud  
 
Market stimulation has been the source of numerous studies and models in the 
airline world.  NFO infratest, in its Monitor Group Analysis has shown that as much 
as 59% of the LCC traffic is created by new demand or travelers that would not have 
flown if there were no offer from LCC. In fact as much as 71% of it would have not 
travelled at all, and the other 29% would have drove or taken the train.  
In emerging countries, the stimulation of traffic has come from a transport mode 
shift to air. In Mexico, the vast bus long distance network has been the source of 
traveler capture of air travel. In India, the extensive railway network throughout the 
country has been the source of stimulation of traffic of air travel by transferring 
from rail to air. Often, the air alternative is the same of slightly higher priced that the 
other mode while cutting time door to door by an average of 5 hours.  
For example, it would have taken a typical Chinese factory worker from the urban 
coastal town of Wenzhou to his home town Nanchang, about 3 days by bus to come 
home in an uncomfortable and overcrowded bus . The bus ticket price was 120$. 
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Today, the same worker could take a direct flight with Sichuan Airline  and be in his 
hometown in about 2 hours and 30mn  in a comfortable aircraft for 95$ , or 30% 
less than the bus ride.  

















































































In India, the entry of the LCC changed air travel of the masses.  Before 2004, the 
1700 kms trip between the mega cities of Delhi and Mumbai would have had to be 
either with a very uncomfortable train ride for 23 hours or with  an expensive 
airline. At that time, the first class ticket on the train would have cost 3750 Rupees, a 
the second class train 1775 rupees, while the legacy airline fare was 8475 rupees. In 
2004, Air Deccan and other LCCs entered the market and prices on the Dehli-
Mumbai air route dropped from 8475 to 2900 rupees. The travel time was reduced 
from 23hrs to less than 90mns. Here, deregulation brought competition, better 
access, cheaper fare, more services, faster journey, convenience and comfort.  It 
changes radically the way people travel in the country. Long time considered a 
mode of transportation for the elite or business travelers , air travel is now 
affordable for the medium income Chinese or Indian.  This phenomenon is 
spreading fast throughout Asia.  
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Intra Asian LCC network, 09/2001 vs. 09/2009
Sep. 2001 Sep. 2009
 
Over the last 10 year the number of route served by Asian LCC has grown from 48 to 
576 for the Intra Asia market (excluding the domestic market). As the ASEAN 
countries deregulate their market towards an open sky, the market share of LCC will 
continue to increase to reach 50% share within the current decade. Sometime in the 
process, China will possibly fully or partially deregulate its domestic market, 
creating another stimulus to air travel in the region. Today, the world LCC airlines 
represent 21% of the total air travel market.  
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Figure 25: Low cost airlines entry in the market 
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I-2 The market for commercial aircraft  
I-2-1 The drivers of aircraft demand 
 
The demand for commercial aircraft is essentially driven by air travel demand, the 
airlines  aircraft retirement plan and the airlines  ability to acquire new aircraft.  
Air travel demand growth is largely dependent on economic growth.  For developing 
market such as Asia, the typical elasticity for GDP to air traffic demand is between 2 
and 2.5, meaning that 1% increase in GDP will translate into 2 to 2.5% increases in 
air traffic. In mature markets such as the US , Europe, Japan or Korea, the elasticity is 
only about 1. These markets will be more sensitive to air fare.  A 1% increase in air 
fares will typically induce a 1% decrease in air traffic demand.  Oil price will have 
some effect on demand, but the elasticity is very low until it reaches a price per 
barrel in excess of 150$.  
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New aircraft delivery demand
Source: Laurent Rouaud  
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The correlation between GDP and traffic growth is actually very high. On a 
worldwide basis, as much as 90% of the traffic variation can be explained by the 
variation of GDP. The remaining 10% is mostly explained by air fares.   
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Source: ICAO, Laurent Rouaud
 
Air travel demand will also depend on external factors to the airlines such as the 
competition with the high speed train network, the regulatory environment such as 
the degree of liberalization, the environmental taxes levied by airports or countries, 
or the number of new routes remaining to be opened on a profitable basis. Airport 
development, especially in emerging countries is an important factor for the 
development of air transport. India in particular, with its lacking road infrastructure 
and its congested hub airports has accelerated the construction of new state of the 
art airports throughout the countries.  State airports strategic planning packages 
unveiled by the Indian government in late 2008 and early 2009 have made funds 
directly available for projects that will help the country air transport infrastructure 
that have struggled to keep pace with the 20% increasing demand for 
transportation. The government has also relaxed regulation to make it easier for 
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those that are involved in airport infrastructure projects to gain access to foreign 
funds and expertise. This in turn is accelerating the airline supply for air 
transportation throughout the country.  
































































Source: OAG, Airbus, Laurent Rouaud
 High Speed Train opening: 1999
 HST travel time: 2h10
 Air distance: 390 km
Air daily seats (one way average)
HST
 
The High Speed Train (HST) has affected Europe air travel development since the 
introduction of the French TGV throughout France. Some domestic city pair have 
seen almost their entire air traffic transferred to rail. This is the case for Lyon – 
Paris. In other parts of the world,  HST is developing fast. HST has been established 
in Japan, Korea, and is starting in China and Brazil. China has a very ambitious HST 
network currently in construction that will certainly challenge the aviation 
development. It is estimated that China will have some 4,000km of HST tracks by 
the turn of the century. Generally, any route that is 2 hours away by HST will switch 
all his traffic to HST from air. Above 300 km, the market share diminishes. Over 
700km, air travel is generally preferred.  The London Brussels  HST was introduced 
in 1999 and has gained 50% of the travel between the 2-cities.  
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China s Beijing-Shanghai HST line is anticipated to open service in 2013. The two 
cities are separated by 1100km, a 5hrs journey with an HST. Although, the value of 
time might be different for a Chinese than for a European, the HST will eventually 
capture some of China s air traffic. However, the distance, time and more 
importantly the planned location of the HST in the 7th ring of Beijing, far from the 
center, will not help the development.  
Aircraft retirement is an important driver of the demand. Airline demand for 
aircraft is 35% to replace their older equipment and 65% to fuel growth on a 
worldwide average basis. Retirement is influenced by fuel price and the availability 
of more fuel efficient equipment developed by manufacturers. However, it will 
always be an airline management decision The relative operating cost of new versus 
older types is generally the trigger point in the management decision to retire a 
particular aircraft type Part of the large order in 2006 through 2008  was largely 
explained by an oil price above 100$ per barrel According to Airbus, with an oil 
price of 4$ per gallon, an airline can save about $1 million per year and per aircraft 
with a new A320 compared with an older generation aircraft such as MD80 that was 
delivered some 30 years ago. For a long range aircraft, Airbus estimate that the 
saving is about $4.5 million per year and per aircraft. Today there are about 50 
airlines which have individually an annual fuel bill in excess of $1 billion. American 
airline for example, has still a fleet of 300 older generation aircraft. The saving 




Figure 29: Aircraft retirement timing 
Assumes retirement @ 25 years
































































































Source : Ascend, Laurent Rouaud
 
Today there are more than 14,000 aircraft above 100 seats in operation with the 
world s airlines. Among the active fleet, 5000 units are anticipated to retire within 
the next 12 years. If in the past, the relatively low fuel price were not really 
influencing aircraft retirement, it seems that the current high fuel price 
environment is changing that dynamic. With relative low fuel price, aircraft 
maintenance cost was the most influencing factor in deciding the retirement of a 
particular aircraft. Aircraft were usually withdrawn from passenger service to be 
either scrapped of converted into freighters after 25 years of age. Today retirements 
largely depend on the supply of more efficient aircraft form the manufactures and 
the fuel price. With the recovery, it is expected that fuel price pass the 100$ mark in 
a couple of years. This in turn is encouraging the aircraft manufactures such as 
Airbus and Boeing to develop new re-engined derivative of their current smaller 
aircraft products.  
Manufactures are contemplating the launch of an Airbus A320Neo or a new 
generation of Boeing 737 for entry into service in 2014 or 2015. Their choice is also 
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driven by the new Canadian Bombardier entrant in the Airbus and Boeing size of 
aircraft that promised to be 15% more efficient than the current A320 or 737.  















Cash & Market Finance (Lessors)




Source : Airbus   
 
Finally, airlines will acquire aircraft depending on their financial outlook and ease of 
financing. Despite the crisis, airlines have been able to finance the deliveries of the 
aircraft on order. Airbus and Boeing had very little back stop financing activities 
even in the middle of the crisis. Financing for aircraft comes from 6 sources: 
 Manufacturing back stop financing 
 Cash and market financing from airlines 
 Cash and market financing from lessors 
 Export Credit Agencies (Eximbank, COFACE) from airlines   
 Export Credit Agencies from lessors 
 Sale and lease back from lessors 
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In the tough environment of 2008 and 2009, the ECAs in the US, Canada and Europe 
have stepped up to provide up to 60% of the aircraft delivery financing.  
I-2-2 The cyclical nature of the commercial aircraft demand 
 
Because the all factors described above (the economy, the fuel prices, the retirement 
of aircraft, the airline profits and the financing availability) are cyclical in nature, the 
aircraft demand is therefore highly cyclical.  In addition, the air travel is greatly 
influenced by external event such as war (Gulf war, Iraqi war), terrorism attack 
(9/11) , natural events (volcanic ash) that deeply affect the demand or operation of 
air transport and create shocks in the demand for commercial aircraft.  
This cyclicality in aircraft delivery can be observed in the chart below. Since the jet 
age, the industry went through 4 major cycles.  
 









































































































































































* Comet was the 1st jet airliner to fly schedule service(launched in Feb. 1947,  707 is considered the 1st successful airliner that started service in 1958   





























For all 4 down cycle in deliveries, the industry was hit by an exogenous event which 
source was either a war or some crisis that cause a recession. The timing was 
further exacerbated by the end of a retirement cycle following the introduction of a 
significant aircraft program. In the 1960, the down cycle in deliveries was the result 
of the end of the DC9 and 727 first jet introduction. There were not replacing 
anything but it was a debut of the jet age. The 1980 crisis was the result of the 
Iranian crisis and the oil shock that resulted from it. In the 1990, the Gulf War 
created another recession and coincided also with the end of the major wave of 
deliveries for the A320s and 737NG.  The last down turn in the early 2000s was the 
direct consequence of September 11 that hit the air travel industry hard.  It took 
three years to recover. In 2005, aircraft orders came back and continued to build a 
strong momentum up to 2007 when it hits the best level of order ever in the history 
of commercial aviation, with some 2872 ordered aircraft. Airbus, Boeing and 
Embraer delivered 859 large civil aircraft in 2007. Strong of its backlog, the industry 
delivered 979 units in 2009, the best year ever in term of deliveries.  
The financial crisis has not hit the aircraft demand as hard as other industries.  The 
3 main reasons are : 
 The high oil prices 
 The high pace of growth in the new aviation markets of China, India, 
Latin  America, Middle East and other fast growing countries in Asia 
(Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia) 
 The anticipation of higher oil price when the recovery finally take off 
 The anticipated slots scarcity coming with the re-ordering of Asia, and 











Source: Ascend, Laurent Rouaud
 
Airbus has not experienced the same peak and trough of the Boeing deliveries over 
the last cycles. Although, Airbus deliveries hit 2 steps along the way, its deliveries 
continued steady. This was mostly due to (1) its lower backlog in North America 
compared with Boeing exclusive customers reliance on North American customers, 
(2) the success of Airbus in penetrating earlier than its competitor the Low Cost 
airline market, (3) its more geographically balanced backlog and (4) Airbus success 
in emerging countries such as India and the rest of Asia.  
 
I-2-3 The market demand by region and market segment 
 
According to the Boeing Commercial Market Outlook, a yearly publication that gives  Boeing s view,  air travel will grow at an average yearly rate of 5.3%. There will be a 
great disparity in the growth of air travel 
57 
 












8.7% 6.3% 7.5% 5.6% 4.8% 7.1%
North 
America
7.3% 5.3% 7.2% 4.8% 2.8%
Europe
4.6% 4.6% 6.0% 4.1%
Middle East
6.5% - 6.0%





 The mature travel market of North America is anticipated to only grow at 2.8% per 
year.  Since 2000 this market has been growing at moderate but steady pace 
because of the LLC were still expanding and adapting their business model.  
However, the numbers of route the LCC can expand have been almost exhausted. As 
a result the growth is anticipated to be limited in the next 2 decades to an average of 
2.8% per year. Similarly Europe is anticipated to grow at  4.1%. per year. Despite 
the revised economic outlook of Europe in light of the debt crisis in the Greece, 
Spain and Portugal, air travel is anticipated to grow faster than GDP due to the 




                                                     
47 Boeing (2010), Current market outlook, Seattle 
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Source: Boeing CMO  
 
Boeing48 anticipates a demand for 30,900 aircraft above 30 seats. Over the next 20 
years  According to Boeing, air traffic concentration in North America and Europe 
reached 72% in 1990. Today North America represents some 58% of the traffic. In 
2029, China, Asia, India, the Middle East combined would have surpassed North 
America 
Demand is shifting from the west to the eastern region of the Middle East and Asia. 
Latin America, fueled by its emerging mega country Brazil, its natural resources and 
dynamism is growing at a steady pace. Africa is slowly emerging from its lethargic 
post colonial and dictatorship period to become an economic force. For aviation, Africa is an )ndia in the making  
 
                                                     




Figure 35: Aircraft demand in Africa 
Source: Boeing
 
Africa population will reach the 1 billion mark within the decade, and is the second 
most populous continent after Asia. Aviation is playing a key role in the 
development of the region. Africa countries telephone networks have not developed 
like in the western world with land lines first and personal mobile phone later. It 
develops its mobile personal communication capability first and will unlikely go to 
develop extensively its land lines. Aviation is to transportation what the cell phone 
is to communication in Africa.  Road infrastructures will develop but at a slow pace 
Air travel will be the development enabler of Africa. Africa has not been affected by 
the financial crisis as its neighbors. The momentum of the continent will continue 
through its exports of natural resources, the rapid pace of its foreign direct 
investment essentially coming from China, its better productivity of its agriculture 
and its small but emerging industry base, and the rebirth of its tourism.  The impact 
of the better position of Africa has been apparent in air travel as passenger traffic 
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doubled over the last 10 years.  The pace of air travel growth will continue at 5.5% 
rate. There will be a need for 710 new aircraft over the next 20 year.  
 

























Regional Single aisle Twin Aisle Large
Aircraft Deliveries (units)
Aircraft Deliveries (Market 
value in $ Billion)
Source: Boeing
6% 69% 23% 2% 2% 47% 45% 6%
 
 
I-2-4 The incumbents and new entrants by market segment 
 
As stated earlier, over the next 20 years, world airlines will require 30,900 aircraft 
from the 30 seat regional jet to the 550 seat A380. Regional jet demand is 
anticipated to be 1,920 units for a total value of $60 billion. This market is a duopoly 
with two major players with competitive products developed in the 1990s. There 
are two new entrants from Asia: COMAC from China and MRJ from Japan. Both 
products are in development and will be introducing new technology such as carbon 
wing and new more efficient engine from Pratt and Whitney and General Electric. 
The Regional jet will become a very competitive market with well established 
incumbent. The four competitors will be competing for a relative low market in 
                                                     
49  Boeing (2010), Current market outlook, Seattle 
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terms of units and $ value (respectively 6% and 2%). We will see in the following 
chapters that the main incentives for new player to enter this small and competitive 
market are other than return on investment or commercial success. The single aisle 
market is by far the largest market in terms of units. A total of 21,160 aircraft will be 
needed in that segment representing a market value of 1.6 trillion dollars over the 
next 20 years. This market of 100 to 175 seater aircraft is made of two rather 
distinct sub-segments.  The large single aisles are the working horses of airlines and 
include two very successful programs that are the A320 and the Boeing 737s. Today 
as many as 6,681 A320 family have be sold to 226 customers. There are 2,318 
A320s on backlog, some 4.5 years of production. On Boeing side, the 150 seater 
family 737NG has sold 5,434 units with 2,093 still to be delivered as of August 2010.   
Today only Airbus and Boeing have product in the upper sub segment. The 
incumbency is strong for each of them. The new entrants are the Canadian 
Bombardier, the Russian UAC, and the Chinese COMAC. The new entrant are 
planning to introduce their product in 2014/2015 when the new more efficient 
engine will become available and when the retirement of previous generation 
aircraft will peak ( Figure 29: Aircraft retirement timing ). Although the Bombardier 
C series is positioned in the lower sub-segment, adjacent to its traditional segment 
of 70 to 100 seater, Bombardier is likely to complement its family with a third 
member in the 150 market that will be eventually competing with Airbus and 
Boeing. So far Bombardier has received three orders from Lufthansa, Republic (US 
carrier) and the Italian leasing company LCI. The Russian UAC has chosen to 
compete head to head with Airbus and Boeing in the core of 150 seater segment. 
The lower sub segment concerns the 100 to 125 seater. The aircraft of these 
segment are mostly large regional feeder of airline hubs and right sizing aircraft for 
smaller and shorter city pairs. They include the Embraer 195, the CRJ1000 from 
Bombardier, and the Sukhoi Super jet 100. Airbus and Boeing compete in this 
segment from the lower part of their family. Their A319 and 737-700 are mostly 
sold to A320 customers that need a smaller module and rarely on their own. The 
A318 and 737-600 are positioned in the core of this particular market but have 
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never be launched to compete with the strong aircraft in the segment (Embraer and 
Bombardier) but rather to avoid giving a 100 seater price to a A319 or 737-700 
customer.  
Figure 37: Potential new entrant in the narrow body markets 
















































































II The strategic Importance of aerospace  
 
II-1 The reasons for the strategic importance of aerospace 
 Worldwide, aerospace companies generated €  billion of turnover and employed 
directly 1.3 million people in 2009. 
 
Almost all large industrial developments are strongly linked to a political driven and 
complex national economic and trade development agenda. This was true from the 
early US transcontinental railroad development of the late 1800s to the internet 
development in the 1980s. The political roots are often historical and not 
necessarily linked together. The LCA industry is the perfect example of this. From 
the time of Kitty Hawk in the US to the creation of Airbus in Europe, or the creation 
of an aerospace industry in the Middle East, aviation has been built by industry-
government partnership.  
The main reason of the industry-government partnership in commercial aerospace 
is its strategic importance in terms of: 
- National economy 
- Export 
- Employment 
- Technology expertise 
- Innovation 
"The Union has set itself a new strategic goal for the next decade: 
to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth 
with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion 




Moreover, at this particular time, Aerospace/Defense is also an important provider 
of means to tackle the most pressing global problems such as monitoring of climate 
change, mitigation of natural disasters, search-and-rescue operations, surveillance 
of migration flows, global mobility, space telecommunications, fight against 
terrorism, protection of critical infrastructures, and peacemaking operations In 
short, aerospace brings economic growth, competitiveness and social values. More 
generally, the US congress and the US administration have recently stressed the importance of science and technology in improving America s economy, but also 
moving to sustainable forms of energy, and protecting national and global security50. 
 
According to the Aerospace Industries Association51 (AIA) aerospace sales reached 
$214.1 billion in 2009, up more than 4 percent from 2008. As of 2008, aerospace 
manufacturing by sales accounted for 1.4% of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) 52. 
Most of the growth in 2009 took place in the military sector. Sales of military aircraft 
are higher in 2009 at $61.7 billion, a year-over-year increase of more than 8 percent 
with fighters and military rotorcraft driving that growth. Despite the recession, 
military aircraft R&D increased more than 15 percent in 2009. Military sales have 
smoothed out the effect of the recession on aerospace commercial sales.  
                                                     
50 United States Government Accountability Office (June 2009), Report to Congressional Committees 
on Technology Transfer June 2009 GAO-09--548 
51 The Aerospace Industries Association is an US association that represent more than 100 
companies 
52 Aerospace Summary,  in Aerospace Facts & Figures, 56th ed. (Washington, DC: Aerospace 




Figure 38 Importance of aerospace in the US Economy 
Civilian aircraft first US export by far
Good Category 2009 export in $ million











US Exports of Goods by End-Use Category and Commodity
Source: US Census Bureau, Laurent Rouaud
 
According to Kravis (1992)53, over the last twenty years, the overall US industry 
share has declined by one third while the share of multinational has been virtually 
constant. Higher innovation, spending in R&D, and human capital intensities in the 
US multinationals are often associated with high share of exports.  
 
In term of exports, the US civil aircraft, engine and civil aircraft parts exported $74.7 
billion worth of goods54.  Civilian aircraft has been consistently the top American 
export well ahead of other any other goods. For comparison, the 2009 second and 
third exported goods were pharmaceutical preparation and semiconductor with 
respectively $46.1 billion and $37.4 billion.  
 
                                                     
53 Kravis Irving and Lipsey Robert (1992), Sources of competitiveness of the United States and of 
multinational firms, Review of Economics and Statistics, Volume 74  
54 US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/data/index.html 
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As Gregory (ooks wrote:  the US Air Force could not rely on market forces to 
maintain the world s largest and most technologically advanced aircraft industry. National security has become equated with industrial policy .55 
 
Figure 39 Top 25 US exported Goods 2009 
Importance of aerospace in the US economy









80,000 in millions of US$ 
Source: US Census Bureau, Laurent Rouaud  
 
 
In 2009, the overall U.S. trade deficit was $514.3 billion. However, with aerospace exports representing .  percent of total U.S. exports, the industry s trade surplus makes a significant positive impact on the nation s trade balance. Aerospace is one 
of the very few goods that are positive on the trade balance. The US Census bureau 
trade statistics show that America has  comparative advantages with its trade 
partners in civilian aircraft and semiconductor trade during 2009 and 2008. In 2008 
                                                     
55 Hooks G (1991), Forging the military industrial complex, University of Illinois Press, Urbana 
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for example, America exported $74 billion worth of civilian aircraft to other 
countries around the globe while importing $35.4 million worth of foreign-made 
civilian aircraft engines and parts as well as complete aircraft. America also sold 
$50.6 billion worth of semi-conductors to the world while importing $25.7 billion 
worth of semi-conductors from other nations. It is interesting to note that from 
2003 through 2008, Japan was the top purchaser of U.S. aerospace export products, 
accounting for an annual average of 10 percent. For the first three quarters of 2009 
France moved into the lead at 10 percent56. Aerospace import is anticipated to reach 
$25 billion in 2009, a 34% decrease over 2008. The aerospace import to the US is 
concentrated on 2 countries: Canada and France that account for 50%. 
 
Figure 40 Aerospace trade balance growth vs total trade balance 
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Source: Aerospace Industries Association, US Census Bureau, Laurent Rouaud  
 
                                                     




Aerospace trade balance has also continued to rise, doubling over the last 10 years, 
while the US overall trade balances decrease significantly. The main reason is that 
while aerospace has internationalized its sourcing as the other industries, the final 
assembly of its products still remains in the US and is therefore shipped from the US.  
Aerospace is also strategic in term of employment, job creation, and wealth. In 2009, 
aerospace employed 646,800 people or 5.1% of the total US workforce. The average 
annual wage of an aerospace worker is about $50,000, well above the average US 
annual salary of approximately $39,000. Despite the financial crisis of 2007, 
aerospace is doing better than most other industries. Employment for all 
manufacturing in the US fell by 3.2 percent and employment at durable goods 
manufacturers fell by 3.8 percent, while aerospace employment increased by 1.5 
percent. 
 
Figure 41 Importance of aerospace in terms of jobs 
Employment























In Europe, the aerospace and defense industry generated €  billion of turnover, 
directly employed 676,000 highly skilled people and invested € .  billion in R&D 
in the year 2008. The European aerospace sector employs 497,000 people of whom 
70% are based in France, the UK and Germany.  
 
Figure 42 Aerospace jobs in Europe by country 










160,000 Number of employees 
Source: Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe, ASD   
 
 The European aerospace export more than its output and provide € .  billion of 
positive trade balance. It impact thousands of small and medium companies 
throughout 15 countries of the European Union. 
 
In 2002, Europe has established its Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21st century, 
four governing principles for Europe s aerospace industry57 are as follows: 
 
                                                     
57 OECD (2002), Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21st century, Creating a coherent market and 
policy framework for a vital European industry, July 2002 
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I. Aerospace is vital to meeting Europe s objectives for economic growth, 
security and quality of life. It is directly associated with, and influenced by a 
broad range of European policies such as trade, transport, environment and 
security and defense. 
II. A strong, globally competitive industrial base is essential to provide the 
necessary choices and options for Europe in its decisions as regards its 
presence and influence on the world stage. 
III.  European aerospace must maintain a strong competitive position if it is to 
play a full role as an industrial partner in the global aerospace marketplace. 
IV.   Europe must remain at the forefront of key technologies if it is to have an 
innovative and competitive aerospace industry. 
 
 
II-2 Are the reasons for the strategic Importance of aerospace the same for the US 
and Europe?  
 
Some academics have advanced the idea that the focus of Europe and the US to 
maintain a strong innovative and independent aerospace industry might have 
different drivers. They argue that the  US drivers are essentially economic. Their 
meaning of national security is to provide good jobs with high wages and maintain 
technology leadership. Europe might have been driven by the desire to emancipate 
geo-strategically from the US. Europe might have been less concerned with 
economics but more with political sovereignty and to develop a success story for 
Europe. Some academics even suggested that the Europeans are much less 
concerned with the profitability or the economic rationale of undertaking a project 
such as Airbus or Galileo but are more driven by what those projects do to represent 
Europe success story and to re-enforce the political sovereignty of Europe. For those 
academics, Airbus or Galileo are seen as geo-strategic instruments advocated by the 
Europeans to respond to the challenges provided by the Americans58. What those 
                                                     
58 Annemarie M. Spadafore, Transatlantic Misunderstandings on the Importance of Aerospace for the 
United States and Europe and Their Role In the Boeing/Airbus Subsidies Dispute, Miami University  
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academics failed to mention however is that Airbus in particular had much more 
chance to fail that it had to succeed in its early stage of development. Airbus could 
have been Europe s failure story if Airbus engineers had failed to develop 
differentiating products that met market needs, failed to sell those products to 
worldwide customers and failed to derive profits to give them the possibility to 
further develop a full family of products. Those aspects will be covered in the next 2 
chapters concerning the entrée of Boeing and Airbus in the market of the civil jet 
aircraft.   
 
II-3 Strategic importance of aerospace innovation  
 
The following chapter highlights (1) the national strategic importance of innovation 
as a driver of economic growth, and social responsibility, (2) the importance of 
authorities, institution and legislators as key players in innovation development, 
diffusion, and leverage and (3) the importance of aerospace innovation for its spin-
off and spillover effect within aerospace and across industry.  
 
In times of increasing reliance on services to fuel the economy of developed nations, 
aerospace innovation is one of the very few domains in which the US and Europe 
can count to maintain technological leadership in manufacturing, accumulate 
knowledge and most importantly spillover aerospace innovations to others 
industries. Aerospace innovation is therefore strategic for Europe and the US as a 
driver of economic growth. 59 
 
I have always been surprised how difficult it is to obtain a clear answer and a 
consensus on the definition of innovation, even in the most innovating circles of the aerospace industry. The best definition ) have found is in the OECD s Frascati 
                                                     
59 Pinelli T (1997), Knowledge diffusion in the US aerospace industry: Managing knowledge for 
competitive advantage, Ablex Publishing Corporation,London,  
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Manual60. According to the manual, innovation involves the transformation of an 
idea into a marketable product or service, a new or improved manufacturing or 
distribution process, or a new method of social service. The term refers both to the 
process and to the resulting new or improved product. In the innovation process 
sense, the focus is on the different stages of the creative process during which the 
innovation is designed and produced, from pure creativity, marketing research, 
development, design, and production to the distribution. The process involves 
interactions between different functions within the firm bringing the innovation to 
market but also with its environment such as its main suppliers, the research 
laboratories, universities, government and institution support.  
 
As a 1995 OECD document put it:  
 
Knowledge in all its forms plays today a crucial role in economic processes. Intangible 
investment is growing much more rapidly than physical investment. Firms with more 
knowledge are winners on markets. Nations endowed with more knowledge are more 
competitive. Individuals with more knowledge get better paid jobs. This strategic role 
is at the root of increasing investments by individuals, firms and nations in all forms of 
knowledge.  61 
 
The slowdown of  economic growth in the 1970s in the developed and 
industrialized countries, the rise of Japan as a major technology power, and later the 
rise of newly industrialized countries such as Korea and Taiwan have highlighted 
the importance of the knowledge base economy in a nation economy at that time. 
Forty years later, the rise of China as an industrial power and now clearly with the 
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61 OECD (1995), Technology, Productivity and Job Creation, Vol. I and II, The OECD Job 




ambition of becoming an innovation power has brought the subject of innovation , 
once again, in the front burner of developed nations to as one of the very last drivers 
of economic growth.  
 
In addition, the emergence of newly competing countries bringing innovation to 
market, the growing internationalization of the productive system and of the 
research and innovation activities, the steep rise in the cost of research, the 
increasing importance of social responsibility health, environment, governance, …  
are all factors that have changed the way innovations are processed.  Those factors 
make, more than ever, authorities  fundamental players in the process of innovation 
dissemination.   
 
Innovation and the concept of knowledge creation as a driver of economic growth 
have been researched since the late eighteen century with classical economists such 
as Karl Marx to Joseph Schumpeter62. Joseph Schumpeter had two different 
approaches of the innovative process (1) creative destruction  and  creative accumulation . Creative destruction emphasizes the role of new entrepreneurs 
entering markets by introducing new ideas and by innovating, these entrepreneurs 
challenged existing firms through a process of, which was regarded as the engine 
behind economic progress. (Schumpeter, 1912). In the creative accumulation, 
Schumpeter stresses the key role of large firms as engines for economic growth by 
accumulating non-transferable knowledge in specific technological areas and 
markets. Those economists have stressed the importance of innovation and 
knowledge accumulation for long-term growth. They have been the source of the 
new theories of growth known as endogenous, stressing that the development of 
technological progress, rather than the accumulation of capital are the driving forces 
behind lasting growth. Economists have also recognized that knowledge 
accumulation can be analyzed like the accumulation of any other capital good. In the 
New Theory of Growth (NTG), the authorities influence the foundation of economic 
                                                     
62 Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (1998), Endogenous Growth Theory, Cambridge MA, MIT Press. 
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growth in the development of the know-how and through the distribution of skills 
throughout the whole of the economy and society.  The ability of an economy to 
obtain competitive advantages from its innovation depends on the dynamic 
efficiency with which companies, authorities and institutions can disseminate, 
adapt, and apply knowledge. Johnson and Gregersen (1995)63 define European 
integration as a process towards a coherent institutional setup for production, trade 
and innovation within Europe.  They identify four interrelated types of economic 
integration: (i) formal and (ii) informal institutional arrangements between political 
actors, and (iii) formal and (iv) informal institutional arrangements between 
economic actors. 
 
The relationship between economic growth and employment is essentially the fact 
that product innovations lead to an increase in demand which itself drive an 
increase in investment and employment. Process innovations contribute to an 
increase in productivity by increasing production or lowering production costs. 
Both product and process innovation result in an increase in purchasing power, 
which itself increases once again demand and employment.  
 
Innovation will be also crucial in improving productivity in Europe, a major source 
of growth. Europe has devoted a lot of efforts in increasing productivity in the 1990 
as it was lagging compared with its competitors in the US and Japan. As Europe 
demographics shift towards an older population and a much smaller working 
population, greater productivity gain will be required from those who do work. In 
Germany for example, the 25-59 age group will decrease from 56% to 48% of the 
total German population64.  
 
                                                     
63 Johnson, B. and B. Gregersen (1995), Systems of Innovation and Economic Integration, Journal of 
Industry Studies, 2, pp. 1-18. 
64 Statistisches Bundesamt 
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McKinsey research 65 on productivity across Europe and across industries indicated 
that the key to productivity gains is the successful development, diffusion and 
leverage of business and technology innovation.  
 
The European demographics constraints in the future give innovation an even more 
important role to increase productivity and therefore growth in Europe. For 
example, in both France and Germany telecommunication industry, productivity 
increased by respectively 17.7% and 19.4% per year with technology related 
improvement accounted for about 90% of the total productivity gain. Those 
improvements came from major technology innovative products in operational 
support systems, digital technology in mobile services and IT innovation such as the 
introduction of improved order handling or fault management.  In other industries, 
                                                     
65 McKinsey Global Institute, Improving European Competitiveness, July 2003 
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such as banking, productivity improvement came from process innovations such as 
back office automation and business innovations in call centers and internet 
banking.    
 
Diffusion or dissemination of innovations is as important as its development. 
Without adequate diffusion, innovation would only concern limited number of firm 
and therefore lessen the effect on economic growth. The French automotive for 
example have been successful in adopting best process practices developed in Japan 
such as lean manufacturing, improved supplier purchasing system, and simplified 
design process. The adoption of these innovations allowed the French automotive 
industry to realize productivity gain of 15% per year between 1996 and 1999. 
Similarly, the UK automotive industry was lagging by as much as 50% in 
productivity vs their Japanese competitors in the early 1990. After adopting best 
practice from the Japanese manufacturers, the UK car manufacturer succeeded in 
closing the gap in productivity vs. their Japanese competitors.  
 
According to Mckinsey, leveraging innovations to obtain their application to an 
optimal scale is often critical to productivity performance. The German retail 
banking business has a poor performance compared with its neighbor countries. 
Most of the difference in productivity comes from the fact that the German banking 
is scattered among a great number of small banks. The German bank ownership 
structure restricts their consolidation. The small banks are not in a position to 
leverage the innovation in IT that brought major productivity gain to other 
European banking system such as France. Another example where leveraging 
innovation could bring tremendous productivity gains is the road freight in France 
and Germany. The road freight industry is very little concentrated. The top 6 
companies account for up to 9% of the revenue. German and France road freight 
productivity lag behind the US , with productivity at 80% of the US model. There are 
thousands of small operators. Consolidation will be the only mean to leverage 




Authorities, legislations, institutions are key actors for the development, diffusion 
and leverage of innovations. For the examples above, the improved French 
telecommunication process was encourage by the decision of the government to 
create a competitive mobile phone market.  The improvement of the automobile 
productivity adopting was also trigger by the opening of the domestic market to 
highly productive foreign competitor from Japan and Korea. The German 
automobile market did not have to face the same pressure and had less incentive to 
increase their productivity.  
 Authority s involvement can also be justified since without its intervention, the 
innovating firms may not get the benefits of their hard search to innovate due to the 
possible spillover effects. In fact, in most cases, the total potential benefits to society and to the innovator firm s competitors are greater than the return for the firm that 
came up with the innovative idea. As knowledge cannot be owned or licensed, the 
private firms might be therefore less incentivized to pursue innovation (market 
failure).  
 
II-4 Innovation is strategic in enabling social responsibility 
 
Innovation is strategic for government because it is above all a social phenomenon. 
With innovation or technological progress, individual, society, corporations express 
their creativity, their needs and desires for their future and the future of their 
children. Innovation in a way creates a social condition and helps create the 
condition of change for society. It brings a response to the important societal 
problems of the present such as improving living conditions after national disasters 
such as in Asia or in Haiti, treating illness such as H1N1 or any pandemic, , or for 
example, helping to treat environmental disasters after a oil spill. It can improve 
safety or working conditions, improve transportation, it save energy, reduce 
pollutants, help integrate handicapped people or make everybody work from their 
remote home locations, giving them an equal chance in rural area. It can help reduce 
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the difficulties of most developed countries in dealing with aging demographics and 
social protection. It can help solve issues of underdevelopment, malnutrition and 
health. For this, any sectors that bring innovation will be strategic for government to 
help achieve social value. Aerospace as a major innovation enabler in general is a 
major contributor to social progress through its innovation. The private sector, 
social sector and public services within their national boundaries need innovations. 
By its nature, innovation is a collective process that requires commitment from all 
the players in its value chain, from educators to private researchers, from 
corporations to governments. 
 
 Consumer s behavior is always evolving over time depending on the products 
offered but also because of societal reasons. The 2007-2008 recession has 
accelerated the change to a new sets of behaviors. First, we save more.  A McKinsey 
survey shows that US respondents said that their households had reduced spending 
as a result of the recession, 33% of them significantly  so. The survey, which 
included 600 households in three consumer segments comprising about 40 percent 
of all US homes, found that 45 percent of those who reduced spending did so by 
necessity and 55 percent by choice. Will the behavior switch back to the previous 
overspending on the early 2000, when household were actually spending more than 
they earned? Probably not, since the spending at that time was abnormal. The same 
survey shows that consumers will stay frugal in their spending after the recession. 
Secondly, consumers do not believe in large brands nor rely on the brand to make 
the choice for them. Brand does not translate necessarily in value. Consumers will 
not count on Mercedes to deliver great product because they are Mercedes 
anymore. Third, consumers are looking for simplicity in general and simpler 
products. They look for a way to combine entertainment and communication for 
example. They do not want to carry multiple devices, a phone, a blackberry, a 
computer, an ipod. They want a single product that can do all and more. Fourth, they 
want a healthier lifestyle. That trend is very visible in supermarket with the increase 
interest of consumers for organic food and products. Fifth, they want a greener 
lifestyle and are starting to introduce greener behavior in their everyday task. Sixth, 
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they are expecting institutions, legislators, authorities to encourage or even force 
better governance in corporations and governments. The healthier and greener 
lifestyles, the wish for better governance are part of a bigger societal behavior that 
seeks more social responsibilities. Corporations such as Starbucks, Gap, Wal-Mart, 
and General Electric have well understood this and are engaged in reporting their action and score cards  to the public. Corporations are facing an increased pressure 
from the public, the governments, their employees and their competition to play a 
leading role in addressing a wide array of environmental, social and governance 
issues ranging from climate change to obesity and human rights: that is social 
responsibility.   
 
Innovation is proving to be strategic as a mean to reach a new level of social 
responsibility for institutions and corporations. Some international corporations 
have been quicker than others in adopting these values and are succeeding in 
creating financial value from their socially responsible focus. Corporations are 
taking a long term view in environmental, social and governance activities to 
anticipate risks from emerging issues and turn those risks into opportunities. Novo 
Nordisk for example manages itself with a performance dashboard that go well 
above their financial bottom line. They actually have a triple bottom line goal:  
financial viable business, environmental sound and socially responsible business. 
Nova Nordisk invested in technology and time in researching ways to prevent, 
diagnose and treat diabetes and build up a related health care infrastructure. They 
have used their investments to strengthen its position in mature markets and 
develop its business in new ones. Verizon, a telephone and communication firm in 
the US, sponsored research on the way information and communication technology 
promote energy efficiency. Verizon sponsored a multi-industry research called Smart . The report of the research explains that with broadband internet 
connection, it can help the US to reduce its CO2 emission by 22% and reliance on 
foreign oil by 36% as early as 2020. IBM in partnership with the World Bank, and 
with banks in India and Brazil provide free web based resources on business 
management to small and mid size enterprise in developing economy through its 
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small and medium enterprise tool kits. For IBM, it is a useful way to improve its 
reputation, relation with its partners and potential future customers. Telefonica has 
been developing new product and services specifically aimed at the over 60 age 
group, such as helping them to communicate with their grandchild abroad. It meets 
a social need by helping people while developing a new market base.  The initiative 
of General Electric in two major programs: ecomagination  and 
healthymagination  are an interesting example on how the firm creates financial 
value for themselves while improving the environment, the social governance for 
the society with innovation. Closer from the Aerospace industry, ACARE is another 
European example of innovation helping competitiveness and the environment by 




Ecomagination is a General Electric (GE) company wide business initiative to help meet customers  demand for cleaner and more energy-efficient products and to drive reliable growth for GE. Green is Green.  GE Ecomagination also reflects GE s 
commitment to invest in a future that creates innovative solutions to environmental 
challenges and delivers valuable products and services to customers while generating profitable growth for the company. GE s target is to grow revenues from 
ecomagination products with an annual goal of $25 billion in 2010. GE is clearly on 
the path to achieve that goal since as of May 2009 the ecomagination portfolio 
includes 80 products and the has generated more than $17 billion in revenue in 
2008. GE has progressively invested in their ecomagination initiative from $750 
million in 2005 to a planned $1.5 billion in 2010. GE internal Green House Gas 
(GHG) and energy efficiency plan is to reduce GHGworlwide by 1%, reduce the 
entensity of GHG emissions 30% by 2008 and improve energy efficiency 30% by the 
end of 2012 vs 2004 level. It has already surpassed its goal of reducing GHG 
intensity of GHG by 30% in 2008. GE has also committed to reduce its water 
consumption by 20% by 2012 from a 2006 baseline. GE goal in ecomagination is 
also to keep the public informed of its ecomagination actions and results through its 
website, global conference, advisory board or public-policy engagement.  Its 
ecomagination products or services must significantly and measurably improve 
customers operating performance or value proposition and environment 
performance.  In terms of public policy, GE was a founding member of the United 
States Climate Action Partnership (USCAP) which is a group of business and leading 
environmental organization that have come together to call on the federal 
government to quickly enact strong national legislation to require significant 




 GE Aviation business for example has introduced in 2008 a improved Flight 
Management System (FMS) that optimizes aircraft descent profile to lower fuel 
consumption, CO  emissions while lowering airlines costs. The GE s FMS enables 
pilots to determine while maintaining a highly efficient cruise altitude, the exact 
point where the throttle can be reduced to flight idle while allowing the aircraft to 
arrive precisely at the required runway approach point without the need for throttle 
increase. Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) has 36,000 descents yearly into Stockholm  
alone, annual benefits could reach $6 million in cost savings and an additional  $4 
million in cost avoidance due to increase efficiently.  
 Another ecomagination initiative GE s wind turbine. GE is one of the world's leading 
wind turbine suppliers. With over 11,600 worldwide wind turbine installations 
comprising more than 18,000 MW of capacity, GE has established knowledge, 
expertise and recognition over a period spanning more than two decades. A 100MW 
wind farm, over the course of its 20-year lifetime, has the capacity to generate an 
amount of electricity that would require about 2.9 million tonnes of coal. GE s 
installed base of over 11600 1.5MW turbines has the capacity to produce 52 million 
MWH of electricity, which could be equivalent to avoiding the emission of over 31 
million metric tons of CO2, or the equivalent of CO2 emissions of 6 million cars per 
year. Worldwide, about 85% of wind generation capacity is split between Europe 
(70%) and the US (15%). In the US, although the cost of wind energy is becoming 
competitive with other source such as coal or gas, it has penetrated less than 1% of 
the US generated electricity. However, the US government has plans to bring wind 
generation up to 20% share in the future. In Europe, the target for wind power is 
much more ambitious. Wind is projected to deliver 33% of all new electricity 
generation capacity and provide electricity for 86 million Europeans by the end of 
2010.  
 
In Abu Dhabi, GE and a local development company are constructing the first ever 
ecomagination center. Upon completion Masdar City will be the first carbon neutral, 
zero waste city completely powered by renewable energy.  
 
The United Climate Action Partnership (USCAP) of which GE s a founding member is 
calling on the US government to enact strong national legislation to require 
significant reductions of GHG emissions. In 2009, the group created a proposal 
which calls for reductions between 14 and 20% of 2005 GHG levels by 2020 and an 
80% reduction by 2050 through an economy-wide trade program. 
 
This project exemplifies the fact that technological progress and innovations in our 
developed society is a interactive process that requires not only economic but also 
social factors and a multitude of stakeholders either individual, institutions and 




GE s ecomagination Advisory board include leaders from Climate Change Capital, 
Pew Center on Global Climate Change, a former CEO of Shell International 
Renewables, and leaders from various institutions such as the World Resources 







From the experience and success of ecomagination, GE showed practically that 
technical innovation can drive solutions and value for customers, investor s 
employees and the public. Strong from his experience, GE decided to invest in a 
similar project in health. Healthcare in the US but also worldwide is challenged by 
rising costs, inequality of access and persistent quality issues. GE plans is to provide 
new solution with innovation in smarter process and technologies that help doctors 
and hospitals to deliver better healthcare to more people at lower costs.  Launched in May , GE s healthymagination initiative is aimed at four critical needs: low-
cost technology; healthcare IT; innovation accessible to all; and consumer-driven 
healthcare. GE has committed that by 2015 it will invest $3 billion in research and 
development to launch at least 100 innovations that will help deliver better care to 
more people at lower cost. GE intends to provide $2 billion in financing and $1 
billion in technology to bring healthcare information technology to rural and 
underserved areas. It plans to reduce the cost of procedures that use GE 
technologies and services by 15 percent and develop products tailored to 
underserved regions of the world. More importantly GE intends to reach 100 million 
more people every year with services and technologies essential to health. As in his ecomagination, where Green is Green , GE intend to derive significant revenues from their initiatives. (ere they consider that (ealth is Wealth . Below are a couple 
of examples of GE healthymagination products. 
 
Morsel is an ipod application that GE develops to promote health and wellness. The 
free application help people to get healthier by suggesting simple daily tasks that 
anyone can do. Its main goal is to make healthier lifestyle accessible to everybody. 
 
Another GE healthymagination project is to expand access of state-of-the-art 
medical imaging to underdeveloped regions around the world. The US National 
Institute of Health awarded a contract to GE to develop new magnet technology that 
will make MRI systems less costly.  
 
The development of a lower-cost mobile MR) platform would help support GE s 
healthymagination vision by expanding MRI use into underserved communities 
worldwide. 
 
GE created an advisory board that will advise GE on its health efforts, investments and policy and will participate in regular reporting on GE s performance. The board 
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includes regulators, institutions  leaders, doctors, and business leaders such as Dr. 
Devi Prasad Shetty, chairman of Narayana, a cardiac care hospital in Bangalore, or former US senator Bill Frist and Tom Daschle. Tom Daschle said we can only find 
real solutions in health care when business, government and their partners work 
together. The commitment GE made on access, cost and quality are a great start 









ACARE is an other example of the strategic importance of innovation for Europe in 
the area of aerospace that will crucial on the competiveness of European aerospace 
in the future. ACARE stands for Advisory Council for Aeronautics in Europe. Its 
original aspirations are for better technology linked to social aspiration such as 
cleaner environment, safer travel and more security as well as the benefits of a more 
competitive Europe.  
 
In January 2001 a group of European personalities in aerospace and institutions 
chaired by an EU commissioner established a report called the European Aeronautics: a vision for . The group established a number of 
recommendations for fulfilling the European Aeronautics ambition to better serve society s needs and strengthen its quest for global leadership. The Group 
recommended developing a long-term commitment by all stakeholders of the 
aeronautics industry, airlines, airports, air traffic control service providers, 
governments and regulators, research institutes and academia to work in closer 
partnership and on the basis of consensus with the aim of strengthening and 
reorganizing research and development efforts in Europe. Among its conclusions, 
the Group stressed the need for a new Advisory Council for Aeronautics Research in 
Europe (ACARE) whose aim would be to develop and maintain a Strategic Research 
Agenda (SRA) for aeronautics in Europe. The ACARE advisory board is tripartite in 
composition to include a representation of Member States, the Commission and 
stakeholders. It includes:  
 
- Member States with significant public funding for aeronautics research 
(23members ) - The other Member States are invited to be represented as 
observers  
- European Commission (2 members)  
- Manufacturing industry - airframe, engine, equipment and supply chain, 
including ATM - (10 members)  
- Research establishments (3 members) EREA  
- Airlines (2 members) AEA, IATA  
- Airports (1 member) ACI  
- Regulators (2 members) JAA , EASA  
- EUROCONTROL (1 member)  
- Academia and other relevant expertise (1 member). 
 
ACARE Vision 2020 took into account the challenge of meeting continually rising 
demand while demonstrating sensitivity to society s needs by reducing the 
environmental impact of manufacturing, operating, maintaining and disposing 
aircraft and associated systems. ACARE Strategic Research Agenda set some 
environmental goals that require significant breakthroughs, both in technology and 




- Reduce CO2 by 50% per passenger kilometer (assuming kerosene remains the 
main fuel in use) 
   -Airframe contribution: 20 to 25% 
  -Engine contribution: 15 to 20% 
  -Air Traffic Management 5 to 10 
- Reduce perceived noise level to one half of current average level 
- Reduce NOx emissions by 80% 
- Reduce other emissions: soot, CO, UHC, Sox particulates, etc 
- minimize the industry impact on the global environment including substantial 
progress toward Green-MDD (Manufacturing, Maintenance and Disposal). 
 
ACARE has also set 2 large joint projects : Clean Sky Joint Technology initiative, a 
project devoted to technologies that will improve the impact aviation has on the 
environment, and SESAR, a comprehensive project aimed at modernizing the 
European Air Traffic Management.   
 
The Clean Sky JTI will be one of the largest European research projects ever, with a budget estimated at € .  billion, equally shared between the European Commission 
and industry, over the period 2008 - 2013. This public-private partnership will 
speed up technological breakthrough developments and shorten the time to market 
for new solutions tested on Full Scale Demonstrators. Clean Sky will encourage the 
participation of Small and Medium Enterprises to ensure their full involvement in 
the program, therefore offering opportunities to the entire aeronautic supply chain 
from all EU Member States and Associated countries. Clean Sky will demonstrate 
and validate the technology breakthroughs that are necessary to make major steps 
towards the environmental objective sets by ACARE. The Clean Sky JTI is made up of 
6 Integrated Technology Demonstrators : (1) the  SMART Fixed Wing Aircraft will 
deliver active wing technologies and new aircraft configuration for breakthrough, 
news products; (2) Green Regional Aircraft will deliver low-weight aircraft using 
smart strutures, as well as low external noise configurations and the integration of 
technology developed in other ITDs, such as engines, energy management and new 
system architectures; (3) Green Rotorcraft will deliver innovative rotor blades and 
engine installation for noise reduction, lower airframe drag, integration of diesel 
engine technology and advanced electrical systems for elimination of noxious 
hydraulic fluids and fuel consumption reduction; (4) Sustainable and Green Engines 
will design and build five engine demonstrators to integrate technologies for low 
noise and lightweight low pressure systems, high efficiency, low NOx and low 
weight cores and novel configurations such as open rotors and intercoolers; (5) 
Systems for Green Operations will focus on all-electrical aircraft equipment and 
systems architectures, thermal management, capabilities for "green" trajectories 
and mission and improved ground operations to give any aircraft the capability to 
fully exploit the benefits of Single European Sky; and (6) Eco-Design will focus on 
green design and production, withdrawal, and recycling of aircraft, by optimal use of 
raw materials and energies thus improving the environmental impact of the whole 




The SESAR (Single European Sky ATM Research) program is one of the most 
ambitious research and development projects ever launched by the European 
Community aimed at developing a modernized air traffic management system for 
Europe. The program is the technological and operational dimension of the Single 
European Sky initiative to meet future capacity and air safety needs. The EU Single 
European Sky initiative was launched by the European Commission in 2004 to 
reform the architecture of European air traffic management. It proposes a legislative 
approach to meet future capacity and safety needs at a European rather than a local 
level. SESAR will help create a paradigm shift , supported by state-of-the-art and 
innovative technology. The SESAR program will give Europe a high-performance air 
traffic control infrastructure which will ensure the safety and fluidity of air 
transport over the next thirty years, will make flying more environmentally friendly 
and reduce the costs of air traffic management. SESAR is bringing ATM into the 
information age, making accurate information available as quickly as possible to all 
who need it, right across the spectrum to help all the players make better decisions 
for their operations with a focus on optimizing the aircraft trajectory, as part of the 
overall network. It will also help us increase the level of automation, so leaving 
humans to do what they do best  taking difficult decisions in unusual situations and 
leave a number of routine tasks to machines. 
 
Given the complexity of the program, a legal entity was founded by the European 
Commission and Eurocontrol, to coordinate and concentrate all relevant research 
and development efforts in the Community. The total estimated cost of the 
development phase of SESAR is € .  billion, to be equally shared among the 
Community, Eurocontrol and the industry €  million Community, €  million Eurocontrol, €  million industry . 
 
The key SESAR objective are: 
 Restructure European airspace as a function of air traffic flows  
 Create additional capacity;  
 Increase the overall efficiency of the air traffic management system  
 
Airspace users want primarily to be able to optimize and implement trajectories 
which suit them best: reduce delays, reduce travel time, reduce costs and provide 
maximum flexibility. Any new ATM system must retain safety as being centrally 
important, while reducing their environmental footprint is another expectation of 
airspace users. 
 
SESAR stakeholders include airspace users (civilian and military), airports, air 
navigation service providers, the manufacturing industry, aviation associations and 
organizations, regulators, the scientific world, regulators and administrations as 




The SESAR projects, with its numerous work packages distributed among European 
aerospace firms is a catalyst for innovation and competiveness. SESAR is developing 
a system of systems: components that have never talked together before will work 
together and be interoperable, a sort of very complex technical puzzle.  The Federal 
Aviation Administration in the US is pursuing a similar project called NextGen. In the 
US, a single authority regulates the whole geographical area and there are a limited 
number of ATM canters. In Europe, however, there are multiple national authorities 
and many ATM centers with different cultures and languages. Furthermore, 
European airspace is among the busiest in the world with over 33,000 flights on 
busy days and high airport density. This makes air traffic control even more 
complex. SESAR focuses on air traffic management, NextGen takes what is called a curb-to-curb  approach, including not only air traffic control, but also airports, 
airport operations, security, and passenger management. The operational 
capabilities are similar, differing mostly in terminology, though SESAR seems to 
place greater emphasis on capabilities of the ATM system than on the aircraft and its 
avionics, especially during the period up to 2013.The SESAR program targets an in-
depth modernization and harmonization of the existing ATM systems in Europe. NextGen is very much a can-do  project, where a number of key new technology 
projects are identified and these are pushed through. NextGen is more heavily 
dependent on aircraft and avionics capabilities, policy changes and an emphasis on 
greater use of Area Navigation (RNAV), Required Navigation Performance (RNP) 
and Vertical Navigation (VNAV)-based flight profiles. The U.S. enroute airspace is 
largely conventional, using ground-based navigation aids to define the routes, while  
the European enroute airspace structure is completely RNAV-based (RNAV-5). 
SESAR is slightly more intellectual approach, where Europe have sat back and developed an overall systems  approach, a concept of operations blueprint which 
Europe is now working toward. Some of the more notable differences between SESAR and the NextGen include the fact that SESAR s scope is larger than that of 
NextGen, reaching much deeper into the areas of research, airspace management, 
institutional issues, safety management, environmental and human factors, among 
others.  
 
 Considering the comparable nature of these two initiatives, airlines users (most of 
whom fly in the US and Europe) have been requesting interoperability between 
SESAR and NextGen to avoid costly duplication of airborne equipment. As a result, 
the US FAA and Europe Eurocontrol are currently working on a Memorandum of 
Cooperation that will come as a pragmatic response to airspace users' request. It 
will guarantee interoperability between both future ATM systems and promote the 
development of international standards through the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), the Memorandum is aimed at establishing a binding 
framework for fruitful technical cooperation relating to their development. The 
cooperation should ensure that the same aircraft can fly in Europe and the US air 
space using one system,  that common standard are available in time,  the 
cooperation minimize the cost and share information, but also enable 
manufacturers of both systems to compete and supply both markets. The FAA & 
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Eurocontrol have always had a good relationship when sharing R&D but there is 
also benefit in competition and alternatives in ideas and implementation.  
 
Nevertheless, they remain two distinct and parallel projects inspired by a sort of 
intellectual emulation, if not also by competition. SESAR could bring enormous 
added value to Asian air traffic which is seeing the highest growth in traffic and the 
greatest need for ATM reorganization. At some stage in the future, countries that 
cannot respond technologically will see a need to upgrade their technology. Strong 
of its unique multi-country European experience in interoperability, the European 
SESAR system might be the preferred solution to the Asian multi-country. Emulation 
between the two approaches is also important in a way that it will incite 
manufacturers on both sides to innovate and bring solution to the deployment 
phase sooner to the benefit of the users.   
 
II-5 Importance of aerospace as innovation spillover 
 
The strategic importance of aerospace also resides in the spinoff and spillover of 
aerospace innovation that can be realized across the aerospace value chain but also 
to other sectors of the manufacturing industry, and emulate research into research 
centers.  In the case of spin-off66, two types must be differentiated: government spin-
off and research spin-off. Spinoffs are products which have undergone a technology 
transfer process from research to public use. These uses may be direct or indirect. 
Research spin-off concern a company founded on the findings of a member or by 
members of a research group at a university. This is a classical example of 
innovation leading to economic growth.  In the case of government spin-off, this is 
typically the dual military-commercial use of technology. For example the microchip 
that is used in guiding missiles can possibly be used for automobiles, or for bike 
computers.  In the government spinoff model, the scientist working on a major 
defense project would make discovery that in turn make some new product or 
service possible Scientists and engineers working in commercial firms would learn 
of the discovery, develop and bring to market a product or process from it. The 
innovation would in that case spin-off  from the defense sector to the commercial 
                                                     
66 Alic John, Branscomb Lewis, Brooks Harvey, Carter Ashton, Epstein Gerald (1992),beyond the 
spinoff, Military and commercial technologies in a changing world, Harvard Business School, Boston, 
MA   
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sector. In the case of government spinoff, most government R&D focuses on national 
defense, space exploration or health innovation. Those innovations however are not 
ruled by normal economics and market prices. Although they yield a real new 
product or service, those technological products or services are sold to a single 
customer: the government. The price of these products and services do not reflect 
its market value, e.i the value to society but are based on costs. Therefore, one can 
argue that the only way government R&D drive net economic growth is through 
spillover of innovation rather than spinoff. On the other end, privately funded R&D 
brings a direct return to the investors and generate a spillover net effect to another 
industry and therefore to another part of the economy. The real value of 
government spinoff is through the creation of a competitive advantage. Without the 
defense involvement, key technology such as semiconductors, computer 
communication satellite would have taken years or decades more to be developed 
and might have changed the leadership position of the US in these sectors. 
Moreover, given the fact that government usually pay premium price for new 
technology, they finance a large portion of the learning curve until the commercial 
market takes over. Generous defense procurement was just as important as R&D in 
influencing the leadership or competitiveness of the national aerospace or health 
industry. Private R&D spillovers are becoming much more prevalent in generating 
economic growth as the sheer volume of government R&D has never cease to 
decrease since the end of the cold war. Government spinoff will be studied in detail 
in the next section when the entry of Boeing into the market for jet aircraft. Today, 
private sourced R&D represent about 70% of the total US R&D , compared to 30% in 











Figure 44: US R&D funding by sector 













Source: National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics, National Patterns of R&D Resources (annual series).
Laurent Rouaud




For comparison, the worldwide R&D expenditures totaled an estimated $1.107 
trillion in 2007 (the latest year for which data are available)67. The United States 
accounted for about 33% of this total. Japan, the second-largest performer, 
accounted for about 13%. China was third, at about 9%. Germany and France, 
respectively, fourth and fifth (and the largest performers in Europe), accounted for 
6% and 4%. The top 10 countries (also including South Korea, the United Kingdom, 
the Russian Federation, Canada, and Italy) account for almost 80% of current global 
R&D performance. The 27 nations of the European Union (EU-27) accounted for 
about 24% of global R&D. R&D by the EU-27 grew at an average annual constant 
dollar rate of 3.3% between 1997 and 2007. By comparison, the U.S. pace of growth, 
on the same basis, averaged 3.3%.  
 
                                                     
67 US National Science Foundation  
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)n today s environment of reduced defense budgets, the dual use of technology 
interaction has changed significantly from the time of Boeing enter in the 
commercial aircraft. The commercial sector is focusing in getting other means of 
government support for innovation as the share of defense contribution shrink and 
the military planner on the other hand has to recognize the defense increasing 
dependence on the technology from the commercial sector. As a results (1) 
commercial aerospace has become not only a matter of economic security but also a 
matter of national security and (2) the spillover of commercial innovation to other 
industries has become the real driver of economic growth. 
 
II-6 The benefits of innovation spillover – example of successful spillover and survey 
of economic literature on innovation spillover 
  
Innovation is the main pillar of future success and competitiveness of the firms 
involved in aerospace or in any other industry. The challenge of the airlines to 
reduce their costs, reduce their impact on the environment, simplify their operation 
while increasing safety and reducing manufacturing costs are the main drivers of 
innovation of the aircraft manufacturers.  
 
The following chapter investigates (1) the mechanism of innovation spillover or 
technology transfer in the UK and the US; (2) gives a few examples of actual 
innovation spillovers to different industries to highlight that these mechanisms 
actually work, and (3) it shows that Asia is becoming a formidable force in driving 
innovation. How important innovation is to economic growth as the race to innovation  goes on in the US, Europe and now Asia.   
 
According to an OECD study68, innovation contributes to the three main drivers of 
economic growth: capital , labor and productivity. The study suggest that countries 
experiencing above-average growth performance in the 1990s were the one that 
                                                     
68 OECD 2004 Understanding Economic Growth 
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had more people employed; accumulated more capital; improved the quality of their 
workforces; and improved the multi-factor productivity (MFP).  Innovation drives a 
greater efficiency in the use of labor and capital, improves management practices, 
organizational changes and ways of producing the good of service to the benefit of 
the customers. The study indicated that the countries that had an above average 
rate of growth in productivity in the last 20 years (Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United States) had an above 
average rate of growth in patenting. It has been estimated that a 0.1 percentage 
point increase in R&D could boost output per capita growth by some 0.2%. 
 
It is rather intuitive to believe that innovation spillover must occur often and 
meaningfully from aerospace to automobile in the field of material, structure and 
aerodynamic. However, there are very few documented examples of such spillovers 
in Europe. The most likely reason is that spillovers are difficult to estimate since 
they are a combination of measurable and non-measurable effects. For example, the 
UK has a strong aerospace industry and has long been the world's center of 
excellence for motorsport at its highest level, boasting championship winning F1 
teams like Lotus, McLaren and Williams. The UK government even set up a structure 
which sole purpose was to transfer technology from aerospace to motorsports in 
2002. The actual innovation development in aerospace that made its way to 
motorsports is actually small but the knowledge base has been tremendous through 
the transfer of aerospace engineers in the field of aerodynamics and structures. The 
experience that these engineers took with them cannot possibly be quantified but its 
value is certainly important to motorsports. For example, the current managing 
director of TAG McLaren International was originally a mechanical engineer that 
started his career at British Aerospace as a structural engineer. Similarly, Mike 
Gascoyne (graduated from Cambridge in fluid dynamic) graduated in aerodynamic 
and started his career at Westland Helicopters, before joining the motorsport 
industry as an aerodynamic engineer. Today, he is one of the most successful chief 




The UK is one of the very few countries in Europe that has been concerned about the 
policy on technology transfer for decades.  Both in the UK and in the US, the use of 
government funded technology research, in defense, emerged as key topic for 
economic and policy research in the 1980s. Very early on, the attention of policy makers focused on whether the UK s defense research were contributing to the 
national wealth creation. The debate culminated when a report showed in the mid 
1980s, that one of the best examples of a successful innovation transfer from the 
defense field to the civilian field concerned the liquid crystal displays, a technology 
that was exploited commercially by the Japanese and not a UK company69. In the 
early 1990, researches laid the ground for the establishment of a UK mechanism to 
better capture technology transfer and create innovation spillover. Shama in 199270 
identified 4 different level of strategy leading to innovation spillover from passive strategy to the most active called national competitiveness : 
 
I. a passive strategy: the research laboratories limit themselves to publishing 
their technologies hoping for clients to come forward. The laboratories 
 provide information and respond to inquiries. 
II. an active strategy: in addition to the passive strategy, , the laboratories try to 
acquire rights to the technologies they developed and seeks to obtain 
revenue streams through licensing;  
III. an entrepreneurial approach strategy: try to set up of joint venture to exploit 
the technology developed by the laboratory; 
IV. a national competitiveness strategy: laboratories focuses their technology 
transfer activity on technology that contribute to the social and economic 
well being of its country  
 
                                                     
69 Barnes, J. and Holeman, B. (1987), The transfer of defence research on electronic materials to the 
civil field. Technology in the 1990s: the promise of advanced materials: proceedings of a Royal 
Society discussion meeting held on 4 and 5 June 1986. The Royal Society,London, 27-38. 
70  Shama, A., 1992. Guns to butter: technology transfer strategies in the national laboratories. The 




Following the debate in the UK, a number of institutions were created to encourage 
technology transfer. Most proved to be ineffective and were abandoned. Among 
them the Defense Technology Enterprises Ltd. (DTE) created in 1984, organized as a 
large innovation database, failed because most technology innovation concerned 
defense at that time and the dual use of innovation was already in place by long 
established relationship. Another initiative was launched with the Civil Industrial 
Access Scheme (CIAS) and later the Dual Use Technology Center (DUTC). All failed to 
commercialize innovation in the public sectors; those initiatives however have 
contributed to established a great experience base on technology transfer. At the 
same time, the background of budgetary constraint of the mid 1990s encouraged to 
obtain more value from the UK government research laboratories. This incited 
technology transfer to be focused on the end result of commercializing a final 
product or service and commercial orientated management practices were put in 
place. The creation of the Defense Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) in 1995 
and the Defense Diversification Agency (DDA) in 1998 was based on this concept.  
Unlike other European countries, an example of successful commercial technology 
transfer can clearly be observed on the UK technology transfer bodies of the UK 
government, such as the Defense Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL). The 
Dstl is an agency of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) whose purpose is to supply 
scientific and technical research and advice to the MOD. In particular, the UK 
government has tasked Dstl with ensuring that its innovative ideas and technologies are translated into wealth-creating enterprises that benefit the economy and wider society and bring useful income to Ministry of Defense.  As a result, Dstl launched 
Ploughshare Innovations Ltd, as its technology management company. Ploughshare 
Innovations, is a wholly-owned company of Dstl whose job is  to exploit selected 
Dstl Intellectual Property in non-MOD markets. In short, Ploughshare only job is to 
bring innovation made for the UK defense to commercial use by finding the best 
investment partners and make license deals.  
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As a recent example of spillover, Ploughshare brought to commercial use an 
innovation that originated from Dstl to make soldiers' protective clothing more 
effective against chemical attack. 
 
 
Example 1:  
Original laboratory: UK Defense laboratory 
Original purpose: make soldiers' protective  clothing more effective against 
chemical attack 
Original industry: military  
Spillover industry: sportswear, energy, electronic, health 
Spillover usage: shoes, water filtration, solar energy, textile, glass and ceramic, bio-
consumable 
Spillover potential:: multi $ million market  
 
 This technology reduces the surface energy of a material so that liquids are repelled 
and resist to being absorbed. The technology has already found  an application with 
the leading US sportswear equipment company Nike to repel water on sport shoes, 
and with Energy Launch Partners, a US company specialized in the high growth 
market of renewable energy.  In the case of Nike, multi-patented liquid repellent 
technology employs a special pulsed ionized gas (plasma), created within a vacuum 
chamber, to attach a nanometer-thin polymer layer over the entire surface of the 
shoes . Nike launched its first shoe product using that particular technology on 
December 2009. The potential application of the technology is rather extensive from 
the performance textile (water repellency, stain resistance or better breathability), 
eyewears (effective water shedding from lenses for active sports), consumer 
electronics (protection against both water and oil, increase reliability), bio-
consumable (avoid cross contamination), filtration (increased performance of 
filtration components) or glass and ceramics (prevents water, frost and dirt from 
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forming on optical surfaces. The six markets or fields in which this innovation could 
be introduced are multi-billion euro in volume of business.  
 
Figure 45 Example of spillover from the battle field to water filtration 
Original laboratory: UK Defense laboratory
Original purpose:
Original industry: military 
Spillover industry: sportswear, energy, 
electronic, health
Spillover usage: shoes, water filtration, solar 
energy, textile, glass and 
ceramic, bio-consumable 
Spillover potential: multi billion market
Source: UK Defense Laboratory, Center, Laurent Rouaud
 
 
In the US, the 1980 Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act included 
technology transfer among the missions of all national laboratories, including those 
with a defense role. A number of legislation establishing technology transfer tools 
and procedures was put in place shortly after71. Following is a list of legislation and 
mechanisms that was enacted by the US congress to encourage the dissemination of 
innovation and the commercialization of those innovations.72   
 
 
                                                     
71 Shama, A., 1992. Guns to butter: technology transfer strategies in the national laboratories. The 
Journal of Technology Transfer, 17 (1), 18-24. 




The Stevenson Wydler Technology Innovation Act (1980) 
The act required offices of technology transfer in Federal agencies and established 
budgeting and reporting requirements. 
The Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Act (1980) 
Permitted government grantees and contractors to retain title to federally funded 
inventions and encouraged universities to license inventions to industry. The act is 
designed to foster interactions between academia and the business community. 
The Small Business Innovation Act (1982) 
Established the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program within the 
major Federal R&D agencies to increase government funding of research that has 
commercialization potential within small high-technology companies. 
The national Cooperative research Act (1984) 
 Encouraged U.S. firms to collaborate on generic, precompetitive research by 
establishing a rule of reason for evaluating the antitrust implications of research 
joint ventures. The act was amended in 1993 by the National Cooperative Research 
and Production Act (NCRPA), which let companies collaborate on production 
activities as well as research activities. 
The Federal Technology Transfer Act (1986) 
amended the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act to authorize 
cooperative research and development agreements (CRADAs) between Federal 
laboratories and other entities, including state agencies. 
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
established the Competitiveness Policy Council to develop recommendations for 
national strategies and specific policies to enhance industrial competitiveness. The 
act created the Advanced Technology Program and the Manufacturing Technology 
Centers within the National Institute for Standards and Technology to help U.S. 
companies become more competitive. 
The National Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act (1989)  
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amended the Stevenson-Wydler Act to allow government-owned, contractor-
operated laboratories to enter into CRADAs (see below for an explanation on 
CRADA) 
The National Cooperative Research and Production Act (1993)  
 Relaxed restrictions on cooperative production activities, enabling research joint 
venture participants to work together in the application of technologies they jointly 
acquire. 
The Technology Transfer Commercialization Act (2000) 
amended the Stevenson-Wydler Act and the Bayh-Dole Act to improve the ability of 
government agencies to monitor and license federally owned inventions. 
 
The America Competes Act and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
followed in 2009 to specifically address the importance of the U.S. innovation 
system for national economic growth.  
 
Organized in 1974 and formally launched by the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 
1986, the Federal Laboratory Consortium for Technology Transfer (FLC) objective is 
to promote and strengthen technology transfer nationwide. More than 250 federal 
laboratories and centers and their parent departments and agencies are FLC 
members. The consortium is the US nationwide network of federal laboratories that 
provides the forum to develop strategies and opportunities for linking laboratory 
mission technologies and expertise within the marketplace. 
 
There are usually 4 ways of transferring technology from a government research 
lab: 
 
(1) A cooperative research and development agreements (CRADA): Under these 
agreements, the government laboratory employees collaborate with the private 
partners on research projects that will directly benefit the government research program mission and the partners  research. The laboratory may contribute 
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personnel, equipment, or other in-kind resources to a project, the private CRADA 
partner must contribute funds, in-kind resources, or both. The CRADA idea came 
about in 1986 to encourage the transfer of technology between the government 
and the private sector, and enhance U.S. competitiveness. Congress passed 
legislation under the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 that promotes 
technology transfer by introducing the CRADA as a mechanism to increase 
federal laboratories' interaction with industry. The CRADA is a flexible contract. 
Both parties enter into the contract with the intention to complete the tasks 
defined. However, if either party finds that the tasks are impossible to complete 
because of technical difficulties or diminished resources, that they may not be 
completed per expectation, or that there is no longer the interest in the 
technology transfer, the contract can be amended or cancelled.  In fiscal year 
2008 alone, the GAO estimated that the 17 laboratories of the Department of 
Energy generated 698 CRADAS agreement 90% of which were with private 
industry partners. These agreements generated some $69 million of funding 
from private companies in fiscal 2008.  
(2) Nonfederal work-for-others agreements: Under a Nonfederal work-for-others 
agreement, a government laboratory agrees to conduct research on behalf of a private sponsor. The research must be consistent with the laboratory s missions and rely on the laboratory s unique capabilities. This type of agreement differs from CRADAs in that the research does not directly benefit DOE s programs. The 
private sponsor must pay the full cost of the project. In fiscal year 2008 alone, 
the 17 laboratories of the Department of Energy participated in over 2,600 
work-for-others agreements with nonfederal sponsors. As much as 65% of this 
agreement had a private sponsor and 35% a university, state or local non-federal 
sponsor. These agreement generated 373$ million in revenues for the 
Department of Energy. 
(3) Licensing agreement: the research laboratories share its technology by 
licensing their patented discovery, copyrighted software programs, or other 
intellectual property to a private, state, university or local authority to use or 
commercialize that technology. The licensee may agree to pay a fees or royalties 
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to the laboratory for the use or commercialization of the technology.  The chart 




Figure 46 Technology transfer stages 
During product development,
manufacture, or marketing, the
licensee may need to secure
loans or investment capital or
consult with experts.
Technology transfer from the government lab to 
commercialization
Laboratory researchers
invent a new technology
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The different action from the innovation done in the government lab or 
university to the commercialization follows in general 6 typical stages. A 
government technology transfer office is generally responsible for coordinating 
a grouping or all national laboratories efforts to identify technologies and obtain 
patents or other legal protections for those technologies. The technology office with the laboratory is usually responsible for promoting the laboratory s 
technologies to potential users, and negotiating the license agreement.  The 
Licensees are responsible for commercializing the licensed technologies by 
integrating the technologies and come up with the products from the 
development, manufacture, and marketing of those products. The licensee may 
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require the financing of venture capitalists or other financing to launch the 
product. The licensee may or may not pay fees or royalties to the laboratory in 
exchange of permission to use the technology. In the US, the national 
laboratories of the Department of Energy derived fees and royalties from their 
patents for a total amount of $44 million in revenue for 2008. 
 
4. User-facility agreements: Under a user-facility agreement, scientists from 
outside the government lab can use the scientific equipment for their own 
research. The users who wish to keep their results private, however, must 
reimburse DOE for the cost of using the government laboratory facilities. The 
Department of Energy, for example, had more than 2,800 user-facility 
agreements for user facilities at 8 of their 17 laboratories of which 783 were 
with private entities in 2008. The user-facility agreement generated 6.5$ million 
in revenue for the Department of Energy.  
 
Here are four other examples of innovation spillover from a government lab to an 
industry for which the innovation was not at all intended and have found or has the 
potential to find a significant market.  
 
Example 2:  
Original laboratory: Langley Research Center 
Original purpose: Research study on forces of pressure and viscous drag 
Original industry: military aerospace 
Spillover industry: sportswear equipment 
Spillover usage: swim suit 
Spillover potential: market: 750$ million approximately  
 NASA s Aeronautics Research main objective is to research ways improve flight 
efficiency such as understanding the forces of pressure and viscous drag that slows 
down an aircraft or space vehicle. NASA uses their wind tunnels to study the forces 
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of friction in gasses and liquids. The pressure forces are use to optimize the shape 
and performance of an airplane. In high speed or low speed, the thin boundary layer 
around a moving object in the air or in water reduces the velocity of the fluid 
surrounds the moving object. This layer is about 2 centimeters thick for a swimmer.  
Speedo, the manufacture of swimwear products, asked NASA to help design a 
swimsuit that will reduce drag, shortly after the 2004 Olympics. Research 
determined that the viscous drag on a swimmer is about 25 percent of the total 
drag. Researchers began testing of fabrics in a small wind tunnel developed for low-
speed viscous drag reduction. They came up with a fabric called the LZR Racer. The 
LZR Racer reduces skin friction drag by 24 percent more than previous Speedo 
racing suit fabric, while the compression helps the swimmers maintain a good body 
form enabling them to swim longer and faster since they are using less energy to 
maintain form. The research seems to have paid off; in March 2008, athletes wearing the LZR 
Racer broke 13 world records. It paid off so much that the speed suit will be illegal to use 
in competition in 2010. 
 
Figure 47 Example of spillover aerospace to swimwear 
Original laboratory: Langley Research Center
Original purpose: Research study on forces of 
pressure and viscous drag
Original industry: military aerospace
Spillover industry: sportswear equipment
Spillover usage: swim suit
Spillover potential: market: 750$ million approx.




Example 3:  
Original laboratory: Kennedy Space Center 
Original purpose:  keep space shuttle fuel ultra cold while minimizing ice build up 
Original industry: Space 
Spillover industry: construction 
Spillover usage: home insulation 
Spillover potential: market: 1-2$ billion approximately  
 
NASA Space Shuttle needs to keep its fuel at ultra cold temperature while 
minimizing ice buildup that could endanger the mission. The temperatures of the shuttle s engines climb to more than ,  °F . The fuel used is liquid hydrogen that 
is maintained at -423 °F.  Mixed with liquid oxygen (kept below -297 °F) it creates 
an explosive mixture that is combined to powdered aluminum-fueled solid rocket boosters. The final mixture makes the shuttle escape Earth s gravity. The cryogenic 
temperature of the liquid fuel can create ice and cause safety issues at launch. NASA 
started to explore innovative solutions for providing superior thermal insulation to 
the fuel tanks of the shuttle. It develops an aerogel derived silica, aluminum oxide, 
or carbon gels using a supercritical drying process. The aerogel, the lightest solid on 
earth, can withstand extremely hot temperature. Acoustiblok, the industry leader in 
acoustical insulation, has developed with NASA a spillover of the aerogel to be 
applied in construction. The commercialized product consists of narrow strip of 
flexible aerogel to be applied to wall wooden studs in buildings for thermal 
insulation. The commercialized product is called: Thermablok. It  is a thin strip of 
flexible aerogel in a plastic casing with an adhesive in the back. The Thermablok is 
100-percent recyclable, include more than 30-percent recycled material, and allow 
low-cost, low-emissions shipping due to their virtually weightless composition. 
According to tests conducted U.S. Department of Energy, a strip of Thermablok 
applied to wall studs before the installation of drywall increases the wall s 
insulation factor by 30. Acoustiblok believe that for a typical home,Thermablok  
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would save over $700 annually in energy costs with an accompanying 3.9-ton 
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions.  The market of the product is worldwide and 
should be commercialized to the major home improvement stores in the world in 
2010.  
Figure 48 Example of spillover from space to home construction 
Original laboratory: Kennedy Space Center
Original purpose: Keep Space Shuttle fuel ultra 
cold
Original industry: space
Spillover industry: home construction
Spillover usage: home thermal insulation
Spillover potential: market: 1B-2B$ approx.
Source: Kennedy Space Center, Laurent Rouaud
 
Example 4 
Original laboratory: Ames Research Center, Johnson Space Center, Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory 
Original purpose:  Assist human operations in space with remote controlled robot 
Original industry: Space 
Spillover industry: health 
Spillover usage: software to improve people health 
Spillover potential: market: 0.5 billion approximately  
 
In the 1990s, NASA developed a small robot that landed in July 1997 on the surface 
of Mars to take samples and photographs. The robot was called Sojourner and was 
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the first successful rover mission on Mars. The program was one of the most 
successful programs of NASA. Unpredictably, the technological innovation originally 
for space found its way to the table of consumers; as it is today influencing the way 
people eat. The program led to another research to produce a free-flying robot 
capable of assisting astronauts with tasks such as structural repairs, assembly, and 
on-orbit refueling, and the Ranger Neutral Buoyancy Vehicle (NBV) was developed. 
The main engineer on the program founded a online nutrition company and used 
the same computer algorithm in the NBV to resolve a problem of disconnect 
between the vast amount of nutritional data available to the public and how the data is actually used. (e realized that the challenge was similar to the NBV s challenges of 
combining 20 different computers. The solution for the robot was to create 
intelligent software to mediate between the operator and the robotics data. The 
nutrition software issue was resolved using the same technology. The result is a 
user friendly on-line software on which the user set health goals and then the 
software using a food nutrition database generate and plan balanced meals with 
indication on vitamin, calories, fat and minerals.  The product called Vitabot has 
more than 1,000 company clients such as HBO, Warner Bros. and health clubs such as Gold s Gym. 
 
Figure 49 Example of spillover from space to the kitchen 
Original laboratory: Ames Research Center, 
Johnson Space Center, Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory
Original purpose: Assist human operations in 





Spillover potential: market of 0.5$ billion approx.






Original laboratory: Los Alamos National Laboratory’s 
Original purpose:  Ultra sound research 
Original industry: Aeronautics 
Spillover industry: Energy 
Spillover usage: Extract oil from algae cell 
Spillover potential: multibillion industry  
 
This example is probably in the field of the most promising field of energy the 
future. Driven by a decreasing fossil oil reserve, an increasing price and the more 
stringent environmental regulations clean or cleaner alternative fuel is ripe for a 
successful introduction, particularly in transportation. One of the most promising 
cleaner alternative fuels is algae, which has the critical advantage of not competing 
with food. Algae are also a very promising source of alternative fuel for airlines with 
the potential to change the business model in term of the fuel value chain 
distribution.  
 
The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has been working on innovative 
acoustic technologies. They patented a technology that use sound wave to 
concentrate the harvested algae mixture and extract oil from algae cell. Solix 
Biofuels, Inc entered a license agreement with LANL to large scale 
commercialization of micro-algae based fuel. The technology not only facilitates the 
extracting but also eliminates the need to use chemical solvents in the extraction 
process. Solix is planning to bring the process forward very soon and start 
commercializing the algae base fuel as an alternative to petroleum base fuel in the 




Figure 50 Example of spillover from aerospace to energy 
Original laboratory: Los Alamos National 
Laboratory
Original purpose: Ultrasound research
Original industry: Aeronautics
Spillover industry: Energy
Spillover usage: alternative fuel - extract oil 
from algae
Spillover potential: multibillion billion – new 
market
Source: Los Alamos National Laboratory, Laurent Rouaud, 
 
In both the case of the US and the UK, the successful spillover of innovation can be 
attributed to:  
- A single national system of technology transfer, 
- A solid experience on what works and doesn t, 
- Strong defense sector leading the way,  
- Success breeding success, 
-  the successful commercialization of a product or service. 
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III  The historical leadership of the United States LCA industry 
 
All industrial development follows a complex economic policy framework whose 
historical roots are often long and intricate, linking events that at first glance appear 
unrelated Commercial and military aerospace is certainly one of the highest 
strategic markets for a developed nation if not the highest.  The US has for a long 
time dominated the aerospace market. Why did Europe, the birth place of aviation 
and full of innovative ideas through the history of aviation, fall behind the US until 
the 1990s? This question brings us back to the signature of the Yalta treaty on 
February 11th 1945. 
 
If Yalta treaty main goal was to accelerate the end of the war and prepare peace, the 
issue of the territorial influence between the US and the Soviet Union was certainly 
high on the agenda. The two states can organize as they wish the economic 
dependence of occidental countries strained by four years of occupation and 
combat. The two superpowers recognized that the technical knowledge and 
technology was critical in maintaining their dominant position. This drove the two 
superpowers to invest heavily in nuclear power and aeronautics. In this new 
industrial strategy, aeronautic technology was at the forefront of the political 
agenda. This era marked the beginning of the US dominance in this field.  As a result, 
the US and the URSS started to subsidize heavily the development of the military 
aerospace industry. The following comment at that time testifies of the importance 
given to military aerospace technology: 
 
The congress must prepare itself to invest and give the necessary effort to maintain 
our dominance in aerospace that we have successful kept since the World War II. We 
must fight relentlessly to maintain this dominance  




On the other hand, the war has had catastrophic consequence on European 
industries and in particular to its aerospace industry. The previous German science 
and technology capabilities had been totally destroyed. The United Kingdom is the 
only European nation that has kept a strong aerospace position thanks to the 
military aircraft it had produced during the war.  
 
The US commercial aircraft is a small part of the much larger US aerospace sector at 
that time. All US commercial aircraft manufacturers are heavily engaged in the 
manufacturing of military aircraft. The links are vital to the growth and profitability 
of the aerospace industry as the stability of the military revenues was the main 
driver for the development of civil aircraft. The stability of the revenue proved to be 
especially vital in regards to the already very cyclical nature of the commercial 
aircraft business. Moreover, the US manufacturers of commercial aircraft had the 
opportunity to obtain some government subsidies to develop their civil aircraft 
business. The main reason for the US government support of its aerospace industry 
was essentially: 
 the need to insure a strong military defense; 
 continue and development of the dominance on key technologies; 
 continue to derive important export revenues from the sales of 
military aircraft; 
 the development of the national prestige from the participation in key 
industries.  
 
There were five different ways for the US government to intervene in the market: 
 massive technology transfers from military to civil in the area of R&D, flight 
test and technical evaluation; 
 production assistance from military contracts on R&Ds , equipments, tools, 
and government facilities to develop commercial programs; 
 Financial assistance with progressive payments and fiscal assistance; 
 Market stimulation with special financial assistance to airlines;  
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 Special assistance to insure federal funding available. 
 
The US has used two instruments to support the development of its aircraft 
industry: the support for aeronautics R&D, and the procurement of military aircraft. 
These instruments have been remarkably successful. Well before the beginning of 
World War I, the US aviation industry was concerned that the US was lagging 
relative to the major European countries in institutionalizing aircraft R&D capacity. 
In addition, the eminent US participation in World War I precipitated the decision to 
establish an Advisory Committee for Aeronautics that later became the National 
Committee on Aeronautics (NACA). NACA developed the US research facilities and 
staff and especially the construction of state of the art wind tunnels to test propeller and airfoil design. As early as the mid s research at Langley Field and at 
Stanford University were operating and producing results. In 1931 a wind tunnel 
was constructed that was able to test the performance of an entire aircraft. Even during the late s and s NACA performed some important technical 
innovations, such as the NACA cowling (aerodynamic fairing streamlining radial 
engine). In 1939 the 60 percent reduction in drag and the 14 percent increase in 
speed predicted by NACA wind tunnel tests were confirmed by a transcontinental 
speed record by a Lockheed Air Express equipped with a NACA cowling.  
 
After NACA, came the NASA era. The Sputnik satellite program of the USSR in the 
mid 1950s precipitated the creation of the National Aeronautic and Space 
Administration (NASA). NACA research facilities and personnel were absorbed by 
the NASA or transferred to the Air Force. The transition from NACA to NASA was 
accompanied by a new focus on space rather than on aeronautic and especially from 
an R&D performed in-house NACA research lab to contracting the research to large 
aerospace contractors.   
 Throughout the s and s defense procurement accounted for a minimum 
of two-thirds of R&D directed to advancing aircraft performance. Between 1920 and 
1970, US government funding through NASA, the Department of Defense and the 
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other federal agencies contributed to 45 of the 51 innovations in the civil aerospace 
industry. The table below gives the list of some of the most important innovations 
between 1920 and 1964. This period was the most important period in the entry of 
Boeing into the civil jet aircraft era. If the subsidies of the different programs are 
attributed to the government (third column) it means that it comes either from a 
public research centers or from a government contract. If the innovation is 
attributed to the private sector, it means that none of the financing for the 
innovation considered comes from the government. For example, the star-engine 
cooled by air was developed in cooperation with the army and the navy following a 
government contract established in 1920. Civil application started in 1922 and its 





Table 5 Important aerospace innovation 1920 - 1960 - Funding sources 
Innovation Year Funded/subsidy 
First year of 
operation 
Military Civil 
Star-engine 1920 Federal/military 1922 1925 
Retractable landing gear 1921 Federal/military 1931 1930 
Hypersustantation 1927 Civil 1932 1933 
Surpercharging 1927 Federal/military 1930 1930 
NACA cowling nacelle 1928 Federal/civil 1932 1929 
De-icing 1928 Federal/civil 1935 1935 
2-way radio 1928 Federal/military 1928 1929 
Molded Structures 1930 civil 1930 1930 
Aluminium alloy 1931 Civil 1935 1935 
Pitch mechanism for propeller 1932 Federal/military 1933 1933 
Autopilot 1933 Civil 1936 1935 
Kerosene with high octane 1936 Federal/military 1936 1946 
Pressurized cabin 1937 Federal/military 1937 1938 
Helicopter 1941 Civil 1942 1946 
Adhesive bonding 1941 Federal/military 1942 1958 
Turbojet 1941 Federal/military 1942 1954 
ILS 1941 Federal 1943 1947 
Arrow wing 1945 Federal/civil 1947 1954 
Delta wing 1945 Federal/civil 1948 _ 
Fatigue test 1946 Federal/military 1948 1947 
Thrust reversors 1946 Federal/military 1963 1954 
Titanium 1947 Federal/military 1952 1954 
Supersonic flight 1947 Federal/military 1953 _ 
Ground weather radar 1948 Federal/military 1948 1950s 
Doppler radar 1949 Federal/military 1954 1955 
Numerical command computing 1951 Federal/military 1956 1956 
Inertial navigation 1953 Federal/military 1963 1967 
Ultrasound fatigue testing 1955 Federal/military 1956 1957 
Turbofan engine 1956 Federal/military 1961 1960 
Digital onboard computer 1957 Federal/military 1957 1967 
Communication satellite 1958 Federal/military 1966 1962 
Digital flight plan 1959 Federal/military 1959 1961 
Flight simulator computer  1960 Federal/military 1960 1963 
Weather satellite 1960 Federal/civil 1960 1960 
Composite material 1961 Federal/military 1969 _ 
Fog dispersor 1963 Civil 1967 1963 
Navigation satellite 1964 Federal/military 1964 1970 
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The table above includes a few important examples of technology transfer or 
government contract that helped the US aerospace industry to enter into the 
military and civil aircraft business. All these innovation has been applied to 
commercial aviation by Boeing.  
In 1941, the aerospace industry built more than 19,000 fighter aircraft from the 
United Kingdom. The production increase significantly after Pearl Harbor to 48,000 
and doubled again in 1944. At the end of the war, the aerospace industry in the US is 
operating at full capacity. Once the war was over, some military transport was 
converted to civilian use to carry passengers. The competition within the US and 
with the enemy aerospace capability greatly motivated the government and the 
private research labs to innovate. That effort led to considerable technology 
progress. In particular, Boeing developed and produced long range bombers whose 
basic design was used to develop the first transport aircraft. The US aerospace has 
largely benefitted from the experience gained during the war as well as the 
significant subvention and contracts as the table above shows.  
The most important technology to date in commercial aviation, the jet engine, was 
developed during the last few years of the war under federal and military funding.  
France, still under occupation, could neither participate nor benefit from those 
technological advances.  
    
III-1 European responses to the US dominance 
 
After the war, the US prosperity contrasted with the destruction of the European 
aerospace. The industry faced the added difficulties of tight frontiers within Europe 
as a result of the war. This situation is followed by a long restructuration of the 
European aerospace industry. The process will be covered in 3 stages (1) the 
reconstruction phase from 1945 to 1958, (2) the strong growth resulting from the 
integration of Europe and the creation of the European market (1958-1973), and  
(3) the internationalization of the industry accelerated by the oil crisis.  
114 
 
Despite the reconstruction period, the aerospace industry in Europe faced some 
deep structural problems in the 1960s. Advanced aerospace requires integrating 
research from various fields of science and technology. The research costs more and 
requires large market application to be profitable. Europe had sufficient financial 
and industrial resources to produce the aircraft its market needed but its collective 
resources were dispersed into national program. The national market are too small 
to support an aerospace industry in each of the main European countries and be 
commercially successful. The Caravelle, developed by Sud Aviation, and later 
Mercure, developed by Dassault, are good examples of great technology and 
performance aircraft that failed commercially. Not only was the national market 
small but sometime two similar products competed for the same market (Caravelle 
and Mercure). The Europe aerospace industry had limited funds available compared 
to the US. In 1966, the US invested $1.5 billion compared with $470 million for the 
UK, $270 million for France and $30 million for Germany.  More importantly, the US market is by far the largest market in the world, .  time larger than Europe s. )t is 
clear that at this time, European had enough financial resources to equip its airlines 
and air force. However, these resources were used at the individual national level. 
The aircraft manufactures in Europe could only rely on their small domestic market.  
Furthermore, US aircraft manufacturers had already a strong position in Europe as 
well. The competition was fierce. This situation resulted in the decreasing influence 
and presence of Europe in the aerospace industry. It made Europe dependant on the 
US to provide civil and military aircraft. More generally, Europe became dependant 
vis a vis the USA not only technology wise but also politically, economically and 
financially . National cooperation and especially international cooperation appeared 
as a necessary condition to have a prosperous European aerospace industry. The 
creation of Aerospatiale in France was clearly a result of the USA dominance in 
aerospace at that time.  
Below is the analysis of the creation and structure of Aerospatiale. It details the 




III-2 The rise of the European aerospace industry  
 
III-2-1 Creation of Aerospatiale and structure of its cooperative system 
 
Introduction 
Aerospatiale was created in 1970 from the merger of Sud Aviation, Nord Aviation 
and the SEREB. However, if the group Aerospatiale was only created in 1970, its 
cooperation trajectory really started in the 1950s. Aerospatiale was an aerospace 
group covering 4 activities: the production of civil and military aircraft, helicopters, 
tactical vehicles, and the strategic systems such as the vector of the nuclear bomb. 
The shares of Aerospatiale were owned by: 
 CINDUS (Credit Lyonnais Industrie):  20% 
 French State : 60% 
 SOGEPA (Societe de Gestion et Participation Aeronautique) : 20% C)NDUS s share was owned by Credit Lyonnais. SOGEPA owned 20% of Dassault 
Aviation. Aerospatiale were at 90% owned by the French state. The only private 
ownership comes from the private ownership within Credit Lyonnais (13.68% of 
the Credit Lyonnais share were private) and from Thomson CSF (39.90% of 
Thomson share were private.). Thompson owned 8.85% of Credit Lyonnais.  A total 
of 3.4% of Aerospatiale share were held privately at that time 
(20%x13.68%x8.5%x20% = 3.4%). The entry of Credit Lyonnais in the capital of 
Aerospatiale was announced in July 1992, and was part of the strategic plan to 
reinforce internal funding of the large French industrial groups through 
partnerships with financial groups. For Aerospatiale, the venue of Credit Lyonnais 
reduced its debt level. For Credit Lyonnais, it followed its 1989 strategic decision to 
develop partnership bank-industry that reinforced links with its major customers 




III-2-2 Evolution and motivations of the cooperative trajectory of Aerospatiale 
 
The alliances and partnerships of Aerospatiale that started shortly after its creation 
showed how dynamic the group was in terms of cooperation and how determined it 
was to grow within Europe and worldwide. The concept of cooperation is at the 
base of Aerospatiale strategy throughout its life. It realized very early that a strategy 
based on product development was no longer sufficient to insure growth and 
profitability in a very competitive market. In the technology sector that requires the 
combination of various sciences and technologies, a single company, no matter how 
big, cannot invest in all areas of research. The firm must cooperate with the supplier 
that have the best technology and with financial institutions to provide financing for 
its research and development. The cooperative structure of Aerospatiale was 
established with this logic in mind. Historically, the direct sales of its products have 
slowly evolved towards more complex contracts, most often including economic 
compensation in the form of offset agreement. Later, cooperation product by 
product was developed, then by area of responsibilities by specialization (wing, cockpit, … .  The cooperative system evolved toward the Airbus )ndustrie sytem of 
cooperation based on the associative structure of Groupement d )nterets 
Economiques (GIE) and later joint venture such as Eurocopter. The industrial 
resources can stay within each partner such as in Airbus Industrie, or can be placed 
in the structure resulting from the fusion in the case of Eurocopter. The goal is to 
share the enormous and long terms investment required and its risk while 
preserving the identity of each participant.  
 
III-2-3 Cooperative structure of the Aerospatiale group 
 
The cooperation structure of Aerospatiale started in the 1960 with the launch of the 
C-160 Transall by Nord Aviation and the German firm MBB. The Transall 
replacement gave birth to another more extensive cooperation of the 5 most 
important European aerospace firms: DASA of Germany, Alenia of Italy, BAe of the 
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UK, CASA of Spain and Aerospatiale. This cooperative objective was to develop a 
military transport aircraft (today Airbus A400M) that prove to be necessary in the 
new conflict such as the Golf war. This horizontal cooperative agreement was a 
capitalistic agreement that created a joint venture called the European future large 
aircraft group (EUROFLAG.) Today, this joint program is conducted by Airbus 
military.  Originally the project began as the Future International Military Airlifter 
(FIMA) set up in 1982 with Aerospatiale, BAe, MBB and Lockheed to develop a 
replacement to the Transall but also to the C-130 Hercules. Due to conflicting 
requirement for the aircraft and the added difficulties of European politics, 
Lockheed left FIMA in 1989 to develop its own replacement to the C-130, the C-130J 
Super Hercules.  This cooperative agreement is a strategic alliance since it follows a 
central decision of the 5 Europeans firms to develop a common tactical transport 
aircraft that will become the A400M. The resources committed to the project are 
substantial in the sense that they are financial, technological and human and 
strategic because they bring all the resources from the different partners into one 










III-2-4 Aerospatiale cooperation structure in Civil Aircraft: Airbus Industrie 
 
As early as 1965, manufactures and governments in Germany, France, and the UK 
start discussions with the idea to develop a commercial aircraft capable of 
DASA Alenia Aerospatiale BAe CASA 
EUROFLAG 
20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 
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transporting 250 passengers. Recognizing their past commercial failure to bring a 
commercial aircraft to market, they were determined that the project must be 
European to avoid unfruitful competition and offer the largest possible market to 
the new product within its European market. The agreement protocol of September 
16th 1967 opened the definition of the 250 seater Airbus A300. The final cooperative 
agreement that sealed the government agreement was signed in July 1968. The 
firms designated by the government agreement included Sud Aviation (later 
Aerospatiale), Hawker Siddley (later British Aerospace), MBB (later DASA)  for the 
airframe and Rolls Royce, SNECMA and MAN for the engine. However, in February 
1969, the British reversed their decision on participating in to the cooperation. They 
insisted that the A300 project be replaced by its competing program the BAC311, 
prepared in secrecy by British Aircraft Corporation (BAC). If the BAC311 were to be 
selected, Hawker Siddley would have become the leader of the project. The goal of 
the British is to stop Sud aviation from having the lead role on the project. The 
British are worried of the dynamism , investment, and drive of the French aircraft 
manufactures in the project. On April 10th 1969, the UK department of technology 
announced its intention to withdraw from the Airbus project.  This episode, almost 
anecdotal, stressed the difficulty of setting up cooperation between competing firms 
and the disadvantage of specialization of tasks. On May 29th 1969, an cooperative 
agreement was signed between the French and German government. Shortly after, 
on July 24th 1969, Hawker Siddley joined the program in a limited way as supplier. This cooperative trajectory eventually led in  to the Groupement d )nteret 
Economique (GIE) with the creation of a joint company: Airbus Industrie. In 1971, 
the Spanish firm CASA joined the consortium with a 4.2% share.  
 
This strategic alliance was based on a GIE agreement in the framework of an 
additive integration. Generally, GIE has been legally set up to allow groups of 
company to develop industrial projects with a limited timeframe. The Airbus 
Industrie GIE differs in the sense that the an aircraft manufacture can only be 
competitive if it develop a family of aircraft covering a large spectrum of the airlines 
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needs from the 100 seater to the 400 seater designated for transcontinental flights 
Developing a family of aircraft requires the commitment of the partnership on 
several decades given the level of investment and the human resources required. As 
a result, the A300 was followed by other member of the family, the 150 seater A320, 










III-2-5 Aerospatiale cooperation in the regional aircraft  
 
The cooperation between Aerospatiale and Alenia for the production of regional 
aircraft (ATR42 and 72) relied on a GIE type of agreement. This cooperation allowed 
Aerospatiale to avoid the specialization limited to the cockpit, central wing box, 
pylons and final assembly in the Airbus GIE by developing the wing for the GIE ATR. 
The wing design, manufacturing and assembly is a critical know how in the civil 
aircraft business, especially strategic in the aerodynamic R&D. Aerospatiale 
recovered with ATR, the expertise over the full design of civil aircraft. The chart 
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Figure 51: Specialization in ATR and Airbus GIE 
Aerospatiale involved in all components














III-2-6 Aerospatiale cooperation in helicopters 
 
With the same strategic logic of increasing the home market potential to amortize 






increasing development costs, Aerospatiale and DASA decided to merge their 
helicopter activities in 1991. This strategic alliance is much stronger than the GIE 
Airbus and ATR alliance since it is based on a completed integration of the activities 
of the two partners without any differentiation or compensation of any kind: 
commercial resources, R&D labs, existing and future product lines, production and 
final assembly. The advantage of this type of cooperation is that it avoid duplication 
and is in theory without time limit. In this cooperation, the task sharing is not done 
solely in terms of competence. The competitive and political tension of the GIE is 
here non-existent as it is a truly single entity. After the creation of the helicopter 
division within each of the two firms, a holding company was created, Eurocpter 
Holding S.A headquarterd in Marignane , France whose ownership structure is 60% 
Aerospatiale, 40% DASA. Eurocopter has succeeded in creating a solid network of 
alliance within the aerospace industry (see below). The main objective of the 
network is to develop or produce product(s) and to use resources that Eurocopter 
cannot assume on its own. For example, Eurocopter is associated with Augusta 
(Italy) and Fokker (Netherland) in the form NHI SARL for the production of the 
NH90 helicopter. Its alliance network makes Eurocopter a strong European center 
for helicopter production and second largest helicopter manufactured in the world 
(behind Sikorski). Eurocopter is therefore the result of a strategic alliance in the 
context of a strong capitalistic agreement. Within the alliance, Aerospatiale assumed 
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III-2-7 Aerospatiale cooperation in tactical vehicle and missiles 
 
Aerospatiale is the first missile company in the world in terms of revenues and 
product line. Aerospatiale cooperation in missiles is extensive and to the scale of 
Europe.  Strategic alliances have been negotiated with Thompson, DASA, BAe, and 
Alenia. They have been established by the respective governments, most often at 
launch in an effort to organize a common weapon program. This was the case for 
Euromissille, the French – German program, EMDG a tripartite cooperation between 
Aerospatiale , DASA and BAe, and Eurosam a Franco- Italian program involving 



































III-2-8 Aerospatiale s cooperation in strategic systems and space 
 
All activities of the group in the space field were done in a international partnership. 
This is the case in particular with Ariane. In the satellite area, Aerospatiale 
partnered with DASA, Alcatel, Alenia and Space System/Loral in the US. This 
structure is a important worldwide player in the space field. In theis partnership, 
Aerospatiale is the lead contractor in the final assembly of the Intersat satellites. The 
agreement concerns technical and commercial cooperation for satellites and 
associated space systems. In addition, Aerospatiales cooperated with Dassault in 
Hermespace France. Hermesspace France itself is in partnership with DASA and 
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III-2-9 Summary of Aerospatiale partnerships 
The chart below summarizes the partnership system of Aerospatiale in the 1990s. It 
shows that Aerospatiale have had a long experience in building European and 
international partnerships in all activities. Most of these partnerships are still in 
place today within EADS. Over the years Aerospatiale has succeded in consistantly 
building a vast network of partnerships. Aerospatiale partnerships have not been 
the result of opprtunistic behaviour but the result of a focus strategy on building 
alliances in aircraft, missiles and space to become a real international player. Over 
the last few decades, Aerospatiale alliances strategy has allowed the firm to quickly 
overcome the gap in technology, commercial position and product portfolio with its 
US competitors. The alliance network have given Aerospatiale a strong market 
presence in four different areas of aerospace: helocopters, missiles, space, and aircraft. Alliances with Germany s DASA was clearly the preferred route in all  
sectors. In fact, throughout the 1990 s, more than 60% of Aerospaiale s revenues 
were done in partnership with DASA. As always, the fundamental reason of these 
alliances are to share the investment and the risks given the massive resources 
needed in R&D  and the obtained the benefits of scale and scope. Aerospatiale built 
partnership networks at two different levels in accordance to: the products and the 
sector. At the product level, the alliances concerned the Airbus,  ATR, Eurocopter 
and Euromissile GIEs. This type of partnership allows coordination between the 
different participants, reduce tension and the risks of internal conflicts. In the sector 
level, Aerospatiale alliances were made with major four European aerospace 
groups. The cooperation resulted from the larger consensual  political will to reach 
common long term objective right from the end of the war and the dominence of the 
US in the aerospace field. The efficiency of these partnership relied on a common 
objective and common adversaries or competitors. It assumed that the partnership 
would bring higher market penetration and market share than each of the 
individual firm would have gained by itself. Two elements helped the efficiency of 
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Aerosaptiale partnerships: the accumulation of experience in managing the 
coordination between the partners and the better understanding of the different partners their operations , governance, management, … . The accumulated 
experience in working together as partners improved over time from partnership to 
partnership, especially in the case of DASA. The partnership structure of 
Aerospatiale was similar to quasi-concentration (because of its symetric and almost 
anti-competitive nature) around a system of stable alliances. The network of 
partnership started decades ago and has evolved from a program by program 
approach to a larger structural industrial approach. The paroxysm of this strategy 
was reached when EADS was created functioning to a great extend as a holding 
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IV  Market entry of the current incumbent competitors  
IV-   Boeing s market entry in the LCA market 
 
The Boeing Company, created in 1916 in Seattle, Washington State is now the 
second largest commercial aircraft manufactured in the world and the largest US 
exporter. Its successes throughout its history can be traced back to the transfer of 
technology from military programs such as the KC135 to the Boeing 707 in the 
1950S.  The first US commercial jetliner, the 707, was delivered to Pan American 
Airlines in July of 1954 and initiated transatlantic service in October 1957.73 
The 707 illustrated the relationship between military procurement and commercial 
aircraft. Boeing engineers began to consider the possibility of developing a 
commercial jet airliner after World War II. The project did not go ahead at the time 
because the potential market could not justify the huge development costs and 
especially the risks. Shortly after, the Air Force contract to build a military jet tanker 
designed for the in flight refueling of the B-52 bomber resolved the financing of the 
707. The main factor in the decision of launching the 707 was the opportunity of a 
civil application of its KC-135, entirely funded by the government.  It started Boeing 
policy of using military contracts to fund the development work that fed into the 
design of commercial airliners. The dual development of a civil and military product 
was critical in establishing Boeing as the leader in commercial aircraft. According to 
the US Congressional Office of Technology Assessment in 1991:  
The single greatest means by which U.S government  policy has affected the 
competitiveness of the commercial aircraft industry is in the procurement of 
military aircraft funding of the related R&D. In some cases whole systems 
developed for the military have been spun-off to commercial applications, 
reducing development costs and risks to the commercial users.            
Congressional Office for Technology Assessment, 1991 
                                                     
73 Rodgers, E, (1996), Flying high: the story of Boeing and the rise of the jetliner industry, the Atlantic 




In addition, between 1951 and 1955, Boeing increasingly relied on government 
owned facilities (56% increase over the previous period). Boeing profitability 
reached $20 million in 1951 and $53.6 million in 1953. The profitability of the early 
1950s played a major role in Boeing decision to launch the 707. The simultaneous 
development of the KC-135 and the 707 provided important economy of scale. The 
prototype having been developed for flight test of the KC-135, the Air Force 
accepted to cover the entire flight test costs.74 The results of the KC-135 flight test 
were used for both applications. The details developments of the KC-135 done with 
the Air Force were crucial for the quality, reliability, and time to market of the 707. 
The total 707 development costs was $16 million compared to $300 million for an 
aircraft developed as a commercial transport aircraft on its own such as the DC8 of 
Douglas Aircraft. The large order for the KC-135 from the Air Force was also a great 
help for the development of the 707. The Air Force understood the value of 
developing the civil application in parallel and accepted that all equipment used for 
the KC-135 be also used for the 707. As much as 80°% of the joint KC-135/707 
program costs were paid by the Air Force. In return, Boeing accepted to reimbursed 
the Air Force $110000 per 707 sold for the first 100, and $60000 for the following 
100 units. It was estimated that Boeing saved about 30% of the development cost by 
running the 707 and KC-135 simultaneously vs the DC8. Boeing market entry in the 
large commercial aircraft (LCA) was largely attributed to the KC-135. 75 
In the critical years of the beginning of the jet age in commercial airline of the 1950s, 
Boeing was contracted to produce a total of 4,422 aircraft by the Pentagon. The 
period marked the foundation of Boeing supremacy in commercial aircraft. Shortly 
after the 707, Boeing developed the 727, a tri-jet with 120 to 160 seat aircraft 
capable of flying transcontinental US. The 727 utilized the same fuselage of the 707 
to reduce design and production costs. The 727 began the creation of a full family of 
                                                     
74 Newhouse John,(1982), The sporty game, Alfred Knopf, New York  
75 Heppenheimer, T (1995), The turbulent skies, Wiley, New York 
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products.  By the mid 1960s, the 727 sales exceeded the military sales for the first 
time. The 747 and 737 followed the 707 and 727 that made Boeing the only 
manufactured to propose a full family of product from the short range 130 seater 
737 to the 400 seater intercontinental 747.76  
Figure 52: Boeing's revenues share military/civil 1958 to 2009 
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From the 1960s, Boeing progressively reduced its dependence on military programs 
as its civil aircraft business started to prosper with the commercial jet transport era.  
Throughout the 90s, military revenues increased to reach the 50% level in an effort 
to counteract the effect of the very cyclical nature of the civil aircraft market.  
Following the September 2001 terrorist attack, the military business became, once  again, the primary source of Boeing s revenues because of the triple effect of the war 
in Iraq and subsequent operations in the Middle East that boosted military 
spending, the effect of the post 9/11 on airlines and the recession, and the financial 
                                                     
76 Rodgers, E, (1996), Flying high: the story of Boeing and the rise of the jetliner industry, the Atlantic 




crisis of 2007. Given the depth and length of the recession and the complex Middle 
East situation, the source of Boeing s revenues is likely to remain evenly distributed 
between military and civil for the next 2 to 5 years.  
Boeing historical dominant position has allowed them to time their products to 
ensure that their life cycles are conveniently distinct. The profits from previous 
programs are financing the development cost of new programs. As an example, the 
estimated profit of the 747-400 in the mid 1990s (only aircraft in the 400 seat long 
range market at that time) was approximated to be around $25 million dollars, about /  of an A s price.  
 
Table: 6 BOEING product launch and delivery time table 
Aircraft Launch First Customer First Customer Last Total  
   date   delivery   delivery delivered 
367-80 20.05.52 - - - - 0 
KC135 05.10.54 USAF 28.06.57 USAF 12.01.65 820 
707 13.10.55 Pan Am 15.08.58 Pan Am 28.04.94 856 
720 22.11.57 United 30.04.60 United 20.09.67 154 
727-100 05.12.60 Eastern/United 29.10.63 United 03.11.71 571 
727-200 10.08.65 Northeast 11.12.67 Northeast 27.05.72 310 
727-200ADV    20.04.72 Iberia 18.09.84 950 
737-100 19.02.65 Lufthansa 28.12.67 Lufthansa 26.07.73 30 
737-200 05.04.65 United 29.12.67 United 21.08.88 1114 
737-300 05.03.81 Southwest 28.11.84 US Air 13.12.99 1113 
737-400 04.06.86 Piedmont 15.09.88 Piedmont 25.02.00 486 
737-500 20.05.87 Southwest & others* 28.02.90 Southwest 21.07.99 389 
737-600 14.03.95 SAS 18.09.98 SAS 14.09.06 69 
737-700 17.11.93 Southwest 17.12.97 Southwest     
737-700BBJ 02.07.96 General Electric 23.11.98* General Electric     
737-700ER 31.01.06 All Nippon 16.02.07 All Nippon     
737-700QC  US Navy 29.09.00 US Navy     
737-800 05.09.94 Hapag Lloyd 22.04.98 Hapag Lloyd     
737-800BBJ 11.10.99 Boeing Business Jet 28.02.01* Saudi-Oger     
737-900 10.11.97 Alaska 15.05.01 Alaska     
737-900BBJ 16.10.06 Boeing Business Jet 31.12.08      
737-900ER 18.07.05 Lion Air 27.04.07 Lion Air     
747-100 13.04.66 Pan Am 13.12.69 Pan Am 09.09.86 205 
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747-200 19.12.68 KLM 15.01.71 KLM 19.11.91 393 
747SP 03.09.73 Pan Am 05.03.76 Pan Am 09.12.89 45 
747-300 12.06.80 Swissair 01.03.83 UTA 25.09.90 81 
747-400 22.10.85 Northwest 26.01.89 Northwest 26.04.05 442 
747-400BCF(conv) 07.01.04  19.12.05 Cathay Pacific     
747-400D  Japan Airlines 10.10.91 Japan Airlines 11.12.95 19 
747-400ER 28.11.00 Qantas 31.10.02 Qantas 30.07.03 6 
747-400ERF 30.04.01 ILFC 17.10.02 ILFC/Air France     
747-400F 13.09.89 Air France 17.11.93 Cargolux     
747-400LCF(conv) 09.04 Boeing 01.07 Boeing     
747-400M  KLM 01.09.89 KLM 10.04.02 61 
747-8 14.11.05 Boeing Business Jet 04.11 Lufthansa     
747-8F 14.11.05 Cargolux 09.10 Cargolux     
757-200 31.08.78 British AWs/Eastern 22.12.82 Eastern 26.04.05 914 
757-200PF 31.12.85 United Parcel Service 17.09.87 United Parcel Service 12.08.99 80 
757-300 02.09.96 Condor 10.03.99 Condor 27.04.04 39 
757-300  Northwest 20.07.02 Northwest 21.10.03 16 
767-200 14.07.78 United 19.08.82 United 24.02.94 128 
767-200ER 01.83 Ethiopian 26.03.84 El Al 31.03.08 117 
767-200AWACS  JASDF 01.12.94" JASDF 01.01.97 4 
767-300 02.83 Japan Airlines 25.09.86 Japan Airlines 23.08.01 104 
767-300ER 01.85 American 19.02.88 American     
767-300F 15.01.93 United Parcel Service  12.10.95 United Parcel Service     
767-400ER 28.04.97 Delta 11.08.00 Delta 27.01.09 38 
767-400ERX 13.09.00 Kenya Airways - -   0 
777-200 15.10.90 United 15.05.95 United 17.05.07 63 
  15.10.90 British Airways 11.11.95 British Airways 05.12.96 9 
  15.10.90 Thai International 31.03.96 Thai International 06.12.00 16 
777-200ER 14.06.91 Euralair  06.02.97 British Airways     
  14.06.91 United 07.03.97 United     
  14.06.91 Emirates 11.04.97 Emirates     
777-200LR 29.02.00 EVA Airways 24.02.06 Pakistan International     
777-200F 24.05.05 Air France 02.09 Air France     
777-300 26.06.95 All Nippon  30.06.98 All Nippon  13.11.03 18 
  26.06.95 Cathay Pacific 22.05.98 Cathay Pacific 27.07.06 42 
777-300ER 29.02.00 Japan Airlines 29.04.04 ILFC/Air France     
787-3 26.04.04 All Nippon 04.13? All Nippon     
787-8 26.04.04 First Choice 02.10 China Eastern     
787-8 26.04.04 All Nippon 02.10 All Nippon     




Boeing was also the first aircraft manufacture to recognize the value of a global 
strategy. Its objective was to become the leader in every commercial aircraft market 
from the 100 seater short range aircraft to the 400 seater intercontinental range 
aircraft market. To achieve its objective, Boeing invested 4 to 6% of its revenues in 
R&D. Secondly; it focused its development effort to develop a full range of aircraft 
family covering the entire market. Thirdly, Boeing built a strong, coordinated and 
global marketing and sales organization. Fourth, it insisted in building a global 
customer services and after-sales organization centrally coordinated to maintain the 
best possible quality standard. Finally, Boeing concentrated its effort in reducing 
production costs through efficient manufacturing process and controlling centrally 
its spending on R&D. The cash generated by the successful 707 and 727 programs 
have allowed Boeing to implement this strategy in the early 1980s. As a result of this 
strategy, Boeing succeeded in building a very strong market base with 5,200 aircraft 
delivered to a global base of 420 customers. From the early 1980 to the first delivery 
of the A380, Boeing was the only aircraft manufacturer to have a family of product 
covering the entire market segments. This dominant position was to be challenged 
by the entrée of Airbus in the late 1970s with the A300, a 250 twin aisle, two-engine 
wide body aircraft. Boeing responded with the 757 and 767 aircraft in the early 
1980s. Boeing will be once again challenged with the A320 development. It tried to 
convince Airbus to delay the launch of the A320 by pointing out the great financial 
risk of such a program. Boeing threatened Airbus to launch the 7J7, a revolutionary 
aircraft with a flight computer and an open rotor engine. Although the 7J7 program 
never took off, it sets an important milestone in starting cooperation agreements 
with the Japanese aerospace industry. The cooperation with Japan will continue to 
grow steadily to become a pillar of Boeing aircraft development. The strength of the 




IV-2 Airbus  market entry in the LCA market 
 
IV-2-1 From infancy to world leader 
 )n the late s and early s % of the world s large passenger jets were 
produced in the US. Europe has always been aerospace pioneers, designing77 and 
developing78 the first turbojet, producing the first commercials jet  transport 79, and 
the first supersonic commercial aircraft80.  These innovations failed to result in any 
long lasting competitive advantage as they lagged behind their American 
counterparts as they gained 90% of the market for jet airliners in the 1960sAs 
previously stated, the US dominance started shortly after the war and lasted until 
the mid 1990s. Europeans have been nonetheless very active in developing new 
airliners throughout the 1960s.  The Comet was introduced in passenger service in 
1952. Although it was a great success in terms of passenger appeal, the aircraft had 
a number of fatal accidents in late 1952, 1953 and a major disaster in Rome that 
grounded the entire fleet of Comet 1.The accident were attributed to a design flow 
on the square window that developed a fatigue crack growth from a rivet hole.  
Redesigned, the Comet 4 was re-introduced in 1958. However, with the bad press 
and more importantly as Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8 were faster and cheaper to 
operate, the redesigned Comet 4 failed to reach commercial success and production 
stopped in 1964. A total of 112 Comet had been sold. Other attempts by European 
manufacturers also failed to reach commercial success despite their technology 
innovations. All these commercial failures were attributed to the difficulty in gaining 
market acceptance in the largest market for air travel at the time: the United States. 
The other reason for the failure was that each European country with a national 
                                                     
77 The first patent for using a gas turbine to power an aircraft was filed in 1921 by Frenchman 
Maxime Guillaume 
78 Frank Whittle in the UK  and Hans von Ohain in Germany developed the concept independently 
into practical engines during the late 1930s 
79 The de Havilland Comet was the world's first commercial jet aircraft to be manufactured  
80 TheConcord was the first turbojet supersonic passenger aircraft. It was developed by Azerospatiale 
of France and British Aircraft Corporation of the UK. It flew for the first time in 1969 and entered into 
service in 1976 until 2003 
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aerospace manufacturer was launching their own program, often competing with 
each other and with a home market too small to be successful. The table below 
summarizes the different European programs prior to the success of Airbus.  
Table 7: European commercial jet aircraft program 1950s - 1980s 












DH 106 Comet 1945 BOAC/BSAA 1949 1952 BOAC 1964 112 
SE210 Caravelle 1953 Air France 1955 1959 Air France 1973 279 
DH 121 Trident 1957 BEA 1962 1963 BEA 1975 116 
Vickers VC10 1957 BOAC 1962 1964 BOAC 1970 54 
BAC/Romaero 111 1961 BUA 1963 1965 BUA 1991 241 
VFW614 1961 Cimber Air 1971 1975 Cimber Air 1986 14 
F28 1962 LTU 1967 1969 LTU 1987 241 
Concorde 1962 Air France / BOAC 1969 1975 Air France/British Airways 1980 14 
Mercure 1968 Air Inter 1971 1974 Air Inter 1985 11 
F100 1983 Swissair 1986 1988 Swissair 1996 278 
F70 1993 Pelita/Sempati 1993 1994 Ford Motor Co. 1997 47 
 
None of the 1950 to 1980 aircraft program launch in Europe exceeded 300 orders 
from customers, insufficient to even break even. The Caravelle which was very 
similar to the DC-9 in all aspects, including design, technology level, fuel economy 
and operating cost, sold 279 units while the DC-9/MD80 sold 2167 units. The 
Caravelle represented a first tentative at European collaboration, utilizing the nose 
and flight deck of the de Havilland Comet, which led to a wider relationship between 
the French and British industries on the supersonic Concorde. The emerging mass 
travel called for another type of aircraft defined loosely at that time by a short range 
high capacity aircraft, a wide body concept. The basic specifications and 
requirements was first developed in the UK by the Lighthill committee and by a 
working party set up by the major European airlines of that time. A number of 
projects surfaced at the same time. Hawker Siddeley in the UK worked toward a 
high capacity version of the Trident with 2 different sizes, an 160 seater HS132 and 
a larger 204 seater named HS134. Breguet in France proposed a double deck Br124 
powered by four Rolls Royce Spey engines in pairs. Alternative twin engine layout 
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was also considered using RR or PW s JT D turbofan engines. Nord Aviation in 
France were planning to do a high wing four Spey engines with a double bubble 
fuselage and 12 abreast seating for 250 passengers. The two side by side cabins was 
separated by a central bulkhead. Sud Aviation was working on the Gallion, a single 
deck 200 seats 6 abreast, and a double deck alternative for up to 250 seats. Even 
Avions Marcel Dassault had a 220 seat double deck design with engines mounted 
under a low wing.  A total of 5 different programs serving the same market was 
considered at that time by 5 different European manufacturers.   
The creation of Airbus brought to an end the competition among the European 
manufactures. In order to counter the strong US position held by Boeing, Lockheed, 
and McDonnell Douglas in the commercial aircraft market during the 1960 and 
1970s, and to avoid any bankruptcy of the European manufacturers, the 
government of France, Britain and Germany discussed a strategic alliance, and in 
1967 helped organize a multinational effort to build an aircraft consolidating the 
resources of European aerospace. The governments of the United Kingdom, France, 
and Germany quickly realized the redundant enormous financial and technical 
needs to build such an aircraft and urged their aircraft manufacturers to enter into 
partnerships. It is interesting to note that the UK government in particular has been driving cooperation as early as  with a white paper entitled An outline requirement for an Ultra high capacity short range aircraft.  The irony reside in the 
fact that the UK government changed its mind at the last hour of the Airbus 
negotiation and chose not to joined the consortium. Serious discussions started in 
1964 between the UK and France. France also initiated high level discussions with 
the German industry. Germany in particular saw the collaboration as essential for 
the future of its aerospace industry, hampered at the end of the Second World War. 
Germany becomes soon the driving force of the cooperation. In July 1964, the 
German federal government set up an Airbus Study Group in Munich with Dornier, 
Flugzeugbau, Messerschitt, Siebelwerke and Vereinigte Flugtechnishe Werke. The 
main issue for Germany was to create a structure allowing the participation of its 
five aerospace companies with a single point of contact with the potential other 
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European partners. Hawker Siddeley entered discussions with Breguet and Nord 
Aviation of France, while British Aircraft Corporation initiated talks with Sud-
Aviation and Dassault on cooperation on the Gallion. The European consortium idea 
was still a high challenge to say the least. It appear that the most attractive 
proposition in term of product came from the Hawker, Breguet Nord Aviation 
discussions to develop a conventional 200-250 seater, a circular fuselage, two 
efficient high by-pass ratio engine mounted under a low wing with a 30 degree 
sweep. However, disagreement still subsisted among airlines and manufacturers on 
the specific design requirements such as capacity and range. In October 1966, the 
aircraft manufacturers presented a joint concept document to their government. 
The concept was approved in May 1967 by the governments and the definition 
phase began. It was then that the aircraft was referred as the A300. The concept had 
grown to 267 seats in a circular 21ft fuselage diameter, and powered by two Rolls-
Royce RB207 of 47,500lb of thrust.  
In the meantime, with the talks on the Gallion between British Aircraft Corporation 
(BAC) , Sud-Aviation and Dassault going nowhere, and following British Airways 
concern that Airbus will propose a successor to the smaller BAC1-11, BAC firmed up 
its design of an 208 seater 1300 nm range aircraft on its own called the BAC2-11, a 
sort of A320 size aircraft before its time. However, the UK government having 
committed to the Airbus program, refused to fund the BAC2-11. At that time, many 
British airlines and industry experts questioned the government logic to support the 
Airbus project. A memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed in September 
1967 authorizing continued studis and project definition. The agreement nominated 
Sud Aviation, Hawker Siddeley and Deutsche Airbus (founded in September 1967)  
as the aircraft partners. The agreement discarded the earlier plan of having the 
French as leader while the other partners acting as subcontractor towards an joint 
owner-supplier relationship structure. It was agreed that Sud Aviation would have 
the design leadership for the airframe, in exchange of Rolls-Royce leadership for the 
engine. Britain and France were to contribute to 37.5% of the first phase 
development costs and Germany providing the balance. Britain was also responsible 
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for 75% of the engine development costs while Germany and France shared the 
reminder. RR was supposed to work with Snecma of France and MTU of Germany. In 
addition to the design leadership, Sud Aviation was given the responsibility of the 
flight deck, nose and fuselage center section, engine installation, most of the systems 
definition and final assembly. Hawker Siddeley was to be responsible for the t 
design and manufacturing of the wing. Deutsche Airbus was responsible for the 
remainder of the fuselage, empennage development, as well as the passenger cabin, 
cargo holds and installation of the APU.  
The cooperation had some rocky start. The French decided to cancel the Airbus 
program in favor of the Dassault Mercure, a 150 seater aircraft, before to reverse to 
the original Airbus plan some only three days later. Air France and Lufthansa 
pushed the A300 toward a bigger size of 300 seats which resulted in higher engine 
thrust requirement. Rolls-Royce was also changing interest towards the US 
competitor tri-jet longer range DC10 and L1011 programs, anticipated to be a larger 
market and more adapted to their smaller engine.  Rolls-Royce also felt that in 
addition to addressing to the long range market requirement, the US programs 
would also encroach in the shorter range A300 market. Except Air France and 
Lufthansa, most airlines wanted a smaller twin aisle in the 220 to 250 seat category. 
In December 1968, Hawker Siddeley and Sud Aviation release a smaller A300, 
briefly call the A250. The new 250 seater brought the 50,000 lb thrust engine CF6-
50 of GE in contention being developed for the DC10. The airline responded 
favorably to the smaller A300. The use of an existing engine was to reduce the A300 
launching costs by 30%.  With Britain hesitation to commit and Rolls-Royce decision 
to pursue the US L1011 program with the RB211, Airbus became confident to go 
with the GE CF6.  British Airways (at that time British European Airways) were still 
pursuing with BAC the BAC3-11, a slightly larger aircraft with similar characteristics 
that the A300. Similarly Air France, anticipating an increase in passenger demand 
within Europe, was pressing Airbus for 24 more seats. Another 2 frame were added 
to provide an additional three row of seats. The GE CF6 engine turbofan engine had 
already grown more powerful to suit the heavier aircraft. The length of the aircraft 
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was finalized at 175 feet providing up to 281 seats in 8 abreast configuration, and 
up to 345 seats in nine abreast. At the end, British Airways got neither their 
preferred BAC3-11 nor the A300. This marked the first episode of difficult 
relationship between Airbus and British Airways that ended three decade later with 
the A320 orders. With the new option of taking an off-the-shelf US engine, the 
British withdrew from the Airbus project in April 1969. France and Germany signed 
the final development contract (covering the prototype phase and extended over a 
period of one year after the certification of the basic type. France and Germany 
decided to retain Hawker Siddeley as a privileged subcontractor to avoid 
unacceptable delays to the program given the competitive US program. The 
withdrawal of the British government and Rolls-Royce from the program did not 
stop France and Germany commitments to the program. The organization of the 
Airbus partnership was set up in December 1970 by the creation of Airbus Industrie as a Groupement d interet Econmique G)E  under French law. The structure allows 
operational flexibility and enables third parties (customers, suppliers) to deal with a 
single entity. The GIE establishes Airbus Industrie as the central authority for 
technical , financial and marketing. A number of restructuring of the aerospace 
industry in Europe took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Sud Aviation and 
Nord Aviation merged in 1970 to form Aerospatiale.  Dornier withdrew from 
Deutsche Airbus. The restructuring of the German aerospace industry took place 
through the combination of the manufacturing capability of HFB, Messerschitt , and 
Siebel under the MBB name (Messserschit-Bolkow-Blohm.) The strong presence of 
France and Germany in the program brought credibility in the industry for Airbus. 81  
At the end of 1970, the Dutch government decided to join Airbus Industrie and an 
agreement was signed but Fokker-VFW, the company designated to be the Dutch 
participant, elected not to become a full member. . In 1972, CASA of Spain joined the 
consortium with a 4.2% share, reducing the German and French shares to 47.9% 
each. Britain rejoined the consortium on January 1979.  
                                                     
81 Yoshino M, (1986), Global Competition in a salient industry: the case of civil aircraft in Porter M, 
The Competition in Global Industries, Harvard Business School Press, Boston 
140 
 
Three factors were essential in the success of the alliance: (1) the product definition, 
(2) the establishment of the governing rules, (3) the clear definition of the industrial 
and management structures. It is after having assess the market and identify a niche 
, where none of the incumbent were present, that Airbus decided on developing a 
300 seater twin wide body aircraft. Partly due to the structure of the market and 
partly because of the traditional thinking that 3 or 4 engine was required to fly over 
long distance over water, there were either aircraft serving the domestic market at 
100 to 160 seat and the large 3 to 4 engine 300 seater intercontinental aircraft such 
as the 747 and DC10. Airbus breakthrough was to offer a twin engine aircraft 
positioned between the domestic and larger multi-engine aircraft, a market left 
alone by other manufacturer. The Airbus aircraft was also capable to fly over the 
Atlantic from smaller cities  while offering substantial economic advantages over the  engines DC  and  engine DC . The A  was also attractive for short/medium 
distance city pairs on domestic or intra regional markets (US, France, intra Europe)  
with high density demand or longer transcontinental  routes between the US and 
Europe. The A300 were not intended to address the longer range market such as 
Europe to Asia or US to Asia like the DC10 and 747. It was the first twin engine 
medium range aircraft in commercial aviation, and a real potential game changer at 
the time.   Air France became the first customer with an order for a disappointing six 
aircraft in November 1971. Early on, most of the sales of the A300 came from 
Europe. The agreement included a commitment from the governments that the 
national carriers would order the A300. Iberia became the second airline customer ordering  A B . Lufthansa ordered  A B  at the end of . The )beria s B  
was an extended range version of the original B1/B2 1750nm range to 2000nm 
with an additional center wing tank of 28,000lbs. 
 It is interesting to note that at the time of the A300, the Concord program was 
running into some headwinds with major cost overruns, schedule delay, and very 
few orders. Most engineers and program management human resources for the 
A300 came from the Concord program.   The A300 would have an airframe launch 
cost of 190 million pounds in 1974 £.   
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A300 production was allocated across three different countries: 
- Wing assembly in Britain 
- Fuselage and tail assembly in Germany 
- Nose and center wing box in France. 
The first flight of the A300 was in October 1972, only 3 years after the launch and 33 
days ahead of schedule. This was a real performance considering the 787 and 380 2 
to 3 year delays. The A300 closest competitor product was the DC10 from Douglas 
Aircraft and the L1011 from Lockheed. The A300 was lighter, more efficient but 
with less range than its competing products and was sold for 24$ million, some 6$ 
million cheaper than the DC10 and L1011. In 1970, Air France was the launch 
customer, even before the consortium was formally formed. Lufthansa placed an 
order for the A300, but the British and Spanish national airline did not follow. The 
first non-consortium buyer was Korean Airlines, which ordered in 1974. In 1975, 
Airbus obtained for the full year a market share of 10% of aircraft above 100 seat 
sales. The 1974 to 1977 were difficult in term of new sales and it looked at time than 
Airbus would failed and turn into bankruptcy. Between 1974 and 1979 Airbus 
market share remained at about 5%.  While Airbus was selling to second-tier 
airlines such as Western Airlines, the US market was inaccessible until a major 
breakthrough came in May 1977, when Eastern Airlines leased 4 A300B4. At that 
time, the US market represented 70% of the world demand and was considered a US 
aircraft manufacturers market fortress. No aircraft program would have been 
considered a success without launching customers in the US market. Today, the US 
market represents only 30% of the demand for aircraft. Airbus redoubled its effort 
to penetrate one of the four major US airlines at that time. Eastern Airlines needed a 
modern aircraft to fit in size between its L1011 and its 727 and capable of operating 
economically on its shorter sector on the US East coast. The airline was in financial 
disarray at that time and in no position to acquire aircraft. Driven by Airbus 
eagerness to penetrate the US major airline market and Eastern to grow its 
business, Airbus proposed Eastern to make the A300 available to Eastern for a trial 
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period of 6 months at no charge, except for the furnishings. At the end of the period, 
the agreement was that Eastern could either purchase the aircraft or return them if 
they felt inappropriate. The A300 performed extremely well and Eastern decided to 
order 23 firm and 9 options in June 1978.  
It is only in the 1980s that Airbus became successful internationally reaching 17% 
market share between 1980 and 1985.  
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With Douglas abandoning its project of a twin engine DC10 and Boeing plan for a 
7X7 twin mid range aircraft, Airbus decided to pursue its strategy of entering into 
markets left opened by its US competition. According to Muller (1989)82, it was the German that pressed hard in putting the accent on further establishing the place of 
                                                     
82 Muller P , L a itio  Europee e, L Har atta , Paris 
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Airbus in its original niche . In 1978, it launched a derivative of the A300 with 
longer range and smaller capacity: the A310-200. In 1984, Airbus decided to extend 
the life of the program by developing a derivative to the A300-B4 which introduced 
advanced technologies such as a 2-crew cockpit with CRT displays. 
In addition, as the A300 was entering the market in an open niche, the three US 
manufactures ,Douglas, Lockheed and Boeing, had begun disastrous competition in 
the same upper market segment. 83 
The A300/A310 was not a great commercial success with total orders for 566 and 
255 units, but it allowed Airbus to enter into the market, develop its supply chain, 
and most importantly build a customer support organization critical to its future 
success. In 1975, Airbus had two goals: create a family of aircraft and target a 30% 
share of the market. The supervisory board of Airbus outlined the building of a new 
small and two larger jets which eventually became the A320 and A330/A340 
programs.   Besides entering in the market in a white space  and developing a worldwide customer support organization, Airbus  strategy third pillar was to differentiate its 
products through technology innovation over an entire family of product from a 100 
seater domestic to a 400+ seater long range intercontinental. The major technology 
differentiator came from the fly-by-wire innovation, not new to the military world, 
Airbus succeeded in introducing for the first time in a commercial aircraft program 
with the A320. Differentiated technology was a critical factor of success in an 
industry that values long term relationships and strong established incumbency. 
The reasons for the strong incumbency are essentially related to the importance of 
optimizing the productive time of an aircraft from an operation point of view which 
comes from a reliable proven product and a top class customer support 
organization. It is also driven by the increased cost of switching product from new 
tooling, infrastructure, process, spare pool, disposition of older equipment, and 
                                                     
83 Newhouse John, (1982), The sporty game, Alfred Knopf, New York 
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training . Launched in 1984, the A320 evolved to include a full family of product 
from the original 150 seater A320 to the 200 seater A321, the 125 seater A319 and 
the 100 seater A318. The Airbus business case at the time of the launch predicted a 
market capture of 900 units over the A320 program life. Although it looked very 
ambitious at that time to reach 900 sales given the experience of the Caravelle and 
Mercure, Airbus today sold more than 6,000 A320 family aircraft and is still 
counting. The fly-by-wire family was later extended to include the A340 and A330 in 
1988. The fly-by-wire (FBW) technology not only reduced weight on the aircraft and 
simplified the architecture of control surfaces of the aircraft it also help airline 
customers to reduce their operating costs and improve productivity and therefore 
their bottom line through the commonality of the FBW applied to the full family of 
aircraft. The FBW technology helped reduce airline costs through: 
- Increasing productivity of the pilots from less down time spent on transition 
training  from one aircraft type to another; 
-  Reducing the training time/costs and cost for crews, mechanics, pilots; 
- Sharing a common spares within each sub-family.  
Thanks to its innovative technologies such as the FBW, Airbus succeeded in offering 
a differentiated alternative to the US aircraft suppliers . Within a few years after its 
launched,  Airbus FBW family of aircraft increased its worldwide market 
penetration from 7% in 1979 to 20% in late 80s.  Shortly after, the fly-by-wire 150 
seater A320 aircraft developed into a 4 member family of aircraft with the launch of 
the 100 seater A318 , the 125 seater A319, and the 220 seater A321 . The success of 
the  Airbus strategy came about when it consistently obtained 50% of the net orders 
of aircraft above 100 seats.  
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In December 2000, Airbus formally launched the A380 555 seat aircraft, completing 
Airbus 1970 original goal to develop a full family of aircraft from 100 seat to 400+ 
seats. As of August 2010, the A380 has received 250 orders from 20 customers. 
Some 40 years later, Airbus has succeeded in gaining 50% market share, sold nearly 
10,000 aircraft to more than 320 customers and hold a backlog of 3,500 units or 5 
years of production at current level.  
 
 
Table 8: Airbus aircraft launch 
Aircraft Engine Launch Customer First Last Total  
        service delivery delivered 
A300B1/B2/B4/C4/F GE/PW 1969 Air France 1974 1987 249 
A300-600/R/F/ST GE/PW 1980 Saudia 1984 2007 300 
A310-200/200F/300 GE/PW 1978 Swissair 1983 1998 255 
A318-100 PW/CFM 1999 LAN Airlines* 2003     
A319-100 CFM/IAE 1993 ILFC 1996     
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A320-100/200 CFM/IAE 1984 B.Cal 1988 
 
  
A330-200 GE/PW/RR 1995 ILFC 1998     
A330-200F PW/RR 2007 Guggenheim 2010 
 
  
A330-200MRTT GE 2008 Australian Defence Force 2009     
A330-300 GE/PW/RR 1987 ILFC 1994 
 
  
A340-200/300 CFM 1987 Qatar 1993 1997 245 
A340-500/600 RR 1997 Air Canada 2003 
 
  
A350-800XWB RR 2006 Pegasus Aviation Finance 09/2014     
A350-900XWB RR 2006 Finnair 06/2013 
 
  
A350-1000XWB RR 2006 Qatar Airways 11/2015     
A380-800 RR/EA 2000 Qantas 2007     
Source: Laurent Rouaud 
IV-2-2 Transformation of Airbus into an integrated company 
 
As a G.I.E , Airbus Industrie has acted as a conduit for sales with its four 
partners/suppliers sharing the responsibility for producing  airplanes as well as 
sharing in the profits from the sale of the airplane. Although the system worked well 
for decades, by the early 1990s, it was clear to Airbus that the G.I.E structure was no 
longer a sufficient vehicle for Airbus to remain competitive in the world market. 
More importantly the fixed price negotiated with the partners as supplier for every 
program was a strain that Airbus could not sustain to remain competitive. In 
January 1997 (six months before the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger was 
announced) the Airbus partners entered into an agreement to form a new 
consolidated company. However, implementing that decision required several years 
of negotiation during which the contemplated structure changed several times.  
The integrated process started in late 1999, when Aerospatiale Matra, Daimler 
Chrysler Aerospace AG and CASA signed agreement for the creation of the European Aeronautic, Defense and Space Company EADS . EADS is currently Europe s 
premier aerospace company and third worldwide, behind Boeing and Lockheed 
Martin.  
In June 2000, BAE Systems plc (BAeS), EADS and CASA entered into an agreement 
relating to the creation of a joint company with respect to their Airbus assets and 
activities. The three companies integrated their assets and activities, including their 
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respective interests in Airbus G.I.E into a single company. The new company, Airbus 
Integrated Company S.A.S was incorporated under French law and constituted a 
restructuring and rationalization of the existing legal structure. BAe Systems held 
20%. Both EADS and BAe Systems were publicly traded companies listed in London, 
Paris, Frankfurt and Madrid stock exchanges. Prior to the integration, 60% of Airbus 
was already fully owned by publicly held companies.  
The new structure allowed the large civil aircraft activities to be integrated under a 
single management, permitted the centralization of essential functions, streamlined 
the management decision making, and provided wider access to financial markets.  
The transition from partnership to an integrated company was a far more complex 
process than the simple merging of existing corporate assets that has characterized 
the consolidation in the US aerospace industry. The German and British shareholders were spinning-off  their civil aircraft business units into arms lengths 
subsidiaries. The French and Spanish shareholders were spinning-off and 
privatizing their civil aviation business units at the same time. A multinational cross 
border spin-off, privatization and merger process of this scale was without 
precedent in corporate history on either side of the Atlantic.  
The objectives of the Airbus restructuring were the following:  
 to integrate the civil aviation activities under a single management fully 
accountable to its shareholder; 
 to centralize key functions such as design, production, management, after 
sales support, and purchasing in order to further improve efficiency; 
 to streamline management decision making in order to react more quickly to 
market demands; 
 to remove conflicts of interest between ex partners/suppliers by imposing 
corporate governance monitoring; 
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 to provide increase financial transparency, thereby permitting wider access 
to financial markets and foreign partnerships. 
Given the events that unfolded after the integration such as the increase 
competition, the GATT dispute on the 1992 agreement, and the internationalization 





V - Key determinants of competitiveness in the large civil aircraft 
business  
 
The key determinant of competiveness can be divided into those that are internal to 
the firm and those that are external to the firm. Internal factors are by definition controlled or controllable by the aircraft manufacturers such as the firm s R&D 
spending, its strategy, the internationalization of its production, or its funding 
sources. Manufacturers in Europe and in the United States face the same 
circumstances with respect to market conditions. How well manufacturers do vis-à-
vis each other is primarily a function of the choices made by the management of 
each company in response to these market conditions. The internal factors could be 
also characterized as the supply side factor of competitiveness. The key 
determinants are the management strategic choices and decision-making on the 
product strategy, its product differentiation and value proposition to the customers, 
or its manufacturing process, its supplier base strategy, or outsourcing strategy to 
lower its costs.  Guenther (1986) found that there are four key determinants of 
competitiveness across all industries: cost structures, quality, exchange rate and 
government policy. 84 
 
External factors affecting competitiveness of the firm are by definition beyond the 
direct influence of the firm. There are for example, the macroeconomic factors, such 
as exchange rate, fuel prices, inflation, and availability of capital and government 
policy.  The external factors also include the demand factors that come from the 
airlines. The government policy external factors have a major impact on the aircraft 
industry through direct or indirect support of their national aerospace companies. 
As seen in the previous chapter, aerospace is of strategic importance for Europe and 
the US.    
                                                     
84 Guenther Garry (1986), Industrial competitiveness: definitions, measures, and key determinants, 
Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C   
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V-1 Internal determinants of competitiveness 
 
V-1-1 Corporate Structure 
 
Corporate structure influence competitiveness as it determines how and how much 
a company pays taxes on its profits, reports its revenues or whether or not it reports 
to its shareholders or board the strategic decisions the firm might take for its future. 
It also influences its local, states and federal funding in its home base countries and 
in its outsourcing countries.  At the time of its creation, Airbus was organized in a groupement d interet 
economique (GIE) under French law. Airbus main objective at the time of the GIE 
was to create the condition necessary for long term profitable participation in the 
supply of large jetliners to the world. Its goal was to: 
 Develop a base product;   
 Create an appropriate financial/industrial structure; 
 Establish a market base and global support system;  
 Develop a full range product family;  
 Achieve a sufficient share of the total. 
The GIE was the right structure to develop this ambitious goal. It was a grouping of 
mutual economic interest to oversee cooperation between Europe s major 
aeronautical concerns involved in the Airbus project. The GIE was a type of joint 
venture that had a legal identity separate from its members and which had no 
formation requirement of fixed capital contribution. Similar to a partnership in the 
US, the GIE was not required to report financial results. The members of the GIE 
were jointly and separately liable for the GIE debts and obligations. Airbus member 
companies needed not to share information about their costs. The companies as 
well as the GIE knew the actual cost of manufacturing Airbus planes. The lack of 
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transparency decreased the oversight and control the partners could exert on the 
GIE Airbus. A GIE is a unique European structure that allows members of a joint 
venture to collaborate on a particular project without merging or forming a true 
partnership. The benefits from a GIE structure are essentially: 
 Enables cooperation on full partnership basis; 
 Merges the technical strength of the participant;  
 Receives new members easily; 
 Enables partners to vary participation program by program; 
 Avoid locking up large sum of capital; 
 Allow to deal directly to customer as a single entity. 
The GIE major assets were attached to the manufacturing base, therefore in the 
hands of the members. It enabled merging of common interest without the merger 
of assets and avoiding major equity participation. All contractual relationship 
between Airbus and partners were based on fixed price contracts for the life of the 
program in US$ subject to US escalation.  
The GIE structure of Airbus allowed the entity to distribute among its member 
companies the risks, including losses, associated with the high cost of research and 
development, manufacturing and marketing a new commercial aircraft. Without the 
GIE structure it is unlikely that Airbus would have survived pass the A300.  
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Source: Laurent Rouaud  
 
Figure 56: Airbus launch aid by program 











The subsidy issue has been the source of many discussion and debates across the 
Atlantic. Per definition, a subsidy is a grant or gift of money by a government to a 
private person or company to assist an enterprise deemed advantageous to the 
public. The Airbus so called subsidies are repayable through a levy on aircraft sales 
at a real rate of return. Therefore, it is more a refundable launch aid than a subsidy. 
The grey area is that the repayment is not mandatory if the program fails and the 
interest rates are very low.  In the case of Airbus, all programs had been successful 
and the government investment has been paid many times over. 
The refundable launch aid was given to AI partners for a program-specific R&D, and 
not for a generic technology development or not for a production subsidy. The 
government loans were repay repayable on royalty basis. The repayment continued 
for the life of programs even if loan is fully repaid. The A320 family since its 
introduction into airline service some 22 years ago has generated about 10 times 
the original investment made by the government of Germany, France Spain and 
France. It was definitely a good investment. The risk at the time of launch was too 
high to have an interest in the financing of the program.  
In comparison, US manufacturers are obligated to make business decision with the 
approval of their shareholders which are most commonly driven by short term 
interests in a 20 year aircraft product cycle industry. US corporations are also 
taxable.  
The main disadvantage of the GIE structure is that it decision process is more 
complex and slower than for a single entity.  Another disadvantage is that each of 
the Airbus partners has the dual role of being owners and subcontractors. As a 
result, the behavior of the partner might be guided by the best interest as of the 
subcontractor rather than the best interest to Airbus. The dual role brings tension 
between the owner/supplier partners of the GIE on a regular basis. The location of 
the final assembly line was always a passionate negotiation with some heated debate within the G)E. )n contrast, US manufacturer s decisions are solely based on 

































Source: Laurent Rouaud  
 
 
While Airbus GIE were developing its family of aircraft the large US aerospace were 
consolidating. Three main groups emerged from the first round of consolidation. 
Boeing main goal was to increase its military revenue to balance its portfolio of 
product equally between defense and commercial aerospace. At the end of the 






Figure 58: consolidation of the large US defense firms 
UA&T 42.3% Boeing 16.9% Boeing 36.4%
Curtiss-Wright 38.7% McDonnell Douglas 11.3% Lockheed Martin 21.7%
Douglas 8.6% United Technologies 9.1% Raytheon 13.4%
Glenn Martin 5.4% Lockheed 8.4% United Techn. 8.0%
Consolidated 2.9% General Electric 5.8% Northrop Grumman 7.2%
Great Lakes 1.8% General Dynamics      5.7% General Electric 5.9%
Grumman 0.3% Rockwell 5.6% General Dynamics 3.3%
Raytheon 5.4% Litton 3.2%











Source: Aerostrategy, Laurent Rouaud    
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V-1-2 Firm Strategy 
 
Firm strategy is a critical component in the ability to develop a sizable business to 
finance future program and insure the viability of the firm. This is critical 
considering the long program life of an aircraft program. On average, a successful 
program will last 25 years. Some program are upgraded with a newer and more 
efficient engine, or equipped with the latest systems. All aircraft manufactures have 
the same overall goals: 
 Offer new aircraft with the best possible technology that will 
differentiate and give competitive operating costs for their airline 
customers;  
 Maximize commonality across their product portfolio; 
 Develop a worldwide customer support organization; 
 Obtain the lowest possible cost structure. 
 
V-1-3 Develop a family of products 
 
Offering a wide product range that covers the full requirement of an airline 
customer brings not only economy of scale and economy in the operation of the 
airline but also some significant economy of scale, scope and experience to the 
manufacture of civil aircraft. The family concept also provide allow the incumbent to 
react to new entrant by developing a derivative to its product portfolio at a much 
lower cost than a potential entrant by using the same tooling, supplier base. The 
derivative could be as simple as to stretch the current aircraft by adding a few 
frames to the fuselage or shrinking the fuselage by a few frames. The A318 was a 
shrink of the A319, itself a shrink of the A320. The A318 allowed Airbus to compete 
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in the 100 seater against Embraer 100 seater E-195. The A321 is a stretch of the 
A320 that compete with the 757. The demise of Douglas as a supplier of large civil 
aircraft was partly due to the lack of a wide product range within their product 
offering, covering less than 30% of the market.  
Airbus and Boeing have both employed a product strategy that has focused on 
developing a family of product in tune with the market requirements. Airbus, 
because of its later entrance with no legacy products, has relentlessly used 
commonality throughout its product as a differentiating technology.  This strategy 
has been very effective in persuading airline customer to switch supplier from 
Boeing/Douglas to Airbus despite the high cost of transitioning from a fleet to 
another. Te enabler of the commonality throughout the Airbus product line resided 
in the fly-by-wire innovation that Airbus introduced in its A320.  




































The A330/A340 family was launched in 1987 to respond to the increasingly 
deregulated market environment that has led to the growth of point to point 
services and greater efficiency by matching capacity to market size. This market 
requirement led Airbus to develop the A330/A340 family of aircraft for medium and 
long range routes, with the continued policy of pursuing maximum commonality of 
powerplant, fuselage, components, and systems through the product range.  
 
The A330/A340 complemented the A320 family and the A310/A300 family. From 
1993, Airbus has been in a position to build from its common base of products, 
adding incremental developments to enhance its product line and giving choice to 
airlines. The first of these was the A319, a smaller version of the A320, which was 
launched in the depths of the recession in June 1993.  The decision reflected a focus 
on the long-term nature of the civil aircraft business and the anticipation that the 
market would have recovered by the entry into service scheduled at the time in 
1996.  While the timing of the decision was considered bold in the prevailing 
economic conditions in 1993, the subsequent orders and the economic upturn 
proved that it was the right strategic decision.  
The development of a full product offering was completed in the year 2000 for 
Airbus with the launch of the A380. The A380 allowed Airbus to offer a family of 
common product from the 100 seater A318 to the 600 seater A380.  
In 2006, Airbus launched the A350 family that will cover the long range market in 
the 250 to 375 seater market. The A350 three member family has been extremely 
strategically well positioned as a replacement of the 767-300ER, and the 777 and responded to the threat cause by the Boeing s product developments in the long 
range middle of the market. The A350 response was also addressing the success of 
the 777 and the airlines lack of enthusiasm on the 4-engine A340 from the airlines 
because of the higher fuel consumption of quad engine and the ability of twin engine 
to fly longer distance over water.  
159 
 
Boeing has used the same strategy of product development except that it had to 
start from a legacy family of products. Its 737 family has 4 members spanning from 
the 100 seater 737-600 to the 175 seater 737-900ER. In 1990, Boeing launched its 
777, a 300 to 375 seater capable of flying up to 8000 nm at full payload. In 2004, it 
launched the game changing, 787 family that spans from a 225 seater to a 300 
seater in response to the point to point long haul airline requirements. In the A380 
market segment, Boeing launched the 747-8, the successor to the older version of 
the 747 with a new wing and new engines. So far, the aircraft has been very well 
received by the cargo operators but with less enthusiasm by the passenger airlines.  
Both Boeing and Airbus have a complete family of products.  
It is interesting to note that the segment covering the medium range 250 seater 
market has been left uncovered by the incumbents since the A300/A310 and 767 
The A300/A310 has been discontinued in the early 2000s while the 767 is slowly 
ramping down at the end of its product economic life. Why did the potential 
entrants decide not to enter the market space left open, the same market in which 
Airbus decided to enter some 40 years ago? Why are they entering in the most 
competitive market of the 125-175 seater? 
The reasons for not entering the 200-250 medium range is essentially: 
 The 250 twin aisle medium range market demand is small;  
 The demand 250 seater market seat in a grey zone between the short 
range and long range market; 
 The 250 seater market can be addressed by the incumbents from the 
210 short range and by the 300 long range markets;  
 A true 250 medium range seater will require a brand new program 
that would cost a minimum of 7 to 8 billion dollars;  
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 The market for short range 150 seater is crowded (Airbus , Boeing, 
Bombardier CSeries, COMAC C919) but with a demand for 15,000 
aircraft; 
 The incumbent products (A320 and 737) are arriving at the end of 
their product life cycle.  
Figure 61: Demand for new aircraft deliveries 2010-2029 Middle of the market 















Over the next 20 years, Airbus85 estimates that the market for the 250 seater 
segment is about 2,200 units.  This market is made of long range aircraft requiring a 
range of more than 6,000nautical miles for the Europe to Asia and Transpacific 
markets. These two fast growing markets will be actually captured by the adjacent 
market segment of 300 seater aircraft since most of the demand for twin aisle will 
come from higher capacity aircraft. Few of the airlines will went to add another type 
to cover the 250 segment. Similarly, the demand for 250 seater on shorter distance 
such as the Europe to North America and Europe to Africa market are shorter range 
                                                     
85 Airbus, (2009), Global market forecast, Toulouse, France 
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(3,000 to 5,000nm) but can easily be covered by 300 seater longer range aircraft 
such as the 787, A330, 777 or A350s. Some of the 250 seater could actually be filled 
from the 210 seater single aisle aircraft such as the A321 or 737s. Therefore, of the 
2,200 aircraft demand market only about 800 to 900 units are truly medium range 
aircraft. With development costs of about $7B to $8B, the market is too small to 
allow any return on investment at any rate. It worked for Airbus in the 1970s 
because the 250 seater aircraft ,at that stage of air travel development, was used on 
short range domestic Europe and US markets and because most of the international 
markets were concentrated on the North America to Europe route. Today, with the 
development of international travel, the Atlantic market is small in comparison to 
the others. The250 seater aircraft that were used extensively on the domestic 
markets in the 1970s and 1980s have been replaced by much smaller models such 
as the A320s and 737.  The smaller models have become the preferred airline tool 
on the domestic markets as the competition on these markets has increased and as 
the passengers started to value frequency and price rather than only price in the 
earlier stage of air travel maturity.  
 
V-1-4 Commonality as a market barrier 
 
The fly by wire technology that was introduced by Airbus in the mid 1980s on the 
A320 enabled to use the concept of commonality as a valuable differentiator for 
airlines. The common flight deck and common systems which came from the use of 
flight by wire reduced significantly the training costs of flight, cabin and 
maintenance crews within the family. Pilots, for example, could cut the training time 
required for transitioning from one aircraft type to another larger aircraft type from 
three weeks to a few days of computer base simulation. The fly by wire technology 
provides similar handling characteristics and procedures within a same family. 
Airbus applied the fly by wire technology to the larger and longer range products as 
it develop its product line in the 1990s and 2000s. As a result, the 100 seater A318 
and the 555 seater A380 have similar handling characteristics. Not only would a 
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pilot be able to transition quicker within the same family such as the A320 family for 
example, but he could also transition from one family to another (A320 to A330 for 
example) in a matter of days instead of weeks. The shorter training time of pilots, 
crews and mechanics translate in significant labor cost savings for the airlines. In 
addition, because the pilots down time is reduced, they can also be more productive 
and bring more revenues The commonality brings also productivity through a 
quicker turnaround time on the ground and a more efficient use of the aircraft itself. 
Because, the pilot and crew is qualified to fly the full family of aircraft size, the 
airline operation dispatch can adapt the passenger demand with the right aircraft 
size on a short time basis. The load factor will be optimized and the fuel cost be 
reduced as a result. Another economic advantage of fleet commonality is in spare 
parts inventory. The cost of parts inventory decreases with the number of common 
planes, since demand for unique parts and maintenance equipment is minimized. It 
is estimated that the commonality between the A320 and A330, for an airline that 
possesses both aircraft in its fleet, is about $1 million per additional aircraft per 
year.  It is estimated that to get an airline to break with commonality, all other things being equal, the new manufacturer s price would have to be % below that 
of the common competing aircraft. It also means that an incumbent with a complete 
family of aircraft can justify a price 10% higher than the new entrant that either has 
one product family or compete to introduce one product into the airline in which the 
incumbent has already at least one product.  *this provides the airline with the 
incentive to choose products from other families by the same manufacture.  
Commonality tends to discourage entry of new players in the LCA industry. Russia 
has stated that to sell in the western markets of Europe and North America, they 
must use Western engines and avionics not just because of quality considerations 
but also because of commonality.  
Not only does an incumbent manufacturer benefit from developing a commonality 
strategy through the marketing of their products, they also reap benefits from 
development cost efficiencies by using common features and parts on different 
aircraft, manufactures spread development costs across more products.  The cost of 
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developing a derivative with common features is about 10 times cheaper than that 
of developing a new aircraft program. Common parts and manufacturing 
requirements permit for a more efficient assembly of different aircraft on the same 
production line, providing increase productivity through the use of common 
production processes, tools and human resources. The MS21 or the CSeries is likely 
to cost between $9 billion to $12 billion to develop. The new aircraft to be delivered 
in 2014 is anticipated to bring a 15% fuel burn and a 5% operating cost advantage 
over the current A319 or 737-700. Airbus and Boeing have public ally stated that 
they are working on re-engineering their A320 and 737 series of aircraft with new 
generation engines and some slight aerodynamic clean up that will yield the same 
economic improvement. The cost of developing a re-engine program is likely to be 
in the neighborhood of $1 billion to $1.5 billion As Airbus and Boeing have already 
manufactured several thousands of their aircraft. Their recurrent costs are very low 
compared to the early program recurring costs of a potential entrant, while the 
benefits to the airline in terms of operating costs are the same.  
The commonality has some trade off and limits for incumbents. It works best over 
an entire product range that is developed over a decade or two. As the technology 
evolves, manufactures must decide between maintaining a level of commonality and 
introducing a new technology on a new program that cannot be retrofitted on 
previous programs. As the product line ages and develops, manufactures are 
confronted with the dilemma between preserving commonality and introducing a 
step change innovation. A potential entrant can use the commonality to its 
advantage if the incumbent are still developing products on a previous commonality 
cycle and if the new entrant innovation provides a significant step in operating cost 
advantage.   
V-1-5 Product innovations  
 
Product innovation is a key determinant of competitiveness as it improves the 
product and services in the area of product performance, economics, environmental 
impact, productivity, safety, or operational flexibility. Technology for the sake of 
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technology has absolutely no value in the competitive airline environment. The 
changes in technology are driven by the market, competition and regulatory forces 
regarding safety and environmental standards. Innovation enable to improve 
operating cost for airlines fuel consumption, maintenance, training … , aircraft 
performance (take off field length, payload, reliability, productivity, CO2 emission, noise emission, turn around time … , or passenger appeal comfort, internal noise 
level, flight entertainment, interior appearance, humidity of cabin … .  Different 
airline segments can value innovation in a different way. A Low Cost Airline will be 
as attentive to operating cost as a legacy airline, but will value aircraft boarding and 
de-boarding more than a legacy airline. Airbus, for example, has brought a number 
of key innovations over the last decades. Aircraft delivered today use technology 
developed in the 1990. Among the innovation that Airbus brought to the market in 
the 1990s are: 
 Advanced aluminum alloys on the A310 
 Composite in primary structures 
 Trim tank/center of gravity control 
 Carbon brakes 
 Sidestick controller 
 Fly-by-wire 
 Extensive use of composites and advance aluminum alloys on A320s 
 Cross Crew Qualification and Mix Fleet Flying 
 Carbon Fiber Reinforce Plastic on the A380 
 GLARE on upper fuselage panel 
 Laser welded lower fuselage 
 
The development of larger aircraft that travel longer distances more efficiently 
created the need for material which are lighter, stronger, and last longer. Aircraft 
manufactures have introduced composite material to satisfy that need.  
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V-1-6 How do airlines evaluate the value proposition of competing product   
 
Airlines are sophisticated buyers. The aircraft fleet planning decision can 
significantly affect the viability of the airline over the entire life of the aircraft 
selected. As a result, airlines tend to be analytical and exhaustive in their review of 
the available competing products. Their evaluation is always conducted by 
analyzing the performance and economics of the competing aircraft and how those factors impact costs and revenue generating over an aircraft s economic life of 
approximately 25 years.  
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The first part of the evaluation is the life cycle costs and revenues of an aircraft type, 
including such elements as fuel burn, maintenance, crew costs and ownership on the 
cost side, and passenger and cargo loads on the revenue side. Competing aircraft are 
evaluated over a specific mission defined as a given number of passengers over a 




The second part of an aircraft evaluation most commonly consists of assessing the 
different competing aircraft ability to be economically redeployed on different 
routes and still generate profits. This can be characterized as aircraft type flexibility 
and is of increasing importance to airlines as they attempt to manage future 
uncertainty due to both external macroeconomic shocks and competitive move 
within its industry. A major element driving this flexibility is type commonality. 
Other attributes considered can include the effect of a wider and more spacious 
cross section on a passenger preference or the branding associated with the aircraft 
family.  
Airlines typically quantify the attribute and characteristics of competing aircraft by 
using discounted cash flow analysis, projecting twenty years or more into the 
revenue future.  The method allows airlines to simulate the effect of their aircraft 
decision on their bottom line. Ownership cost represents a small fraction of the 
overall cost and is only one parameter of the evaluation equation.  For example, an 
average wide body aircraft can consume its own cost in fuel over its economic life 
span. Moreover, the discount cash flow methods provides a result that can be 
related back to the aircraft price  For example, if an aircraft consumes $340,000 
worth of fuel less than the competing aircraft, one can calculate a resulting  
discounted cash flow of $3 million., commanding a price premium of the same 
amount. Fuel saving can be achieved through innovation. As an example, the saving 
in structural weight due to the use of composite material is 1,600 lbs. A 1,600 lbs 
saving is equivalent to adding 8 passengers with their luggage on every flight, which 







Figure 63: Airline evaluation of competing aircraft 
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Source: Laurent Rouaud  
In the example above, aircraft B has a present value advantage of the discounted 
cash flow of about $3 million for aircraft B. Its value proposition come from a better 
fuel consumption, and better passenger and cargo revenues. The $3 million 
advantage means that aircraft B can justify a $3 million price premium over aircraft 
A.  
By developing aircraft using innovative and advanced technology and commonality 
benefits throughout its product families, an aircraft manufacture can succeed in 
differentiating its products from its competition and offering airlines a very 
competitive asset in terms of their ability to generate profits and minimize costs.  
V-1-7 Entry barriers  
 
A new entrant must choose a market segment or niche and develop differentiating 
innovative technologies to attract key potential customers away from the incumbent 
firms. In addition, a new entrant must be able to commit and have access to billions 
of dollars to design, develop, test, certified and produce a civil aircraft program. 
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Boeing, for example, in 1966s, incurred a development cost estimated at $1.2 billion 
in 1966 dollars for its 747 program.  It was more than three time the total 
capitalization of Boeing at that time. It almost pushed Boeing into bankruptcy. Once 
the investment is made, the funds cannot be recovered by selling the assets, they are 
sunk costs. Incumbents producers have capital available from their current program 
and have access to financing as they have an history of previous successful program 
and better credit rating that an entrant. The following costs are the sunk costs or the 
non-recurring costs that constitute the major entrée barriers to the large civil 
aircraft business: 
Table 9: Entry barriers for large commercial aircraft  
Non-recurring costs Description 
Design 
human resources, IT, design bureau work in the area of 
structural tests, wind tunnel testing, flight test, aircraft 
certification 
Wind tunnel  Design and production of model for wind tunnel testing 
Structural test 
Prototypes production, tools, test equipment, installation of test 
equipments 
Simulators Design of flight simulators 
Equipment development Development of all systems: air conditioning, communications, 
automatic pilot, FMS, electric power, hydraulic … 
Calibration and tooling Design the manufacturing processes 
Development aircraft First aircraft for test flight 
Flight tests Test equipment, IT, ground support 
Modifications changes in the aircraft conception, tooling, documentations 
Ground support 
storage, maintenance of flight test aircraft, equipment, tooling, … 
Documentation 
Develop the documentation for maintenance, operability, training, … 
Others Supplier integration, contract negotiation with suppliers, travel, 
Customer focus group, advertisement, promotion, … 
Sales and marketing organization Build a strong global marketing and sales organization 
Source: Laurent Rouaud )ncumbent s relationship with customers  
The new entrant would have to establish the credibility in the very concentrated 
airline market. There are about 400 airlines in the world with a fleet ranging from a 
few turboprop aircraft to network airlines with a fleet of 500 or more aircraft. The 
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credibility of the entrant would have to be established with a few of the airline trend 
setters such as Air France, Lufthansa, Easyjet, or Ryanair in Europe, Singapore, 
Qantas, Korea Air in Asia, TAM, Lan, or Gol in Latin America, Emirates, or Qatar in 
the Middle East.  The trend setters and incumbent manufactures have established 
long term relationship throughout their management structures and are 
continuously engaged in Voice of Customer dialogue to help shaping the next 
generation aircraft with the manufactures. The incumbents have already proven 
their technical capabilities.  The entrant will have to heavily invest in building a 
strong marketing and sales force, but more importantly will have to establish a 
global and credible customer support organization in which the customers will 
trust. The costs incurred by a manufactures of providing a after sales support to its 
airline customers declines significantly as the installed fleet of aircraft increases. 
The upfront cost of establishing a customer support network that is global and 
satisfactory to the customer is substantial. A long established airline-manufacture 
relationship cannot be built easily by new entrants.   
In addition, because an aircraft is a working asset that last up to 30 years, airlines 
decision to acquire an aircraft is influenced by their assessment of whether the 
manufacture will stay business for the long term to continue supporting the aircraft 
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Economy of scale and learning curve and economy of scope 
The long term presence of incumbent firms provides important cost advantage. 
First, cost efficiencies in the large civil aircraft business is derived through the 
lengthy production runs, which allows  manufactures to spread the high 
development costs over more aircraft and provide a learning curve effect that makes 
unit production costs  to decline as output increases.  
Baldwin and Krugman (1988)86 showed , using a Cournot Nash87 game subsidy to 
model the welfare effect of industrial trade policies in the LCA, that the substantial 
learning economies caused the negative impact of Airbus entry in the market for the 
industry and the European tax payers but brought consumer gains. Klepper 
(1990)88, using a Cournot-Nash game in production capacity confirmed that the 
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competitive benefits of Airbus were diluted because of the steep learning curve in 
LCA manufacturing by transferring learning economies from Boeing to Airbus with 
an overall loss of value. Because of the learning economies, Neven and Seabright 
(1995)89 showed with their competition model that the absence of Airbus would 
have discouraged Douglas Aircraft from producing the MD-11 (300 seater long 
range aircraft). Counter intuitively, it is because Boeing can obtained higher 
economy of scale from the absence of Airbus and therefore price the 777 at a level 
which Douglas cannot compete. Given the fact that the 777 is 25% cheaper to 
operate than the MD-11, Boeing can obtain higher value pricing for the 777, while 
enjoying significant higher economies of scales. The model suggests that Airbus entry made life easier for Douglas because its sales reduced Boeing s economies of 
scales and therefore increased its pricing relative to the MD-11. Benkard (2000) 
90even argued that restrained antitrust policy could be justified based on the fact 
that concentrating learning is socially optimal 91. 
 
It is recognized that civil aircraft manufacturing is characterized by a learning curve 
with an elasticity of 0.2, i.e. a doubling of the output brings a 20% lower production 
costs. Secondly, fixed costs can be also spread by using components, systems, and production facilities from previous programs. Manufactures  experience from 
previous programs enables them to design, develop, test, certify and produce much 
faster than its smaller new entrant. This is particularly true for Airbus since its 
strategy is based on developing common product.  A third advantage comes from 
the optimum utilization of the production resources.  Not only does the number of 
aircraft produced in critical, the length of the program, is as important.  
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V-1-8 Flexibility of the production  
 
The flexibility of the production is a key element of competitiveness because it 
maintains the position of the incumbents. In case of a sharp increase of demand 
from the market (as in 1988-1989, or 2005-2008), a low production output will 
delay the availability of aircraft and will discourage airlines to place an order to fill 
air travel demand growth. Similarly, a sharp drop of demand for air travel (as in 
1992, 2001, 2010) followed by a long reaction time in adjusting production output 
will drive inventory up, and create white tail  aircraft, the worst nightmare for 
manufactures. Airbus and Boeing have a 6month lead time in building an aircraft, 
from the first cut of metal to the actual delivery. They also need six months to 
reduce the manufacturing output. Both manufactures can produce a maximum of 42 
to 44 A320 and 40-42 737 per month. In comparison, the CSeries production line 
will only be able to produce about 20 to 25 per month.  Continuous improvement in 
manufacturing cycle time introduces benefits in flexibility in order to respond to 
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changes in market demand, an ability that was absent in the previous cycles of the 
1980s. Lead time reduction is also a major factor in driving inventory performance, 
which is vital for the industry in releasing cash previously tied-up in working 
capital. The choice of the right level of aircraft production level is a compromise 
between:  
o the additional costs from the under utilization of the production 
facilities; 
o the potential  delivery delays and the loss of potential sales from lack 
of open aircraft positions;  
o the buildup of unsold inventory that would drive price down and 
incur;  
o the social regulations in Europe which tend to avoid large hiring and 
layoff of production personnel. 
It is the interest of the manufacture to manage carefully its workforce since labor 
represents 25% of the cost of building an aircraft. In 1970, Boeing laid off 60,000 
people (55% of its workforce) following the cancellation of orders on its 747s. 
Shortly after, Boeing had difficulties in hiring back as demand for aircraft increased 
and lost experienced workforce that resulted into quality issues in the production 
line.  
Benkard (2000) suggested that learning economies can be achieved by the 
accumulation of human capital. The flexibility of the production system paid off for 
Airbus during the economic recovery following the event of September 11, 2001. 
Airbus production flexibility comes from the high level of automation throughout 
the Airbus factories, the manufacturing workforce, and the efficient work processes.  
The flexibility of the work force is built with short term sub-contracting (retractable 
within 6 months), working time enhancement (such as forced temporary unpaid 
leave), overtime management, and temporary labor, time limited contracted labor 
and voluntary early retirement. Before 9/11, this built-in production system 
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flexibility accounted for 20% of the total capacity.  In 2002, through reduction of 
overtime, reduction of weekly work time, flex time, Airbus achieved significant labor 
cost reductions without layoff. 
This was achieved with constant dialogue between management and the work force 
representatives throughout the Airbus production system. The built in flexibility 
proved to be very effective in managing the downturn while preserving and growing 
the valuable skills and experience of the workforce. It also succeeded in keeping its 
experienced workforce to rapidly ramp up production when the recovery of the 
demand for air travel happened.  
In contrast, Boeing laid off 30,000 people in 2002. The production rates increased in 
the mid 1990s resulted in the increase of its workforce from a low of 90,000 to a high in  of , . Drastic lay off are costly. For example, Boeing s Form K 
filing to the Securities Exchange Commission for Q3 1997, reported a $1.6 billion 
pretax charge representing the financial impact of unplanned and abnormal 
production inefficiencies and late delivery cost.  
During the recovery years of 2005 through 2008, because of its production 
flexibility, Airbus was able to resume its production ramp up at a much faster pace 
than that of its competitor. 
V-1-9 Internationalization of the supply chain  
 
In the 1990s there was little if any breakthrough in technology or structure of the 
aerospace industry except for the consolidation of the industry into major firms. The 
development of the next generation of aircraft (787 and A350) and the next single 
aisles is precipitating a supply chain breakthrough leading to an extensive 
globalization of the productive system of the incumbents The capacity of 
manufactures to simplify a complex supply chain from thousand of suppliers to a 





The first internationalization of the productive system started with offset obligation 
in aircraft sales contract in the 1970 and 1980.Many of these offset has been 
triggered to the economic development or industrial diversification plans of foreign 
governments that control the purchasing decisions of their national airlines92. At 
that time there were still a number of government own airlines whose government 
wanted to share the production of the aircraft they were buying. This has resulted in 
the emergence of offset agreement (initiated by McDonnell Douglas and Yugoslavia 
in 1972). The offset agreements increased steadily throughout the 1980 and 1990s.  
These offsets were also the beginning of Asia s emerging economies plan to transfer 
technologies through co-operation with established western industries.  The offset 
agreement delivered especially new production methods to foreign manufactures, 
or an international transfer of production skills from one nation to another.93  Most 
studies of internationalization of the production have focus on labor such as 
Schoenburger (1988) 94and some on product life cycle Markusen (1985)95.  Most studies however failed to list the manufactures  own actions to drive these offsets as 
a way to access new customers as a market strategy. Eriksson (1995)96 provided a 
comprehensive survey of the aircraft manufacture reasons for the 
internationalization of their production.  According to Smith (2001), faced with the 
increasing threat of Airbus, Boeing responded with joint ventures, mergers, and 
international subcontracting arrangement.97 In the mid 1990s, offset contracts 
multiplied 98quickly. The timing coincided with Boeing exclusive contract with the 
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three major airlines in the US. For example, Boeing offset contract with Korea 
involved building a wing for the 717 in 1995. Hyundai received the engineering and 
technical drawing and were able to produce wing as early as 1997. According to 
Mowery (1987)99 , offsets did not have a negative impact on the US employment of 
highly skilled labor as it increased sales and therefore production of the final 
assembly and component made in the US.  Airbus has evolved from being focused on the four main industrialized nations of Europe to % of today s spend is spread among nearly  countries, the largest %  being the US where €  billion is spent 
per year. In China Airbus has source $70 million worth of industrial goods in 2007, a 
figure that is expected to almost quadruple by 2012. China is to become a major partner for the A  with % of the aerostructure manufacture there. Airbus  )ndia 
co-operation dates back 30 years. Airbus has established co-operation on R&T, IT 
services, MRO, training and manufacturing agreements. Hindustan Aeronautics 
Limited (HAL) now produces almost half of all A320 forward passenger doors 
worldwide. Airbus Engineering Centre India (AECI) is expected to employ 300 
people in the next few years Airbus Training India partnership with Canadian 
training company CAE will be capable soon to train up to 1,000 pilots per year and 
will offer maintenance courses. In Russia a wide co-operation program will generate 
more than $2 billion turnover for Russia over ten years ($800 million for Airbus) 
covering R&T, material procurement and design, manufacturing and certification 
work. The ECAR, (Engineering Centre Airbus Russia) was set up in 2003 with 
Kaskol. About 150 ECAR Russian engineers and scientists have been involved in the 
A350 XWB. Under offset agreements, Russia will supply $200million of components 
over the 10 years to Airbus and more than half of Airbus titanium will come from 
the Verkhnaya Salda Metallurgical Production Association in Russia. Airbus stated 
that the two major reasons for internationalization are (1) financial: to achieve 
market growth, while remaining competitive and integrating natural hedging and 
(2) tap into resources: to access the best resources in order to reduce costs.  
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Airbus CEO, Tom Enders, stated in February 2010 that internationalization is driven by 
finding engineering resources in emerging countries as the European and US pool of 
qualified engineers diminishes. According to Airbus, the aging populations as the baby 
boomer generation approaches retirement, and the changes in graduate output are 
driving them to seek outside the west for engineering talents. For example, in the US, the 
steady decline in engineering undergraduates (down 1,500 to 75,000 since 2004) is set 
to continue for another three or four years, echoed by drops in the number of graduate 
students (down nearly 4,000 to 37,000). As up to 40% of those graduates go on to work 
in other professions, there are even fewer available for the industry. As a result Airbus 
believes that is difficult to ignore several hundred thousand engineering graduates in 
China and India. For Airbus, tapping into new resources can complement existing R&T 
teams to accelerate the application of step-change solutions, freeing them up to focus on 
higher value-added activities.  
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In other words, leveraging large international network of highly skilled people and 
experienced suppliers is supposed to add more brainpower onto projects, speed up 
product launches and upgrade quality as well as freeing OEMs to focus on high value 
added items.  
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However, the transformation of the supply chain of Airbus and Boeing towards more 
internationalization is not only a matter of talents is more about reducing manufacturing 
costs to stay competitive as the new technology breakthroughs required for the next new 
generation necessitate  massive R&D resources.  It all about leveraging the innovative 



















Source: Boeing, Laurent Rouaud  
 
The analysis of the foreign content of Boeing aircraft shows that in the 1960s, every 
major airframe sub assembly for the 727 was produced inside the US. Only 2% of 
the content in terms of value was produced outside the US on the 727. By 1990, 5 of 
the 7 critical airframe components for the 777 were produced abroad.  As much as 
30% of the value of the 777 was produced outside the US.  
 
However, all aircraft that fly today were designed, manufactured and their parts 
supplied under the organization that prevailed in the 1960s and 1970s when the 
B737C and A300 were developed. Technology on the new programs, to the 
exception of the fly by wire, was evolutionary. The same suppliers were selected 
program after program. Most suppliers had limited engineering and innovation 
capabilities, the conflicting transactional relationships prevailed rather than 
partnership, the supplier size was limited by the role given by the manufactures, 
1000s of suppliers had direct access to the aircraft manufactures, often located 
around their engineering base and often family owned.  That supply chain system 
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led to a limited improvement potential to lower manufacturing costs, a complex 
supply chain with limited agility, a limited re-engineering or innovation in current 
products, and long development and lead time and a lack of integration. The 787, 
currently under test flight, brought the globalization to an entire new level both in 
terms of content but also in terms of production and assembly to such an extent that 
it is considered a supply chain breakthrough.  Given the high cost of labor in Japan, 
the decision to outsource 35% of the 787 to Japan could be questioned.  However 
Boeing will be receiving about $1.4 billion of Japanese government subsidy. In 
addition All Nippon Airways and Japan Airlines are both launching customers of the 
787.  According to MacPherson and Prichard (2004), the real drivers is the political 
relationship as the platform for Japan sales and government subsidies. 100 
 
Figure 69: Boeing 787 outsourcing engineering 
Source: Boeing
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The 787 breakthrough were driven by the ambitious strategy of  
 develop faster  
 Buy more integrated packages 
 Flow down higher share of risk to suppliers 
 Become more global  
 
It means transferring engineering roles to the suppliers, selecting suppliers much 
earlier than before on basis of high level specifications, reduce the number of 
suppliers at tier-1 suppliers level which implies a new structure of the supply chain 
and new relationship with suppliers. As a result, tier1 led suppliers consolidated 
and now develop their portfolio of technologies and better control their supply 
chain to retain direct market access to OEMs and airlines. At the subassembly level, 
the tier-2 suppliers also consolidated.  
 
Figure 70: Suppliers consolidation to a few tier-1 































 more integrated packages 
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The ultimate goal of the airframers was to develop faster which implied giving 
suppliers more responsibility; transferring detail design and buying integrated 
systems. The required capabilities to become and remain a tier-1 supplier include 
design, technologies development and product support.  
 
For Airbus it means that the suppliers were selected much earlier in the 
development of the A350 compared to the A330. Landing gears, APU,  hydraulic 
systems for example were selected at the authorization to offer (ATO) the product 
instead of 18 months later at the design freeze It also translate in much fewer work 
packages to suppliers, from 150 on the A330 to about 90 on the A350. 
 
If the ambitious new outsourcing model leading to more globalization and less tier-1 
suppliers will expand in the future, it has been interrupted or temporary revised to 
become more conservative. Following the well publicized major setback of 787, 
Boeing is taking a more conservative approach for the time being. Production delays 
on the 787 will result in almost 3 years delay in aircraft delivery to airlines. The 
delays has benefited Airbus because it had (1) the best product currently in 
production in the 787 segment with the A330, and (2) Airbus had aircraft position 
available to offer to unsatisfied 787 customers.  An estimated 150 to 200 A330s was 
sold because of the 787 delays. In addition to the loss of business, the delays 
represent significant added development costs for Boeing because of the additional 
work to be done, the rework on 787s already in the production pipeline, and the 
contractual obligations made to airlines as they will not receive their aircraft as 
anticipated in their fleet growth plan.  The difficulties of the new model 
implementation at the supplier level were underestimated. Key suppliers were not 
ready for the changes and the new technologies, such as the carbon barrel, were not 
as mature as it had been anticipated. Their own supply chain was not mature 
enough to deliver on spec and on time. To reach their committed cost goals, the tier-
1 suppliers embarked themselves in the globalization of their supply chain. For 
example, from 2000 to 2009, some 125 major aerospace companies elected to move 
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some of their lower value added manufacturing to Mexico, from 25 in 2000 to more 
than 150 suppliers in 2009.  
 
Nevertheless, the new supply chain model will continue in the future and will 
become a key determinant of competitiveness in the large civil aircraft business. It 
also means that the tier-1 suppliers get access the lucrative aftermarket and that the 
consolidation extended capabilities of tier-1 suppliers led to raising the entry 
barrier for aspiring tier-2.  However, it also means that the tier-1 suppliers will be in 
a position to offer the same packages to new potential entrants that they offer to 
their large incumbent customers and make it easier for the potential entrant to 
design, develop and bring to market a new product. The only risk for entrants is that 
large OEMs develop exclusivity agreement with the tier-1, and that pricing might be 
higher due to the larger volume of Tier-1 production for the main OEM. The capacity 
of production might also be an issue as Tier-1 dedicated more production capacity 
to their high volume, lower risk incumbent customers. 
 
 V-2 External determinants of competitiveness 
 
The external factors of competitiveness include fuel price, regulations, 
macroeconomics, business cycles, availability of capital and government policies. 
The following chapter assessed the importance of government policies affecting the 
large civil aircraft industry. The debates does not centered on the fact of 
government support but rather on the form and amount of the support.  
The United States has chosen to support its aeronautical industry through broadly 
based research that is directed and funded by government agencies such as NASA, 
the Department Commerce and the Department of Defense. The research consists of 
applied and development research by industry contractors, as well as basic research 
within the university and private research centers. Often, research programs have 
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direct applications by industry contractors as well as basic research within 
university and private research center.  
The issue of government support for the large civil aircraft business has long been a 
source of transatlantic debate. Given the large investment required to develop an 
aircraft, there would be no commercial aircraft without the support of their 
government.  Brander and Spencer (1985) 101highlighted a prisoner s dilemma in 
export subsidies. Both the US and Europe could be better off by reducing subsidy on 
each side, but would be worst off if there were to unilaterally reduce subsidy.  
Therefore is likely that both will continue to seek subsidy or launch aid in the future 
likely through international procurement source.  Tyson and Chin (1992)102 
suggested that the US industry issues vis a vis Airbus are not due to errors of trade 
policy, but to errors of domestic industrial policy. 
The US government acknowledged this fact when it entered the 1979 GATT 
agreement. Often, research program have direct applications which by consequence 
benefit the industry contractor, thereby converting the contract into a subsidy. 
Specifically, through the life of the program grant and beyond, the technology and 
know-how remain with the company and no repayment to the US government is 
required. For example, when the NASA High Speed Commercial Transport program 
was cancelled, none of the $1.8 billion expended by the US government was 
recouped from the companies that performed and benefited from the research. The 
US National Research Council identified some examples: 
…Some aeronautics R&T programs have produced breakthrough  that are 
immediately usable. NASA’s low drag cowl for radial engines and coke-bottle 
fuselage  to reduce transonic drag rise are examples from the past. In the 
Department of Defense, aeronautics breakthroughs include shaping for stealth, 
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multi-axis thrust vectoring exhaust nozzles integrated with airflight control 
systems, fly-by-wire flight control technologies, high strength high stiffness 
fiber composite structures, and tilt wing rotorcraft technology. Many of these 
advances have been achieved in partnership with NASA R&T programs and are 
finding widespread use in both military and commercial aircraft … 103 
Unable to match the US support in this sector, Europe has taken a different 
approach that focuses its research on certain important technologies and directly 
funding its program through grant or contracts, but rather through repayable loans 
for specific high yield project. This form of support can be profitable for the 
government involved. In the case of the A320 program for example, Airbus fully 
repaid the associated loans with interest and continues to make royalty payments to 
the European governments.  
The US government argues that Europeans loans are not made on commercial 
conditions while the Europeans governments, in response, argue that the billions of 
dollars of research grants by the US government constitute subsidies and should be 
subject to international disciplines.  
In addition to the forms of government support, Europeans note that there are other 
means of subsidization employed by the US. The foreign Sales Corporations (FSC) 
tax rules allow a company to receive large tax benefits on income earned from 
export. By avoiding federal taxation, US exporters with FSCs enjoy lower costs than 
their competitors. The financial benefits can be passed to the customers in the form 
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PART 2: Threats to the Large Commercial Aircraft 
Duopoly 
VI-A new era of innovation development: the entrance of emerging 
countries as innovation powerhouses 
 
Governments in emerging parts of the world are planning and acting on increasing 
their knowledge base economy as they realize that it will generate well-paying jobs, 
contribute to higher value products and ensure competitiveness when their 
economy matures. As stated by Fisher (2006)104, innovation is increasingly seen not 
only as a critical driver in national and regional economic development but as the 
most important component in the future. As a result, many national and regional 
governments as well as academics have become focused on the policies promoting 
innovation105. As early as the 1990s, the Chinese State Council identified innovation 
as a critical objective for their future, and a series of effective reforms were put in 
motion. Worldwide, knowledge intensive services industries and high technology 
manufacturing industries have grown more rapidly than any other segments of 
economic activity. In 2007, these knowledge and technology intensive industries 
combined contributed about $16 trillion to the global economic or 30% of world 
GDP. The top 5 high technology industries were:  communications and 
semiconductors ($445 billion), pharmaceuticals ($319 billion), scientific 
instruments ($189 billion), aerospace ($153billion), and computers and office 
machinery ($114 billion). 
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In 1990, the US and Europe represented as much as 90% of the total worldwide 
R&D spending. Today, Asian countries represent more than 30% of the world R&D. 
The emerging Asian economies are investing heavily in technology in order to bring 
more added value to their export but more importantly to continue the high level of 
growth their economy is used to and is based on. It follows a logic of growth that 
was first based on export of lower added value items such as textile to higher valued 
items such as complete computers. Export will continue to strengthen for some 
time, fueling their economy. Soon, a new force or source of growth will take the 
relay: their formidable number of growing middle class consumers whose 
consumption will accelerate in the present decade. Finally, in the next decade, while 
the domestic consumer will still be providing a formidable level of growth, 
technological innovation on high value products and services will take the relay to 
continue their high rate of economic growth. As in the US and the UK, the advantage 
over Europe is that China will only have to deal with one system. The second even 
greater advantage is the power of their market size in the next decade. Therefore, 
not only the manufacturing center of the world and the biggest market of the world 
will become Chinese, but the innovation center of the world might also become 
Chinese. This put additional pressure on the US and especially on Europe to 
strengthen and unify their technology transfer mechanisms to a more commercial 
output driven.  
This chapter highlights the importance placed by emerging nations on innovation.  
In particular, it focuses on understanding the innovation system in China. The 
analysis is important in determining if China might enter the commercial aircraft 
business successfully. Will they enter the market with a me too  aircraft or will they 
have the capability to bring a differentiated product with major innovations, and if 
yes when could it happened? In the next chapter, the different components of the 
National Innovation System will be reviewed and analyzed through an OECD 
document guideline106.  
                                                     
106 OECD (1996) The measurement of scientific and technological activities proposed guidelines for 




VI-1 Metric to measure China ability to innovate and become an LCA leader 
 To do so, it is important to not only analyze China s R&D evolution and the 
deployment of its advanced education system that will foster their innovative 
propensity in the next decade, but it is also important to understand the innovative 
environment of the firms, which is itself greatly dependent on the national policy 
towards innovation development.  
 
The pursuit of modernization in China through sciences and technology science and 
technology has been central to its economic reforms to modernize its economy and 
its society in the context of greater social, ecological and environmental 
sustainability. 107 
 
There are three main actors in the Chinese innovation system:  the government 
research institutes, the higher education sector and the business sector. The 
effectiveness of the innovation system will depend on the performance of each of 
them, the coordination between them in the environment created by the 
government policies but also to a larger extent nowadays the interactions with the 
international innovation scenes. The government is not directly involved in the 
performance of R&D, but it plays a key role in (1) providing  direct support through 
funding and tax incentives and (2) in setting the coordination environment. Since 
the early 1990s, similar to the developed countries, the Chinese  government has 
put in place a number of programs to foster coordination among the three actors.  
 
The OECD s document called The Measurement of scientific and technological 
activities – Proposed guidelines for collecting and interpreting technological 
innovation data (referred as the Oslo Manual) is an interesting document in the 
sense that it gives an appropriate map of the elements of a good national innovation 
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policy or a set of conditions that makes the firm environment conducive to 
innovation. This document has been used to evaluate the innovation environment of 
firms in emerging countries at this point in time. The purpose of using this map is to 
give a framework to our analysis. It helps in collecting the data (qualitative and 
quantitative) that will base our judgment on the degree of readiness that the 
emerging countries have reached in shaping their innovation system. According to 
the OECD, there are four categories or domains of factors relating to innovation: (1) 
the business enterprises firms ,  the science and technology institutions,  
the transfer and absorption of technology, knowledge and skills and (4) the 
surrounding environment. The fourth domain is of particular importance for 
emerging countries as it drives the range of opportunities for innovation through its 
institutions, its legal arrangement, its macroeconomic settings, and other conditions 
that exist regardless of any considerations of innovation.  Those four domains are 
mapped in the following fashion:  
 
Figure 71: The four general domains of the innovation policy 
The four general domains of the innovation policy terrain
FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS
The general conditions and institutions
which set the range of opportunities for innovation
TRANSFER FACTORS







SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING BASE
Science and technology institutions underpinning the
innovation dynamo
Source: Department of Industry, Science and Technology (1996), Australian Business Innovation: A Strategic Analysis – Measures of





VI-2 The framework conditions to innovation 
 
The framework conditions set the rules and range of opportunities for innovation. 
The framework conditions include the institutions set-up, the basic educational 
system for the general population, which determine the minimum educational 
standards and the domestic market. It also includes the communications 
infrastructures (roads, telephone, and electronic communication), the financial 
institutions (ease of access to venture capital) and the market access (such as size 
and ease of access). 
 
VI-2-1 The Chinese institutions influencing innovation  
 The highest level of China s institution for R&D governance includes six main 
actors108:  
1.  the State Council (top level of China central government) Steering Group of  
Science & Technology  (S&T) and Education which main role is to  provides 
top-level leadership and co-ordination;  
 
2. the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) is at the center of the innovation system in China. )t designs and implements China s S&T and 
innovation policies. Its key missions include: formulating strategies, policies, 
laws and regulations for S&T development; setting priorities, promoting the 
building of the national S&T innovation system; conducting research on 
major S&T issues related to economic and social development; guiding the 
reform of the S&T system; designing, organizing and implementing funding 
programs for basic and applied R&D; inducing firms and especially SMEs to 
                                                     




innovate; creating science parks and incubators, etc.; and promoting 
international S&T co-operation and exchanges; 
3. the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) occupy a strong position in the S&T 
and innovation system since it depends directly from the central government 
within the State Council. Most of the government R&D is done within the CAS. 
CAS responsibility is to conduct research, to undertake nationwide surveys 
on natural resources, to provide scientific data and advice to the government 
for decision making, to undertake national R&D programs, to train personnel 
and provide advanced graduate education, and to promote high-technology 
companies. CAS has 91 research institutions and received the majority of the 
government funds for innovation. It is CAS that undertook  the reform of the 
R&D system that started in the early 1990s. It greatly influences MOST in 
establishing S&T policies. CAS is also responsible for the transfer and 
commercialization  of R&D output; 
4. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is responsible 
for the  allocation of public funding for innovation and the technological 
upgrading of all economic sectors. It is a powerful institution with 
responsibility across the full horizontal chain of the economy and of the S&T 
in particular. Within NDRC, the department of High Technology is 
responsible for monitoring the progress of the high tech development.  
5. The Ministry of Education (MOE) is responsible for setting policies for human 
resources through higher education, for university research and for the 
commercialization of research;  
6. The National Natural Science Foundation originally created as a funding 
agency for basic research. It has played an important role in implementing China s basic research policies in general. The NNSFC promotes and supports 
basic research and identifies and fosters scientific talent. It mainly funds 
research projects carried out by universities on the basis of evaluation and 
peer review of proposals. It has grown into the role of  advising  the 
government on major issues related to the development of basic research. 
NNSFC develops international cooperation and exchanges with scientific 
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organizations in foreign countries. Funds mainly come from the government 




The framework is also characterized by the absence of any coordination body 
among those institutions concerning S&T. The coordination is done on a case by 
case, program by program. 
 
VI-2-2 Education set-up and basic education system 
 
Concerning the educational system, China is still behind the US and Europe per 
population but is catching up at impressive rate. The number of first bachelor 
degrees per 100 of 24 year-old might be low in percentage of the population but 
given the sheer size of the population of China, it is rather impressive. Although the 
Chinese first degree rate has increased almost fivefold over the last 12 years while it 
stagnated in the developed countries, still only 5 out of 100 24-year old Chinese has 
a bachelor degree. This compares to 33 in the US.  
 
However, in term of volume, China has produced in 2002 (last data available) six 
time more engineers than in the US. The 2010 figure should well exceed this ratio.  The higher education sector s role in supplying human resources for technology will 
be a key factor in the performance of the R&D underway in China. Such a rapid 
growth can only be explained by strong financial support from the government to 
invest in a higher education in order to become a world leader in terms of 
innovation by the next decade.  The Chinese government seems to concentrate their 
support in the field of science and engineering, certainly in order to create a world-
class research environment and performance. The top 50 Chinese universities 
received two third of the total R&D expenditure. R&D activities are focused on a few 
key disciplines in natural sciences and engineering. In 2005, 66% of total R&D 
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expenditure by the top 50 universities concerned engineering, natural science being 
the distant with 16% of the total expenditure.  
Figure 72: First university education - China vs other countries 











2002 or most recent year
1990
First university degrees per 100 24-year-olds
Source: National Science Foundation, Laurent Rouaud
 
 
Figure 73 Science and engineering bachelor degree comparison 
Sources: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UNESCO Statistical Yearbook (various years); UNESCO Institute for Statistics database, http://www.unesco.org, accessed 14 
December 2006, special tabulations; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Education at a Glance (various years); OECD Education Database, 
http://www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde/members/EDU_UOEAuthenticate.asp, accessed 14 December 2006; China—National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook (2004); India—Department of Science 
and Technology, Research and Development Statistics 1996–97 (1999); Japan—Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture, Monbusho Survey of Education (various years); Taiwan—Ministry of Education, 
Educational Statistics of the Republic of China (various years); and United States—National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics, Integrated Science and Engineering Resources Data System 
(WebCASPAR), http://webcaspar.nsf.gov, accessed 14 December 2006.
Region and 
country/economy
1990 2002 most recent year
S&E Engineering S&E Engineering
Asia 898,000 311,400 1,209,200 590,800
China 268,400 115,900 533,600 351,500
India 205,000 29,000 NA NA
Indonesia 30,700 9,800 97,100 20,600
Japan 187,900 81,400 351,300 98,400
Malaysia 3,400 900 4,800 900
Philippines 71,100 29,400 NA NA
Singapore 3,700 1,200 5,600 1,700
South Korea 79,300 28,100 113,100 64,900
Taiwan 24,400 9,000 72,500 41,900
Thailand 24,200 6,800 31,200 10,900
EU-15 284,300 92,700 506,100 198,300






















First university degree in natural science and engineering in 000
Source: National Science Foundation, Laurent Rouaud
 
Doctoral education typically prepares a new generation of faculty and researchers in 
academia, as well as a high-skilled workforce for other sectors of the economy. It 
also generates new knowledge important for the society as a whole and its 
competitiveness. Here again, the number are showing a definitive focus on 
engineering and on building a strong knowledge base economy for the future.  
 
VI-2-3 Communication infrastructure facilitating innovation 
 
The framework conditions also include the communications infrastructures (roads, 
telephone, and electronic communication), the financial institutions (ease of access 
to venture capital) and the market access (such as size and ease of access). These 
three factors are well covered in the literature but also in the press. Communication 
access has been the focus of the Chinese government for over two decades and the 
aviation; high speed train planning and road network developments have been 
impressive. Concerning the financial institutions, there was the one that bailed out 




VI-2-4 Financial institutions facilitating innovation and market access 
They also have since the early 2000s been very active in financing major US and 
European projects from aircraft acquisition to large construction projects. Finally, 
with a potential 500 million middle class citizen by 2015, China is ripe to become 
the number one market in the world for consumer goods to industrial goods. 
Figure 75: Top financial institutions by market capitalization 
4 Chinese banks in the top 10 in 2010
• Citigroup (US)
• HSBC (UK)
• Bank of America (US)
• Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (US)
• Lloyds TSB (UK)
• Bank of  Tokyo-Mitsubishi (Japan)
• Wells Fargo (US)
• Fannie Mae (US)
• Chase Manhattan (US)
• UBS (Switzerland)
• Citigroup (US)
• Bank of America (US)
• HSBC (UK)
• JP Morgan Chase (US)








• Bank of China (China)
• HSBC (UK)
• JP Morgan Chase (US)
• Mitsubishi UFJ Financial  (Japan)
• Banco Santander (Spain)
• Goldman Sachs (US)
• Wells Fargo (US)
• Bank of Communications (China)
2000 2005 2010
Source: Financial Tmes, Laurent Rouaud
 
However, China financial system is made of large banks that are typically loaning 
money large state owned Chinese companies that have generally not been very 
profitable or have been losing money.   According to the Chinese Banking Regulatory 
Commission, there was RMB 1,268 billion in non-performing loans in the 
commercial banking sector at the end of 2007. The banking system is not set up to 
efficiently serve small and medium size enterprise especially start up stemming 
from the innovation spin-off .Given the risk and the long payback, very few domestic 
or foreign venture capitalists  are willing to step up to investing in innovation spin-
off. The Chinese government has rightfully identified the lack of venture capitalists 
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as a major impediment to the innovation transfer in China. As a result, it turned to 
regional authorities whose responsibility is to establish venture capital companies. 
These companies are essentially publically funded and staffed with civil servant who 
lack the technical, commercial and managerial skills . This system has failed to 
deliver venture capital to the right project is subject to partial distribution of funds. 
The Chinese government have also created in 1999 the Innovation Fund for 
Technology-based SMEs (Innofund), whose responsibility is to fund early-stage 
commercialization projects with innovative technology and good market potential. 
It provides grants and loans to high-technology firms in six fields: information 
technology (IT) and electronics, biotechnology and medicine, advanced materials, 
automation, new environmental resources and energy. Between 1999 and 2004, 
Innofund gave grants worth RMB 4.3 billion to 6 400 projects. So, the venture capital 
is still in development but show some early sign of improvement  from the central 
government initiative with Innofund. However, a large scale venture capital will 
take some time to develop. 
 
A recent private initiative that  promises to deliver venture capital is Innovation 
Works, a private firm, launched in September 2009.  Innovation Work was founded 
by Dr. Kai-Fu Lee, the former President of Google Greater China. Innovation Work 
could create a new paradigm in the Chinese innovation system that will facilitate the 
start-up of technology firms in China.  
 
According to Dr Lee: The Chinese entrepreneurial environment is still in its formative 
stage, with significant barriers for the early-stage entrepreneur: the lack of 
management experience and coaching, the reluctance of venture capitalists to invest 
in companies in the formation stage, and the lack of networking and experience to pull 
a company together. These barriers contribute to have a very few high-tech start-ups 
in China.  
Dr Lee have created Innovation Works as a business creation platform focused on 
establishing high-technology companies and mentoring the next-generation of 
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Chinese entrepreneurs. Innovation Works concentrates on internet, mobile internet 
and cloud computing technology advancement. Innovation Works plans to collect, 
analyze prioritize and execute the most promising innovations. More importantly it 
plans to match entrepreneurs, engineers, and capital to improve the success rate of 
start up companies and accelerate time-to-market of products. Innovation Works 
plan to provide mentoring and support to the next-generation of Chinese 
entrepreneurs that today are faced with lack of resources, management experience, 
and especially lack of venture capitalists network to launch their technological 
innovation. Innovation Work start-up  itself was financed by world renown venture 
capitalists and investors such as Steve Chen Co-Founder of YouTube), Foxconn 
Technology Group, Legend Group and New Oriental Education & Technology Group, 




Focus on one of the very few Chinese venture capital firm: the WI Harper 
Group 
WI Harper Group was founded in 1993 and is one of the founding venture 
capital franchises in China. The firm specialized in investing in early and 
expansion stage companies with significant operations in China and aspirations 
to become a global leader. Wi Harper Group has already invested in over 100 
technology companies worldwide with a particular focus on China. They focus 
on technology, clean technology and Healthcare. The typical investment size is 
between $5M to $10M. Below are a list of China companies in which WI Harper 
has invested: 
Company Activity/market position Location
21Vianet
leading chinese carrier neutral internet data center and content 
delivery network provider Beijing
Cwill Telecom Provider of technology related to China's 3G wireless standard Beijing
Pollex Mobile
A leading mobile software company focusing on providing 
mobile application platform and applications products for 
mobile devices. Beijing
Sungy Data Ltd 3G.net is the first and largest independent WAP portal in China Guangzhou
Daqi
Leading BBS aggregation website and offline PR events 
management provider Beijing
Maxthon Holdings
Maxthon is one of the most popular Internet browsers in China, 
second only to IE. Beijing
Troodon Entertainment Provider of Massive Mobile Multi-player Networking Games Beijing
PayEase Customer Loyalty Programs Beijing
New Dynamic Institute 
Online and offline English training programs in tier two cities of 
China Wuhan
Focus Media Holding Ltd
operates a nation-wide segmented media network to enable 
targeted advertising in China. Shanghai
VeriSilicon Holdings
fabless and chipless ASIC Design Foundry, which provides ASIC 
design services and turnkey solutions. Shanghai
China Diagnostic Provider of diagnostic medical equipment and supplies Beijing
Edan Instruments
Provider of fetal monitoring and ultrasound systems to both 
Chinese and international markets Shanghai
ShanhhaiMed Healthcare leading provider of healthcare management services in China. Beijing
Medical System Leading Chinese clinical information system provider Shanghai
Cnano Technology
Developer of Carbon Nanotube and related advanced 
applications Beijing
 
In the area of Clean technology, WI Harper Group is active in sub-sectors 
including advanced materials, energy efficiency, and pollution control. They 
believe that advanced materials is a tremendous key enabler of sustainable 
industrial growth. WI Harper experience in China allow them to  identify and 
commercialize opportunities in advanced materials through their established 
relationships with Chinese universities, governments and industry leaders. A 
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good example is their investment in Cnano. In healthcare, they consider that 
although the US is the largest market, China offers great opportunity. They 
intend to bring Western technology, executives and business practices into 
China to build the next generation of global health care companies. They 
particularly focus on health IT, medical devices, services, and diagnostics. Their 
investment in Edan and Medical System in China is an example on their focus. In 
technology, WI Harper Group focuses in investing in Internet and wireless, 
digital media, electronics, technology-enabled services, and semiconductors. 
Their investment in Focus Media is an example in the technology field..  
 
VI-3  The dynamo to innovation: the science and engineering base. 
 
The Science and engineering base brings the theoretical understanding base for 
business innovation. It comprises the technical training system and the university 
system. It also includes basic research. Basic research might not yield a direct and 
short term benefit to firm innovation but brings a wealth of knowledge in terms of 
advanced equipment use and specialization that helps in the long terms.  The 
Science and engineering base is also fed by the government funding of the public 
goods R&D activities (such as health, environment and defense), the strategic R&D 
activities (pre-competitive and generic technologies), and the non-appropriable 
innovative support in some fields where the firms cannot expect to gain an 
appreciable return in the short to medium term from their in-house research.  
 
VI-3-1 The technical training and university system 
In 2006, some 174,000 Science and Engineering (S&E) doctoral degrees were 
awarded worldwide.  The United States gave the largest number of S&E doctoral 
degrees of any country (about 30,000), followed by China (about 23,000), Russia 
(almost 20,000), and Germany and the United Kingdom (about 10,000 each).  More 






































































Doctoral degree in natural science and engineering in 000
Source: China—National Bureau of Statistics of China; Japan—Government of Japan, Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Higher Education Bureau, 
Monbusho Survey of Education; South Korea—Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD. Stat Extracts, http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx/; United 
Kingdom—Higher Education Statistics Agency; and Germany—Federal Statistical Office, Prüfungen an Hochschulen, and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
OECD. Stat Extracts, http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx/; and United States—National Center for Education Statistics, Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, 
Completions Survey; and National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics, Integrated Science and Enginee ring Resources Data System (WebCASPAR), 
http://webcaspar.nsf.gov. See appendix tables 2-40 and 2-41.   
In the field of natural sciences and engineering109 , China has quickly caught up with 
the US. Although in 2006, the United States awarded 23,000 doctoral degrees in 
those fields vs. 21,000 for China, it had probably surpassed the US in 2009. As a result, China s researcher have more than doubled over the last decade from about 
500,000 in 1995 to more than 1.4 million in 2007, increasing its world share from 
13%  to 25%. The US and the EU 27 members have also 1.4 million researchers.  
                                                     
109 Natural sciences and engineering include physical, biological, earth, atmospheric, ocean, and 
agricultural sciences; computer sciences; mathematics; and engineering. 
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Figure 77: Number of researchers in selected countries 1995-2007 






































































Number of full time equivalent (FTE) researcher in 000s
Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators Science and Engineering Indicators 2010
, Laurent Rouaud  
Since 2000 China has doubled its number of researchers, expanding at twice the rate 
of the EU, US and Japan. Russia, on the other hand, have been reducing the number 
of its researchers by an alarming 2.2% per year on average over the 1995-2007 
period as they consider the compensations in other professional opportunities and 
because of the decrease focus of the government on basic research.  
 






























As the number of researchers increase in China, so have the number of scientific 
articles in scientific publications. If the US and Europe have been the most prolific in 
terms of research article production, their share have steadily decreased from 69% 
in 1995 to 59% in 2008. In the meantime Asia increased its share from 14% to 23%. 
Here, once again, the Asia s increase reflects China s productivity in generating 
article at a rate of 14% per year. China is now responsible for producing about 8% 
of the world scientific article (from 1% a decade ago). Moreover, for the field of 
engineering alone, the US share of article production decreased from 36% to 20% over the last  decades.  Europe succeeded in maintaining its share, while Asia s 
share (without Japan) grew from 7% to 30% over the same period, with China 
producing nearly half (14%). Between 2000 and 2006, the total number of scientific 
publications produced in China each year grew by 178% while it only grew by about 
18% both in Europe and the US and by only 5 % in Japan. As a result, the Chinese 
share of world scientific publications has more than doubled within six years and 
has now well surpassed Japan. Robert N. Kostoff and others 110 showed by studying 
the Chinese scientific articles in scientific journals from 1980 to 2005 that China's 
publication of Social Science Citation (SCI) research articles has had an annual 
exponential growth rate of 20% over the last 25 years. The top 10 research 
institutions listed below published 1,607 , 6,235 and 35,759 respectively in 1985, 
1995 and 2005. Among the most prolific in 2005 was the Chinese Academy of 
Science that is well connected to most research institutions throughout China and 
appear to be a central core of the Chinese institutional research network. The main 
reason for its prominent position in the Chinese research establishment is largely 
explained by the fact that 81% of the total funding granted to the Chinese 
government research institutes are given to the China Academy of Sciences.  
 
                                                     
110 Robert N. Kostoff, Michael B. Briggs, Robert L. Rushenberg, Christine A. Bowles, Alan S. Icenhour, 
Kimberley F. Nikodym, Ryan B. Barth and Michael Pecht , Chinese science and technology — Structure and infrastructure , Technological Forecasting and Social Changes Volume , )ssue ,  




Figure 79: Top 10 Chinese article publishing institutions 
1985
• Chinese Acad Sci (870)
• Acad Sinica (175)
• Beijing Univ (126)
• Chinese Acad Med Sci (99)
• Univ Sci & Tech China (83)
• Nanjing Univ (72)
• Fudan Univ (66)
• Beijing Med Coll (42)
• Nankai Univ (40)
• State Seismol Bur (34)
1995
• Acad Sinica (1808)
• Chinese Acad Sci (1524°
• Nanjiing Univ (617)
• Beijing Univ (488)
• Univ Sci & Tech China (358)
• Fudan Univ (353)
• Tsing Hua Univ (346)
• Julin Univ (259)
• Nankai Univ(243)
• Lanzhou Univ (239)
2005
• Chinese Acad Sci (14051)
• Tsing Hua Univ (3650)
• Zhejiang Univ (3268)
• Beijing Univ (2710)
• Shanghai  Univ (2435)
• Univ Hong Kong  (2109)
• Nanjing Univ (2031)
• Univ Sci & Tech China  (1992)
• Fudan Univ (1770)
• Chinese U Hong Kong (1743)
1607 articles 6235 articles 35759 articles
Source: N. Kostoff Michael B.Briggs , Robert L.Rushenberg, Christine A. Bowles, Alan S. Icenhour, Kimberley F. Nikodym, Ryan B. Barth and MichaelPecht , Chi ese 
science and technology — “tru ture a d i frastru ture , Te h ologi al Fore asti g a d “o ial Cha ges Volu e , Issue ,  No e er 2007, Pages 1539-1573 
 
Ronald N. Kostoff and others shows that there is a clear evolution of the type of 
articles Chinese institution have been focusing from multidisciplinary science, 
medicine, and life science in 1980 to more specific articles on materials, chemistry, 
and physics in 2005. The second trend in their analysis is that there is now a large 
difference in the subject of article between the US and China, and that difference is 
also widening. China emphasis is now on physical and engineering sciences that 
drive defense and commercial needs. The USA seems to emphasize research areas 
focused on medical, psychological, and social problems.  
 
Chemistry and physics represent almost one-half of China's research articles 
production in 2007. This compares with 17% in the US and 25% in Europe. In 
particular China seems to direct their focus on Computer Sciences (especially in 
Cybernetics & Systems Engineering and Signal Processing)  and Physical Sciences  
(especially in Materials Science, Chemistry and Nanotechnology.) Within those 
disciplines,  Systems Theory,  Structural Mechanics, Materials,  Applied 
Measurement,  Power/Energy Market Enterprises, and Organic Chemistry are 
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particularly cited. According to Robert N. Kostoff and others, the China scientific 
research publication is indicative of a society growing to sustain itself and become 
technologically competitive on a global scale. They also surveyed the abstracts of 
China scientific article to show that the most cited disciplines in the scientific 
literatures are:  
 Energy/Power Generation,  
 Mining,  
 Materials & Structural Mechanics,  
 Signal Processing,  
 Systems Engineering, 
 Transportation & Traffic flow,  
 Robotics, Sensors & Diagnostics,  
 Advanced Communications,  
 Nanotechnology,  
 Assessment Methods,  
 Mathematics,  
 Environmental & Ecological,  
 Modeling & Simulation, 
 Control Theory.    
 
All of these areas have applications that can be of military significance and is 
important to aeronautics. 
Figure 80: Difference in scientific publication China vs USA 
(ranked by highest differences in favor of China)
China (1) USA (1) Ratio China/USA (2)
Bearing capacity 145 12 12.08
XRD 2213 237 9.34
Microhardness 174 22 7.91
Photoelectric 86 13 6.62
Diesel Engine 152 23 6.61
Wavelet transform 338 54 6.26
Fiber Bragg grating 115 19 6.05
Wear resistance 213 37 5.76
Annealing temperature 214 39 5.49
Impact strength 92 19 4.84
Magnetron 285 60 4.75
Countermeasures 57 13 4.38
Intrusion detection 100 23 4.35
Missile 100 24 4.17
(1) Number of citations; (2) ratio of citation on that discipline in China / US 
Source: N. Kostoff Michael B.Briggs , Robert L.Rushenberg, Christine A. Bowles, Alan S. Icenhour, Kimberley F. Nikodym, Ryan B. Barth and MichaelPecht , Chi ese 




In terms of R&D, Asian developing economies have also focused in increasing their 
level of investments. Over the past decade, while the R&D/GDP ratios of developed 
countries held steady, China R&D doubled from a very low base. The R&D intensity 
of China, measured by the ratio of GERD to gross domestic product (GDP) reached 
1.43% of GDP in 2006, up from 0.6% in 1995. China has increased its R&D 
investment steadily at an average yearly rate above 18%.  This compares to 2% per 
year growth for Europe between 2000 and 2005. If the ratio is still relatively low 
compared to other OECD economies, the level reached over the last 10 years is 
particularly impressive since it had to chase a double digit GDP growth rate.   
 
















In % of GDP
Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators  Science and Engineering Indicators 2010, Laurent Rouaud
 
 
With a $86.8 billion Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) at purchasing power parity PPPs , China s GERD was the third largest worldwide in , after 
the United States and Japan.  
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China Japan EU 27 US
1995-2000
2000-2005
Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators  Science and Engineering Indicators 2010, Laurent Rouaud
 
These impressive rates hide one important qualitative characteristic of the China 
R&D spending that is lagging compared with all other developed OECD countries: 
the absolute amount and share of R&D invested in basic research.  
Figure 83: China R&D by type of activity 














Source: China yearly statistical yearbook 2008, Laurent Rouaud




VI-3-2 Basic Research  
 
Most of the growth in R&D over the last 20 years has been directed towards 
experimental development rather than to the longer term basic research and 
applied research. In fact, the share of total R&D on basic research has stagnated 
since 1990 at 5.2%. OECD countries invest on average 10 to 20% of their R&D 
money into basic research. More worrisome is the fact that the applied research has 
even decreased in importance from 26.4% in 1995 to 16.8% in 2006. OECD 
countries invest on average 50% of their R&D money into applied research.  
 
Figure 84: China vs Europe R&D by type 










Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators  Science and 
Engineering Indicators 2007, Laurent Rouaud  
The low Chinese basic research is explained by the fact the business sector R&D has 
quickly become the most important contributor to China R&D efforts and about 
80% of its total R&D effort on experimental research. Their renowned expertise in 
this field is actually accelerating this growth, as international firms tend to 
outsource more of their experimental research to China because of its much lower 




A recent development of this takes place in the field of biotechnology. The market 
for pharmaceutical biotechnology is expanding rapidly worldwide as a result of 
consumer demand for a healthier lifestyle. In China, in particular, this market has 
grown 21.4% per year over the past 4 years. Because of China health care reform 
and the government choice of pushing this field of science, the market in China is 
anticipated to grow above 30% in the coming years. The research and clinical trial 
in biotechnology is risky, costly and has long lead time. As a result, Pharmaceutical 
companies in developed region are tapping into the human and financial resources 
of China, obliged to outsource if they want to continue growing profitably. China is 
particularly attractive as it has a large patient subject pool, great research centers, a 
large market for biotechnology and a supportive government.  
 
In particular, the central government support of applied research has encouraged 
Chinese business to develop new therapies in pioneering field of gene therapy and 
stem cells. Examples include genetically modified (GM) crops, and vaccines.  In stem 
cell or GM crops, an added difficulty for research and clinical trial in developed 
countries are the stringent regulations and controversial ethical issues. Although the 
US and Europe are leading stem cell research, China, with its looser R&D regulation 
environment is anticipated to emerge as the leading research and product 
development in the applied area of stem cell.  
 
 The business sector increased its R&D expenditure by an average of 20% per year 
since the beginning of the 1990s. As table 1 shows, most of the business sector R&D 
is self funded (87% in 2006). Another negative sign of the Chinese R&D beside its 
extraordinary growth is the fact that the number of R&D units has actually 
decreased within the business sector over the last 20 years. Over the same period, 
the government funding became the most important funding source for the 
government research institutes. The government objective was to focus on basic 
research and applied research in the field of public goods, such as agriculture and 
defense that requires more government funding. However, in absolute terms, the 
magnitude of the business sector growth R&D growth focused on experimental 
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research has underpinned the government effort at increasing basic research in its 
research institutes.    
Table 10: R&D Participation of China's government research, higher education and 
business sector 
Government  research 
institute
Higher education Business  sector
Number of units 3901 institutes 1792 university and colleges
28567 Large+middle firm 
6775 have S&T units 
248813 small firms 22307 
have S&T activities
Share of R&D personnel (FTE) 18.10% 16.10% 65.70%
Share of government funding 66.50% 20.40% 13%
Share of R&D expenditure 19.70% 9.20% 71.10%
Share of R&D expenditure in basic research 46.40% 44.90% 8.70%
Share of R&D expenditure in applied research 40.70% 26.90% 32.40%
Share of R&D expenditure in experimental development 13.30% 3% 83.70%
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology, 2006, Laurent Rouaud
 
Figure 85: Government funding of institution R&D 





















1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Government funding
Share of government funding
Government funding in 
billions of RMB
Share of government 
funding in %
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology, Table 2-1, 2005 and China Statistical Yearbook on Science and
Technology  2006 (NBS, 2005a and 2006a)., Laurent Rouaud  
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VI-4 The transfer factor for innovation, or the links between participants 
 
The transfer factors help the innovation system to be effective by linking the 
participants (the government research institutions, the higher education and the 
business sectors) , ensure the effectiveness of the information flows and the 
development of skills.  The OECD Oslo Report identifies 8 transfer agents: 
 formal and informal linkages between firms, but also the link within the 
small firms, the relationships among users and suppliers, relationships 
between firms, regulatory agencies and research institutions, and the 
competition stimuli within an industry clusters  .  
 the presence of expert,  technological “gatekeepers” or receptors – 
individuals who, through many means, keep abreast of new developments 
within a firm; 
 International links are networks through which information is channeled by 
international experts transmitting up-to-date scientific understanding and 
leading-edge technological developments; 
 the degree of mobility of expert technologists or scientists will affect the 
speed at which new developments can spread; 
 the ease of industry access to public R&D capabilities; 
 spin-off company formation  
 ethics, community value-systems, trust and openness  
 codified knowledge in patents, the specialized press and scientific journals. 
 
VI-4-1 The linkage between innovative firms 
 
Central to the transfer links are China s S&T and innovation policies. Since the late 
1980s, the policies have focused on the same following 5 elements:   
- the promotion of basic research in selected scientific fields which have 
significant potential impact on social progress and economic development; 
- the research and development of new technologies in selected high-
technology areas of national priority, such as biotechnology, information 
technology, space technology, energy technology, new materials; … 
- the  technology innovation and commercialization; 
-  the support for the construction of infrastructure for scientific research and 




Since there is no formal institutionalized coordination mechanism between the 
policy makers and the main actors (higher education research labs and the business 
enterprises), the only real effective transfer mechanism is  the different programs 
that involves the different actors for a particular objective.   
 
As in developed countries of the OECD, the preferred and most effective way to link 
and coordinate the higher education, business and research institutions is through 
specific programs. ACARE is an example of this. In China the 5 policies described 
above has been supported by a number of programs that gave started as early as the 
mid 1980s. The Chinese S&T program was part of the policy and ran by the central 
government major entities such as MOST. They were conceived to overcome mostly 
the co-ordination failure. Below are the most important of those programs. 
 
Table 11: Chinese S&T programs 






1984 Foster key technologies to upgrade 
traditional industries and create 
new ones - focuses also on the 
sustainable development of Chinese 
society and 
the enhancement of the national 
innovation capacity 
first R&D program 
implemented in China by 






1997 foster innovation capacity in key 
high-technology - to develop 
breakthrough technologies and 
improve the international 
competitiveness of major Chinese 
industries 
Priority projects in six 
high-technology fields: 






energy and environment 
technology– run by 
MOST 
National 




1997 Support basic research - mobilize China s scientific talent to conduct 
research in agriculture, energy, 
information science , environment , 
human health, materials 
science, synthesis and forefront of 
major science  and related areas 
supports cross-
disciplinary research to 
develop 




Spark Program 1986 promotes rural development and 
supports 
technology transfer in agriculture 
 
Torch Program 1988 Support development of high 
technology 




According to MOST, In 
2005,succeded in setting 
up 53 national Science 
and Technology 
Industrial Parks and 534 
technology business 





1997 use global S&T resources to solve 
bottleneck problems in some critical 
technologies, to provide a platform for 
international S&T exchange and 
cooperation, to improve indigenous 
innovation 
According to MOST, in 
2000-05, China and its 
foreign partners financed 
631 projects for a total  
RMB 424 million RMB. 
229 patents granted ; 3 
623 papers  published – 
run by MOST 
Innovation Fund 





1999 supports Small and Medium business 
innovation 
 
Funding in the form of 
loan-interest refunds, 




1997 restructure the research institutes of 
CAS, revitalize and train highly qualified 
personnel, create new high-technology 
companies via incubators, and become a major national S&T and int l actor in 
innovation 
Extensive transformation 
on quality – younger 
scientist 77% of 
researchers  under 45 -  
average age of institute 
leaders is 47 vs 56 in 
1991 – run by CAS 
 
  
The  Government  Support for basic research are the  Natural Science Foundation 
programs and  973 program, but also some human resource scientific and 
technology programs such as the Yangtze River Scholars Program, the CAS Hundred 
Talents Program, and  the NSFC National Distinguished Young Scholars Program all 
aimed to academic excellence.  
 
The largest Government support for high technology R&D are  the High Technology 
R&D Program  (863 Program), and the National Key Technology R&D Program. 
 
The Government support for technology innovation and commercialization includes 
programs for the development of new products, such as the National New Product 
213 
 
Program, and the Torch , the Spark , the S&T Achievement Dissemination program, 
as well as the Action Plan for Thriving Trade through S&T. 
 
What is the effectiveness of those programs to foster research, innovation and 
commercialization? Why is basic research still decreasing in share of R&D? 
 
As the survey on R&D cooperation shows 111, that beside the program cited above, 
cooperation among Chinese s business enterprises with other enterprises and with 
the higher education sector or research institutes is very limited. Of the few Chinese s large and medium-sized business enterprises that have their own R&D 
capabilities (less than a third of them) carry out R&D projects on their own. The 
surveyed business enterprise had 39 072 R&D projects in 2005 or which only 4.4% 
were done in cooperation with the higher education sector and 9.7% with the 
government research institutions. Similarly, of these projects only 3.6% were 
carried out in cooperation with other Chinese domestic enterprise or foreign 
wholly-owned units. This clearly shows that the program government program has 
not succeeded in bringing research institutions, universities and business 
enterprises to cooperate effectively as those programs intended.  
   
Table 12: R&D projects in business sectors by co-operation type 
R&D projects in the business sectors 2005 
operation with overseas institutions  1.9% 
Co-operation with higher education 4.4% 
Cooperation with government research institute 9.7% 
Cooperation with foreign wholly-owned 
enterprises 0.1% 
Cooperation with other enterprises  3.5% 
Independent implementation  77.7% 
Other 2.8% 
Total number of R&D projects  39072 
Source: China Statistical yearbook, 2007, Laurent Rouaud 
                                                     




One reason the programs are not as effective is that the decision making is 
centralized, with a top-down approach by the Central Government and MOST, 
particularly in program initiation and design. Another reason is that there is still 
little transparency on the evaluation of the programs. Unlike in the US there is no 
accountability office like the GAO in China. There is no legislation that makes the 
evaluation of the R&D programs a legal requirement. In fact, the original purpose of 
the evaluation was mainly to draw lessons for the sake of internal management and 
not for the sake of accountability. The evaluation results of the different programs 
are mostly kept internal. As a result, there is a lack of information on the program 
and little accountability to deliver results, and most importantly a lack of an 
evaluation culture throughout the innovation system from the lab researchers to the 
policy makers. 
 
The system is in place though with institution such as The National Centre for 
Science and Technology Evaluation  (NCSTE ) created in 1997, but there is no 
obligation to evaluate or to give the evaluation to the public. For example according to his website , the NCSTE aims at providing an objective and impartial basis for 
government departments, enterprises and investment organizations to make better 
decisions, to offer consulting service in a wide range of sectors, and to promote dialogue between government, industries and academies .112  The NCSTE is staffed 
with 25 to 30 specialists in management consulting, public policy research, 
technology-economy analysis and system engineering. They are in charge of 
designing evaluations, organizing activities, performing research and reporting and 
communicating. the result It can also draw from a group of 40 or so senior or retired 
senior evaluators and advisors (about 40 people),and a vast pool of  a pool of more 
than 2000 experts providing resources in research , economics and organization. 
The NCSTE has been very active in evaluating R&D project having evaluated more 
than 1 000 projects such as National Key Science and Technology Industrial Projects 




and the Key Projects of the National New Products Program. In particular, the NCSTE has evaluated three times the  program, the largest of MOST s R&D 
program. The evaluation was intended to judge to what extent the program had 
narrowed the technological gaps between China and the leading S&T nations.  The 
evaluation was based the typical evaluation criteria of any projects: relevance, 
effectiveness, efficiency and impact.  The evaluation concluded that the 863 Program 
had played a decisive role in narrowing the gap within the strong S&T advanced 
countries in some fields but that gaps still existed in terms of innovation capacity, 
invention patenting and supporting conditions. However, a major lesson of the 
study was the lack of fully relevant indicators and methodology. This raised the question of setting closing the gaps  as a relevant operational objective of such 
large programs. The NCSTE has also formulated a set of guidelines for project 
evaluation in line with international standards. It includes the description of 
procedures and recommendations for evaluation methodologies and tools as well as 
rules of behavior for evaluators and their relations with evaluated bodies. 
 
Despite the progress that has been made to date, there is still a concern about the 
lack of openness, fairness and transparency in the selection process, program 
management and evaluation. The evaluation system or system of the different 
programs exists and is well in place. Its methodology, measurement, human 
resources seems to be adequate to assess the efficiency and results of the program.  
The only issues is that so far the evaluation  purpose is up to now mainly  to draw 
lessons for the sake of internal management.  However, changes are slowly  being 
implemented. According to Fang (2005), the purpose of evaluation is shifting 
towards the question of public accountability. 113 
 
Considering the openness of these programs, one of the main criticism of the 
programs is that it is concentrated on a few large programs. In fact the twenty 
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largest program receive 50% of the funding, with the 973 and 863 programs being 
the 2 largest. The government was often criticized as to concentrate funding on a 
narrow circle of privileged beneficiaries, either firms or main research institutes. 
Some of the firms or research institutes were actually created for the sole purpose 
of the project. This process creates entities that unfairly compete during the 
selection process. For Fang (2005), the evaluations were mostly aimed at measuring 
the effectiveness of Science and technology programs in order to accelerate the 
technological catch-up process and were used as an input for R&D program 
managers and decision makers. However, Fang anticipate that as the reform of the 
Chinese S&T continues, evaluation will shift towards ensuring equitable resource 
allocation and the fairness of selection processes as opposed to the more 
hierarchical and closed environment with little external consultation. The 
evaluation of the 863 Program has been instrumental in helping shaping those 
changes. For instance, whereas earlier evaluations of the gap with foreign countries was a key focus, firms  participation is now crucial notably in patenting, definitely a 
new focus for officials and scientists).  
 
The Chinese government keenly aware of the requirement for better co-ordination 
of their S&T program and the need for openness has already incorporated a number 
of policy improvements in their 11th Five-year S&T Plan summarized below. Will 
the initiative of the government to have more coordination between the research 
institute, the higher education and the business enterprise be successful? It is hard 
to say. However, the right measures seem to slowly be put in place to improve co-







Improvement for better co-ordination of S&T programs, accountability and 
openness in China 11th Five-year S&T Plan: 
 
Ensuring fairness, openness and greater transparency in programme 
management requires transparent project evaluation. To this end several measures 
are being implemented. First, a sound expert consultation mechanism will be used 
to evaluate the scientific rationale of the projects proposed. Concrete measures 
include the establishment of a unified information management platform and the 
implementation of online project application. Applications for projects under the 
863 and 973 Programs are subject to online evaluation and appraisal by experts 
who are selected and assigned assessment missions randomly. Second, 98% of the 
projects of the National Key Technology R&D Program and 87% of the major 
projects of the 863 Program will be awarded on the basis of publicly published 
information and guidelines and competitive bidding. At the same time, information 
on all projects under all three programs, except classified projects, will be made 
public through e-government information channels. Third, a database of scientific 
experts will be established and the expert pool for project evaluation will be 
expanded to avoid repeated reliance on certain experts and risks of 
conflicts of interest (for example, the involvement of an expert from a given institute 
in project assessment and funding decisions relating to his institute). 
 
Science-industry (S-I) link/coordination: will be an important criterion in 
evaluating project proposals, and priority will be given to institutions with well-
established S-I relations when awarding publicly funded projects. The government 
will actively explore new mechanisms for fostering S-I relations and the formation 
of consortia of research, university and enterprises for major industrialization 
projects. 
 
Accountability and improvement of program  management through closer 
monitoring and build an independent yet mutually controlled management system, the 
government will rely on various means, including rules and regulations, the Internet 
and process management. The government has issued a number of related documents, including Some Opinions on the Reform of Management of National S&T Plans , Some Opinions on Strengthening Planning Management at the Ministry of Science and Technology, and Perfecting the Supervisory Mechanism  and Opinions on the )mplementation of the Reform Requirements on the Budget 
Management, and Strengthening the Management and Supervision of Science and Technology Funding at the MOST . )t also aims to establish a system of mutual 
dependence and control between government decision making, expert consultation, 
process management by implementation agencies, and third-party monitoring. 





VI-4-2 Ethics in R&D 
 
On ethics in R&D, China appears to be more relax on certain rules. For example, the 
central government support of applied research has encouraged Chinese business to 
develop new therapies in the pioneering field of gene therapy and stem cells 
research Examples include genetically modified (GM) crops, and vaccines.  In stem 
cell or GM crops, an added difficulty for research and clinical trial in developed 
countries are the stringent regulations and controversial ethical issues. Although the 
US and Europe are leading in stem cell research, because of its looser R&D 
regulation environment; China is anticipated to emerge as the leading research and 
product development in the applied area of stem cell. 
 
VI-4-3 International links 
 
Concerning, international links which are important conduit of innovation transfer, 
China has done some significant achievement over the last 5 years and is set for 
even greater international links in the future. The patents and the number of 
technical articles co-authored by  Chinese and foreign researchers are good 
examples of the increasing international links. The number of foreign business 
enterprises setting research centers in China and even the small but growing 
number of Chinese firms setting research centers in the US and Europe are another 
example of the increasing international links  without China s innovation system.  
 
China domestic co-invention by one or several Chinese researcher(s) and one or 
several foreign co-author(s) is a great measure of the international nature of 
research in China. It gives a pragmatic indicator of R&D international co-operation 
between inventors from different countries. Worldwide, domestic co-authored 
invention with foreign researchers represents only 7% of all inventions. In China, 
because of the increasing number of foreign research centers and  the increasing 
number foreign firm that outsource part of their R&D to Chinese research centers, 
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the number of international co-authorship is much greater. In fact, international co-
invention in China is about 30% of the total domestic invention. This figure is to be 
compared to 7% in Europe and 12% in the US.  
 
 











Japan EU 25 USA China
1991-1993
2001-2003
Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators  2007, Laurent Rouaud
 
 
International alliances and partnerships give China an opportunity to catch up 
quicker with their global competitors in high value added technology products. The 
size of the Chinese domestic market is a great leverage for China to attract foreign 
firm into investing in China and build in partnerships or strategic technology 
alliances. Chinese firms bring the knowledge of the market and legal environment 
while the foreign firm brings the technological solutions. The Chinese firm might 
decide later to acquire a technology foreign firm which operates in a country with 
safer and more transparent patent regulations than in China.  The Chinese computer 




Another way to increase China international links is through the 
internationalization of its R&D The internationalization of developed countries R&D 
to emerging countries make sense as it lowers its costs and tap into a vast reservoir 
of research resources. It may be counter-intuitive that a Chinese firm might decide 
to set a research lab in a high cost R&D intensive developed countries but the 
benefits are interesting in the sense that it helps to catch up quicker with the US and 
Europe on the technology front . Companies such as Haier are great example of this 
trend. Haier has three industrial parks in the US, Jordan, and Pakistan, ten listening 
posts  in Seoul, Sydney, Tokyo, Montreal, Los Angeles, the Silicon Valley, 
Amsterdam, Vienna, Taiwan and Hong Kong, and design network that include Lyon, 
Los Angeles, Tokyo, Amsterdam, and India.  
 





Source: Maximilian von Zedtwitz (2005) International R&D Strategies in Companies from Developing Countries – the Case of 





According to  von Zedtwitz (2005) 114, there are 4 types of R&D internationalization. 
The traditional is the oldest type where typically a country of the triad, US – Europe – Japan will set up research center within each other. The rise of China and India has 
resulted in a second type called the modern type of R&D internationalization, where 
a firm in an advanced economy conducts R&D in developing countries. This type 
was the prevalent type in the 1990S. Examples of the modern R&D internationalization are )BM who has establishing its R&D in )ndia or Microsoft s 
Research lab in China. The large foreign firms are either (1) starting their own 
research center, or (2) building an R&D partnership with a Chinese firm, or (3) 
entering in a co-operation agreement with a Chinese government research lab or a 
university. Does this internationalization help fostering the innovation capability of 
China? On the positive side, it trains local researchers, improves their language skills 
that are clearly a barrier to internationalization, trains Science and Technology 
future manager and increases the number of patent with possible spillovers. 
However, it also has some negative impact. China researcher prefer to work for 
international companies and usually prefer to stay in the international company 
over the long term, thus preventing talent to enter the Chinese national innovation 
system. Finally, the foreign firm with a Chinese R&D lab provides little funding to 
the university less than 1% of university funding). So, in general the foreign firms 
R&D lab in China do contribute to raise Chinese researcher level of expertise and 
china S&T in general but in China innovation system must rely on its own action to 
bring step changes in their S&T capabilities.  
 
One way of doing so is to set up their international R&D capabilities. Recently, a new 
type of R&D internationalization concerning, this time the developing countries, has 
started to emerge.  This type consists of a firm in a developing country investing in R&D in a developed country. Von Zedwitz calls this type the catch-up  as it was 
                                                     
114 Maximilian von Zedtwitz (2005) International R&D Strategies in Companies from Developing 
Countries – the Case of China,, Research Center for Global R&D Management, Tsinghua University, 
Beijing PR China 
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intended to close the gap between technology capacity with the advanced country. 
The rationale for doing so is also to escape the competitive market of China to 
expand the developing market reach to the developed regions. In some cases, they 
respond to the request of their international customers to set up an R&D lab in their 
country. Example of this type are Haier , ZTE, Huaweu, and 3NOD which have 
established a real network of international R&D labs. ZTE established its first three 
foreign R&D centers in the US and Chile as early as 1998, and founded more R&D labs in Korea and Sweden. The last type of von Zedtwitz s international R&D 
concerns emerging countries firms that set R&D capability in other emerging countries, that he calls the expansionary  type. The rational for doing so is to 
expand the market to a similar environment or to seek a second generation 
innovation application that brings the innovation already exploited in the original 
emerging country to an even less developed country. An examples of the 
expansionary type is (uawei s R&D center in Bangalore, )ndia. (uawei has 
established a strong international R&D base. It was the first Chinese company to set 
up an R&D center in Bangalore in 2000, which it expects to serve its targeted 
strategic markets of Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, and Africa as strategic 
markets. Huawei has recently decided to set up a basic research center in Cergy-
Pontoise, in the French district of Val-d'Oise. The table below give a few other examples of China s catch-up  and expansionary  international R&D initiatives.  
 
Table 13: Example of Chinese firms with R&D centers in developed countries 
Chinese firm Activity International R&D location 
Huawei  Telecom 
Stockolm, Dallas, Silicon Valley, Bangalore,Moscow, 
Cergy-Pontoise  
ZTE Telecom Stockolm, Bangaolore 
Glanz Group Electronics Silicon Valley 
Konka  Electronics Silicon Valley 
Haier Electronics Germany, South Carolina, India, Boston 
Foton Automotive Japan, Germany 
Chongqing Changan Automotive Turin, Tokyo 
Kingdee Software Singapore 




The 11th Five-year Plan targets the internationalization of China R&D. In particular 
the plan focuses on international co-operation in the field of clean energy 
development, environmental protection, HIV treatment and other health issues, 
nano-science and aeronautic technologies. To do so the key national R&D programs 
and funds will be open to overseas partners. Universities and government research 
institutes are encouraged to expand Manassastheir co-operation and exchanges 
with foreign counterparts. To motivate them, the government will help business 
enterprises to set up overseas antennas to benefit from international S&T resources. 
It will encourage Chinese scientists to work in international organizations and to 
participate in international scientific projects.  
 
However, there are still barriers to overcome to have a truly global Chinese R&D. 
Among them is the fact that Chinese firm are generally still much smaller compared 
to the major advanced countries  firms. The Chinese companies  procurement is still 
local or regional base. Setting R&D in advanced countries is costly to set up and 
costly to operate. Chinese researchers have limited management experience in 
working and managing in an international environment. The market in China is still 
strong and companies have less incentive to go international. 
 
VI-4-4 Spin-off company formation 
 
The spin-off process is one important means of transferring and commercializing 
technological innovations. Spin-off companies as shown in II-6 contribute to the 
technology transfer process that in turn leads to new economic growth and more 
generally wealth creation. According to Rogers (1986) 115, a spin-off is a mechanism 
of technology transfer because it is usually formed in order to commercialize a 
technology which originated in a government R&D laboratory, a university, or a 
                                                     
115 Rogers, E. M. (1986a) The role of the research universityin the spin-off of high-technology 
companies.Technovation 4, 169–181. 
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private company. Military spin-offs have been studied earlier and examples have 
been given. University spin-offs are as important. According to Carayannis et al 116 
two factors are almost always involved in each spin-off: (1) an entrepreneur,who, 
according to the usual definition, usually transfers from a parent organization, and 
(2) a technology on which the new venture is based, and which also, by the usual 
definition, comes from a parent organization. Some universities such as MIT, 
Harvard, Stanford or Cambridge are the most known in terms of spin-off. Spin-off 
concerns all universities that have center of competence in a particular technology 
or any research institution. In the case of MIT, an analysis by the Bank of Boston 
(1997) indentified 4000 spin-offs from MIT. According to this analysis, these 4000 
spin-off created 1.1 million people and generated $232 billion in annual sales in the 
mid 1990s. It estimated that on average, MIT generated some 150 spin-off per year 
throughout the 1990s. Some universities have even created technopolies, Stanford 
University with the Silicon Valley, the University of Texas in Austin, and Cambridge 
University in Cambridge. Sun Microsystems originated from research at the 
University of California Berkeley. Cisco Systems grew from research on operating 
system in Stanford University.   
 
In China, the best example of a spin-off on the scale of Sun Microsystem, was Lenovo who has become the world largest producer of computers. Before it bought )BM s 
personal computer division, Lenovo was formed by a few researchers from China 
Academy of Science. Although the Chinese government is encouraging spin-off in all 
discipline of S&T, the most promising sector in China for spin-off are the 
biotechnology and nanotechnology fields. In both these field China is becoming the 
world research leader from basic to development research.  
 
                                                     
116 Elias G. Carayannis, Everett M. Rogers Kazuo Kurihara, Marcel M. Allbritton (1998), High-
Technology spin-offs from government R&D laboratories and research universities, Technovation, 
18(1) (1998) 1–11 
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The spin-offs system is not new to China. As previously stated, the Torch program 
was created especially to bring innovation to commercialization through the 
creation of spin-off business. There are three types of spin-off in China: the 
incubators, the technology parks and the university-run enterprises.  
 
The technology incubators were the target of the Torch program as a facilitator of 
technology base start up enterprise China originally borrowed the idea of 
incubators from the United States. They were expected to create convenient and 
efficient environments for start-up companies, as well as in providing financing, 
taxation and land-lease incentives. According to MOST, there are 548 incubators 
throughout China that have had helped raise about 20,000 high technology 
companies, with about 600 of them having an  annual revenues of more than 100 
million Yuan (13.7 million U.S. dollars). The initial funding provided is governmental 
either from the local S&T commission, or the local government of the Torch 
administration. The incubators are usually focusing on a particular issue or sector of 
the technology field. Some focus in attracting Chinese researchers back to China, 
others focus on the deployment of international networks, or a particular sector of 
technology such as biotechnology, internet or software. Established in 2000, the Tianjin Women s Business )ncubator is a non-profit business incubator based in 
Tianjin dedicated to promote the development of women-owned businesses of all 
types in Tianjin. While there are over 400 business incubators in China, TWBI is China s only women s mixed business incubator. The incubator has currently  on-
site tenants and 10 off-site tenants and to date has graduated 4 companies and 
employ directly and indirectly about 2,000 people. They also are diverse in terms of 
operational models: some are government based, other business based, or multi-
investor base. . A business incubator is an organization that devotes itself to 
nurturing entrepreneurial companies by offering them various resources and 
services from physical space, capital and investment, administrative services, to 
networking connections and providing financial help for the day to day operation. 
These incubators are not supposed to derive a profit. A director is often appointed 
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by the government to supervise and manage the incubator.  Private business 
enterprises are responsible to set up the business-based incubators.  They have a 
board of directors, which takes all decisions and appoint a director to run the 
operations. The multi-investor co-operative models are financed by two or more 
investors and are governed by a shareholder model. According to Yan (2003) the 
incubation period is usually three to five years and survival rate is an impressive 
85%. 
 
The reason for this high rate of survival is the requirement needed to become an 
incubate candidate. To be accepted in an incubator, the candidates have to develop 
an advanced technology with a feasible commercialization, to complete a business 
plan with some initial investment, have a good market prospect, and a competent 
team in the area of technology, management, and marketing.  
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Incubators 80 77 110 164 324 378 431 464 534 548 
Number of incubated firms 2670 4138 5293 8653 14270 20993 27285 33213 39491 41434 
Number of employees 45600 68975 91600 143811 28551 363419 482545 552411 717281 792590 
Number of graduated firm 825 1316 1934 2790 4281 6207 8981 11718 15815 20000 
 
Over the 1997 to 2006 period, the number of incubators are increased seven-fold 
while the number of graduated firm from the incubated has been multiplied by 
almost 20. MOST planned to have 1,000 incubators by 2010, harboring more than 
50,000 companies and helping create over one million job opportunities. There is 
very little information made available though on the actual results of the graduated 
firm in terms of products generated or actual performance in attracting oversees 
Chinese researchers. However, according to Zhanglian Chen 117, previousl vice 
president of Peking University and now President of  the China Agricultural 




University, the 4,500 companies belonging to Chinese universities generated some 
US$12 billion annual revenue in 2004.  
 
VI-4-5 Presence of expert 
 
One of the challenges is the lack of experience in management of the incubates 
leaders. In the 90s the government have encourage university professors to become 
CEO. Furthermore, the Chinese culture place a higher value on scientific education 
rather than business and the entrepreneurship spirit is still at its infancy in the 
Chinese society. The most important challenge though remains the lack of 
appropriate financing in the traditional risk adverse  and debt adverse Chinese 
society  .  According to Chandra et al (2007) 118 who have interviewed 12 incubators 
managers, financing was the key bottleneck for the successful development of 
Chinese incubates. In fact most incubators managers job is to find a financial backer 
through the financial network.  Although the capital markets in China are relatively 
underdeveloped, the  primary job of the incubators managers is to  introduce their 
incubatees to banks (mostly state owned) , venture capitalists (limited), loan 
guarantors (from the incubator),  Angel funds (small size investors who invests in a 
venture that holds high potential)  or soft loans. The financial service business is 
relatively young in China. Capital markets are still limited. Furthermore, the banking 
system in China is composed by mega-state owned banks that are use to loan money 
to large Chinese state own firms. The private sector, although more profitable and 
with better prospect than the large state owned firms have little chance to get 
adequate bank financing from the large state owned banks. The primary private 
venture capital investors belonged to both the major international investment banks 
and the Chinese diasporas from the United States, Taiwan, Hong Kong and other 
countries or regions. China has a long way to go before catching up with the US 
venture capital capability.  
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 Other challenges faced by incubates are their inexperience in building business 
plan, and marketing their products. They receive very little advice from incubators 
as they are public servants with limited business and market experience. Another 
challenge comes from the government support of the incubators and the conflicting 
roles they play as investor and regulator. A free market driven environment is likely 
to better encourage the creation of a technology network and financing availability 
from private sources without the invisible hand of the government.  
 
Over the next future though, changes will likely occur to make venture capital more 
available to small business enterprises. Among these changes are the slow but 
forthcoming reforms of the Chinese banking system which is prompted by the WTO 
membership of China. In addition, if the Chinese states banks have been focused on 
financing large state enterprises, they cannot continue to ignore the formidable 
opportunities to finance small and medium size businesses and be part of this 
consumer market. If not, foreign banks will definitely seize the opportunity and grab 
a significant market position. Furthermore, the foreign venture capitalists have 
started to show sign of interest in the Chinese technology market. An example is Japan s Softbank s US$  million investment in Alibaba, an online Business-to-
Business marketplace that helps small- and mid-sized businesses trade goods 
globally. It seems that for U.S. or European venture capital, to invest in China is no 
longer so far away. Soon, foreign banks and foreign venture capitalists will push 
Chinese bank to no longer ignore the start-up technology firms. In a way,  it is a 
contestable market.  There are signs that the domestic venture capitalists are slowly 
emerging (see Wi Harper Group box above). Finally, initiative such as the Innovation 
Work should be able to bring trust and transparency in the Chinese technology 
system to facilitate more and more venture capitalists of the west invest in the next 







The mobility of expert technologists or scientists  plays a role in the transfer of 
technology in the sense that it affects the transfer of technology and speed up its 
development.  The mobility of scientists can be measured by (1) the number of 
Chinese students and graduates in high education graduate in foreign countries such 
as the US or Europe, (2) the return rate of the graduate student , (3) the Chinese 
expatriates return to China, (4) the cooperation between Chinese university and 
foreign universities and research institutions (5) the employment of Chinese citizen 
outside of China,(6) the Chinese scientists and engineers employed in joint venture 
companies involving an foreign firm , or (7) the internationalization of the Chinese 
firm that will send their scientists and engineers in their international offices.  
 
The number of students in foreign universities are covered in following chapters . 
There was a large increase of postgraduate students studying abroad in the year 
2000. Surprisingly, the number has stayed relatively stable over the last few years 
with about 130,000 students enrolled in postgraduate education abroad. It has been 
estimated that the number of Chinese undergraduate and postgraduate student 
studying abroad was about 450,000. The number of postgraduate student abroad 
represents about 12% of the total enrollment of student in postgraduate education 
in China (1195047 in 2007). This figure is particularly high compared with Europe 
or the US. The internet bubble of the late 1990 with the much higher paying job in 
the US and Europe have encourage Chinese students to stay abroad after their 
graduation in that period. Since the end of the bubble in 2000, the numbers of 
return graduate students to China have steadily increased. In 2007, 1 out of 3 
Chinese students return back home after their degree. The incubator specialized in 
getting the Chinese international student back to China is bearing its fruit. The 
return rate is anticipated to show a substantial increase in 2008-2009 in the 





Figure 88: Mobility of Chinese postgraduate students 
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology, 2008, Laurent Rouaud  
There is no statistic on the return of Chinese expatriates to China, but only anecdotal 
evidence. The most striking piece of evidence comes from the Government initiative 
to make Shanghai one of the world financial centers by 2020. As in other instances, 
the Chinese central and local government shows imagination and effectiveness in 
pursuing their plans. In particular, Shanghai official have in 2009 teamed up with 17 
major financial institutions to recruit in the US, Canada and Singapore financial 
talent to bring them to Shanghai to help build the government s vision. The Shanghai 
Financial Development Services Office organized job fairs in the three targeted 
countries. In New Jersey they posted 117 and attracted 700 candidates. In addition 
to the attractive salary proposed, a 1million RMB bonus is given to the high profile 
of high talent candidates. This initiative is part of the government's 1,000 People 
Plan, a project announced in 2009 to facilitate the recruitment of overseas Chinese 
talent in various fields. In 2008, Shanghai has attracted 66 talents of which 6 were 
recognized as high profile talent under the 1,000 People Plan. Most applicants are 
Chinese expatriates that want to return home. The foreigners represent a very small 
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proportion of the applicant (10 out of 700 total applicants in 2009.) This particular 
initiative promise to be not only helpful in facilitating the transfer of technology but 
will also help in increasing managerial skills, business skills, entrepreneurial spirit 
and venture capital investment experience and network. All these attributes are 
critical to China future in commercializing innovation successfully. 
Another initiative to attract returning Chinese talent was launched in 2008 by the 
authorities in the Beijing suburb of Yizhuang to work for companies established by 
the Beijing Economic-Technological Development Area (BDA). Under the program, 
qualified Chinese recruits returning from overseas are entitled to an award of 
100,000 RMB housing subsidies, free medical checkup, and education subsidies for 
their children. In addition, BDA companies that will recruit returning talents could 
receive an award of up to 500,000 RMB. Already the program succeeded in 
attracting some 300 talents from oversees. Xie Liangzhi, one of the returned talents 
working in BDA, said: "I graduated from Massachusetts Institute of Technology and I 
quit my job in a US company to establish my own company. But the incentives offered 
by BDA attracted me to create my own business here. I am sure that there will be more 
people like me coming back from overseas seeking job opportunity in the current 
economic downturn."  
Kai-Fu Lee is a great example of a successful return and its influence on the 
technology transfer dynamics could be instrumental to the next phase of the Chinese 
innovation system.  Lee started Innovation Works, a company based in China whose 
goal is to bring innovative ideas, engineers, entrepreneurs and venture capitalists 
together. He was raised in the US, studied in the US and return to China to head 
Google China before starting Innovation Works. At a conference Lee argued that the 
Chinese American might lose their elite status in China due to local people s 
continuous effort to catch-up. If you want to go back, go back soon. Your advantage 
is about to run out  said Lee.  
The foreign firms that invest in R&D in China contribute to improving the science & 
technology knowledge of Chinese scientists. Most of the foreign firms that have set 
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up a R&D center are in partnership with a local research organization that provides 
a significant portion of the staff. According to Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) 119 the 
most important conduit of knowledge spillover from foreign R&D centers is the 
mobility of people.  Not only will the foreign R&D train and develop the local 
researchers but it will push other domestic firm or research center in the same 
industry or field to innovate if they want to survive in their market. If the foreign 
R&D is generally considered as a positive on the mobility of Chinese researchers and 
on its influence on China innovation, however, there are drawbacks. The China 
researchers that do join the foreign R&D center tend to stay in the foreign lab. In 
addition, the foreign lab usually conduct development research rather than basic or 
applied research. Finally, the foreign center might focus on a fraction of the total 
research required for the final product. For example, a chemical compound might 
require hundred of reactions, with different speed and timing. The China lab might 
focus on a very few reactions or operations in isolation where each Chinese scientist 
might only see a small element. The total process of the chemical compound will be 
kept under the responsibility of the home base R&D.  Finally, the recent ease of 
regulations permit foreign firm to set up wholly owned R&D lab in China instead of 
forming a partnership with a local R&D facility in the past which limits the 
possibility of hiring local researchers and therefore their mobility. As mentioned 
earlier, the new trend for Chinese firm to implant R&D lab in advanced countries 
might become the best way to develop mobility for Chinese scientist and 
subsequently build experience, technical knowledge, language skills and managerial experience. All those attributes are in dire needs for China s researchers.   
 
VI-5  The innovation dynamo: the business enterprise 
The factors shaping the firm innovation is referred to as the innovation dynamo . It occupies a central place in the OECD s framework map as the firm innovation is 
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Economic Surveys, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp.1-31. 
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conditioned by its policy environment but most of all, it is driven by the firm itself.   
Regardless of its location, a firm bringing innovations to a successful 
commercialization will depend on its ability to create technological opportunities, to 
exploit them, to understand the market in general and estimate the market demand 
for the particular innovation considered. If the market is worthwhile in terms of 
demand and profit potential, then the firm will need to be able to set up a relevant 
strategy, carry the strategy, and transform these inputs into a real innovation that 
will be commercialized.  Finally, the firm will also need to be able to time the 
innovation to market earlier than the competition or better than the competition.  
Along the way from the innovative idea to the commercialization, the firm will have 
a lot of options and directions to choose. It will have to strategically choose on the 
market to enter, or seek to create the type of innovation they might commercialize, 
or/and vice versa. In its R&D effort, the firm might prefer to invest more for the 
medium to long term by focusing on basic research, or might want to focus on a 
more strategic research approach (no specific application) geared towards 
broadening the range of applied projects that are open to it. The firm could also 
select a more applied research route to specific innovations or modifications of existing techniques. The firm s R&D approach might be to develop product concepts 
to judge if they are viable by designing a prototype and testing it, then develop and 
modify the prototype to the final design solution. The firm might also want to 
engage in non-R&D activities that could also bring innovations. For example, a firm 
with an extensive product experience and marketing experience might engage in 
discussions with its customers through its market development team within the 
marketing department to position the product and draw its top product objectives 
(TPO). It can also simply buy a license for a product or royalties. The firm that would 
know its competitors might follow and copy an innovative product from its 
competitor by doing reverse engineering.  
To do so, the firm will need to have the right caliber of people in place to put all this 
together. It includes an engaged and skilled workforce that does not consider 
innovation as a fringe activity but the main activity of a firm that want to stay or 
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become competitive.  It needs researchers and engineers that can design the actual 
product or service and organize the production. It needs a procurement team that 
will source internationally.  It needs a strong marketing and sales department. It 
needs a strong financial team that will carry the business plan and attract venture 
capitalists. Furthermore, it needs good managers that will put it all together. The 
Chinese innovative firm today excel in  research and engineering, in production 
capabilities but lack in market research outside their domestic market, lacks in 
financial capabilities to attract funding outside the government support, lack in 
management of projects. Today a significant number of firms come from the 
conversion of some public research institutes into business enterprise. From 1998 
to the end of 2003, 1,149 public research institutes were converted into business 
entities.  This explains why the firms are still lacking the marketing, financial, and 
managerial skills. In addition, the governance of these companies did not encourage 
manager to take risk or to propose innovation. However, framework conditions are 
being improved. Strong of their benchmarking, the government has develop policies 
that addressed some of the issues in the innovation system. The framework has 
moved business into a more market driven environment. A steady number of 
successful market driven companies have been developed. Among these successes, 
the list below was the most impressive. Most were born in China s  incubators.  
Table 14: Top innovative companies in China 
2010 ranking Company Activity Comments 
1 Huawei Technologies Telecom 2nd largest telecom equipment in the world 
2 BYD Batteries 
use cutting edge technology in lithium-ion ferrous phosphate battery;  
plan to mass market electric car 
3 Alibaba Internet on line buying more than 145 million users 
4 Huayi Brothers Media First film ad TV to be list o the stock exchange 
5 Tencent Internet 450 million members 
6 Suntech Power Alternative energy revolutionary technology to decrease reflectivity of cell 
7 Sohu Internet search engine specificto chinese market 
8 Eno Retail - clothes target young population 
9 Ctrip Travel - on line  caters rapidly expanding middle class + executives of foreign companies  
10 Baidu Internet search engine largest search engine in China 





Some Chinese firms have already mastered all the skills required of an innovating 
firm. According to the respected  Fast Company s ranking of innovative 
companies, five of the Top 50 most innovative firms in the world are based in China: 
Huawei (No. 5), BYD (No. 16), Alibaba (No. 29), HTC (No. 31), and Huayi Brothers 
(No. 42). In China, the innovator dynamos are starting to increase in numbers and 
significance. The top innovative dynamos are listed above according to Fast 
Company ranking. Huawei, TCL and Lenovo, Haier are in high-technology sectors  
that have gained a significant global market presence to become the top firm 
worldwide in their industry. Most of them have been nurtured by Chinese 




VI-6  Conclusion: does China have what it will take to design and commercialize 
successfully the next game changing single aisle aircraft? 
 
The OECD framework map to evaluate the innovative capability of a nation has been extremely useful to systematically assess China s innovation system. These elements 
have been assessed in detail in the section above. The table below summarizes the finding and highlight the main challenges of the current Chinese s innovative 
system.  It also compares China to the US and Europe and give a qualitative 
assessment of the Brazilian, Russian and Indian innovation system. The most 
challenging issues for the China s firms are: 
- basic research 
- linkage between firm 
- presence of experts 
- venture capital for technology start-up firms 
- management skills and experience for researchers 
- marketing research, market development skills  
- ease of industry access to public R&D capabilities 
- strategic research capabilities of the firms 
- capacity of combining all innovation dynamo factors of the innovative firm 
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Table 15: Evaluation of the innovative environment of the firm in emerging countries 
based on OECD framework 
 Brazil Russia India China US Europe 
Framework             
basic educational system Y Y Y Y Y Y 
communications infrastructure Y Y N Y Y Y 
financial institutions Y - - Y Y Y 
legislative and macro-economic settings Y - Y Y Y Y 
market accessibility Y - Y Y Y  
industry structure Y - N Y Y Y 
Science and engineering base             
specialised technical training Y Y Y Y Y Y 
university system Y Y Y Y Y Y 
basic research - Y Y N Y Y 
Public good R&D activities Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Strategic R&D activities Y - - Y Y Y 
Non-appropriable innovation support Y Y - Y Y Y 
Transfer factors             
linkages between firms - - - N Y Y presence of expert technological gatekeepers  - - - N Y Y 
international links - - Y Y Y Y 
degree of mobility of expert technologists or scientists Y - Y Y Y Y 
ease of industry access to public R&D capabilities - Y - N Y Y 
spin-off company formation - - N - Y - 
ethics, community value-systems, trust and openness - - Y - Y Y 
codified knowledge Y - N Y Y Y 
Innovation dynamo (the firm capacity to innovate)             
skill employee in the firm             
researcher and engineers  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
sales and marketing Y N Y N Y Y 
general managers Y - Y Y Y Y 
Strategic capabilities of the firm       
understanding the market Y - Y - Y Y 
understanding the competition Y Y Y - Y Y 
ability to recognize and exploit technological   
opportunities Y - Y - Y Y 
capability to bring innovation to market Y - Y - Y Y 
time to market vs competion Y - Y Y Y Y 
Strategic research Y - - N Y Y 
Capacity of combining all above dynamo factors 





To be able to develop a game changing aircraft, China would have to master all these 
skills. China has already launched a 150 seater commercial aircraft with the 
ambition to enter the market in 2015. Under this timing, and because of the 6 year 
lead time between the end of the design phase to first delivery, it will be impossible 
for COMAC to be able to include game changing technologies. However, the development of this transition aircraft  will be critical even if it fails commercially 
to build experience in linking Chinese aerospace and international suppliers, to 
generate experts, to develop management skills and experience and build marketing 
expertise in an international environment. Boeing and Airbus anticipate delivering 
their game changing aircraft in the 2023-2025 time frame. To be able to deliver a game changing commercial aircraft timed to market  earlier or at the same time 
that its competitors, China would need to finish preliminary design of their game 
changing aircraft by 2017 or 2018. Possible to Chinese speed of execution but 
challenging especially in the area of basic research, management skill and 
experience and combining the skills for innovation or be a sort of architect that 
integrate all the technology and discipline together.   It will all depend on how the 
Chinese commercial aerospace organizes itself to reap the maximum benefit from 




 VII The large commercial aircraft industry in China 
 
VII-1 Demand for aircraft in Mainland China 
 
Air travel  largely depends on GDP growth and consumer spending. The elasticity for 
air travel of GDP to air traffic is usually 1.2 worldwide. In developed countries, as 
the market is mature the elasticity will be much lower. Traffic volume will be very 
sensitive to change in ticket price. In emerging countries the elasticity of traffic to 
economic growth will be typically between 2.2 to 2.5, i.e. very sensitive to economic 
growth. The second driver of air traffic is consumer disposable income.  
Against these 2 criteria, China and India are definitely without equal even in the rest 
of the emerging world. China GDP is anticipated to grow close to 10% yearly on 
average between 2007 and 2012 while its consumer spending at about 6.5%  per 
year.  
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Figure 90: China's growing economy on its way to number 1 














Source: Global Insight, Airbus


























12- South Korea 
 
Over the last 20 years China has successively passed nine countries in terms of real 
GDP volume. Today, the Chinese economy is only second to the US. Some anticipate 
the Chinese economy to become the first world economy shortly after 2030. In 
terms of air travel, Chinese propensity to travel is still at very low level. On average, 
a European or US citizen will travel twice a year in comparison to a Chinese who will 
travel 0.1 time per year, or 1 Chinese out of 10 will travel once a year.  
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Figure 91: propensity to travel 
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However, China is the fastest growing air traffic market.. The growth is fueled by the 
domestic Chinese leisure market discovering the benefits of air transport. The 
international market is mostly made of foreign tourists visiting China and an 
abundant business traffic. So far, the Chinese international travel have been 
relatively small in comparison to the domestic traffic. This is however supposed to 
change progressively over the next decade. One of the most important impediments to the development of the Chinese international traffic is the lack of Chinese  
infrastructure to receive the typical Chinese travelers who expect to find some of the 
Chinese products when they travel abroad. When it comes to international travel, 
the Chinese have proven to be less adventurous than the European or US traveler. 
Australia has understood this and has succeeded in attracting the first wave of 
Chinese international travelers by developing the right infrastructure to respond to 
the particular need of the Chinese international tourists. That market will be a real 
force going forward and will keep the Chinese traffic growing at double digit for a 




Figure 92: Chinese tourists' destination 









Germany 75 153 2.9
Japan 23 142 7.5
United States 63 123 2.7
China 5 100 12.7
United Kingdom 42 95 3.3
France 21 55 3.9
Netherlands 22 46 3.0
Italy 16 35 3.1
Canada 19 31 2.0
Russia 12 31 4.0
Source: World Tourism Organisation
World Top 10 outbound tourism countries by 2020
* Average Annual Growth Rate
 
By 2020, it expected that the Chinese outbound tourists will reach 100 million 
people in China. It will then surpassed the United Kingdom air travel volume and be 
close to the US level.  
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Airbus anticipates the Chinese air traffic to increase fourfold over the next 20 years 
and the fleet to increase threefold. The fastest growing market segment in China in 
terms of aircraft demand will be the dedicated freight aircraft. Freight will grow the 
fastest under the driving influence of a fast domestic and international demand but 
also because the freight aircraft market is still underdeveloped in China. The large 
and fast growing economy, coupled with impressive domestic demand for air travel 
and the expected global economic recovery, has led the major aircraft producers to 
conclude that China is their most important future market. Boeing is more bullish 
than Airbus on the China aircraft market. Boeing forecasts that China will need to 
more than triple its aircraft fleet by 2028, requiring 3,770 new aircraft valued at 
over $400 billion. Single-aisle aircraft serving the domestic air travel market are 
expected to account for 70% of the new deliveries. AVIC forecasts that China will 
need to increase its commercial aircraft fleet to 4,233 by the end of 2028. This 
equates to 3,796 new aircraft deliveries over the next 20 years. In 2010, the Chinese 
airlines are expected to take delivery of 243 new aircraft, more than any other 
country worldwide. 
Figure 94: Aircraft demand by country 
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New passenger (100 seats) and freighter aircraft
India 117.7
Source: Airbus  
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The major aircraft OEMS have long recognized the strategic significance of China s 
market. Airbus rolled out its first A320 assembled at its final assembly line in 
Tianjin. Airbus Tianjin FAL is planning to deliver 26 A320 family aircraft and up to 
40 by 2012. In July 2009 Airbus  started the construction of a $350million facility in 
Harbin for the manufacturing of composite parts for A320 and the new A350XWB. 
This is part of a commitment that Airbus have with the Chinese government to 
manufacture 5% of the airframe of the A350XWB in China. It is reported that Airbus 
already procures around $100million from China, with the plan to reach 
$500million by 2015. Similarly, Boeing is thought to have $600million in supplier 
contract partnerships with China. AVIC Shenyang Aircraft Corporation builds the 
787 vertical fin. It is estimated that Rolls-Royce already has more than $1billion of 
business with China and it is expected to grow its sourcing of materials from 
$200million in 2009 to $800million within three years, and to $1billion by 2015. 
It is evident that all the aerospace OEMS have reflected the emergence and importance of China s aviation in their own manufacturing strategies. This has, and 
will continue, to influence their purchasing policies and, as a consequence, there will 
continue to be a profound effect on their supply chains. However, it is not only the 
existing major OEMS that are increasing their investment and purchasing spends in 
China. China has ambitions to establish its own civil aerospace development and 
manufacturing capability. 
VII-2 The Current Situation of  the Aviation Industry in China 
 
In May 2008, a new company, the China Commercial Aircraft Company (COMAC) 
was set up by the Chinese Government with the aim of developing China s own 
indigenous large aircraft producer to rival Airbus and Boeing. This is part of a wider 
government initiative to develop the aerospace sector in China. A year earlier, the 
State Council, the highest executive organ of the state, approved a new large aircraft 
project alongside plans for lunar exploration and manned space flight. This 
demonstrates the priority the Government has placed in aerospace in its overall 
economic development agenda. The project is known as the C919 and the objective 
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is to produce a single-aisle, 150 seat aircraft by 2016 to compete with the B737 and 
A320.  
According to Goldstein (2006)120, China strategy to build an indigenous LCA industry 
is based on two pillars: (1) leverage the interest that foreign manufactures have in 
accessing China domestic market by entering in various partnerships, (2) develop 
competencies across the full supply chain from aerostructures , systems, and 
propulsion, as well as their integration and the final assembly. China recognized it 
needed to learn from western LCA manufactures in technology, managerial and 
commercial skills, crucial to the successful development of a commercial aircraft 
that will be credible in the Europe and North America as well as with the domestic 
airlines. COMAC will be responsible for the overall C919 program. The Government has also merged the country s two biggest aerospace industrial conglomerates - 
AVIC I & II - into a single state-owned enterprise. They were originally a single 
entity, but were divided in 1999 in order to break the monopoly and foster fair 
competition.  
AVIC has over 420,000 employees, about four times more than Airbus and Boeing 
Commercial aircraft combined, spread across more than 200 subsidiaries and 20 
listed companies. The operation covers manufacturing plants and research 
institutes with capabilities across all aspects of the aerospace supply chain from 
airframe, aero-engine and airborne systems, through to the production of military 
fighter and transport aircraft, and the civil regional turbo-props. In 2009 AVIC 
entered the Fortune 500 Global companies, with revenue of $21.7 billion and profits 
of $568 million. It ranks 11th in largest Aerospace & Defense Company, ahead of 
Bombardier. The restructuring and the launch of the C919 program has resulted in 
the acceleration of foreign engagement in China s aerospace sector which had 
already some momentum. Overseas aerospace OEMs and Tier 1 suppliers have 
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recognized the opportunities that the market presents and have been expanding 
their relationships with the aerospace supply chain in China. 
 
Recently General Electric formed a 50:50 joint venture with AVIC to develop a new 
avionic company that will market worldwide its product and will compete with 
Rockwell and Hamilton Sundstrand. The JV will supply the core processing system, 
display system and on-board maintenance system for the newly launched the C919.  Under the terms of agreement, the JV will also integrate the airplane s entire 
avionics system. The integrated avionics systems that GE AVIC has agreed to 
provide for the Comac C919 include an open-architecture, integrated modular 
avionics core processing system, a large-area display system, an on-board 
maintenance system and the flight recording system. The JV intends to market the 
avionic system to other new programs after the C919 is completed. Similarly in August , Goodrich and AV)C Xi an Aircraft )nternational signed agreements to 
form two joint ventures to produce landing gear and components for the C919.  
China has also reached a new milestone in its international partnerships goals as it 
is now looking at oversea investments and acquisitions in order to boost its capabilities. As recently as December , AV)C Xi an Aircraft Company concluded 
the purchase of a 91% stake in Austria s Fischer Advanced Composite Components 
(FACC), a $393 million turnover enterprise which supplies Boeing, Airbus, 
Bombardier, Embraer and Gulfstream. Back in 2007 AVIC also made enquiries 
regarding the Airbus facilities in Europe that were being sold at the time. There 
were also reports that AVIC also bid last year for the experienced German composite 
aircraft manufacturer, Grob Aerospace, and has looked at Piper Aircraft in the US. It 
is clear that AVIC is proving an attractive partner to major foreign aerospace 
companies looking to exploit the market opportunities in China. It is also evident 
that AVIC also has the desire, and importantly the financial resource to acquire the 
expertise and technology it needs to become a truly global player in the sector. Its 
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stated strategic corporate goal of 22% revenue growth to reach sales of one trillion 
Yuan (USD 147billion) by 2017 is a measure of its bold ambition. 
 
Table 16: Government structure of the aerospace in China 
 
 
VII-3 The entry  of China in civil aviation  
 
In the early 1980, China started its first reverse engineering aircraft program, the 
Y10, based on the 1950s Boeing 707121. The Chinese civil aviation developed itself 
from the military capabilities and from China long partnership history with western 
manufacturers. The knowledge gained over the last 20 years history of partnerships 
has given the Chinese full capability for producing their own civil aircraft programs 
                                                     




that can meet FAA and JAA certification standards. The oldest partnership was 
established with the Soviet Union on both military and civil programs.122 The 
military partnership with the Soviet Union can be traced back to the Mig models. 
The latest partnership concerned the co-production with the Sukhoi design bureau 
on the Su-30s in 2000. On the commercial aircraft side, the cooperation started with 
the co-production of the YAK-10 that originated form a Russian design.  
Since the early 1980s, the Chinese airlines through their government have 
purchased western built aircraft. China s central government retains the ultimate 
approval regarding civil aircraft purchase. There are two entities within the 
government structure that control the purchase of aircraft: 
- the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC); 
- the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC). 
The NDRC needs to approve any aircraft purchase and supervise the aircraft 
acquisition negotiations with the manufacturers. The CAAC because of its 
responsibility over Air Traffic Control and Safety is the second body to approve the 
purchase. The airlines of China need to obtain CAAC approval before any type of 
fleet expansion. If neither NDRC nor the CAAC can oblige an airline to take a 
particular type of aircraft, their power reside in their ability to withhold the 
allocation of aircraft needed by the airlines. Over the last 15 years, the NDRC and the 
CAAC have balanced the orders of aircraft equally between Airbus and Boeing. 
However, given the level of investment of Airbus in the Tianjin final assembly of 
A320 and the fact that Airbus has only 35% of the installed fleet in China vs Boeing, 
it is likely that the China authorities order more Airbus aircraft for the for 
foreseeable future.   
Historically, all large aircraft contracts with western aircraft manufactures included 
some type of offset program to manufacture some of the aircraft component in 
                                                     
122 Frankeistein J , China s defense industry : a new course ? in James Mulvenon and Richard 
Yang Eds , The people s liberation army in the information age, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica 
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China. The Chinese firms involved in the offset had to comply with FAA and JAA 
standard that was often taught to them by the FAA and JAA directly in China.  
For every offset, western firms had to detach their employees on site at the Chinese 
manufacture to oversee and train their Chinese counterpart. The FAA and the JAA 
also develop oversight in the Chinese factories doing parts not only for the Chinese 
delivered aircraft but for deliveries of the aircraft globally. The most successful offset agreement so far is the A  door agreement between *airbus and AV)C s 
subsidiary Shenyang Aircraft. Shenyang has delivered its 8,000th door in April 2009.     
  
Table 17 Offset agreement with western aircraft manufactures 
Western aircraft program Type of aircraft Western Manufactures type of offset 
MD-82 125 seater Narrow Body Douglas Aircraft Final Assembly 
MD-82 125 seater Narrow Body Douglas Aircraft Nose section 
737 125 seater Narrow Body Boeing Fuselage panels for section 48 
MD90 130 seater Narrow Body Douglas/Boeing Fuselage panels 
737 130 seater Narrow Body Boeing Horizontal stabilizer 
757 175 seater standard body Boeing Empennage 
757 Freighter small freighter Boeing Cargo door 
A300 freighter medium freighter Airbus Cargo door 
737 130 seater Narrow Body Boeing Vertical fin & tail 
ATR42 70 seats ATR Center Wing box 
ATR72 90 seats ATR Rear fuselage 
A320 150 seater Narrow body Airbus Door and FAL 
Source: survey, Laurent Rouaud 
 
 VII-3-1 China Aviation Industry Corp. (AVIC) 
 
AVIC is a fully state owned company that was created in 2008 by the merger of 
China AVIC 1 and AVIC 2 which at its peak employed jointly about 520,000 people. 
The main objective of the merger was to create a state owned company that will 
manage aircraft manufacturing for all China aircraft program from turboprop to 
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aircraft in the size and range of the Airbus and Boeing product portfolio123. The large 
aircraft above 100 seats are the responsibility of COMAC, a separate company under 
government control, partly owned by AVIC (see next chapter). AVIC is responsible 
for designing and manufacturing large and medium size military transport, bomber 
and special military purpose aircraft. The restructuring has ended the separation 
between the military and civil parts of AVIC I and II. Western companies were more 
comfortable dealing with the civil side knowing that there was a firewall between 
the two. In reality, it seems that this firewall was just a perception. In any case, since 
the merger, western companies have notably increased their partnership and 
presence in AVIC.  
Over the last 10 years, AVIC I and II have developed an international partnership 
and collaboration with the main aerospace groups in Europe and the Americas. AVIC 
has also expanding its presence across China, has changed its company structure 
reflecting the structure of western firms. In order to improve its capital structure 
and access to private capital, AVIC has integrated its listed companies to its 
structure.  
Immediately after the merger, AVIC has restructured by different specialties in 
order to integrate more than 200 subsidiaries of the merged companies and 
eliminate cost overlap between the subsidiaries of the two AVICs. The specialty 
Divisions are financially independent in the sense that they manage their own Profit 
and Loss statement. AVIC is located in 19 provinces shown below.  
 
                                                     
123 Goldstein A (2005) The political economy of industrial policy in China/ the case of aircraft 





   
Figure 95: AVIC restructuring 





























Source: Aviation Week, Laurent Rouaud  
Although AVIC announced in 2009 that it will hire overseas talent for management 
role within the 10 division of AVIC, all General Manager are Chinese. The reason 
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invoked was the confidential information that the GM would have access. The 
divisions are not located in a central location such as Beijing but throughout China, 
in the main aerospace clusters. AVIC Aircraft is based in the aerospace cluster of Xi an, while AV)C (elicopter is based in the cluster of Tianjin. The establishment of 
the Division was the result of a careful selection of site by the central government 
and follow the strategy to industrialized different and provide high tech jobs in 
different areas of china other than the 3 major cities of Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Shenzhen.   
AVIC continues to develop partnerships with leading western aircraft manufactures 
and tier-1 suppliers. In 2009, AVIC signed agreement with Bombardier to for its 
CSeries aircraft. AVIC has been a partner of Airbus since the mid 1980s. In 2009, 
AVIC and Airbus signed another agreement to build a composite manufacturing 
centre in Harbin to produce as a joint venture composite parts and component for 
the A350 as well as for the equipment of the A320 wings.   
 
Table 18 AVIC recent partnerships and mergers  
Partnership/merged company Detail of agreement/contract 
Airbus 
JV with Airbus to build a manufacturing center in 
Harbin for composite material parts and components 
for the A350. AVIC to hold 80% and Airbus 20% 
Airbus 
FAL, Tianjin municipal government JV with Airbus. 
Airbus control 51%, remaining 49% split between 
Tianjin Free Trade Zone Investment (represents 
Tianjin) holds 60% and AVIC 40%  
Airbus 
Airbus and Xian Aircraft Industry signed a cooperation 
to  equip A320 wings for the A320 to be assemble in 
China. A new facility will be built in Tianjin next to the 
FAL. A new subsidiary was created Xian Aircraft 
Industry Company 
AVIC I and AVIC II 
Merger into AVIC to form the biggest aircraft 
manufacturer in China 
COMAC 
Formation of COMAC to take the responsability in 
building Chinese large civil aircraft (ARJ and C919) . 




Strategic cooperation agreement. AVIC to support 
COMAC by providing R&D capability to COMAC and 
marketing. Stated goal is to "increase market share of 
China made civil aircraft" 
Boeing 
Boeing expanded capacity of composite facilities JV 
Boeing Tianjin Composite Co. Ltd, 88% Boeing, 22% 
AVIC 
Bombardier AVIC and Bombardier entered a strategic cooperation 
agreement in 2007.  
Bombardier 
Agreement with Shenyang Aircraft to become 
Bombardier partner for its 130 seater Cseries aircraft 
and the Research and manufacturing of short to 
medium haul aircraft 
Source: Aviation Daily, Laurent Rouaud 
 
In recent years, AVIC has been very active in building its portfolio of product. AVIC 
opened a Defense branch in Beijing as part of its plan to become a global company in 
the defense business such as the fighter aircraft J-10. AVIC is diversifying its offering 
by entering into the electric vehicle market. AVIC signed an agreement with the Central China s (enan province to build a manufacturing facility of electric cars. 
AVIC tried to enter in the airline industry by tempting to acquire the troubled East 
Star Airline. However, the airline did not accept the low price offer from AVIC and 
liquidated. This was the first airline bankruptcy in the history of China airline.  
AVIC decided in 2008 to enter the market of commercial aero engine. In 2008, it 
signed an agreement with the municipality of Shanghai to establish a commercial 
aero engine company. In 2009, AVIC unveiled a turbofan engine at the Zhuhai Air 
Show, by its subsidiary Aviation Engine Industry Corp. The engine introduces a 
number of current technologies. The engine consists of a high by pass fan, a three 
stage combustor, a single stage HP turbine a three stage low pressure turbine, and a 
simple convergent nozzle. The technology that have been selected and successfully 
integrated have surprised all western engine manufacturers. The difficulties though 
now will consist of testing the engine for its reliability, safety, performance, 
maintenance and economics for an airline operation. AVIC Engine Co Ltd own 20 
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member companies including the Shenyang Aero-engine group  and Chengdu 
Engine Co. Ltd and 3 listed companies at the stock exchange.  Most of its engines are 
dedicated to military applications. It possesses R&D facilities, engine test and 
inspection capabilities for the military engine.   
AVIC Aircraft Corporation includes 5 member companies. AVIC Aircraft objective is 







 Customer support 
for medium and large transport aircraft, civil passenger aircraft, and landing gear 
systems. It is also a major part contractor and component design and production for 
domestic and western aircraft manufactures.  
AVIC had made public is intention to list 80% of its business by 2010 and become a 




Figure 96: AVIC aircraft division structure 
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Source: Aviation Week, Aviation Daily Laurent Rouaud
  
 
VII-3-2 The MA600 & MA700 Regional Transport Aircraft 
 
The MA60 is an advanced regional turboprop aircraft developed by AV)C Xi an 
Aircraft Company. The MA60 is suitable for short and medium-haul commuter 
operations as well as multi-role applications. 
 
 
According to forecasts of Bombardier and China Aviation Industry Development 
Research Center, the next 20 years the total global demand for regional aircraft will 
be 5,300-5,500, of which 1,900 will be turboprop regional aircraft. Currently there 
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are three major turboprop regional aircraft manufacturers in the world: ATR, 
Bombardier and Embraer, with AVIC XAIC hoping to join them. 
The MA60 is part of AVIC XAIC Xinzhou series of aircraft. The first MA600 (Xinzhou 
600) was delivered in 2009 and the MA700 (Xinzhou 700) is undergoing 
development. 
The major customers of MA60 are in Africa, Asia and Latin American, including 
Zimbabwe, Congo, Zambia, Laos, Indonesia, and Bolivia. Africa is expected to be a 
priority market where there is a projected need for about 500 new aircraft in the 
next decade. 
 
The MA600 is an upgrade of MA60. Compared with MA60, the MA600 has improved 
structure and integrated avionics systems and enhanced comfort and improved 
economy through better energy efficiency. The price of MA600 is expected between 
100 to 120 million RMB is significantly lower that similar foreign aircraft which sell 
at $18-20 million (about 124 to 138 million RMB). In terms of the operating costs, 
MA600 is expected to be 40 per cent lower than that of the jet aircraft.The MA700 is 
a new generation of turboprop and in the early stages of development. It is being 
designed for EU and U.S. markets and hopes to become a mainstay regional aircraft 
in the world market. 
 
VII-3-3- Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) 
 
Created in 2008, COMAC is a state owned company regrouping the First Aircraft 
Institute, Shanghai Aircraft Manufacturing and Shanghai Aviation Industrial 
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Corporation and its subsidiaries. These three companies have been active in the 
MD80/90 and ARJ21 program. The company is jointly invested by 6 state owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council: Shanghai 
Guo Sheng Co. , China Aviation Industry Corporation, Aluminium Co; of China, 
Baosteel Group Co. , and Sinochem Co. COMAC has a registered capital of 19B yan 
($2.8B).  
COMAC Strategy 
COMAC has outlined its strategy plan as 1 goal, 2 product lines, ,3 centers, 4 
strategies, 5 core capabilities, and 6 relationships  
One goal: To become a world – class aerospace enterprise. 
Two product lines: Series aircrafts of both regional jet and trunk-liner. 
Three centers: General Aircraft Research & Design Center, Final Assembly 
Manufacturing Center, Global Customer Service Center Global Center. 
Four strategies: Corporate Culture strategy, Human Resources strategy, Brand 
strategy, Information strategy Information strategy. 
Five core capabilities: Aircraft design and integration, final assembly and 
manufacturing, marketing and sales, customer service, airworthiness certification. 
Six relationships: Safety and economics; independent innovation and global 
technology resources adoption; mechanism innovation and role of current 
technology and people; technological breakthrough and industrialization; 
government dominance and market mechanism; trunk liner and regional aircraft. 
 
COMAC is responsible for the design, development, manufacturing, flight test, sales 
and marketing of all large aircraft from the regional ARJ21 aircraft. COMAC is 
building a large network of international cooperation starting with the ARJ21 
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aircraft development. COMAC is also in close partnership with its part owner AVIC. All the subassembly of the COMAC s  ARJ  are done by AV)C factories.  













Source: AVIC, Laurent Rouaud
 
 COMAC has received about 300 orders for its ARJ21 aircraft with the first deliveries 
anticipated at the end of 2010. The ARJ21 is the first medium and short range 
regional aircraft by the Chinese. It provides a solid experience base for the development of China s larger trunkliners to come  
In early 2009, COMAC announced the launch of the C919 aircraft, a family of aircraft 
from 150 to 190 seats that will compete head to head with Airbus A320 and Boeing 
737. Developing a large civil aircraft has been in the plan for decades and a core 
national project.  The first test flight in 2014. and the first delivery of the aircraft is 
anticipated for 2016. The dates have  been brought forward from the original 2020 
date, because it is believed that China wants to exploit this market segment before 
Airbus & Boeing look to develop replacements for their A320 & B737 families. This 
accelerated timescale necessitates engagement with foreign suppliers, particularly 
in the areas of propulsion, avionics and materials. However, in procuring equipment 
in these areas China will not be content with straight forward off-the-shelf solutions; 
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it will want to work with suppliers to develop its own long term capability. It has 
already established a new aero-engine company in Shanghai with the ultimate aim 
of developing and producing engines for the C919. AVIC, the Shanghai Municipal 
Government and Shanghai Electric are its principle shareholders and it has been 
reported that it is open to further investment from either domestic or foreign 
investors, for a stake of up to 30%. 
ARJ21 program 
In the short term, COMAC focus is on the ARJ21 which first flight took place at the 
end of November. The ARJ21 is 70% build oversee by 19 major European and US 
suppliers. A stretch version of the ARJ21 is being developed with the support of 
Bombardier. Antonov collaborated with COMAC to design the ARJ s wing. Boeing is 
supporting the ARJ program as a consultant. GE is heavily involved on the ARJ as a 




Table 19 Western suppliers of ARJ21 
Section or components Suppliers Country 
Engine  General Electric US 
Avionics Rockwell Collins US 
Hydraulic Systems Parker UK 
Electric power and APU Hamilton Sunstrand US 
Landing Gear system Liebherr Aerospace Germany 
Air Conditioning  Liebherr Aerospace France 
Flight control system Honeywell US 
Fire Protection system Kidde Aerospace UK 
Water system Envirovac US 
Emergency evacuation  Air Cruisers US 
Oxygen system B/E UK 
Control deck Eaton UK 
Light system Goodrich US 
Source: AVIC 
 
Table 20 Domestic supplier of ARJ21 
Section or components Suppliers Country 
Nose  Chengdu Aircraft Industry group China 
Wing Xi'an Aircraft §Industry Group China 
Fuselage Xi'an Aircraft Industry group China 
Rear fuselage Shenyang Aircraft Industry Group China 
Stabilizer/Elevator Shanghai Aircraft Group China 
Radom Research Institute for Special Structures Composite China 
Pylons Shenyang Aircraft Industry Group China 
Vertical tail  Shenyang Aircraft Industry Group China 
 
 
The success of the ARJ21 outside of China will depend on the quality of the customer 
support and its global coverage. Most aircraft program in China and even in western 
countries that have failed was due to the lack of commitment from the customer 
support side of the business. Aware of this condition, AVIC has build a new 18,000 
m2 customer service center located in Shanghai industrial area. The Center include 
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training for mechanics, crew and flight crews, as well as a technical service, 
maintenance support, and a spare part facility. In order to overcome the difficulties 
to finance the ARJ21 for foreign airlines, COMAC has set up a leasing company that 
will enable airline to lease the asset without worrying about the likely low residual 
value of the aircraft. In addition of its own leasing company, GECAS, the aircraft 
leasing subsidiary of GE, has purchase 6 ARJ21 following the selection of GE engine 
of the aircraft. Despite these efforts, it is unlikely that the ARJ become successful as 
to reach more than 1,000 orders. The most important constraint will remain the 
relatively low probability that the ARJ be successful outside China, and the small 
market for regional jet aircraft in domestic China. In addition, the ARJ21 has already 
suffered some major setback. First the original planned was to have the first 
deliveries in 2009. Because of design and industrial challenges, the entrée into 
service has been pushed back by one year.   The ARJ21 is the stepping stone for the 
emergence of China civil aircraft business in the key area of aircraft architecture and 
integration capabilities, customer services and aircraft marketing, sales and 
contract. It is the opportunity to experience in real situation the different discipline 
of aircraft manufacturing the way western manufactures do. The ARJ program is 
view as a demonstrator program in view of the ultimate China aviation goal of 
building a successful 150-190 seater alternative to the Airbus and Boeing products.  
The C919 program 
The C919 is anticipated to cost about $10 billion. The funding of the program is 
100% government through the shareholder of COMAC: 
- SASAC 
- Shanghai Municipal Government 
- AVIC 






The State Council approved a new large - aircraft project in February 2007 and 
incorporated it into the 11th Five-Year Plan alongside Lunar Exploration and 
Manned Space Flights. The large commercial aircraft project is named C919 and 
aims at the domestic and overseas single-aisle aircraft market, in competition with 
the Boeing B737 and Airbus A320. Premier Wen Jiabao wrote an article in People s Daily  named Let China s own trunk liner soar into the blue sky . This expressed 
how the Chinese consider the Trunk Liner Program as an important strategic 
decision made by the government for the development of a world class science and 
technology base, and for the overall modernization of China. It is seen as a landmark 
for establishing China as an innovative country and its implementation will promote 
the development of the economy, and science and technology in China. 
Figure 98 artistic view of COMAC C919 
 
 
The basic design of the initial C919 includes supercritical low wings, three-point 
type retractable landing gears, and regular empennage and powered by two wing 
mounted advance high bypass ratio engines. The range is 4,075km for the standard 
range version and 5,555km for the extended range version. Three variants are 
planned - 156 seats (mixed class), 168 seats (all economy), and 180 seats (high-
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density It will be equipped with a new generation aero-engine, more advanced than existing aircraft. )t was recently announced that CFM s new LEAP-X1C engine would 
be the power plant. The design has been set the ambitious target of achieving a 10% 
less cost of ownership than B737/A320 models, and a 50% reduction in carbon 
emissions. In March 2007 while announcing the strategy & program, the central 
government clearly stated that China would seek international co-operation. As 
noted above the engine is being sourced internationally and it is expected that 
airborne systems and materials will be open to international partners and selected 
by competition. The C919 is planned to have its maiden flight at the end of 2014, 
and to be delivered to the users after achieving Airworthiness Certification in 2016. 
The engineering mock-up began in September 2009 and the sections of the major 
structure of are expected to be finalized soon. Some estimate that the development 
program should take about 10 years, with a budget of 30-50 billion Yuan (USD 4, 42 – 7, 36 billion). The flight test would take 3 years. Therefore, it will be a significant 
challenge if the first aircraft is to be operational much before 2020, let alone the 
planned 2016. 
COMAC signed MOUs with 9 domestic fuselage suppliers, including AVIC, in May 
2009. These included AV)C Xi an Aircraft Company, AV)C Chengdu Aircraft 
Company, AVIC Shenyang Aircraft Company and AVIC Harbin Aircraft Company as 
well as AVIC Hongdu Company. CASIC is also one of the suppliers. 
The 1st tier suppliers of engines and airborne systems will be foreign, in order to 
assist with meeting the ambitious in-service date. The RFI for this was given to 
overseas suppliers in late February 2009. COMAC at the moment is reviewing all the 
RFIs that have been submitted by foreign suppliers and a decision on the successful 
bids will be made by the end of 2009. Once the system suppliers are chosen, they 
will start to conduct joint concept design work.  
Now, the procedure of suppliers select was finished and the suppliers are presented 




Table 21: C919 suppliers 
System/Equipment Supplier Country 
Fuselage - nose section Chengdu Aircraft Industrial  China 
Fuselage - foreward & aft (barrels) 
Jiangxi Hongdu Aviation Industry Corporation 
Ltd. 
China 
Empennage (Tail section) Shenyang Aircraft Corporation China 
Fuselage mid section, wing boxes, 
spoilers, ailerons, flaps, and slats 
Xi'an Aircraft Industry Company Ltd. China 
Turbofan Engines CFM International Inc. (LeapX engine) USA/France 
Engine nacelles and thrust reversers Nexcelle (GE) USA/France 
Engine exhaust systems Nexcelle (GE) USA/France 
Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) Honeywell (131-9(C9C) APU) USA 
Electric power generation & distribution 
systems 
Hamilton Sundstrand Electric Systems USA 
Starter-generators Honeywell Aerospace USA 
Fuel tanks and systems Parker Aerospace Fluid Systems Division USA 
Hydraulic Systems & Equipment Parker Aerospace Hydraulic Systems USA 
Fly-by-wire flight control actuation 
system 
Parker Aerospace USA 
Source: COMAC, Laurent Rouaud 
 
The C919 is anticipated to provide some benefits in terms of performance and 
economic compared with the current A320 and 737. The capacity of the Chinese 
industry to integrate an aircraft is certainly within reach. It will depend on China 
ability to understand global requirements, design compelling and reliable aircraft, 
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No experience – complex part  
 
 
Manufacture yes yes Experience from wing 
 
The composite application know how for the wing, empennage, and fuselage will be 
critical for future aircraft development. COMAC would have to develop the 
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capability to become a major supplier of composite structure design and 
manufactures. It is doubtful that the product support organization be in place for the 
delivery of the first aircraft. Secondly, one of the biggest challenges will be the 
ability of COMAC to bring together a marketing organization that will be able to 
succeed in placing the aircraft outside of China. The odds seem slim in  view of the 
current activity in the market.  The chart below is an extract of a marketing 
brochure presenting the aircraft to the western customers.  
COMAC919 Marketing
…a d ri g i to full play of the politi al superiority of the so ialist syste  
hi h is apa le to o e trate all resour es to do great jo s.




VIII The aviation clusters in China  
 
Seattle, Toulouse and the North-west England region are the three largest large civil 
aircraft clusters of the western world. According to Hickie (2006)124, they particular 
location can be traced back to experienced engineers who had some strong local 
connections and passion for aviation. In North-west England, the origin of the LCA 
industry came from the creation of A.V Roe Company in 1910 by Alliot Roe in the basement of his brother s Manchester mill. )n Toulouse, Emile Dewoitine set up his 
aircraft company in 1921 in a warehouse. He had some experience in manufacturing 
in World War I and started quickly by receiving military contracts. Bill Boeing set up 
his aircraft factory in a boatyard, to build airplane for his own amusement. 
According to Maoui (1999)125, all three regions developed from small scale 
operation to large companies because they were competent and fortunate enough to 
receive a early boost from large military contract.  
 
VIII-1 The theory of clusters 
 
According  to Niosi and Zhegu (2005) 126clustering and dispersion of industry are 
submitted to two opposing forces: a centripetal force that tends to concentrate 
industry in a few geographical locations, and a centrifugal force that tends to 
disperse industry across regions and nations. A partial typology of clusters could 
consist of six groups: (1) industrial  districts (the Marshall tradition), (2) regional 
poles (the Perroux model), (3) local knowledge spillover , (4) local and regional 
                                                     
124 Hickie  Desmond (2006), Knowledge and competitiveness in the aerospace industry: the cases of 
the Toulouse, Seattle and North-west England, European Planning Studies, Volume 14, number 5, 
June  
125 Maoui (1999), Aerospatiale, Perrin, Paris 
126 Niosi Jorge and Zhegu Majlinda (2005) Aerospace clusters: local or global knowledge spillovers?, 




systems of innovation,  Michael Porter s  diamond applied to innovative clusters 
and (6) anchor firm cluster. The Marshall s district is the agglomeration of small and medium size companies in 
the same or related industries. Universities, vocational schools, government policies 
and public laboratories play a small role in the district. According to Meardon 
(2001)127, they include firms that are self organized and compete in the same 
markets  
The regional poles are based on Perroux work and consist of clusters built around 
industrializing industries such as transportation equipment. There are made of part 
manufactures and component as well as metal, glass, and producers that use this 
material. This type of clustering do not requires universities or local laboratories.  
In the late 1980s and 1990s, academic cluster research128 focused on the US. There 
were mostly local knowledge spillovers with non market scientific and technological 
leakages from research and public laboratories.   
The local and regional systems of innovation emphasized the dynamic between 
several organizations and institutions such as innovative firms research 
universities, public research, institution and government incentives. As Cooke and 
Morgan (1998)129 described, these clusters are have the full panoply of innovation 
organization set in an institutional environment where systematic links among the 
innovator actors is common.  
                                                     
127 Meardon S (2001), Modeling agglomeration and dispersion in city and country : G. Myrdal, F. 
Perroux and the new economic geography, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, volume 60, 
number 1, page 25-27 
128 Feldman M (2000), Location and innovation : the new economic geography of innovation, 
spillover and agglomeration, in G.L Clark, M Gertler, M.P Feldman and K Williams (Eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Economic Geography, page 559-579, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
129 Cooke P and Morgan K (1998), The associative economy, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
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Michael Porter (1998)130 suggested a cluster model as geographical concentration of 
interconnected companies and institutions in a particular field or industry.  
Finally, the cluster that is anchored by a particular firm or firms has been developed 
by Feldman (2003)131. For this type, the clustering is driven by the anchor firm that 
attracts human capital and suppliers and provides knowledge spillover.  
Niosi and Zhegu (2005) great cluster analysis concludes that the aerospace clusters 
of Seattle and Toulouse were originally regional poles as described in the Perroux 
model, but have evolved towards a district Marshall model. Suppliers were first 
attracted by the prospect of selling part to the large firm in the cluster (Airbus or 
Boeing) but progressively became more global and diverse market players. In the 
Toulouse and Boeing clusters, the roles of universities and government laboratories 
in innovation are secondary.  
 
VIII-2 The Chinese clusters 
 
The Chinese government, the defense industrial authorities, and AVIC have been 
drafting the national reforms and plans to make China a world major player in 
aviation within the next 10-15 years. The strategic plan includes the development of 
aviation clusters throughout China. The clusters location have been driven by  
 the education and people resource  
 the transport infrastructure 
 the economic development of the area 
 
The strategic planning involves several administration and processes: 
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- A medium and long-term civilian aviation development plan currently being 
finalized by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT)  
- A long-term corporate plan done by AVIC in 2009 that sets out key priorities 
to 2016;  
- The 12th Five Year defense industrial program drafted by the State 
Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense 
(SASTIND) that will begin in 2011;  
- The civilian and defense versions of the 2006-2020 Medium and Long-Term 
Science and Technology Development Plan promulgated by the State Council and SAST)ND s predecessor. These state-level plans help to locate the 
aviation industry within the overall national development priorities and also 
serve to promote the coordination and integration of civilian and military 
activities.  
 
While some of these plans are classified, especially those related with military 
activities, their key elements and contours can be analyzed. First, the long-term 
building of a world-class civilian airliner industry is a key strategic priority for the 
Chinese authorities. Their process consist of a cautious step-by-step process of 
building more advanced and larger airliners with increasing levels of local 
technological content. The first two stages of this plan have already been laid out 
with the development of the 70-110 seat ARJ21 trunk liner, which is now 
undergoing flight testing, and the COMAC C919 airliner, which is scheduled to fly for 
the first time at the end of 2014. Only 10 percent of the ARJ21 will be local in 
content while the target for the C919 is 30 percent. The third stage is the 
development of a two aisle wide-body airliner after 2020. 
 
A second major goal contained in these plans is the construction of a new 
geographical structure for the civilian aviation industry with specialized clusters 
concentrated in the Pearl and Yangtze River Deltas in South and East China and the 
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Bohai Rim centered on Tianjin. A commercial engines base will be established in 
Shanghai, generation aviation operations in Zhuhai, Guangdong Province, and 
helicopters in Tianjin. These new clusters are intended to complement the existing 
military-intensive aviation industrial complex that was built in the Maoist era and is concentrated in the country s interior, such as Xi an, Chengdu, Shenyang, Guizhou, 
Nanchang and Harbin.  
 









In general, aviation industry clusters represent geographic concentration of 
interconnected aeronautics enterprises that share related production inputs, 
specialized labor pools, distribution and communication channels, and network 
association. They can be characterized as being networks of production of strongly 
interdependent firms (including specialized supplier), knowledge producing agents 
(universities, research institutes, engineering companies), bridging institutions 
(brokers, consultants) as well as distribution channels and customers, linked to each 
other in a value-adding production chain. The aviation cluster approach focuses on 
the linkages and interdependence between actors in the network of production 
when producing products and services. In recent years, this view has also motivated 
more and more policy makers and economic development practitioners to turn to 
cluster-based concept as new tools to strengthen regional economies. 
In China, two types of aviation clusters can be identified. 
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1. Clusters that emerged from the demand of China defense in the 1950s through 
1970s. Xi an, Chengdu, Shenyang, Guiyang, Nanchang and (arbin, were selected by the China s government in the s. The construction of several aircraft factories 
which were to produce primarily military aircraft for the People's Liberation Army 
Air Force (PLAAF) and the air component of the PLA Navy. These cities are located 
in the inland of China, with rich natural resources, which are changing their roles 
and the aviation clusters have begun to take shape. 
2 Clusters that emerged in the 1990s following the growing demand of air travel in 
China 
Shanghai and Tianjin clusters which lie on the coasts were developed for the 
commercial aircraft markets.  
 
The cluster analysis that follows presents the first systematic mapping and analysis 





VIII-3 The Xi an aerospace cluster 
 
The Shaanxi Province has a population of 37.6 million people centrally located in 
China mainland. The province is considered as one of the most advanced industrial 
sectors in China in the area of aviation, aerospace, machinery, electronic, and 
energy. It is considered the number one Chinese province in terms of equipment 
manufacturing. Over the last five decades, Shaanxi has emerged as the number one 




The Shaanxi province is rich in technical and research expertise in aviation, 
possesses a qualified human resource, a full aerospace industrial expertise, and has 
had success with its dynamic international cooperation. The province has 10 
colleges and universities and 4 vocational & technical colleges specialized in 
aviation. As many as 20,000 students graduate in aviation every year. There are 41 
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aviation companies and public institutions that employ approximately 150,000 
people. Shaanxi has 6 states key aviation-related laboratories, 7 key laboratories for 
national defense, 4 state specialized laboratories, and over 20 provincial additional 
laboratories as well as a few national aviation technology development centers. 
Shaanxi is also the only province in China, which has two companies that final 
assemble aircraft. Over the last 20 years the province has succeeded in building a 
solid aviation industry with R&D capabilities, manufacturing parts, performing 
aircraft final assembly, doing flight test and strength test, and providing aviation 
training. Shaanxi also pioneered in launching the first international cooperation in 
the aviation industry in China. It has become a major subcontractor province for all 
aircraft manufactures. The subcontracts has been growing at a speed of 35% per 
year, representing as much as 50% of the aerospace subcontract in China. 
 
The foundation of the cluster Aviation cluster  
 
Building the national aviation industry base in Shaanxi reflects the sixteen Party s 
National Congress on the development of the western region. Relying on the 
advantageous aviation resources established over the last decade in Shaanxi 
Province, the China Aviation Industrial Base integrates airport resources and 
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industry resources of the Guanzhong Region (Central Shaanxi Province) to make the One Base, Five Park Zones  vision.  
 One Base  is China Aviation )ndustrial Base CA)B  while the Five Park Zones  
include (1) Yanliang Aviation Manufacturing Park, (2) Xianyang Airport Industry 
Park, (3) Pucheng General Aviation Industry Park, (4) Baoji Fengxiang Flight 
Training Park and (5) Hanzhong Aviation Manufacturing Park. These 5 parks represent the Xi an aerospace industry cluster.  
 
The CAIB had 253 enterprises in the cluster, of which 17 foreign enterprises, 236 
domestic enterprises, and a total industrial investment of more than 30 billion Yuan 
(USD 4.4 billon). China aerospace companies within the Xi an province have 
established contractual relations with more than 20 well-known international 
aviation enterprises such as Boeing, Airbus, and GE. In 2006, the aviation companies 
in the cluster exported 275 million USD aviation related goods.  
 
The CAIB have decided to invest in three areas:  
 OEM and major projects: focuses on main-line aircraft, regional aircraft and 
general aviation, promote large aircraft project such as the serial production 
of ARJ21 Aircraft and Xinzhou Aircraft, the manufacturing of Little Eagle 
series aircraft. It also focuses in establishing foreign manufacturer 
production lines of advanced aircraft type that fits the Chinese airline 
market.   
 Component suppliers: focuses on supplying component for aero-engine, 
system, avionic, invest in R&D for central of landing gear and new material 




 Support: focus on modification and maintenance of aircraft, international 
cooperation to expand the aviation maintenance business, forming strong 
aviation service capability. 
 
In 2004, the National Development and Reform Commission officially approved the overall development plan Fagaigaoji [ ] No.  of Xi an Yanliang National 
Aviation Hi-tech )ndustries Base. Xi an Yanliang National Aviation (i-tech Industries 
Base was launched officially in March 2005. It is the only national hi-tech industry 
base integrating aviation R&D government labs, aviation manufacturing firms, 
aviation universities and vocational education, aviation equipment manufacturing 
and aviation services firms.  
The National aviation industry base is comprised of the Core District and the 
Expansion District. Yanliang is in the Core District of the national aviation hi-tech 
industries base. The Core District is responsible for design, manufacturing, and test 
flight. The Expansion District is in the Guanzhong Area of Shaanxi Province, covering 
the aviation-based enterprises surrounding Xi'an, is responsible for R&D.  
Capabilities in the area of flight test, hydraulic press, high-performance carbon fiber, 
flight simulators are being developed. In addition, eight key materials and 
techniques for large aircraft manufacturing have been identified. As a result, 
national, provincial and municipal engineering centers have been funded and are in 
operation today. These research centers include: the Manufacturing National 
Engineered Research Center, the Ultra-High Temperature Composites Engineering 
Center, the High-Performance Carbon Fiber Engineering Laboratory, the Silicon 
Carbide Material Engineering Center, the National Defense Science & the Technology 
















AVIC Xi’an Aircraft industry 




largest manufacturing of large 
military and civil aircraft in 
China 
More than 30 different types of 
commercial and military 
aircraft.. 
Commercial aircraft:  Y7 series 
and Shenzhou 60 (MA600) 
(more than 170 orders) , MA700 
entry into service in 2015.  
Military aircraft: Leopard, B6 
series bomber  
 
AVIC Shaanxi Aircraft 
Industry (Group) Co., Ltd 
 
research & development center 
for large military and civil 




AVIC Landing Gear advanced 
Manufacturing Corp 
Liaoyuan Aero-mech Corp 
 
research & development center 
and manufacturing of aircraft 
landing gear 
Plane landing gear, hydraulic 
attachment, shock absorbers, 
Manufacturing, machining, 
vacuum heat treatment, NDT, 
vacuum welding 
AVIC Shaanxi Qianshan 
Aviation Electronics Co., Ltd 
research & development and 
manufacturing of aircraft flight 
data management system. 
 
Manufacturing, research and 
sales of systems. 
Xi’an Aero-Engine (Group). , 
Ltd 
manufactures aero-engines turbo engine/ manufacturing  
  
ZEMIC is a high-tech enterprise, 
26 models load cells have gained 





AVIC Electronic Measuring 
Instruments Co., Ltd 
producing the electronic 
measurement products such as 
strain gages, load cells, airplane 
weighing systems, highway 
weigh pads and automobile test 
facilities. 
load cells have gained NTEP 
certificates; 79 models load cells 
have gained the approvals in 
Ukraine; 52 models load cells 
have passed the metrology type 
approval in Russia; 68 models 
load cells gained the anti-
explosion certificates, 71 models 
load cells gained CE certificates, 
57 models load cells gained FM 
(for US) and CFM (for 
Canada) certificates, 58 
models load cells gained 
European ATEX anti-explosion 
certificate.   
 
AVIC Xi'an Aero-engine 
Controls Company 
develop and produce aero-
engine fuel control systems, 
aircraft hydraulic units and high-
tech industrial electro-
mechanical products 
More than 50 models covering 
150 types of fuel control systems 
for aero-engines  
 
AVIC QING’AN GROUP CO., 
LTD.  
firm established as one of 156 
key projects during the first-five 
year plan of China. has 
established a state level R&D 
center of aeronautic and 
aerospace airborne equipments 
 
Mechanical, hydraulic, 
pneumatic, electronic/ electric 
equipments and control systems. 
AVIC Shaanxi Hongyuan Aero 
Forging & Casting Co., Ltd 
 
specializing in forging and 
casting. 
Aerospace, military, ship, , 
transportation, and electrical 
industry. 
 
Shaanxi Aero Electric Co., 
Ltd. 
Electric power supply system 
and engine ignition system in 
China. 
Specializes in researching; 
developing and manufacturing 
main power supply systems, 
secondary power supply systems 
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and engine ignition systems for 
all kinds of airplanes. 
 
 




one of the 156 major projects in 
"The 1st Five-year Plan", 
research, manufacture aircraft 
wheels and brake accessories  
Machining, rolling, cold and hot-
treating stamping, ferrous and 
non-ferrous forging and casting, 
can also produce non-standard 
equipment, tools, powder 
metallurgy products plastic and 
rubber products. 
AVIC Baocheng General 
Electronic Co., Ltd. 
Design, research and 
development of aviation and 
navigation gyro instruments and 
other products  
 
Source: AVIC, Chinese website, Aviation press, Laurent Rouaud 
 AV)C Xi an Aircraft )ndustry Company Limited  XAC  
 
XAC is the largest aviation firm in China whose activities spans from research to 
aircraft production, under the leadership of AVIC Aircraft Company Limited. XAC is 
based in Yanliang District, employs 19,000 people with a total annual operating 
income of over RMB 10 billion. 
 
From its inception in 1958, XAC primary responsibility is to develop and produce 
military and commercial airplanes. XAC has successively developed and 
manufactured more than 30 different types of commercial and military aircraft. 
Military aircraft include the Flying Leopard and B6 series bomber. Its current 
commercial aircraft include the Y7 series and turboprop regional MA series. XAC has 





XAC was the first Chinese aviation company to step into the international market in 
1980, and successively cooperates with global aircraft manufacturers such as 
Boeing, Airbus, and Bombardier. XAC is the largest Chinese aerospace component 
manufacturers. XAC has successively invested and established more than 30 
enterprises including the Xi an Silver Bus Corporation, Xi an Aircraft )ndustry 
Corporation, and XAC Import and Export Corporation whose products include large-
sized luxury Silver bus, aluminum extrusion, metal architectural panel, aluminum 
doors and windows, and electronics. 
 
 
Figure 99: Demand for small aircraft-World 
 
 
Bombardier and China Aviation Industry Development Research Center forecast 
that 6,100 regional aircraft will be delivered over the next 20 years worldwide of 
which 2,300 would be turboprop aircraft. Regional aircraft account for just 12 




XAC has successively developed and manufactured the MA turboprop regional jet 
series such as MA60, MA600, and MA700. To date, the MA600 has received more 
than 170 orders. The 60-seat MA600, an improved version of the MA60, is  300 
kilograms lighter, and 40 percent more fuel efficient than the MA60. The MA series 
competes with the ATRs and the Bombardier Q Series.  
 
Main characteristics of the MA series: 






Crew: 2  
Capacity: 60 
passengers 
Length: 24.31 m (81 
ft 0 in) 
Wingspan: 29.20 m 
(95 ft 11 in) 
Height: 8.89 m (29 ft 
2 in) 
Wing area: 75 m² 
(807 ft²) 
Power plant: 2× Pratt 
& Whitney Canada 
PW127J Turboprop, 





Length: 24.708m () 
Wingspan: 29.200m 
() 
Height: 8.858m () 
Empty weight: 
13,730kg () 
Max takeoff weight: 
21,800 kg  
Power plant: 2× 
Pratt & Whitney 
Canada PW127J 
turboprops, 2,148 kW 
(2,880 shp) each 
Crew: 2  
Capacity: 70-80 
passengers  




Performance Maximum speed: 
514 km/h (278 KTAS) 
Range: 1,430 km 
(775 nm) 
Service ceiling: 7,622 
m (25,000 ft) 
Maximum speed: 
514 km/h (278 KTAS)  
Range: 1,430Km (775 
nm)  
Service ceiling: 
7,622 m (25,000 ft)  
Maximum speed: 650 
km/h 
Market 30 MA60 currently in 
service in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America 
170 orders from 
Africa, Asia and Latin 
America 
Extension of MA600 
family 
Delivery time The first aircraft was 
delivered to Sichuan 
Airlines in August 
2000 
first delivery to the 
Civil Aviation Flight 
University of China in 
Sichuan Province.  




XAC main products 
 
Turboprops MA60 turboprop airliner  
MA600 turboprop airliner 
 
Bombers Xian H-8 stealth, strategic, heavy bomber 




Xian H-6 twin engine bomber - Chinese-upgraded variant of the 
Tupolev Tu-16 Badger 
Trainers Y-7H trainer based on Y-7-100 
Parts COMAC ARJ21 Xiangfeng -wings and fuselage 
Boeing 737 Next Generation vertical fin 
Boeing 747 trailing edge ribs, floor beams, detailed parts, and 
subassemblies 
Boeing 747-8 trailing edge flaps 
Airbus access doors for wide-bodied aircraft , wing fixed trailing 
edges, medium air ducts 
Military Transport 
Aircraft 
Yun-7 (Y-7) twin-engine turboprop transport 
Yun-14 (Y-14) twin-engine turboprop transport 
Xian Y-20 four-engine turbojet transport 
 
Source: AVIC, press, Laurent Rouaud 
 
XAC takes over Austrian manufacturing FACC 
XAC is the majority share holder (91.25%) of the Austrian aerospace manufacturer 
FACC. XAC bought FACC with another Hong Kong base firm Hong Kong ATL. At the 
time of the acquisition, it was the largest Chinese acquisition in Central Europe. It 
also marked XAC strategic goal to invest outside of China in regions that have had a 
long aerospace experience.  
 
XAC international cooperation started with all the major aircraft manufacturers. The 
cooperation has evolved from a pure supplier relationship to a more strategic 
partnership relationship with Airbus and Boeing. On January 26; 2010, XAC 
delivered the 1,500th vertical fin for Boeing's 737 aircraft and signed an extended 




The extension of the contract showed that XAC is capable of producing large-size 
aircraft components in large volume for leading international aviation 
manufacturers. The first contract for producing 1,500 units of the 737 vertical fins 
was signed in 1996. XAC is currently able to produce up to 24 vertical fins per 
month. Since Boeing manufactures 31 B737s planes per month, nearly two-thirds of 
the newly delivered 737s worldwide fleet are equipped with vertical fins produced 
by XAC.  
 
XAC also produces wings for Airbus A320 airplanes. The A320 wing is the largest 
and most complicated aircraft component a Chinese company has ever made. China 
is Airbus' only wing manufacturer outside Europe. XAC is also a major supplier to 
China's build regional jet ARJ21 and large commercial passenger aircraft C919 by 
manufacturing the fuselage and wings.  
 
AVIC Shaanxi Aircraft Industry (Group) Co., Ltd  
 
AVIC Shaanxi Aircraft Industry (Group) Co., Ltd (SAC) located in Hanzhong city of 
Shaanxi Province and under the leadership of AVIC Aircraft Company It is a military 
company founded by Chinese authorities in 1969 to manufacture transport aircraft.  
 
SAC has over 10,000 employees including 3,600 managers and technicians, 404 
senior engineers and 130 skilled workers. SAC has over 4,000 machine tools, 
including 60 large high precision milling machines. SAC is believed to have the 
largest aircraft assembly capability in China and all special equipment required to 





Figure 100: Y-9 
 
The Shaanxi Y-9 (Yun-9) aircraft is a medium sized, medium range transport aircraft 
produced by SAC. The aircraft was developed as a stretched version of the Shaanxi 
Y-8F with greater payload and range. The Y-9 is considered China's attempt to build 
a C-130J class transport aircraft.  
Originally known as the Y-8X project, the development of Y-9 began in 2000 to 
produce a C-130 class transport intended to replace the older Y-8. Shaanxi Aircraft 
Industry showed models of the aircraft as Y-9 at the 2005 Beijing International 
Aviation Expo, to promote its use as a civilian transport. The development has had 
various technical challenges. As a result, the first flight slipped from 2006 to 2008. 
The Y-9 is powered by four turboprop engines, and equipped with 6-bladed 
composite propellers. The tail ramp is designed to handle vehicle cargo. The aircraft 
is capable of transporting 25 tons of cargo, or configured with about 100 troop seats 
in troop transport. The design was reported frozen in January 2010. No aircraft has 







Flight crew: 4 
Cargo cabin size: (length/width/height) 16.2m/3.2m/2.35m 
Empty weight: 39,000kg 
Maximum take-off weight: 77,000kg 
Overloading take-off weight: 81,000kg  
Payload: Normal 25,000kg; Maximum 30,000kg; or 132 armed paratroopers; or 
vehicles and weapons 
Cruising speed: 600~650km/h 
Cruising altitude: 9,000m  
Range: Ferry range with max payload 7,800km 
Flight length: 12 hours 
 
AVIC Landing Gear Advanced Manufacturing Corp Liaoyuan Aero-mech Corp 
(LAMC) 
 
Founded in 1966, as a member company of AVIC, LAMC specialize in the design and 
manufacturing of landing gears for large and medium sized aircraft, hydraulic 
accessories, and rubber and plastics products. LAMC is located in Hanzhong city, 
southern Shaanxi Province and employs 2,700 people. LAMC use all tooling and 
testing to manufacture landing gears following the strict requirements of 
American Military Standards (MIL), Boeing standards (BAC, DPS), French Aerospace
 Standards, Messier-Dowty Process Specifications, British Standards (BS), and the 
Russian standards.  
 
LAMC possesses all the advanced measurement and test equipment and quality 
control means essential for hydraulic and pneumatic products, which can be used to 
carry out air tightness, strength, life cycle, performance tests and other special test 
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at different high and low temperatures. LAMC has established and implemented 
effectively a rigorous quality system. It had its quality system accredited GJB/Z9001 
and certified in 1996, and ISO9001 certified 1998. In 1998, LAMC became one of 
Messier-Dowty s Acceptable Suppliers.  
 
Since its establishment, LAMC has produced landing gears, hydraulic accessories 
and spare parts for most of China s aircraft program, and has succeeded in 
establishing business relationships with all western landing gear manufacturers to 
carry out subcontracted production of parts and assemblies.  
 
In the field of civil hydraulic products, LAMAC has successively developed and 
produced pumps and valves for mining, metallurgy, automotive, forklifts as well as 
equipment and spares parts for textile, chemical woodworking machineries. 
LAMC works closely with over one hundred companies in China and abroad, on both 
civil and military applications.  
 AV)C Xi an Aero-Engine Ltd. (XAE), 
 
Founded in 1958, is a state-owned large scale base for the manufacture of aero-
engines and one of the top 1,000 large enterprise groups in China. XAE has 
developed and manufactured turbojet and turbofan engines as well as turbo 
starters, turbo generating units, and industrial and marine gas turbine. It has also 
successfully completed several top scientific research and trial production programs 
relating to aerospace, marine and nuclear industries.  
 
XAE has invested in innovation and possesses today a number of intellectual 
properties. In 2001, XAE was restructured into a limited liability company called Xi an Aero-Engine Group, which is modeled on a parent-subsidiary system having Xi an Aero-Engine (Group) Ltd. as its parent company AVIC Aircraft Company 
Limited is the majority shareholder and China Huarong Asset Management 




GE Aviation celebrates 25-Year Cooperation with XAE 
 
XAE and GE have been cooperating on engines for more than 25 years.  In May 2009 XAE delivered its first high pressure turbine (PT  disk for GE s CF  and CFM  
engine models and celebrated 25 years of cooperation between the two companies.  
 
The cooperation between GE Aviation and Xi'an Aero Engine started back in 1984 
when Xian Aero Engine received the first order from GE for a low-pressure turbine 
disk for a gas turbine. With the strong support from executive teams from both sides 
and the collaboration of the GE project team, the delivery was fulfilled with good 
quality. In 1998, the Xi'an Aero Engine Disk and Ring Factory were established in 
order to meet the requirement of the growing orders from GE. The dedicated 
production line provided guaranteed delivery for GE parts. Currently, Xi'an Aero 
Engine is producing over 100 GE part numbers, covering shaft, disk, ring, and seals 
that are used on multiple marine and aircraft engines. In 2008, Xi'an Aero Engine 
delivered $83.6 million worth of parts to GE, which represents a 35% increase from 
2003. The relationship with GE has evolved from a subcontractor to a Risk Sharing 
Partner relationship 
 
AVIC Xi'an Aero-engine Controls Company (AECC)  
AECC developments and manufactures fuel control systems, hydraulic units and 
electro-mechanical products. The company has advanced digitalized precision 
machining, special processes, advanced metrology equipments. AECC is approved by 
4 international aerospace companies  quality standards in USA and UK.  
Since its establishment 50 years ago, the company has successively developed and 
produced more than 50 models covering 150 types of fuel control systems for aero-
engines. At the same time, through the implementation of its strategy for core 
technology radiation, the company has successfully extended its business in some 
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adjacent fields such as space flight, controls of combat vehicles, repair and overhaul 
for airlines and sub-contract production of aerospace products for international 
companies.  
 AV)C Q)NG AN GROUP CO., LTD.  
Affiliated to the AVIC Aircraft Company, Qing an Corporation was established in 
1955 as one of 156 key projects during the first-five year plan of China. Today, Qing an is one of  key state-owned enterprises supported by the government. Qing an has established a state level R&D center engaged in the research and 
production of aeronautic and aerospace airborne equipments, including mechanical, 
hydraulic, pneumatic, electronic/electric equipments and control systems. It has 
strong research & development ability and modern production capacity in 
integrated system. Its expertise includes mechanical, electronic, hydraulic 
technologies, flight control system as well as in rubber seals, engineered plastics, 
special welding, special casting, complex mould of non-conventional shape. It has 
gained the ISO9001 quality certificate.  
 
AVIC Shaanxi Hongyuan Aero Forging & Casting Co., Ltd (HYFC) 
 
HYFC, founded in1965; specialized in forging and casting. It has a  640million Yuan 
capital, and employs 3,500 people with 300 aerospace. Its possess CAD capability. 
Its expertise covers forging and precision forging using steel, Al-alloy, copper-alloy, 
mg-alloy, Ti-alloy and super alloy. Its largest customers include Boeing, BF Goodrich, 
Rolls Royce, Airbus, Toshiba, and Siemens Its export turnover is about $6million 
annually. 
Shaanxi Aero Electric Co., Ltd. (SAEC)  
 
SAEC is part of AVIC and is the leading manufacturer of aviation electric power 
supply system and engine ignition system in China. SAEC specializes in researching, 
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developing and manufacturing main power supply systems, secondary power 
supply systems and engine ignition systems for all kinds of airplanes.  
 
Besides the aviation electric power supply system and the engine ignition system, 
SAEC also has invested recently in other commercial aerospace technology. It has 4 
subsidiaries: Shaanxi Qinling Special Electric Co., Ltd., Shaanxi Qinling Special Motor 
CO., Ltd., Shaanxi Qinhang Electrical Machinery Co., Ltd., and Shaanxi Tianchou 
Construction Co., Ltd. These companies are responsible for manufacturing of electric 
products, generators and motors, rubber and plastic products, aviation standard 
fixing parts, road & building construction. In 1999, SAEC set up a joint venture with 
the US based company Hamilton Sundstrand Aerospace named Xiamen Sundstrand-
Qinling Aerospace Ltd. The major activity of the JV is the overhaul of aircraft electric 
power supply systems. 
 
SAEC is located in Xingping, in the Shaanxi Province and employ 1,800 people, of 
which more than 300 are technical staff. SAEC is capable of doing its own R&D, and 
manufactures aviation electric power supply systems and aviation engine ignition 
systems.  
 
It test equipment are state of the art. It includes electromagnetic compatibility 
testing (EMC), the three stress integrated test for temperature, the humidity and 
vibration test, the high-speed driving test, the 30000 meters temperature-altitude 
simulated test, as well as advanced physics-chemistry analysis and measuring 
inspection equipments.  
 
AVIC Huaxing Aircraft Wheel Corporation  (uaxing Aircraft Wheel Corporation, built as one of the  major projects in The 
1st Five-year Plan . )t was established for the R&D and manufacturing of aircraft 
wheels and brake accessories It has become an important test center for aircraft 
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wheels and tires. It also manufactures car brake parts Huaxing is one of the 500 
biggest transportation manufactures in China. 
 
Huaxing not only has capabilities of carrying out various kinds of processing like 
machining, rolling, cold and hot-treating stamping, ferrous and non-ferrous forging 
and casting, but also can produce non-standard equipment, various tools, powder 
metallurgy products plastic and rubber products. 
 
 Huaxing's military products QAS and civil products QAS were approved and 
certificated by China New-era QS Certificate Center in 1997. It was certified to the 
ISO 9001 accreditation in 1998. 
 
Huaxing manufactures wheels, brakes, hydraulic and pneumatic units for various 
types of aircraft, automotive wheels and brake  
 
Capability of the cluster in Research, Development and Design 
Shaanxi is the base for the third of China talent in aerospace. At present, Shaanxi has 
ten colleges and universities that focus on aviation and four vocational & technical 
colleges. About 20,000 students graduate per year in fields related to aviation. The 
cluster hosts six national aviation-related key labs, seven key labs for the national 
defense, four national specialized labs, over twenty key labs at ministerial and 
provincial levels as well as a number of national aviation technological development 








Figure 101: Main scientific institutions 
Name Main Business Scope No, of Professional 
Technical Personnel 
AVIC First Aircraft Design 
Institute 
The largest design and research 
institute of large and medium 




AVIC Flight Test 
Establishment 
The only national research and 




AVIC Aircraft Strength 
Research Institute 
The only base for aircraft 
strength research and ground 





AVIC Xi’an Flight Automatic 
Control Research Institute  
 
 




AVIC Xi’an Aviation 





Source: AVIC, press,Laurent Rouaud  
 
AVIC First Aircraft Design Institute (FAI) 
FAI was created through the merger of the Xi'an and Shanghai Aircraft Design and 
Research Institutes in June 2003. AVIC First Aircraft Design Institute is engaged in 
the development of medium and large aircraft. It is responsible for development of 
the Advanced Regional Jet (ARJ21) program and is a key player in China's drive to 
penetrate the highly competitive, commercial jet industry. AVIC First Aircraft Design 
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Institute aims to increase China's aircraft development capabilities and 
competitiveness in the global aviation marketplace. FAI headquarter is located near 
Xian There are about twenty design and research departments in Xi'an and 12 in 
Shanghai. FAI has about 2,250 employees in various aircraft projects design 
activities. 
 
FAI is credited for the design of ten aircraft including the: 
· Y-7, the first regional aircraft in China 
· Y-10, the first large jetliner in China 
· LE-500, the first light general aircraft in China. 
 
The institute had also taken part in international co-operation in pre-development 
of the MPC75 and AE-100 in 1980s and 1990s, as well as the cooperation in the 
McDonnell Douglas MD-82 and MD-90 development. FAI was the leading design 
office for the Advanced Regional Jet (ARJ-21).  
 
Engineering, digital, experience 
 
FAI is capable of designing all aspect of aircraft design structure, and integrated 
propulsion. The institute is the pioneer user of CATIA v4-5 in 3-dimention designs, 
digital pre-assembly and digital mock-up in China. In aerodynamics, FAI owns CFD 
methods and software for analysis of structural and fluid flow problems, has 
capability to design and manufacture a wind tunnel test model. 
 
AVIC Flight Test Establishment 
 
The Chinese Flight Test Establishment (CFTE) is the central Chinese state testing, 
evaluation and certification of aircraft and helicopters. It is co-located with XAC. The 
CFTE is active since 1959. It does tests in flight, but also use flight simulators and 
other test beds, such as engine test benches or devices for testing ejection seats. 
Xi'an CFTE has two runways of 3400 m. The test aircraft can be instrumented for 
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data acquisition of up to 6000 parameters. They are equipped with recorders for 
aircraft onboard data storage and telemetry for the monitoring in real time in 
ground base flight test operation center. It has also a ground resonance testing 
facility for all aircraft systems and on-site real-time analysis system. 
 
AVIC Aircraft Strength Research Institute 
Founded in 1965, it is the only research institute of aircraft strength and ground 
strength verification and testing base of Chinese aviation industry. The Institute 
performs structural fatigue, dynamic strength, composite materials testing, thermal 
strength testing, noise and comprehensive environmental testing and aircraft full-
scale structural testing. 
 AV)C Xi an Flight Automatic Control Research Institute 
The institute established in 1960, conducts R&D on flight control and inertial 
navigation, aerospace vehicle control, guidance and simulation, and manufactures 
production of such systems. It has undertaken recent research breakthroughs in 
quadruple redundancy FBW systems, inertial/GPS combined navigation systems, 
and quadruple redundancy combined servo actuators, Fly-by-light (fiber optic) 
control system. R&D is also believed to be underway by the China Avionics Research 
Institute.  
 AV)C Xi an Aviation Computing Technology (ACTRI) 
ACTRI was founded in 1958, originally as the Northwest Computing Institute of the 
Chinese Academy of Science, and now belongs to China Aviation Industry 
Cooperation I (AVIC1). Historically, ACTRI was a national high performance-
computing center. Today the institute is mainly engaged in the development of 
airborne and missile-borne computers, and aeronautical software. Currently ACTRI 
has 1,050 employees and host several research centers such as the Aeronautical 
Laboratory of Computational Fluid Dynamics (ALCFD). ALCFD has been established 
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by AVIC1 in October 1995. From 1990 to 2000, ALCFD had acted as a developer of 
integrated software system for aerodynamics numerical simulations. Recently the 
research focus has been changed to the validation of CFD simulations, and 
aerodynamic database. Experience has been accumulated in development and 
application of software platform for aerodynamic numerical simulations. 
 Training  
There are 672 research institutions (including 49 large-scale research institutions), 
and over 200 large-scale labs (including 55 national key labs). Although they  
employ some 410,000 scientific and technical personnel (including 150,000 in 
electronics and information fields), the cluster ranks only third in China, behind 
Beijing and Shanghai in terms of researchers. The R&D personnel of the cluster 
accounts for 22% of China. 
Xi an is an important base for China s electronic and information industry. 
Electronic City, situated in the south suburb of Xi an City, has gathered  domestic 
top scientific research institutions and large-scale enterprises in the electronic 
information field with 4,000 scientific and technological personnel per km2. Xi an is also an important base for China's higher education. The universities and 
colleges are focused on engineering course. There are 129,000 graduates of higher 
education institutes each year in Shaanxi Province (including 42,000 graduates in 
electronic information) and 108,000 graduates of intermediary vocational schools 
(including 37,000 graduates in processing & manufacturing and information 
technology). There are nearly ,  foreign personnel in Xi an, of which % are 
engaged in education and training in the local area. According to the investigation of Mercer (uman Consulting, the turnover of talents in Xi an is low. In 2003, the 
turnover rate of talents was 6%, and the turnover rate of professional technicians 






































Number 57 672 26 68 89 83 293 
 




 Doctor s 
Degree 
 Master s 
Degree 
















Students 8665  31625  295810 203928  146554  77223  378900 
Graduates 3802  8159  69427  47757  45942  30744  107800 
Source: China Statistical year book 2008 
 Aviation-related Schools Northwest Polytechnic University, Xi an (NPU) 
The Aircraft Department of NPU was founded in 1952 by merging three Aeronautics 
Departments of Shanghai Jiaotong University, Nanjing University and Zhejiang 
University. The next big expansion occurred in 1970 when the Aircraft Department 
of Harbin Engineering College merged into the Department. With the approval of 
AVIC (Aviation Industries of China) and the CAAC (Civil Aviation Administration of 
China), the Civil Aviation Engineering College was jointly founded by NPU, AMECO 
(Aircraft Maintenance & Engineering Corporation) and CNWA (China Northwest 
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Airline) in 1994. In 2003, the Aircraft Department merged with the Civil Aviation 
Engineering College. 
 
Table 24: Aviation education in the X'ian cluster 





33 faculty members, including 8 
professors, 12 associate professors 








7 associate professors and four 
lecturers. 






60 faculty members, including 12 
professors and 16 associate professors. 
15 wind tunnels in total in the 
department, including 6 scientific 
research wind tunnels and 9 teaching 
wind tunnels. Two are large ones: one 
is the low-speed wind tunnel, and the 
other is the high-speed wind tunnel. 
CFD Applications, Flow 
control, Design of Airfoils 







26 faculty members, includes one 
academician of the Chinese Academy of 
Engineering, ten full professors, one 
chair professor of the Cheung Kong 




Theoretical and Applied 
Mechanics for masters. and 









26 faculty members with seven 
professors, five doctor instructors and 
10 associate professors and senior 
engineers. 93% of the faculty members 
are doctor or master degree holders. 16 
of them have the experience of taking 
professional technical training 
programs abroad given by Boeing in 
USA and Lufthansa in Germany. 




The school has 40 full professors and 40 associate professors, 
including one members of the Chinese Academy of Engineering and 
four Cheung Kong Scholars appointed by the Ministry of Education. 
Two of them are the recipients of the Humboldt Foundation 
Sponsorship. There are over 1,300 undergraduate students, 299 
postgraduate students, and 116 Ph.D. candidates at the school. 
Research The school has one national key laboratory, one national specialized 
laboratory, and ten other laboratories, institutes and centers that give 
support to the Aircraft Design, Fluid Dynamics, Solid Mechanics and 
other disciplines.  
 Xi an Jiaotong University 
 
The School of Aeronautics and Aerospace has five academic departments: 
 Flight Vehicle Design, 
 Aerospace Propulsion  
 Theory and Engineering,  
 Navigation, Guidance and Control,  




The school has 80 full professors and associate professors, including over 146 
undergraduate students, 45 postgraduate students. 
 
Xidian University 
Nearly 80 years since its foundation, Xidian University is a key national university 
under the Ministry of Education of China. It focuses primarily on electronics and 
information education and research, and also offers a wide range of academic 
subjects covering engineering, science, management, economics, arts and social 
sciences. It has been approved by the state to be one of the universities funded by Project  and it is one of the  universities having a Graduate School, one of the 
35 universities having a national demonstration School of Software and one of the 
15 universities having an IC Talents Training Center. It is an essential base of IT 
talents training and high-level scientific research innovation. Xidian University has 
over 40,000 students including over 1,600 Ph. D. students and 7,600 Master 
students. Of its 1,696 academic research and teaching faculty members, there are 
over 900 professors and associate professors, who cover the range of specialties in 
electronics and information technology, in the fields of communication networks, 
signal and information processing, information security, microelectronics and 
mechatronics. 
 
Air Force Engineering University 
Air Force Engineering University is a multi-disciplinary, and it is one of the five 
universities prioritized by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The university 
consists of Engineering, Missile Institute, and Telecommunications Engineering 
School and Science. The school trains the Air Force Aeronautical engineers, in 






Xi an Aero Technical College 
Xi an Aero technical College, started in 1956. The college comprises 5 departments, 
offering 27 specialties, 36 laboratories and five comprehensive experimental bases. 
The departments are: Mechanic Engineering Department, Dynamic Engineering 
Department, Electronic Engineering Department, Computer Engineering 
Department and one Basic Course Department. There are 7000 students enrolling 
every year. 
 
Xi'an Aeronautical Polytechnic Institute 
Xi'an Aeronautical Polytechnic Institute, an institution approved by Ministry of 
Education China, was established in 1958. Designated as one of the 31 major 
polytechnics, its two campuses stand over 615 hectares in Xi'an. 
 
The Institute offers five filled of studies : 
 Aerospace and Aeronautical Engineering, 
 Mechanical Engineering, 
 Electronics/Electrical Engineering 
 Information Technology  
 Management.  
 
With 21 specialty areas and more than 50 teaching laboratories, the Institute is 
regarded as a major training institution for Applied Electronics. 
 
 Financing  Xi an has broad financing channels and a relatively complete financial system. At present, various types of financial institutions are focused in Xi an and a more 
comprehensive financial system taking specialized banks and insurance companies 
The entry of foreign banks, such as Hong Kong Bank of East Asia, Bank of Nova 
Scotia, Canada, HSBS of Hong Kong etc. and the well- known accounting firms, such 
as Price Water House Cooper, highlights the position of Xi an as a regional financial 
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center and a capital market. )n , the deposit of the city s financial institutions 
reached $67 billion. The bond market is set to develop in the region to foster and 
develop key projects and capable enterprises to raise funds by issuing bonds. 
 
China to encourage private capital to enter civil aviation market 
In 2009, Xi'an National Aviation Industry Fund Investment Management Company 
Limited (Xi'an Company), China's first national-level aviation industry fund 
management enterprise, officially opened for business in Xi'an. Its stake holders 
include the Management Council of Aviation Bases, Bases Development Center, Xi'an 
International Trust Co., Ltd., Beijing Venture Capital Co., Ltd, and Shaanxi Industrial 
Investment Co., Ltd. This marks a major change to the tradition of China's aviation 
industry having to rely solely on state special funds for development. The move is 
seen as a major event in the history of the development of China s aviation industry. 
It marks the launch of China's first national level aviation industry fund. Private 
capital is being encouraged to enter China's civil aviation industry through market-
oriented operations. This will change the current situation in which investment in 
China's aviation industry come solely from the state. 
 
The Xi'an National Aviation Industry Fund, with an expected of 30 billion yuan (USD 
4.42 billion) was jointly initiated and organized by a group of enterprises led by 
Xi'an Yanliang National Aviation Hi-tech Industrial Base. Over 60 percent of the fund 
will be used to promote the development of the aviation industry and invest in a 
number of enterprises and projects with development potential within the five 
national-level aviation industrial bases in Xi'an, Harbin, Shenyang, Chengdu and 
Anshun.  
Basic Infrastructure of the Logistics in Xi an Xi an is the largest transportation hub in Northwest China. 
Highway: Xi an is one of the cities where high-grade highways across China intersect 
densely. 2 main lines of national road, 3 large roads leading to west China and 5 
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national roads intersect here.  provincial highways radiate from Xi an to the outside or surround around Xi an. These lines connect with  central cities, forming a one-day transportation circle . 
Railway: Double-track Lianyungang-Lanzhou Railway and Lanzhou-Urumqi Railway pass through Xi an and connect with the Eurasian Continent. They join with five railway branch lines, such as Xi an to Yuxia, to Tongchuan, to (ouma, to Yan an and 
to Ankang, forming the largest railway transportation hub in Northwest China. 
Aviation: Xi an Xianyang )nternational Airport, one of the six regional hub-airports 
planned and constructed by General Administration of Civil Aviation of China, 
receives 25 international airlines. It has become a city with the largest amount of 
international airlines in China s western regions. 
 
 Lianyungang, 1,081km, 3-4 days by train, 1-2 days by automobile; 
 Shanghai Port, 1,509km, 4-5 days by train, 2-3 days by automobile; 
 Tianjin Port, 1,301km, one routine of freight train per week by scheduled 
train, 3-4 days; 
 Qingdao Port, 1,570km, two routine of freight train per week by scheduled 
train, 4-5 days. 
 The Shaanxi s aviation industry association  
Shaanxi aviation Industry Association was established in 2009 by the air base 
administration committee and Xi'an Aircraft Industry (Group) Co., Ltd. and five 
other constitutions as co-sponsors. The association is a social group of aviation 
industry whose establishment was authorized by Shaanxi provincial government.  
It is guided and supervised by Shaanxi National Defense Science and Technology 
and the office of aviation industry in the business. After its establishment, the 
association will assist the government departments in the management of the 
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aviation industry actively, and give advices to the industry development to relevant 
government department according to the actual needs in development. These 
advices will reflect the aspirations of members and maintain membership rights. 
The association also will introduce and promote advanced techniques and methods 
about management, organize trade affairs, exhibitions, seminar and discussion 
activities relevant to the aviation industry, and strengthen international exchange 
and cooperation in aviation industry to become a new platform for communication 
and cooperation among members. Today, the association has 70 members, covering 
the major state-owned the private aviation enterprises and their supporting 
constitutions in Shaanxi. The establishment of Shaanxi Aviation Industry 
Association has a significant and far-reaching significance for the integration and 
use of aviation resources in the province 
 
Outlook of the cluster  
As the largest aviation hi-tech industrial base in the country, the CAIB has always 
committed itself to building a platform that allows private capital to enter the 
aviation industry. Among all the 280 enterprises settled in the CAIB, over 85% of 
which are private or foreign-funded enterprises. The aviation industry truly deserves the name of sunrise industry  CA)B s businesses cover aircraft manufacturing, aviation new materials, avionics, air 
testing, aviation maintenance, aviation parts, and aviation technical services Among 
them, 25 industrial projects have been completed and commissioned. These 
includes projects in the fields of :  
 ultra-high temperature ceramic matrix composites,  
 high-performance carbon fiber engineering,  
 aircraft de-icing program 




Another 40 projects are in development. They include a large aviation forging 
hydraulic machine project, an aircraft simulator manufacturing R & D projects, and a 
fuel tank system development project. Some 30 specific targeted projects are 
planning to start in 2011.These projects, together with a large number of aviation 
technology business incubators operated by small and medium enterprises are accelerating China s capabilities in aerospace. The projects and incubators are 
further accelerated by the strategic integration of capital and human resources. In 
April 2008, as a result of a large aviation investment strategy, the CAIB initiated the 
"Xi'an National Aviation Industry Fund". The fund focuses on investment in aviation 
industry park infrastructures, either for major aviation enterprises, key aviation 
projects or major aviation center industrialization projects. The purpose of the fund 
is to facilitate and accelerate the development of the aviation industry in the region. 
In June 2009, Xi'an National Aviation Industry Fund Investment Management Co., 
Ltd. was formally established and  registered with a capital of 300 million yuan (USD 
44. 2 million). Since then the fund has been raising capital. In addition to accelerate 
its aviation capability through the construction of infrastructure, the development of 
talents and the establishment of funding sources, the cluster is also seeking 
international cooperation projects. Since 2007, CAIB has been organizing the "Xi'an 
Aero Subcontract Production and International Cooperation Forum" to facilitate the 
communication and cooperation between domestic and major international 
aerospace companies. In 2009 the Xi'an Aero Subcontract Production and 
International Cooperation Forum gathered 146 enterprises from aircraft 
manufactures, engine manufactures, tier-2 aerospace suppliers, training and 
maintenance firm, and aviation scientific research institutes. )n terms of cluster typology, the Xi an cluster is an anchor firm model with XAC at 




VIII-4 The Tianjin aerospace cluster  
 
The output of the aerospace manufacturing industry in Tianjin reached 11.23 billion 
yuan, or 1.64 billion U.S. dollars, in 2009, a 14-fold increase over 2008. According to 
the Tianjin Municipal Commission of Development and Reform, the output of the 
city's aerospace manufacturing industry ranked fourth nationwide in 2009, after the 
Northwest China's Shaanxi Province, the Northeast China's Liaoning Province and 
the Southwest China's Sichuan Province. The top three's outputs were 27 billion 
yuan, 16.2 billion yuan and 15.7 billion yuan, respectively. Tianjin's aerospace 
manufacturing industry output is expected to reach 40 billion yuan (6 billion U.S. dollars  by . The authority vision is to create a China Seattle  in Tianjin. With 
the production of the Airbus A320 in Tianjin ramping up, the local authority s 
"China's Seattle" dream began to take off. 
The two major programs in the Tianjin cluster are the A320 and the helicopter JV. 
Last year, the new Airbus A320 Final Assembly Line (FAL) delivered eleven 
airplanes which output value was 3.85 billion yuan, or 564 million U.S. dollars. The 
Airbus final assembly line project in Tianjin will assemble and deliver 26 A320 
aircraft in 2010.The  helicopter joint venture between AVIC and the Tianjin 
municipal government reached an output valued at 6 billion yuan, or 879 million 
U.S. dollars.  
Overview of Tianjin  
Tianjin is a metropolis in Northeastern China established in A.D 1404. In terms of 
urban population, it is the sixth largest city of the People's Republic of China, and its 
urban land area ranks 5th in the nation, after Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and 
Shenzhen. Tianjin's urban area is located along the Hai He River, which connects to 
the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers via the Grand Canal in Tianjin. Its ports, some 
distance away, are located on the Bohai Gulf in the Pacific Ocean. The municipality 
incorporates the coastal region of Tanggu, home to the Binhai New Area and the 
Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area (TEDA).  
306 
 
The nominal GDP for Tianjin was 750 billion yuan (USD 110 billion) in 2009, a year-
on-year increase of 16.5%. The manufacturing sector was the largest sector (54.8%) 
and the fastest-growing (18.2%) sector of Tianjin's economy. 
The aerospace industry in Tianjin 
Aerospace is relatively new to Tianjin. In 2005, the aerospace development in Tianjin was only in the white paper  stage. )n June , the National Development 
and Reform Commission and Airbus announced that an Airbus A320 FAL were to be 
located in the Tianjin Binhai New Area. The announcement marked the beginning of 
the aerospace development in the province. In March 2007, the Airbus A320 FAL 
started to be built and the 102 square kilometers Tianjin Binhai New Area Aviation )ndustry Park development plan began. The cluster referred to as Aviation City.  As 
early as September 2008, the first Airbus A320 made in China  was set to start 
assembling. Tianjin, Tianjin became the fourth city in the world to own a trunk-line 
aircraft assembly line after Seattle (US), Toulouse (France) and Hamburg 
(Germany). On May 18, 2009, with the first flight of the first Airbus Tianjin A320, Tianjin s dream of "China Seattle" just started. 
Rapidly, with the successful rollout of the A320, a flourishing aviation industry, 
centered on the Airbus A320 final assembly line took shape in Tianjin Airport 
Industry Aera of Tianjin Binhai New Area. Almost all of the aviation industry is 
concentrated in the 102 km2Airport Industrial Area. The area focuses on the 
development of aviation manufacturing, airport logistics, civil aviation science and 
technology, and trade exhibition. 
Why did Airbus selected Tianjin? 
The attractiveness of Tianjin for any aerospace companies resides in its: 
- Location 
- Transport system 
- Sea port 
- Educated work force 
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- High tech base or clusters for other industry 
- Financing 
 
Location, transport and Sea port 
TBNA is located at the intersection of the Beijing-Tianjin city belt and the Bohai Bay 
Rim city belt, which serves as a main hub connecting China with overseas and links 
North China and Northwest based on North China, Northeast and Northwest China. 
TBNA has the largest comprehensive seaport in the North. TBNA has established 
trade links with over 300 harbors in 170 countries and regions. It is the nearest 
starting point of the continental bridge from Asian to Europe in North China. TBNA 
consists of nine functional zones:  
 Advanced Manufacturing zone,  
 Airport-based Industrial zone,  
 High-tech Industrial Development zone,  
 Seaport-based Industrial zone,  
 Nangang Industrial zone,  
 Seaport Logistics zone,  
 Coastal Leisure & Tourism zone，  
 Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City  





TBNA has a coastal line of 153 kilometers and a population of 2.02 million. TBNA 
has a rather favorable ecological environment. and a verified reserves of oil of over 
10 billion tons and of natural gas of 194 billion cubic meters.  
 
The area has one of the most modern and comprehensive transportation system 
(air, rail, road, sea) in the nation. Not only its trade port is the largest in North China 
in term of volume and the largest in China for containers and bulk cargo, but it also 










recently been opened: the Beijing-Tianjin-Tanggu Expressway and Tangshan-
Tianjin Expressway Across and adjacent to TBNA are the Jing-Ha railway line and 
Jing-Hu railway line which cross north-south in Northeast China, North China, and 
East China. The Beijing-Tianjin high speed train link the 2 cities in less than an hour. 
Tianjin Binhai International Airport is for the time being the largest aviation freight 
center in China and plays the role of the second Beijing airport.  
 
Tianjin human resources 
Tianjin main interest for aerospace is its educated work force. Because of its size 
and importance, the city of Tianjin has many colleges and universities. There are 
over 40 institutes of higher learning in Tianjin, with a total of approximately 
300,000 registered students. In addition, the nearly 1,000 scientific and 
technological research institutes which host over 600,000 technicians, expert 
researchers and scholars complement the universities research centers. The overall 
scientific and technological strength of Tianjin is among the best in China. There are 
six aerospace related higher education universities and colleges:  
- Civil Aviation University of China  
- Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
- CAAC-Rolls-Royce training centre 
- AMECO Aviation College 
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- Tianjin Sino-Germany Vocational Technology Institute 
- Tianjin Sino-Spanish Machine Tool Technology Training Center 
 
The Civil Aviation University of China (CAUC) 
CAUC is a state university in Tianjin, under the Civil Aviation Administration of 
China. The university was established in 1951 to provide civil aviation tertiary 
education and training for new pilots in China. It is next to the Tianjin Binhai 
International Airport. It has 11 research institutes, covering almost all the 
disciplines. CAUC research focuses in flight safety, aircraft and engine failure 
diagnosis, and air navigation systems. CAUC is well equipped with 4 test facilities, 18 
labs, 4 teaching & research labs, and possesses 19 trainer aircraft and 30 types of 
aircraft engines. The university has strong foreign cooperation and exchanges with 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO, the UN body for international 
regulations and international standards in civil aviation), the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA, an airline association regrouping most international 
airlines), the Association Européenne des constructeurs de matériels aéronautiques 
(AECMA), the US Federal Aviation Administration, the Joint Aviation Authorities 
(JAA, representing the civil aviation regulatory authorities of a number of European 
States co-operating in developing and implementing common safety regulatory 
standards and procedures), Boeing, United Airlines, Pratt & Whitney, Roll-Royce, 
Airbus, as well as aviation universities and research institutes in Britain, USA, 
France, Russia and Australia. Many foreign experts or scholars are invited to deliver 
lectures. The university is composed of nine colleges, five departments or sections, 
seven master specialties, seventeen undergraduate specialties, fifteen high-level 
vocational courses as well as continuing education specialist courses in aviation. 
Among them are: 
 College of Aeronautical Mechanics and Avionics Engineering 
 College of Air Traffic Management 
 College of Transportation Engineering 
 College of Safety Science & Engineering 
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 College of Computer Science and Technology 
 College of Humanities and Social Sciences 
 College of Management 
 College of Sciences 
 College of Cabin Attendant 
 Flying College 
 Vocational Technical College 
Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (BUAA) 
BUAA was founded in 1952 from the merger of the aeronautical departments of 
Tsinghua University, Beiyang University, Amoy (Xiamen) University, Sichuan 
University, Yunnan University, Northwest Institute of Technology, College of 
Engineering, North China University, and Southwest Aeronautical Institute. BUAA is China s first university of aeronautical engineering. BUAA was officially listed in 
China's Action Plan for the Revitalization of Education in the 21st Century.  Over 
the past 50 years BUAA has provided about 80,000 professionals of high caliber in 
various aeronautical disciplines for China. Total faculty and staff number more than 
3300, including 10 academicians of either the Chinese Academy of Sciences or the 
Chinese Academy of Engineering Sciences, over 1400 full or associate professors, 
and 290 supervisors of doctorate programs. BUAA has a total enrolment of over 
26,000, including more than 1,300 doctorate candidates, over 5,000 master 
candidates, more than 14,000 in 4 or 2 year undergraduate programs, and about 
300 overseas students. It has 42 research institutes or interdisciplinary research 
centers, 11 key disciplines of the national level, and 89 laboratories.  
CAAC-Rolls-Royce training centre 
CAAC and Rolls-Royce worked closely together on design, building, staffing and 
equipping the centre through a Joint Management Board. The centre provide 
education and training programs in a variety of technical and management 
disciplines to employees from airlines, airports and the CAAC, mostly with staff from 
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the CAAC, but with continuing support from Rolls-Royce. Tianjin intends to offer 
engine type maintenance training for Rolls-Royce and International Aero Engine 
aircraft in operation in China.  The centre will also be able to offer training to other 
airlines operating Rolls-Royce engines in the Asia Pacific region.  
The facility at the Civil Aviation Institute of China (CAIC) builds on more than 30 
years of co-operation between CAAC and Rolls-Royce. In particular, Rolls-Royce and 
the CAAC have been working together on joint training initiatives since 1990, 
covering technical training, teaching methodology and English language training, 
and expanding this to management training in 1992. Discussions on the creation of 
the training centre began in 1994, with the agreement to go ahead with the centre 
being signed in March 1995.  
AMECO Aviation College (Ameco) 
AAC is the first maintenance training organization authorized by Civil Aviation 
Administration of China (CAAC) and the first maintenance training organization to 
receive the JAR-147 approval out of Europe. Ameco Aviation College provides civil 
aircraft maintenance basic training, basic skill training and type rating training. 
Ameco Aviation College also provides customer tailored courses, such as Aircraft 
Structural Repair, Composite Material Repair, AMM Usage, Engine Standard 
Technology, Aircraft Maintenance Standard Practices, Technical English and Human 
Factors.  
 Tianjin Sino-Germany Vocational Technology Institute 
Tianjin Sino-German Vocational Technology Institute was established in July 1985 
by the Tianjin City Government and the Ministry of Education in Beijing. Its main 
focus is vocational training in the fields of electrical engineering and metal 
engineering for skilled workers. The center plans to establish a new system of 
cooperative education, based upon the German concept, Berufsakademie, and to 
extend its courses to new sectors such as automobile mechanics. The teaching staff 
includes German and Spanish experts and more than 200 qualified Chinese teachers 
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that have followed education abroad. The institute has about 4,500 students. Majors 
and courses include the following disciplines: • Processing Technology of Numerically Controlled Machine Tool • Maintenance Technology of Numerically Controlled Machine Tool • Mould Design and Manufacturing • Mechanical and Electrical )ntegration • Electric Automation • Computer Controlling Technology • )nformation Security Technology • Computer Network Technology • German and English Language 
 
Tianjin Sino-Spanish Machine Tool Technology Training Center (CSMC) 
CSMC was built in December 2003. CSMC is a vocational training center established 
as a result of the collaboration between the Spanish and Chinese governments and 
the cooperation between the Tianjin Technology Institute and the Machine Tool 
Spanish Promotional Group. The Spanish government provided $9.8 million USD to 
purchase equipment for the CSMC workshops. Located in Tianjin, CSMC main 
objectives is training and servicing of the Spanish Machine Tool manufacturers. In 
August 2005, Lantek (Spanish machine tool firm) and CSMC signed a collaboration 
agreement in which Tianjin CSMC agreed to provide Lantek with logistic and human 
support for their installations and customer support in China.  The CSMC courses 
include: • Distance Diagnosis Technology • Maintenance Technology of Numerically Controlled Machine Tool • Digital Tridimensional Measuring Technology • Operation of Numerically Controlled Processing Center 
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• Numerically Controlled Grinder Operation • Numerically Controlled Machine Tool Operation • Electro-processing Machine Tool Operation • Electronics • Pneumatic (ydraulics • Principle of Electric Drive Numerical Control • Typical Numerical Control System • )nstallation, Testing and Maintenance for Numerically Controlled Machine Tool.  
 
High tech base of Tianjin 
The interest of international aerospace companies in the Tianjin area is also 
triggered by the area high tech base. Other industries have elected to build their 
own cluster such as telecommunications, biotechnology, and optoelectronics. The 
zone has built eight major competitive industry clusters. To date, more than 450 
billion Yuan ($66.3 billion) investment in fixed assets, more than 200 projects 
completed and commissioned and more than 7,500 registered enterprises and 122 projects funded by the World s Top  Enterprises. )n addition to the Airbus A  
FAL and the helicopter JV, a large number of key projects have settled in the area 
such as the General Administration of Civil Aviation of China Technology Industry, 
the Tianjin Institute of Industrial Biotechnology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. 
Tianjin was also an early adopter of the Green Sustainable Development as its 
development model focusing on low-carbon economic projects, promoting energy 
conservation and emission reductions, and build an eco-friendly and sustainable 
community. 
Tianjin financing  
The third criteria for Airbus to chose Tianjin was the funding offer by the Tianjin 
Province and Municipality that was eager to start their aerospace vision for the 
region. The region has dedicated important financial resources to develop its 
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aviation cluster. )t was China s first aviation industry fund.  s much as  billion 
Yuan ($ 3 billion) was dedicated to fund Tianjin Binhai New Area aviation projects. 
Reports suggest that the fund will grow to 40 billion Yuan (USD 6 billion) in the next 
2 years. The fund was co-established by Aviation Industry Corporation of China 
(AVIC) and China Construction Bank. In the past, most of the projects of the aviation 
industry were military projects and invested by the state. The establishment of AVIC 
Fund was aimed at attracting industrial aviation firms (civil and military), and 
providing convenient and effective channels to access the capital market. The 
aviation projects of Binhai New Area such as the Airbus 320 project and AVIC 
helicopter project are major beneficiary of the fund as well as for their suppliers in the cluster. At the end of the th Five-Year Period , the AV)C Fund is anticipated to 
grow beyond the border of the cluster and into possibly acquisition of foreign 
companies in their home market such as Europe and the US.   
The fund has been allocated by the central government because of the Tianjin plan 
to develop a major aviation cluster but the area of Binhai have also been selected by 
the Chinese government as an experimental zone for comprehensive reform called 
"go and try beforehand". This reform is particularly set up to experiment financial 
market innovations and opening-up the economy to attract international firm.   
The establishment of a Free Trade Zone within the cluster has also facilitated the 
implantation of foreign firms. It is the Tianjin Free Trade Zone and China Aviation 
Industry Corporation I and II that signed the framework agreement with Airbus in 













Following the Airbus announcement, a flourishing aviation industry has developed around 
Airbus FAL as a number of aerospace firms of the aviation supply chain decided to open up 
a facility to support the Airbus FAL. Following the manufacturing implantation, aircraft 
leasing firms, R&D centers, logistic centers, and financial services for aviation have 
continued to keep the cluster momentum. In the early phase of the negotiation, Tianjin and 
Airbus Project had reached a common understanding that suppliers of airbus were to be 
brought together at Tianjin. In the process of attracting suppliers a supplier village was 
specially set up in Airport Economic Zone to attract the existing supporting manufacturers 
of Airbus.  
The Aviation City is fulfilling its dream to become the largest aviation industry cluster in 
Asia. In addition to the A320 FAL, the city now have a cluster of aviation-related industries such AV)C s helicopter project, Goodrich s nacelles manufacturing facility, Thales  radar 
assembly line, STTS aircraft painting service , Canada s FTG aviation meter production and German Lufthansa and (ainan Airline s aviation leasing and Tianjin Airlines Co., Ltd. These 
companies cover a wide range of business such as aircraft manufacturing, R&D, parts, aviation leasing and logistics. AV)C s helicopter project will include the construction of a 
headquarter for AV)C s helicopter operations, R&D base, assembly line and customer 
service facilities. Tianjin has also become home for UAV, Satellite and other domestic 
aviation and aerospace firm. China Aviation Industrial Helicopter Co., Ltd. co-funded by 
Tianjin Port Free Trade Zone and China Aviation Industry Corporation was established in 
the Airport Processing Zone on February 26, 2009.  Headquartered in Binhai New Area, 
China Aviation Industrial Helicopter Co., Ltd. has a multiple of member enterprises and 
specialized research institutes. It is mainly engaged in the R&D, production, sales, 
maintenance and service of helicopter and other aircraft and aviation components.  
Tianjin Airlines Ltd., a joint venture between HNA Group, Tianjin Port Free Trade Zone and 
Hainan Airlines Co. was founded in June 2010. Tianjin Airlines is renamed after Grand 
China Express Air, the biggest regional airlines in China that accounts for 40 percent of the country s regional aircraft fleet. Grand China Express Air is formerly controlled by (NA 







Table 25 Large aerospace companies in the Tianjin cluster 
Name Parent Company Business Scope 
Airbus (Tianjin) Final Assembly Co., Ltd Airbus S.A.S Final Assembly of Airbus 
A320 aircraft 
Zodiac Aerospace (Tianjin) Co., Ltd  Zodiac  MRO of aero safety 
systems,  aircraft systems 
and cabin interior 
products 
Goodrich Aerostructure Service (China) Co., 
Ltd  
Goodrich    
MRO of nacelle 
Avicopter Co., Ltd.  AVIC, TAEA  Civil helicopter R&D, 
manufacturing 
Tianjin Aviation Electro-Mechanical Co., Ltd. AVIC Production of avionic 
device 
Alcan (Tianjin) Co., Ltd. Alcan Aircraft wire production 
Xi'an Aircraft International Tianjin Co., Ltd. Xi'an Aircraft Industry Group Assembly of A319/320 
wing 
Thales (Tianjin) Radar Technology Tianjin Co., 
Ltd. 
Thales Assembly of airport radar 
Indra (Tianjin) Radar Technology Co., Ltd. Indra Assembly of airport radar 
STTS Painting Service Tianjin Co., Ltd. STTS (A French company)  Aircraft painting service  
PPG Tianjin Co., Ltd. PPG Industrial Corporation Paints  supply 
Haite Aviation Technology Co., Ltd. Haite Group MRO of helicopter, 
business aircraft, Avionics 
Maintenance and Repair  
Hangxin Tianjin Aviation Technology Co., Ltd. Hangxi Technology Group Avionics Maintenance and 
Repair, Mechanical 
Components & 
Accessories Maintenance  
FTG  Tianjin Co., Ltd. Canadian Firan Technology 
Group 
Mil-spec and specialty 
printed circuit boards for 
avionics 
Grandstar Cargo International Airlines Co., Ltd  Korean Airlines, Sinotrans  Cargo carrier 
Tianjin Airline HNA, TAEA Passenger carrier 









Main Aeronautic & Aviation companies in Aviation city  
In recent months, a number of companies have expressed the fact that that they were 
evaluating or planning to open a facility in the Tianjin clusters.  These companies are: 
 
Following the A320 FAL, local enterprises of Tianjin also attained rapid development. For 
example, Tianjin Saixiang Technology (TST) is a mechanical private company created in 
1990 of Tianjin. From a general contractor providing transportation services to the Airbus 
FAL, it evolved into becoming a supplier to the FAL. TST have successfully completed the 
design and manufacturing of transport frame, and now undertake the task of transport 
frame manufacturing for the A350 project. Another private local enterprise that has grown 
with Airbus is Tianjin HYLT Aviation Science and Technology Co., Ltd, which was 
established in 2003. The company is specialized in design and production of aviation 
simulating training devices. It has become the first authorized user of Airbus A320 data 
package and will engage in design and R&D of simulators and exercise apparatus in China. 
 
In terms of cluster typology, Tianjin is a regional pole (Perroux model) build around the 
A320 FAL. Although the cluster has a significant research and university system, there are 







VIII-5 The Chengdu aerospace cluster 
 
The Chengdu province has a population of 11.2 million people. It is considered a major 
province in term of high tech investment in which 140 Fortune 500 companies decided to 
implant an office or research center. The province is the second center for aerospace in the 
country. In particular Chengdu has developed a competency in the design and production 
of fighter aircraft, and maintenance base for military and civil aircraft. 
In particular, Chengdu has 33 research institutes and companies specialized in aviation and 
aerospace that employs 50,000 people. The largest Chinese aerospace companies include:  
 Chengdu Aircraft Industrial (Group) Co., Ltd.  
 Chengdu Aircraft Design & Research Institute  
 Chengdu Engine (Group) Co., Ltd.,  
 Chengdu Aviation Instruments Corporation,  
 Chengdu Jinjiang Machinery Factory,  
 Electronics Technology Group Corporation  
 Chengdu Hot Aviation Technology Co., Ltd..  
Snecma,of France has a maintenance base operation called Snecma China Southwestern Airlines Maintenance. Chengdu s aviation and aerospace industry keeps on rising with an 
average growth 17% per year over the last 5 years in terms of revenue.  
Chengdu province strategy for developing aviation 
Chengdu aviation development is part of the national  years  development and construction plan. China s -year plan is very ambitious. The province ultimate goal is:  
 Establish an important state s research, development and manufacturing base for 






 Develop the province into a major production and subcontract manufacturing base 
of domestic large aircraft parts and spare parts of international aircraft. 
 Develop a strong aviation maintenance base 
 Become an important research and manufacturing base of military equipment and 
space navigation products. 
 
Chengdu has already successfully developed a good research capabilities and a great deal of 
aircraft manufacturing By 2012, Chengdu will reach the capability to produce 50 Mi-17 
helicopters per year  It has successfully developed a manufacturing capability in civil 
aerostructure and final assembly of the ARJ21. The final assembly of the ARJ21 will also 
reach a 50 production capacity potential by 2012. Its Airbus part manufacturing will step 
up to reach 50 units for the A320 nose and rear passenger door. Unlike the door, the nose 
section is a difficult part to manufacture and assemble since it involves the floor grid, the 
nose landing gear bay and frame. More importantly, its A320 wing assembly, the more 
technology demanding part of an aircraft structure, will reach the capacity of 3 units per 
year. The Chengdu province developed a manufacturing base for large civil aircraft in the 
100-150 seats with the A320 and C919, in the regional jet with the ARJ21 and in the 
business aircraft market. It also developed the skeleton of an aviation electronic 
equipment, and an aviation auxiliary equipment. Its objective of becoming a prime 
maintenance base is already completed as the A320 and A340 maintenance facility is about 
to open. The facilities will be able to do heavy maintenance, but also aircraft conversion, 
line maintenance, and fleet technical management. The cluster is organized by district with 
each having a particular focus. For example, the Qingyang District focuses on research, 
development and manufacturing of integrated civil aircraft, the assembly of  medium-sized 
aircraft (regional aircraft, general aviation aircraft and helicopters), and the manufacturing 
large parts of large aircraft. The Shuangliu County district focuses on aircraft maintenance, 
ground equipment, and assembly of medium size helicopter. The Xindu District mainly 









Chengdu research capabilities 
Research Center Specialty or focus Employees 
Chengdu Aircraft Design & 
Research Institute 
fluid dynamics,  mechanical 
engineering, structure, vibration, 
electronics, radar,  environmental 
control 
1800 employees - 80% 
researchers and technicians 
China Gas Turbine Research design, experiment and test of 
aircraft engine  
2500 employees including 
1300 engineers 
China Electronic Technology 
Group Corporation Research 
Institute 
system integration, aviation 
communication system and 
electronic system, reconnaissance 
equipment  
2600 employees 
Sichuan Academy of Aerospace 
Technology 
Aircraft design, navigation, 
guidance and control, automation, 
rocket/missile structure analysis, 
photoelectric instrument 







Aviation manufacturing capability 
Chengdu is the second aerospace manufacturing base in the country. The companies in the 
cluster include: 
Company Business Scope 
Chengdu Aircraft Industrial Group 
Co. Ltd 
Fighter aircraft, supplier for Boeing 787 
rudder, Boeing 757 tail piece, Airbus 
A320/A340 doors 
Chengdu Engine Group Co. Ltd Large and medium-sized aircraft 
turbojet and turbofan engines 
Chengfei Civil Aircraft Co., Ltd Project stage: Research , manufacturing, 
subcontractor of components for 
military and civil aircraft   
Sichuan Lantian Helicopter  
Company Limited 
Assembly and production of Mi-17 
transport helicopter 
Sichuan Haite Group airborne equipment manufacturing 
(video system,  dual-band antenna), 
manufacturing of aviation test 
equipment  
Chengdu CAIC Electronics Co. Ltd Aircraft air data system, aircraft 
instruments and sensors 
Wisesoft Co., Ltd.  automatic air control system,  
surveillance radar simulator  





Aviation maintenance capability 
Chengdu aviation maintenance facilities include: 
Enterprise Business Scope Volume 
Sichuan Haite Group Maintenance of aviation auxiliary 
power unit (APU), airborne electronic 
equipment, airborne electrical 
equipment, airborne mechanical 
equipment; overhaul, retrofit of 
aircraft engine 
Net asset 0.6 billion, 
uan, market value 1.4 
billion Yuan 
Sichuan Snecma Aero Engine 
Maintenance Company Ltd. 
Overhaul and repair of CFM56-3 







and engine lease. 
5701 Factory Helicopter maintenance N/A 
Taikoo Sichuan Aircraft 
Engineering Services Company 
Limited 
Maintenance and overhaul of Airbus 
aircraft 
Projects in progress 
 
Chengdu Aircraft Industrial (Group) Co., Ltd.  
Chengdu Aircraft Industrial (Group) CO., Ltd. Has 132 factory sites and is a subsidiary of 
Aviation Industry Corporation of China specialized in military aircraft manufacturing. It is 
also a supplier of part to western civil aircraft manufactures. It designed and now produces 
the Jian-10 (J-10) medium-weight multi-role fighter and the FC-1/JF-17 light-weight multi-
role fighter,  produced in cooperation with Pakistan. Following is a list of its main products: 
Parts and components Comac ARJ21 nose section; Chinese 
licensee of McDonnell Douglas MD-80 / 
MD-90; Parts supplier for Northrop 
Grumman; Empennage (horizontal 
stabilizer, vertical fin and tail section) for 
the Boeing 757; Parts and maintenance 
tools for Airbus Industries. 
Fighters Chengdu J-7 - Lightweight interceptor; 
export models designated F-7; FC-1 
Xiaolong/JF-17 Thunder - Lightweight 
multi-role fighter; Chengdu J-10 - Medium-
weight multi-role fighter; -XX - Heavy-
weight fifth generation stealth fighter. 
Trainers Chengdu JJ-5 (JianJiao-5) basic jet trainer;  
Facilities Chengdu Airframe Plant  
Chengdu Engine Company  









Chengdu Aircraft Design & Research Institute  
Chengdu Aircraft Design was founded in 1970, as a research institute, and later became 
predominantly a design office. The institute has 1800 employees, including over 1300 
technical persons. Among them, 60 are research fellows, 380 are senior engineers, and 650 
are engineers. Their research covers over 80 specialties, from fluid dynamics, to software 
development. 
Sichuan Haite Group 
Founded in 1992, Haite Group is the first non-state-owned aviation enterprise obtaining a 
repair station certificate issued by CAAC. Haite Group is an aviation maintenance 
enterprise Now it is mainly engaged in repairing and inspecting  small engines, and 
developing test equipment for aviation. The headquarters of Haite Group is located in the 
High-tech Development Zone in Chengdu. In 2002, Haite became FAA certified repair. 
Besides importing the advanced international aviation test equipment, such as ATEC5000 
and ATEC 60A from the EADS Test & Services, it has also developed and manufactured the 
the ATE7000 Series Aviation Automatic Test System with the independent intellectual 
property. Haite Group owns over ten subsidiaries, and established cooperation 
relationships with western aerospace suppliers in France, the US and Russia. 
AVIC Chengdu Engine (Group) Co., Ltd.  
Founded in 1958, AVIC Chengdu Engine (Group) Co., Ltd. specialized R&D and  production 
of turbojet and turbofan engine in China. The company six manufacturing centers doing 
case, plating, disc shaft, blade, heat meter, and assembly of engine.  
Chengfei civil aircraft project (project) Chengfei Civil Aircraft Co., Ltd. was financed by Xi an Aircraft )nternational Corporation, 
Chengdu Aircraft Industrial (Group) Co., Ltd. and CATIC Investment Co., Ltd. respectively by 
45%, 40%, and 15%. Its activity will focus on the manufacturing as subcontractor of civil 






Taikoo Sichuan Aircraft Engineering Services Company Limited 
The company is financed by Sichuan Airlines Group, Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering 
Company Limited, Taikoo (Xiamen) Aircraft Engineering Co., Ltd, and Sichuan Haite High-
Tech Co., Ltd., Taikoo Sichuan Aircraft Engineering Services Company Limited (respectively 
42%, 40%, 9% and 9%). Taikoo Sichuan will provide heavy maintenance, aircraft 
conversion, line maintenance, fleet technical management, inventory technical 
management and other engineering services. It will focus on Airbus aircraft.  The company 
is building a small-sized hangar capable of accommodating one Airbus A320 for 
maintenance and later another hangar will be build to accommodate the maintenance of 
two Airbus A340s.  
Aviation universities and research center 
The Chengdu cluster has 6 major universities with aviation courses. Although is it unclear 
how many aviation courses are given in the different department, the 6 universities count 
more than 23,000 students with 4100 graduate and doctoral students.    
 
Universities Departments with aviation 
related training 
Number of Students 




University of Electronic 
Science and Technology 
of China 
School of Microelectronics 
and Solid-state Electronics 
1700 218 1918 
School of Communication 
and Information 







School of Mechanical and 
Electronic Engineering 
700 1200 1900 
Sichuan University School of Electrical 
Information 
2500 451 2951 
School of Electrical 
Information 
    2500 
School of Materials Science 
and Engineering 
1003 269 1272 
Southwest Jiatong 
University 
School of Materials Science 
and Engineering 
    1080 
School of Electrical 
Engineering 
830 341 1171 
School of Mechanical 
Engineering  
2993 581 3574 





1700   1700 
Department of Electronic 
Engineering  
1800   1800 
Southwest University of 
Science and Technology 
School of Information 
Engineering 
2200 100 620 
 
Vocational and technical colleges 
There are 120 vocational and technical schools with  246,000 on-campus students with 
59,000 of them graduating every year. There are 18,000 students in aviation related fields 






Table 26: Vocational training in the Chengdu cluster 









Vocational and Technical 
College 
4122 1898 561 
Sichuan Aviation Vocational 
& Technical College 
8417 5462 280 
School of Mianyang 
Mechanical & Electrical 
Industry 
524    
Sichuan Electromechanical 
Institute of Vocation and 
Technology 
3700 2758 443 
Deyang Electronic Science & 
Technology College 
1087 N/A N/A 
 
Labor Cost 
Chengdu cluster advantage is its lower labor costs compared with other  industrial cluster 
of the Chinese coastal areas. On average, it is estimated that Chengdu labor is 2/3 of the 
coastal areas with a low turnover rate of less than 10%.  
Table 27: Management wage in Yan per person  
Management Level Wage Guiding Indexes in Chengdu 
L/M/H Intermediate 
Company-level  9048/27720/150668 62478 
Department-level  7865/19980/56531 28125 







Wage of Technicians in Yuan per person per year  
Management Level Wage Guiding Indexes in Chengdu 
L/M/H Intermediate 
Computer programmer  12117/21040/33035  22064 
Mechanical engineer  11340/20445/60100 30628 
Software Engineer  33795/46408/110160  63454 
Software Engineer  16368/29370/61131  35623 
Miscellaneous  12439/19440/71658  34512 
 
Average Labor Cost of Representative Industries in Yuan per person per year 
(Example for qualified labor in electronic manufacturing)  
 




Average labor cost of 
employees  
17512 
Average wage of 














education cost  
151 
Average employee 
labor protection cost  
105 
Average employee 




Chengdu cluster infrastructure The National Development and Reform Commission have developed Chengdu as a national 
level-A  logistics hub city and is on its way to become a regional and international logistics 
center. 
Chengdu is served by the Chengdu Shuangliu International Airport, the sixth busiest airport 
in China. The Chengdu Airport has constructed a second runway, capable of landing an 
Airbus A380. The Chengdu Government plan to improve the infrastructure of the airport 
and passenger traffic from 17 million today to  40 million by 2015, making Chengdu Airport 
the fourth international hub in China, after Beijing, Shanghai, and GuangZhou. There is also 
a long-term plan to build a second airport in Jintang County with five runways.  
Chengdu is a railway Junction City and rail administrative center of southwestern China 
and the terminus Chengdu-Dujiangyan High-Speed Railway. New railways are currently 
under construction such as the conventional line to Lanzhou and the high-speed lines to 






Located to the northwest of Chongqing, Chengdu has no direct access to the Yangtze River, 
or any other larger river. However, to ensure that Chengdu's goods have access to the river 
efficiently, the port cities of Yibin and Luzhou -- both of which are reachable from Chengdu 
within hours by expressways—on the Yangtze have commenced large-scale port 
infrastructure development. As materials and equipment for the rebuilding of northern 
Sichuan are sent in from the East Coast to Sichuan, these ports are anticipated to receive 
significant increases in throughput. 
In terms of typology, the Chengdu cluster seems to be an industrial district on the Marshall 








VIII-6 The  Shenyang Aviation cluster 
 
Shenyang is among the top ten largest cities in China and is the economic, cultural, financial 
and commercial center of the northeastern region of the country. Since the 1930s, 
Shenyang has been diversifying its industry from traditional sectors to become an 
important industrial base for a number of new and fast growing of key sectors of the 
economy. It is the gateway to Japan and Korea. It has attracted leading firms in the sectors 
of aerospace, heavy machinery, automotive, electronics, and software. The Shenyang area 
was also helped by the Chinese government's recent efforts to revitalize northeastern As a 
results, it has become, one of the fastest growing software and automotive sectors in the 
country. There are now 800 research institutes, 30 colleges and universities, 550,000 
technical professionals. 
Shenyang aerospace center of competence came from the early development of a military 
aircraft manufacturing. In fact, the first aircraft manufacturer Shenyang Aircraft 
Corporation, of China was founded in Shenyang. In the 1990s and 2000s, the Shenyang area 
expanded its expertise as to cover the civil aircraft sector. Today, Shenyang Aircraft 
Corporation, Shenyang Liming Aero-Engine Group Corporation, and Shenyang Aerospace 
Xinguang Corporation are the most important aviation companies of the cluster.  
Strategic development of the Shenyang cluster 
The overall strategy of the cluster is to develop its international partnerships. The strategic 
plan of the cluster was approved by the National Development and Reform Commission in 
2008. The plan focuses on developing an advanced equipment-manufacturing industry, and  
intensify policy in support of local implantation of international companies  The goal is for 
the region to become an important center for subcontractors of large aircraft and engine 
programs.  
According to the agreement, China Aviation Industry Corporation will invest more than 10 






Bombardier C Series aircraft, ARJ21 aircraft engine assembly, heavy-duty gas turbine 
technology into Shenyang. It will strengthen the R & D and personnel Their objective is 
doubling the output in five years. The agreement is the first major cooperation project after 









The cluster is developing at  the Shenyang Taoxian )nternational  into  cities : Aviation  
City, Science City, and International City  
Science City objective is to host the aerospace technology base with aviation design, R&D, 
education, training, flight training, flight demonstrations, new energy, new materials If the 
aerospace technology is the main driving force, Science City also include research centers 
in microelectronics, computers, biotechnology and optical technology.  
International City focus is on finance, trade, services, administration and possesses an 
exhibit and conference center as well as an international school.  Aviation City is the airport 
and its associated service and operation companies. 
Infrastructure of the cluster 
Shenyang is a major transportation hub in Northeast China, with a well-connected air, rail, 
and road transportation network. The Shenyang Taoxin International Airport, which can 
handle more than 6 million passengers each year, is the largest airport in Northeast China. 






Frankfurt, Sydney, and Los Angeles. Shenyang is one of the most heavily traversed rail hubs 
in China. Six lines intersect in Shenyang, extending south to Beijing, north to the rest of 
Northeast China and Russia, and southeast to North Korea. In 2006, 8.5 million tons of 
goods were transported by rail through Shenyang. Shenyang is also being developed into a 
state- of the art container hub terminals. 
Expressways cross the province and link Shenyang to key cities such as Beijing, Changchun, 
Dalian, Harbin and Tianjin. Within the city, two subway lines are under construction and 
scheduled to be completed in 2010.  
AVIC Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC) 
The oldest aerospace company in China, SAC has been instrumental in developing other 
companies such as Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group and Guizhou Aircraft Industry Co. The 
company mainly focuses on designing and manufacturing fighter aircraft and is a 
subsidiary of AVIC. SAC is divided into four divisions: civilian aircraft and ancillary 
equipment, military aircraft, and civilian products. The civilian product is an adjacency to 
aerospace, mostly focusing on construction materials to passenger buses. .SAC has had a 
number of first development for China. Its F-5 was the first China made fighter jet, the FT-1 
the first trainer, the F-6 the first Chinese supersonic fighter, the red-flag the first Chinese s 
ground to air guided missile, the F-7 the first double fighter jet,  the F-8  the first high-
altitude and high-speed fighter. SAC has build over twelve aircraft program in the last 50 
years A joint venture has been established at SAC to produce the Su-27 aircraft and the 
associated Lyulka AL-31 turbofan engine.  
 
Shenyang Aircraft Corporation has formed a joint production venture with Boeing for 
producing whole tail sections and cargo doors. Of civil aircraft. SAC in the past has done 
work for British Aerospace, Airbus, and Lockheed, and currently has a manufacturing sub-
assembly venture with the Canadian firm Bombardier Aerospace. Boeing maintains a 
sizeable expatriate presence in Shenyang to support the project and has built a strong 
working relationship with the Chinese. SAC has been involved in manufacturing parts for 






The last cooperation agreement with SAC was done in 2007 with Cessna to produce the 
Cessna 162 Light Sport aircraft. Cessna ships raw materials, engines and avionics from the 
US to Shenyang. Cessna provide on-site personnel to oversee assembly, quality assurance 
and technical support. Once test flown and disassembled, the Skycatchers is shipped to 
three authorized Cessna service stations in the US for reassembly and acceptance test 
flights. The first aircraft was delivered in 2009. However, it is Bombardier that have 
established the strongest cooperation with the Shenyang aerospace companies in the last 
decade. SAC has been manufacturing doors for Bombardier's Q-Series aircraft since the 
1990s. In 2006, Bombardier Aerospace signed a major cooperation agreement with SAC to 
supply main parts for the fuselage of the Q400 aircraft. 
In  2007, AVIC and Bombardier signed a framework strategic cooperation agreement to 
further promote the development of the commercial aircraft business of both companies 
and contribute to the development of the global aviation industry. The real reason for the 
agreement was the planned CSeries of Bombardier After the commercial launch of the  
CSeries in 2008, the  agreement become clearer. SAC became a risk sharing partner for the 
CSeries and will supply the fuselage, tail cone and doors for the jetliner. What was new 
however is that SAC had the full technical responsibility for their work packages. 
A large facility has been build to further the cooperation of SAC and Bombardier. Although 
no details are available as to what this facility will do, its size seems to indicate that it will 
be a final assembly line for the CSeries. It is clear that  SAC became a key supplier in the 
Bombardier CSeries aircraft program. SAC delivered the first fuselage test barrel to 
Bombardier in 2009. The test barrel is being used to demonstrate manufacturing and engineering structural concepts before the CSeries aircraft s final design phase began. It 









SAC Military aircraft program  
Aircraft currently in production Aircraft currently in development 
Shenyang J-8II 
 
Shenyang J-11, Chinese variant of the 
Russian Sukhoi Su-27 
Shenyang J-XX A fifth-generation fighter 
aircraft under development.  
Shenyang J-15 Carrier-borne aircraft 
based on the Sukhoi Su-33.  
Shenyang J-20 Another fifth-generation 
fighter aircraft rumoured to be under 




SAC Commercial airplane programs: 
   
Client aircraft programs  
Airbus A320  Wings - Fixed leading edges, wing 
interspar ribs ; Aircraft Doors - 
Emergency exit doors, cargo doors & 
skin plates 
Boeing 737  Fuselage Sections - Aft fuselage section 
 
 
Bombardier CSeries  
Wings - Wing-to-fuselage wingbox ; 
Aircraft Doors ; Empennages - Tailcone 
structure ; Fuselage Sections - Centre 
fuselage 
 
Bombardier Dash 8 Q Series  
Fuselage Sections - Aft & forward 
fuselage ; Empennages 
Cessna 162 SkyCatcher  Final Assembly 
COMAC ARJ21  Empennages 







 AVIC Shenyang Liming Aero-Engine Group Corporation 
Shenyang Liming Aero-Engine Group Corporation is another firm that date way back 
(1954) in the development of China military aircraft strategic plan. The firm is under the 
direct control of AVIC. This firm was one of the 156 important projects built in the first five-
year plan period of China. It is the first aero turbine jet engine manufacturer and also the 
research and production base of the large and medium-sized aero jet engines in China. Over 
the last 50 years, Shenyang Liming Aero Engine has developed and produced more than 20 
models or aero-engine. It employs more than 13,000 people.  
This state-owned company with a long history of military engine development is currently 
in the process of transforming itself into a lean enterprise. on the model of its western 
future competitors. Shenyang Liming development and manufacturing processes have been 
the result of legacy program developed in an era of cheap labor and low production level.  
These legacy programs made Shenyang Liming processes obsolete They have also 
established specific goals within the lean initiative. These include better flow of 
information through the enterprise, optimized use of manufacturing resources, lower 
product development costs, a shorter product development cycle and improved product 
quality. 
As SAC, Shenyang Liming Aero-Engine Group Corporation is a strategic supplier to all 
western engine manufacturers such as General Electric Power Supply in the United States, 
Rolls Royce in the United Kingdom and SNECMA in France. Shenyang Liming Aero-Engine 
Group Corporation became produces heat shield rings for the Roll-Royce BR700 series. 
In 2007, the company signed an agreement with the US-based company General Electric to 
assemble and test GE's CF34-10A engine. The engine will be applied to China's regional 
passenger jet ARJ21-700. This is China's first foreign cooperation project in the area of 
passenger aircraft engines. The first CF34-10A engine is expected to roll off the production 






In 2009,  the company invested 434 million Yuan ($64 million) to construct two large 
aircraft parts production line in Shenyang, The production line is mainly producing 
components such as casing and the short axis for Airbus A350, A380, Boeing 787 and other 
large aircraft engine group. After the official production, the annual export value will 
exceed $120 million. 
Research capability in the cluster 
The cluster possesses three main research institute dedicated to aviation. 
Shenyang Aircraft Design Institute 
Founded in 1961, Shenyang Aircraft Design Institute is the oldest institute for fighter 
aircraft R&D in china. The research institute employs more than 2,000 people. The institute 
is a joint venture with SAC and the government. It has researched and designed the 
Shenyang J-5, J-6 and J-8. 
Shenyang Aero-Engine Research Institute (SARI) 
The Shenyang AeroEngine Research Institute (SARI) is responsible for military engine 
design. Its main partner and sponsor is  Shenyang Aircraft Corporation. It has developed 
the PF-1 turbojet for the domestic JJ-1 trainer, the Hongqi-2 turbojet intended for the 
Dongfeng-fighter. SARI developed several engines for programs that were never launched 
either because the air force lack of interest or because the technology was already too 
obsolete in the design. However, it has developed a tremendous experience since the mid 
50s for developing jet engines. 
AVIC Aerodynamics Research Institute (ARI) 
ARI is under the governance of AVIC. It was established in 2000, by merging former Harbin 
Aerodynamics Research Institute (founded in 1955) with Shenyang Aerodynamics 
Research Institute (founded in 1958). At present, the permanent staff of ARI totaled over 
800 employees of which more than 600 are technicians. In 1982, it was authorized to 






quality certification. It has developed expertise in aerodynamics , aircraft design, research 
and application of CFD technology. It possesses a wind tunnel testing facility.  
Aviation-related Schools 
Shenyang Aerospace University (SAU) 
SAU is a multi-disciplinary university that has a strong aeronautics and astronautics 
department. Founded in 1952, the university was initially administered by the National 
Ministry of Aeronautical & Aerospace Industry, and later by the China General Corporation 
of Aeronautical Industry. Since 1999, SAU has been under the administration of the 
Liaoning Provincial Government, and is the only university owned by the China Industry 
and Information Technology Ministry and the Liaoning Provincial Government. It is the 
only university of aeronautical and aerospace engineering in the Liaoning Province. At 
present, the university comprises 17 schools, with over 900 lecturers, including 400 
professors and associate professors. There are 20,000 full-time students in SAU. The 
university has over 50,000 graduates. A great number of  graduates are now working as 
senior engineers or executives in China aerospace companies.  
Shenyang Aeronautical Vocational and Technical College 
The College has training in CNC machine tools, car clamp milling, electrical and electronic, 
automatic control, electrical intelligence, computer hardware and software and digital 
technology.  
In terms of cluster typology, Shenyang is an industrial district (Perroux model) that focuses 
on supplying part assembly to domestic and international manufactures. Because data is 
not available in determining the level of communication between the 800 research 
institutions of the cluster, we cannot determine if the cluster is a regional system of 
innovation. However, given the fact that the main focus of the area is supplying part 












The major interest of Harbin is the partnership with the Brazilian aircraft manufacturer 
Embraer. Harbin city is the base of heavy industries, such the automobile, electronics, food, 
and chemistry. There are seven manufacturing sectors with strong international 
partnership or cooperation. These include:  
 Power Equipments,  
 Measuring & Cutting Tools,  
 Bearings,  
 Aluminum Alloy,  
 Light Aircraft & Helicopters,  
 Antibiotics and  
 Linen Textile.  
Harbin is also developing its knowhow in bio-engineering, new materials and new energy  









Strategic focus of the cluster 
 
Harbin strategic focus in aviation is the development of the largest and most competitive 
cluster in China for large civil aircraft and helicopter. Harbin intends to develop its aviation 
service with aircraft and engine maintenance. It also plans to develop adjacent businesses 
for advanced composite material, and communication systems. The Civil Aviation Base of 
the Harbin cluster is building up fast in the South of harbin.  AVIC Harbin Hafei Aircraft 
Industry Group, and AVIC Harbin Dongan Engine Co., Ltd  are the driving force of the 
cluster. The first phase of the Harbin cluster development started in 2008 and was mainly 
dedicated to planning the development, starting implementing the programs and 
supporting policies, as well as planning the new construction While building the base, the 
goal was to reach revenues from aviation of 21.4 billion Yuan by 2010, with an average 
annual growth rate of 25%. By 2012 Harbin anticipates to reach 36 billion yuan (USD 5. 3 
billion) with an average annual growth rate of 30% and 100 billion yuan (USD 14. 7 billion) 
by 2015 
 
 The Major firms in the cluster 
AVIC Harbin Aircraft Industry (Group) Co., Ltd. (HAIG)  
 HAIG is an AVIC subsidiary founded in 1952.  Over its 50 year of existence, HAIG 
manufactured and sold 1600 aircraft. A small number compared to western manufacture. 
However , HAIG has built up a multi-families and multi-types of aeronautical products  
including the general-purposed aircraft Y12 , the civil helicopter the H425, the military  
helicopters Z9., the HC120 helicopters. Harbin HAIG has developed a strong and privileged 










Helicopters Harbin Z-5 - Chinese variant of the Mil 
Mi-4 transport helicopter  
Harbin Z-9 medium-weight 
multipurpose twin-engine helicopter - 
Chinese variant of the Eurocopter 
Dauphin  
Harbin Z-9W/G attack helicopter  
Harbin Zhi-15 medium utility helicopter  
HC-120 joint-developed with Eurocopter 




Harbin H-5 - Chinese variant of the 
Ilyushin Il-28 bomber  
Harbin SH-5 amphibious bomber  




Harbin PS-5 Patrol Anti-submarine 
seaplane version of Harbin SH-5  
Harbin Y-11 high wing twin-engine 
piston utility aircraft  
Civil aircraft ERJ 145,under the jointveture of 






Military Transport aircraft Harbin Y-12 utility STOL transport and 




Harbin Embraer Aircraft Company Ltd. (HEA) 
Set up in 2002, Harbin Embraer Aircraft Company Ltd. (HEA) is a joint venture company 





Harbin Embraer Aircraft Industry Company and HAI manufacturer and final assemble the 
ERJ-145 regional jet series products. The production was launched in 2003. A total of 5 
ERJ-145 regional jets have been delivered to China Southern Airline, another 5 to China 
Eastern Airline and 5 for Wuhan Airlines. 
 
Airbus starts Harbin plant 
Airbus started construction of a $350 million component plant in this industrial city, one 
week after it delivered its first A320 plane assembled in China. 
The composite manufacturing facility, in which Airbus holds 20 percent stake, will produce 









Harbin Aircraft Industry Group Corporation Ltd, Hafei Aviation Industry Company Ltd, 
AviChina Industry & Technology Company and other Chinese partners hold the balance 80 
percent stake. The new plant, scheduled to be operational by the end of 2010, is part of the 
world's second biggest aircraft maker's commitment to locally manufacture 5% of the 
A350 XWB airframe under an agreement reached with the Chinese government in 2007. 
The new plant, will be able to manufacture composite parts and assemble composite work-
packages for the A350 XWB and A320 families and future Airbus programs. In 2009, 
Harbin Hafei Airbus Composites Manufacturing Centre delivered the first A320 plane 
elevator saddlebag to a Spanish Airbus factory. 
 
AVIC Harbin Dongan Engine (Group) Co., Ltd. (AVIC HDE) 
AVIC Harbin Dongan Engine (Group) Co., Ltd., was founded in 1948  The company now has 
a staff of over 5,500 people, mostly engineers and technician.  The Company is the high-
tech enterprise group mainly engaged in producing aero-engine, aviation 
electromechanical products, and gas turbine generator. Over 15,000 sets of aero-engine 
and 9,000 sets of helicopter transmission system have been produced and repaired since 
the establishment of the country. Throughout its 60-year, Dongan (Group) Company has 
developed a family of aero-engines and helicopter transmissions system. The WJ5 series 






military transportation airplane Since 2000, it produces an auxiliary power unit. At 
present, the transmission system on domestically made Z-8 helicopter, Z-9 series 
helicopters, Z-11 helicopter are all from Dongan. The group has built a strong and 
independent R&D capability. The Group has carried out international cooperation 
especially with Pratt & Whitney Canada, Eurocopter France, Honeywell USA as well as GE 
Aviation.  
 
R&D capability in the cluster 
 
There are 118 independent scientific institutes in Harbin. Such as the Welding Institute, the 
Veterinary Research Institute, and the Institute of Engineering Mechanics There are 176 
scientific research centers and 35 R&D centers held by large & medium enterprises of  
which 21 are experimental centers The research center is strong in the area of air 
conditioning, engine, turbine, oxygen-making and biochemical  
 
Harbin Institute of Technology  
Harbin Institute of Technology or HIT, is a research university in the city of Harbin, Harbin 
Institute of Technology is consisted of three campuses: the main campus in Harbin, HIT in 
Weihai and HIT Shenzhen Graduate School. Harbin Institute of Technology is widely 
recognized as one of the top universities in China and consistently ranked among the best 
engineering schools. The school is also member of the C9 League, which was formed by 
nine prestigious universities in China in 2009.  
The Harbin Institute of Technology is organized into 20 full-time schools, which hold 73 
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HIT is known to have close links to the People's Liberation Army and the space program of 
China. HIT made great contribution to the Chinese Shenzhou spacecraft project. In 2010, 
the Astronautics Innovation Research Center was established at HIT in conjunction with 
China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation.  
Human Resource 
Harbin city is the hub of science and education. There are 73 high level institutions and 
universities, represented by Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin Engineering University. 
More than 400,000 professionals and technical personnel work in this city and more than 
300 doctoral tutors. The total number of students enrolled in college is 800,000, of which 
200,000 students graduate annually. Among these graduated students, around 6,000 
students have obtained post graduate degrees, 120,000 students have acquired bachelor 
degrees or associated degrees; 80,000 students are graduated from vocational schools. 
In terms of cluster typology, the Harbin cluster is likely to be an anchor firm model build 
around helicopter production with no clear link to research centers.  This typology is likely 







VIII-8 The Nanchang aviation cluster 
 Nanchang is the capital of China s Jiangxi Province, the political, economic, cultural, 
scientific & technological center of the Province.  With a total population of 5million, it is 
one of the 35 megacities in China. 
Nanchang has a strong experience in manufacturing technology, comprehensive processing 
and production capacity for sheet-metal forming, digital control processing, tooling, 
designing and manufacturing, airplane sub assembly and final assembly. It has developed knowledge in manufacturing airplane s large parts and complex parts. Nanchang aviation 
industrial base mainly relies on the leading enterprises such as Jiangxi Hongdu Aviation 
Industry Group Ltd and Changhe Aircraft Industries Group Co., Ltd. Jiangxi Province and 
AVIC are planning to construct an aviation industrial city covering an area of 25 square 
kilometers to create Nanchang a major production base of aircraft, and an international 
aviation industry subcontracting production base.  
Construction of Nanchang Aviation Industrial Base 
 
In. 2009, Jiangxi Provincial Government signed a strategy alliance agreement with AVIC to 
build the Nanchang Aviation Industrial Base with initial investment of 30 billion Yuan ($4.4 
billion).  
The future cluster relies on AVIC Jiangxi Hongdu Aviation Industry Group Ltd. The cluster 
consists of two parks: the Jingdezhen Helicopter Industrial Base, with AVIC Changhe 
Aircraft Industries Group Co., Ltd and AVIC Chinese Helicopter Research & Development 
Institute, and Jiujiang Red Eagle Aviation Industrial Base. The cluster is anticipated to reach 
a total revenue of 100 billion Yuan ($14.7 billion) by the year of 2018  
According to the strategic alliance agreement signed between Jiangxi Provincial 
Government and AVIC, both parties decided to establish three new companies to build the 






Science and Technology Development Company, which is in charge of the overall plan and; 
the Hongdu Commercial Aircraft Corporation which will become the major domestic 
supplier of COMAC and the main subcontractor of international established trunk carriers; 
and the third company Nanchang General Aircraft Company which pay more attention to 
develop the high-end business aircraft.   
 
 
Major firms in the Nanchang aviation cluster 
 AVIC Hongdu Aviation Industry Group  
Hongdu Aviation Industry Group (HONGDU) is a largest firm in the cluster It was founded 
in 1951 and named as State-Run Hongdu Machinery-Building Factory and Nanchang 
Aircraft Manufacturing Company later. Hongdu has become a  technology group capable of 
doing their own R&D, testing including flight test, manufacturing, production., marketing 








Figure 102: L15-05 Trainer 
 
Hongdu first attempt to penetrate the aerospace market was through the development of 
military fighters based on the Russian programs. However its first attempts were cut short 
as the program was cancelled. There is no information as to why the program was 
cancelled. Hongdu enter the aviation market through a few niche products such as the 
military trainers. Today, it has gained expertise in military jet trainers, general aviation and 
multi purpose agricultural and forestry airplanes. Hongdu employs 20,000 people 
including over 3,000 engineers and technical personnel. It has also a landing gear 
manufacturing factory with nearly one 1,000 staff.  
Hongdu products are listed below.  
Table 28: AVIC Hongdu products 




Q-5 "Fantan"(exported under the designation A-5) - single-seat 
dual-engined supersonic attack aircraft based on the Russian 
Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-19; 
Q-6 - A variable sweep-winged attacker, similar to Su-24, cancelled 
Fighter 
 
J-12 –(1970) Chinese lightweight supersonic fighter, Development 
abandoned in 1977. Only prototypes built . 












CJ-6 - basic and advanced trainer, similar to the Russian Yakovlev 
Yak-18; 
NAMC/PAC K-8 - two seat basic trainer; 
Hongdu JL-8 2 seat trainer; 
L-15 supersonic trainer; 
K8 Jet trainer; 
K8E trainers 
General Aviation  Hongdu N-5 multi-use agriculture & forest aircraft 
Transport Yun-5 (Y-5) light utility/transport biplane 
 
Vehicles 
Chang Jiang 750cc sidecar motorcycles derived from Soviet copies 
of the 1938 BMW R71 
 
Parts 
C s a quarter of the fuselage; 
sub-contract with Vought Aircraft Industries which allows the two 
companies to co-produce parts for the 48th section of Boeing 747-8 
airplane. 
 
Hongdu has two subsidiaries AVIC Hongdu Nanchang Airplane Design and Research 650 
Institute was established with the State for the development of regional aircraft.  
Its researchers are considered as the best in the country for aviation R&D including some 
known and experienced aircraft designer Hongdu Commercial Aircraft Corp was 
established in July 2010 with a capital of 1.2 billion yuan (USD 0, 17 billion).  Hongdu 







- Jiangxi Investment Group subscribed  
- Xi'an Aircraft Group,  
- AVIC subscribed  
- Jiangxi Copper Group 
- Jiangxi International Trust  
- Jiangxi Rare Metals Tungsten Group Holdings 
- Jiangxi Tungsten Industry Group  
Hongdu Commercial Aircraft Corp will be producing a quarter of the C s fuselage and 
will be producing structural parts for the new Boeing 747-8 through Vought Aircraft 
Industries in the US. 
AVIC Changhe Aircraft Industries Corporation 
The helicopter industry development in China is interesting in the sense that it started 
before the civil aircraft development and has developed in phase similar to the aviation 
sector from fail programs to reverse engineering, partnership and then indigenous  
programs.  
Established in 1969, Changhe Aircraft Industries Group Co., Ltd.( Changhe Aircraft), is a 
subsidiary of  AVIC. The company has the capability of R&D, testing and production of 
multi-model of helicopters and subcontracting production of aviation parts and sub-
assemblies. Changhe Aircraft employs more than 4,300 people and has  developed a strong 
testing facility and capability for avionics and flight test of helicopters.  
Changhe Aircraft has a 37-year history for developing and manufacturing helicopters such 
as the, Z-8 and, Z-11 models currently in production. Most of its models were produced 







Figure 103: Z5 Helicopter 
 
The first program was the Z5 , which was based on the Soviet Mil Mi-4 Hound with. The 
development of the Z-5 began in 1958 by Harbin Aircraft Factory (now Harbin Aircraft 
Manufacturing Corporation, HAMC ), which later became one of the two primary helicopter 
manufacturers in China. Through the Z-5 project, the Chinese obtained valuable knowledge 
and experience in helicopter design and development. Soon after the Z-5 project  was 
completed, China began its efforts to develop an indigenous helicopter independently. In 
1966, Harbin began the initial studies on the first indigenous helicopter Z-6. The Z-6 was 
mainly designed to carry airborne troops in the frontline, with a fuselage to accommodate 
twelve soldiers. The first prototype of the Z-6 was completed in 1967 for static tests. In 
1968, the Z-6 project obtained officially authorization from the PLA and Chinese 
Government. From 1970, the Z-6 program was relocated to the newly founded Changhe 
Aircraft Factory (now Changhe/Jingdezhen Aircraft Industry Corporation ) Jiangxi, which 
later became the second largest helicopter manufacturer in China. The Z-6 helicopter was 
type classified in 1977, with 15 helicopters already built. However, despite being a 
technologically successful design, the Z-6 program was later cancelled due to various 
reasons, including unsatisfactory performance and poor reliability. The cancellation of the 
Z-6 was a real setback for Changhe Aircraft. From that time, the firm changed its strategy to 
learn from its western competitor and engaged in several partnerships and co-operations. 






the world. The co-operations on helicopters were intense throughout the 1980s. It 
included:  
 The licensed production of the 50 AS 365N Dauphin with the French 
Manufacturer Eurocopter under the name of Z-9.  
 The purchase of 13 French AS 321Ja Super Frelon naval helicopters and the 
following reverse engineering product Z-8.  
 The bid for the PLA s next generation utility helicopter between the Bell 212 and 
Sikorsky S-70C Black Hawk. 
 The negotiation on the purchase and possible licensed production of the Bell 47.  
 The purchase of 6 AS 342 Gazelle anti-tank attack helicopters and the proposed 
licensed production or reverse engineering.  
Figure 104: Z9 helicopter in cooperation with Eurocopter to produce 50 Dauphin 
; 
 In the late 1980, Harbin started to indigenize the production of the Z-9 In 1992 the first 
indigenous variant Z-9B with 71.9% Chinese-made parts flew successfully. The Z-9 were 
the first successful helicopter program of China. It became a multi purpose helicopter for 











Following the success of the Z-9, Changhe Aircraft reverse engineered the French AS 350B 
Squirrel light helicopter (Z-11). The Z-11 program was officially approved in 1989 and the 
development began in 1992. The Z-11 have a limited take off weight performance and so 
far only of few trainers has been ordered by the PLA.  
The strategy of the two Chinese helicopter manufactures is to develop their own program, 
produced locally but still with the help of western manufactures as partners. Both Harbin 
and Changhe have increased their relationship with the European and U.S. helicopter 
industry.  
The EC-120 lightweight helicopter program, which includes Eurocopter, Harbin/CATIC, 
and Singapore Aerospace Co, has been under development since the mid-1990s. Changhe in 
particular has become an international partner for the Sikorsky S-92 medium transport 






Figure 106: EC-120 helicopter in partnership with Eurocopter – CATIC and Singapore Aerospace 
 
 
The Chinese helicopter program is set to become a major force in the development of 
China s aerospace. Three programs have already started to shape the future of China 
helicopter industry 
 A baseline 5,500 kg Chinese medium helicopter tactical for transport for the PLA;  
 A 6,000 kg third-generation attack helicopter also for the PLA   
 A 5,000~6,000 kg commercial transport helicopter with potential growth  
 
In 1997, China signed a $70~80 million contract with Eurocopter France to develop an appropriate rotor system main/tail rotor hubs and blades  for China s next generation of 
helicopter. In 1999, Agusta announced it has also signed a contract with the Chinese to develop the transmission system gear box and transmission components  for China s next 
generation helicopter. The S-92 Tail Rotor Pylon in cooperation with Sikorsky Aircraft 
Corporation is now in production. Jiangxi Changhe-Agusta Helicopter Co., Ltd. , a joint 









Figure 107: China Military helicopter programs 
Model Mission Builder Qty 
Z-11 Training Changhe 12 
Mi-17/-171 Transport/ground attack Mil 60 
Mi-8 Passenger/cargo transport Mil n/a 
S-70C Transport Sikorsky 24 
Z-9A/B Utility/transport HAMC 80~100 
Z-9C ASW/SAR HAMC n/a 
AS-565 ASW/SAR Eurocopter 10~20 
WZ-9 Anti-tank attack HAMC 30+ 
SA 342 Anti-tank attack Eurocopter 6 
Ka-28 ASW Kamov 8~12 
As 332L VIP transport Eurocopter 4 
SA 316/318 Training Eurocopter n/a 
Mi-6 heavylift transport Mil 2~4 
 
Changhe Aircraft is slowly introducing advanced manufacturing  technologies and is 







AC313, the maiden flight of China's first large civilian helicopter in March 2010 
CAIC WZ-10 attack helicopter; it is scheduled to replace Wuzhuang Zhisheng WZ-9 
Changhe Z-8 naval and Z-8A army heavy transport helicopter - Chinese variant of SA321Ja Super Frelon 
Changhe CA109 Utility Helicopter Chinese version of A109 
Zhi Z-11J - military utility light helicopter 
Zhi Z-11 - civilian utility light helicopter 
Parts Tail rotor pylon for the Sikorsky S-92 
Fuselage for the Sikorsky S-76 







The first result of the Chinese helicopter strategy to build their indigenous helicopter is 
becoming a reality with the AC313.  
 
 
 The AC  is China s first locally designed transport helicopter. The AC , made its first 
flight in early 2010. The AC313 is a 13 ton helicopter that can carry four tons of cargo or 27 
troops. (owever, the AC  show some striking resemblance with Eurocopter s Cougar 
EC725 program launched in 2000. China continues to be very pragmatic in developing its 
aviation industry The AC313 was designed for a variety of uses, including search and 
rescue, fighting forest fires, and even assisting in fighting fires within cities. 
AVIC Chinese Helicopter Research & Development Institute (CHRDI) 
Founded in 1969, under the leadership of AVIC, the institute is the China's only general 
scientific research Institution which mission is vertical flight  research and pre-study of 
helicopter development. CHRDI is the overall design authority for Chinese domestic 








Transport infrastructure  
Nanchang and Shanghai's air, rail, road and water transport is well developed It takes five 
hours by railways, 8 hours by highways to reach Shanghai.  The  Yangtze River, allows 
5,000-ton ocean-going vessel to be directly shipped from Shanghai to Jiujiang ,and up to 
2000-ton ship up to Nanchang. 
COMAC and AVIC have publically stated their intention to develop a full family of large 
aircraft beyond the 150 seater C919 to a 300 to 400 seater large aircraft in the future. As 
the A380 and A350 in France, such a program will rely on water transportation. Nanchang 
in that regards is perceived as convenient location to build large structural parts. 
 
Research and universities in the cluster 
 
At present, there are nearly 700,000 students in 32 universities and colleges, 18 adult 
institutions, 131 adult vocational schools in the Nanchang cluster.  
 
Major Aviation Schools: 
 
Nanchang Hongkong University 
Located in Nanchang, Nanchang Hangkong University (or NCHU for short) specializes in 
engineering, and science. It is affiliated to China Aviation Industry Bureau and now is under 
the supervision of the local provincial government and the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology.(formerly National Defense Science industry commission) At 
present, the total number of registered students is 22,000, of whom 19,000 














Machine Design & Manufacturing and Their Automation 
Flight Vehicle Manufacture Engineering Material 
Processing and Control; Welding Technology and 
Engineering. 
School of Aircraft 
Engineering 
Flight Vehicle Propulsion Engineering; Flight Vehicle 
Design and Engineering; viation Technology. 
School of Material 
Science and 
Engineering 
Metallic Materials Engineering;   




Electronic and Information Engineering; 
Telecommunications Engineering; 
Electronic and Information Science and Technology; 
Automation; Computer Science and Technology; Network 
Engineering; Educational Technology. 
In terms of typology of cluster, Nanchan is an anchor type with two companies as anchors: 






VIII-9 The Guiyang aviation cluster 
Guiyang is located in the east part of Yunnan-Guizhou plateau of southwestern China. Its 
industry has been mostly based on the exploitation of its natural resources. The Chinese 
Government made a strategic decision to bring more value base industry in the region. As a 
result it decided to develop Guiyang as an aviation cluster specializing in manufacturing 
fighters and trainers.  
 
  
In the 1970s, after 46 years of development, Guizhou Province established a fairly complete 
aviation industry research and manufacturing driven by Guizhou Aviation Industry Corp  
(GAIC). 
GAIC has pursued independent innovation. Recently, GAIC developed the Shanying 
advanced trainers and a unmanned airplanes. It also develops its civil aviation expertise 
through the development of small to medium size regional jets. The Guizhou Provincial 






Aircraft engines are another product of the group. GAIC considers that China has become 
the fifth leading aircraft engine manufacturer of the world after the United States, the 
United Kingdom, France and Russia. 
 
The development of  the Guiyang cluster  
  
 
Its strategic focus is to strengthen international co-operations, and expand its sub-
contracting scope to produce aircraft and aircraft engine parts.  
In 2008, the National Development and Reform Commission officially approved the overall 
development planning of Anshun Civil Aviation Nation High-Tech Industrial Base. The base 
includes a modern industrial park, a logistics parks and an urban new park. The total 
investment dedicated to develop the cluster is expected to reach 30 billion yuan ($44. 2 
billion). 
According to the strategic cooperation framework agreement with Guizhou province, 






industry with the construction of Anshun Civil Aviation Nation High-Tech Industrial Base. 
The goal is to build the largest aircraft equipment manufacturing and general aviation 
research and production base in the Southwest region. Guizhou Aviation industry Corp 
signed a multibillion yuan deal with Guiyang government for building a manufacturing base 
in the Guiyang National Hi-Tech Industrial Development Zone. The newly launched 
industrial base will focus on aero-engines R&D, manufacturing and maintenance. It will 
also develop new energy, electric vehicles and auto parts derived from the aviation 
technology. According to the agreement, the first projects include engine and engine parts 
manufacturing and maintenance for AVIC's Liyang engine company and new energy 
development project. 
Guizhou Aviation Industry Corp According to the eleven-five  plan that GA)C formulated, the group revenues is anticipated 
to reach 20 billion yuan (USD 3billion) in sales in 2010. Guizhou Aviation Industry Corp. 
belongs to AVIC, and was established in 1964. The firm includes 46 manufacturing sites. 
Among them are four aircraft and seven engine manufacturing sites, and ten aircraft 
equipment factories GAIC also has I/E. Corp a financial and investment company. The firm 
is nationally recognized as a postdoctoral center , a national defense and regional 
computation test center. It has established long-term cooperative relationship with the 
best domestic and foreign universities and research institutions. 
Snecma Xinyi Airfoil Castings Co. Ltd 
Snecma Xinyi Airfoil Castings Co. Ltd, founded in July 2006, is a subsidiary of Snecma 
(85%) and its Chinese partner Guizhou Xinyi Machinery Factory. Located in Guiyang, it 
produces low-pressure turbine blades, nozzle guide vanes and low-pressure turbine seals 
for the CFM56-2, 3, -5A, -5B, -5C and -7B engines. 








VIII-10 Conclusion on China aviation clusters  
 
Although China has succeeding in developing their 7 aviation clusters, it still lacks of basic 
skills in the area of   
- understanding market demand  
- an  industrial base with lean manufacturing  
- a  global supply chain (for both manufacturing and support), 
- the ability to integrate complex structures and systems via a global network 
of suppliers.  
- management experience 
- innovation capability 
- coordination between the companies in the 7 clusters that sometime 
compete or have adjacent programs 
 
Type of cluster Xian Tianjin Chengdu Shenyang Harbin Nanchang Guiyang 
Industrial district (Marshall model) 
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The cluster analysis suggests that the clusters  productivity and innovation failed to keep 
pace with the United States and Europe even though the number of researchers is far 
beyond the one of the west. The analysis shows that the clusters often work on the same 
projects or technologies without differences in regional specialization patterns or 
cooperation. 
The aviation industry has more than 130 large and medium-sized factories and research 
institutes employing 250,000 workers scattered across the country, especially in the deep 
interior, and often possessing the same manufacturing and research attributes. But intense 
rivalry, local protectionism, and huge geographical distances mean that there is little 
cooperation or coordination among these facilities, preventing the ability to reap 
economies of scale, engage in innovation clustering, and also hampering efforts at 
consolidation. For example, there are three clusters that are planning to develop civil 
aircraft engines. All are in the same phase of development although none seems to be co-






Despite these obstacles, the Chinese aviation industry is making robust progress in its 
quest to catch up and become a leading global player within the next two decades. The 
industry has managed to organize itself around its clusters and is starting to display some 
level of innovation within the research centers and universities  To continue to develop, the 
firms in the clusters will need to seek to optimize their value chain through the 
internationalization of its supplier base for building the best product at competitive price. 
Today the internationalization is based on its learning benefits and is aimed at developing 
the indigenous products with the experience obtain in cooperation. The enterprise of the 
cluster should embrace innovation, seek differentiation rather than imitate successful 
enterprises of the west.  
Once the clusters are firmly established, China might very well transition from being a 
technological learner and imitator to becoming an emerging innovative power even though 
the ability to successfully conduct radical innovative activities is still beyond China aviation 
reach for now. While the Chinese aviation industry will continue to close the technological gap with the world s leading aviation powers, its aspirations to join their ranks will still 
remain a long-term prospect. The re-organization of the clusters around center of 
competences would accelerate the process. The research, education, firms, manufacturing 







IX- Russian entry in the large commercial aircraft business  
 
The Russian commercial aerospace has been in business for decades alongside its military 
business. The Russian military aerospace design offices have been extremely prolific in the 
cold war in developing both effective fighter and military transport and a wide variety of 
more exotic aircraft that never passed the prototype phase. Since the end of the cold war, 
the military have been less prolific but has gain credibility in the international aerospace 
world, with noticeable international sales of their fighters. India has recently signed a 
contract for the supply of 29 MiG aircraft for a total of over 1.5 billion USD.  
In 2009, Russia's manufacturing companies delivered 14 aircraft and posted an 18% 
increase in consolidated revenues to 114 billion Rubles ($3.8 billion) over 2008.  Sales of 
commercial aircraft accounted for only 11% of this total, 12.5 billion Rubles, 8.7% up from 
the previous year. Its civil aircraft divisions manufactured 17 civil aircraft, of which 14 
were delivered. The Aviastar plant at Ulyanovsk delivered five Tupolev Tu-204s: two to 
Red Wings, and one apiece to Cubana, Air Koryo and VTB Leasing. VASO delivered four 
Ilyushin Il-96s, three to Polet and one to Rossiya, as well as the first two Russian-built 
Antonov An-148s to Rossiya. The KAPO plant in Kazan delivered two Tu-214s to Russia's 
presidential transport, and a third to Transaero. Three Sukhoi Superjet 100 test airframes 
were manufactured by the KnAAPO plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. First deliveries of the 
type have been delayed. 
 
The Russian civil aircraft has never been recognized outside of the CIS as economic, 
performing and reliable. However, the talent of Russia aerospace engineers is recognized 
worldwide as being the best in class in design and aerodynamic The few successful 
domestic programs they have had in the past are ramping down. As Aeroflot aircraft 
became more productive with their western aircraft, the airline has reduced its fleet size. 
Aeroflot and the other 50 Russian airlines have been allowed for a decade to purchase 






completely free to purchase western aircraft. In fact, very few of the CIS airlines have 
ordered Russian built aircraft in the last decade. Therefore, even though Russia has been in 
the civil aircraft business for decades, its civil manufactures are need to re-invent 
themselves and reenter the market. The Russian government have ambitious plan for 
commercial aircraft. Unlike in the past, a significant amount of resources are being 
allocated to the plan. The extraordinary gas revenues of the last few years are certainly 
providing the fund to fuel Russia ambition. If 2009 and 2010 have looked great on the military 
internationally, the prospect for the Russian civil aircraft manufactures is rather gloom. Old 
technology, poor customer support, quality issues are major impediments for the international 
success of current civil programs.  
Another necessary driver of the future success of their ambitious plan is the execution of 
the integration of all aerospace companies of Russia under the same structure: These 
companies often compete for the same domestic market. Unified Aircraft Corporation 
(UAC) UAC have already signed deals in 2010 with three domestic non-scheduled airlines 
for the supply of 18 aircraft An-148s, including 10 cargo version. The An-148 will enter into 
airline service in the first quarter of 2011, and in the first quarter of 2012.for the cargo 
version UAC's consolidated debt fell by 13% to 157 billion Rubles. It says the debt 
reduction is associated with the initiation of state financial support measures to aerospace 
companies.  
The following chapter assesses the development of the Russian commercial aerospace 
industry, its plan for the future and its chance to succeed.  
IX 1 The structure of the Russian civil aviation industry and its plan to enter the large 
commercial aircraft industry 
 
The years that followed the fall of the USSR have been hard for the aviation industry in 
Russia and other CIS countries. The involvement of the military production sector makes it 
difficult to appeal to foreign capital. Civilian aircraft manufacturers have suffered the most. 
The financing of the Russian civil industry have become difficult. International financial 






are essential to the economic development of Russia. A declining market and an increase in 
the stock of old aircraft, abandoned since the Soviet Union era, followed this crisis. During 
the 90s, the passenger traffic in Russia declined 77% and even more in some CIS countries. 
Aircraft and equipments are developed in the design bureau. After approval of the 
government they are distributed among different plants to be produced. The plants 
responsible for building commercial aircraft were not spared from the difficulty of 
financing new programs. The end of the Cold War seemed to provide a future for this 
promising sector but only 30 aircraft were delivered by the large factories in Voronezh, 
Kazan, Ulyanovsk, Samara and Saratov. Other large plants outside of Russia such as KhAPO 
in Kharkov and TAPO in Uzbekistan have a gloomier future than their Russian counterparts  Thanks to the adoption of the Federal Program Russian Civil Aircraft Development , the 
country has begun to see signs of recovery in the sector. The State will ensure that 
economic and legal conditions are advantageous to manufacturers and to airlines. 
Vladimir Putin showed his interest for the civil aviation industry. In 2006, he signed the 
decree on the creation of the Unified Aircraft Corporation. The company was officially 
registered in November 2006 with chartered capital of 96.7 billion rubles ($3.7 billion.)  
The catalyst was the merger of the main Russian aircraft design and manufacturing 
companies aimed to increase Russian participation in the world aviation market. The 
benefit of the merger was uniting the activities of civil aircraft-makers (Tupolev, Ilyushin, 
Yakovlev), military aircraft-makers (Sukhoi, MiG), transport and special aviation (Ilyushin, 
Beriev), and UAV (IRKUT). These companies combined more than five engineering centers 
and ten manufacturing plants and an extraordinary pool of engineering resources and 
talent.  
UAC strategy in the civil aircraft area is to transform the civil segment of the Russian 
aircraft industry into a competitive industry that will account for at least 10% of the annual 
world supplies of aircraft above long 50 seats. With the government support, UAC is 
implementing its 2008-2015 programs to create critical technologies required for 






The merge of the Russian aerospace companies was complex and set in stages:  
 the initial stage (2006-2010) proposes that 75% of merged group be controlled 
by Russian Government, and 25% by investment and private companies  
 the second stage (after 2010) propose that no less than 51% of the merged 
group be controlled by Russian Government, and no more than 49% by 
investment and private companies 
 
Figure 108: UAC structure 
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Under UAC plan to re-align responsibilities within the Russian aerospace industry Sukhoi 
will retain its responsibility for the Sukhoi Super Jet 100, while Irkut will take the lead for 
the MS-21 future program. The two other player within UAC are MIG and Iljushin. The 
position of the four major aerospace companies in Russia is often misaligned. Putin and 
Medvedev are often called to play the arbiter. Because of the strong leadership of UAC in 







Alexey Innokentyevich Fedorov biography 
Chairman President and Member of Management Committee Irkut Corporation 
Alexey Innokentyevich Fedorov has been President and Chairman of the Executive Board at 
Joint Stock Company United Aircraft Corporation since 2006. Mr. Fedorov serves as the 
Deputy Head of Department at Federal Security Service (FSB). He served as President of 
Irkutsk Aircraft Production Association (now Irkut Corporation) from 1998 to 2005. He 
serves as Director General of Russian Aircraft Corporation "MiG". He served as Chief 
Executive Officer and President of United Aircraft Corporation, a Civil Aviation Managing 
Company of United Technologies Corp. and Russian Aircraft Corporation "MiG" until 
January 2009. He served as an Executive Officer of Russian Aircraft Corporation "MiG". He 
served as Chief Executive Officer - General Designer at FSUE (Federal State Unitary 
Enterprise) Russian Aircraft Construction Corporation MiG from 2004 to 2007. Mr. 
Fedorov serves as the Chairman of JSC Nizhny Novgorod Aircraft Building Plant SOKOL. He 
has been the Chairman of the Board of United Aircraft Corporation since August 14, 2008 
and Russian Aircraft Corporation "MiG" since August 14, 2008. He served as Chairman of 
Irkut Corporation. He served as a Director of Aeroflot - Russian Airlines. He serves as 
Director at Joint Stock Company United Aircraft Corporation. Mr. Fedorov graduated from 
Irkutsk Polytechnic Institute with specialty - aircraft construction engineer-mechanic in 













STAGE 1. UAC founding
Formation of basic capital structure
• Entry of government owned shares
• Incorporation of MiG & KAPO
• Attraction of private investors
































STAGE 2. Forming of the target 
assets structure
Additional shares issue
• Inclusion of MiG & KAPO
• Increase of private share
Government Share > 75%
STAGE 1. UAC as a financial 
holding company:
Control over centralized 
investments, implementation 
of programme management 
standards, human resources 
training & development, 
internal cooperation, set up of 
necessary corporate structures
STAGE 2. UAC as a strategic 
holding company:
• Creation of business 
units
• Pilot projects 
realization
• Change in lifecycle 
management system
• Investment in R&D
• Initial restructuring
STAGE 3. UAC as a 
corporation:
• Final formation of 
business units
• Creation of centers of 
excellence
• New projects 
realization




• Military-technical cooperation legislation
• Privatization legislation





UAC goals are : 
 To retain Russia s position as the third centre of aircraft manufacturing in the 
world,  
 To triple sales in 10 years ($2.5 billion to $7-8 billion),  
 To become one of the top 5 aircraft companies in the world,  
 To create a balanced product portfolio by increasing production of civil and 
cargo aircraft and to enter the international market,.  
 To obtain more than 10% market share,  
 To create world-standard centers of excellence in key technologies  
(assembly, titanium, composite structures),  
 To ensure investment attractiveness of UAC by participation of private 





















In order to achieve its strategic objectives; UAC will have to identify market niches 
(product and market) for positioning the Russian civil and military aircraft, and will have to 
become competitive against the products of foreign aircraft manufacturers  
The UAC strategy has been supported by a number of decrees, resolutions and military planning:  
 Decrees of the Russian Federation President, Resolutions of the Russian Federation 
Government and other guidelines on the development of the national aircraft 
industry;  
 Fundamentals of the Russian Federation policy in the area of the development of the 
defense industrial complex for a period up to 2010 and further long-term period;  
 Fundamentals of the Russian Federation military technical policy for a period up to 
2015 and further long-term period;  
 Key lines of the development of armaments, military and special equipment (AMSE) 
for a period up to 2020 and further long-term period;  






 Strategy of the Aircraft Industry Development for a Period up to 2015;  
 Federal target program Russian Civil Aircraft Development for -2010 and for a period up to ;  
 Transport Strategy of the Russian Federation.  
 
UAC plans are part of a higher strategic economic development agenda that aim to (1) diversify and 
balance civil and military revenues, (2) increase competitiveness, and (3) increase Russia global 
outreach. To diversify and reach a balance portfolio, UAC is planning to develop its business in 
all key aircraft industry segments, using a differentiated approach to each segment and 
considering available market opportunities against its own competences. In order to be 
competitive, UAC plan to attract foreign partners and acquire necessary technological and 
industrial solutions. To increase its global outreach, UAC plan to transition to an open business 
model on the basis of a public company that will be able to obtain additional investments 
from capital markets and technologies from its future partners. 
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The second stage of UAC development will be to form a corporate structure and 
organization similar to an EADS and Airbus. In fact, UAC is referred in Russia as a 
Russian Airbus. The structure will pilot key projects to develop centers of excellence. At 
the end of stage two, UAC corporate plan to have the following structure: 
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The third stage will transform UAC into an aerospace group that will manage its business 
units and centers of excellence. The technology, innovation and resource management as 
well as the procurement will be managed at the group level.  The six companies will be fully 
merged and the group will be organized into three business units: Civil Aviation, Military 






Figure 113: UAC Final Structure 
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The corporate structure is the capitalization of the parent company, where the three business units 
are profit centers and the parent the center of cash flow consolidation The capital structure of the 
company is anticipated to reach $9B by 2015 and be engaged in major partnerships with western 
aircraft manufacturers.  The Corporation s strategy in the civil aircraft area include the development of three 
groups of aircraft projects, the current, the promising and the future projects.  
For the current projects, UAC is engaged in the modernization and serial production of the 
IL-96, Tu-204/214, IL-114, Tu-334, An-148 and Be-200 aircraft families. The 
modernization of these aircraft is to be performed at minimum cost-and aim at reducing 
the production costs At the same time UAC will upgrade its production facilities both to 
increase production of currently manufactured aircraft and prepare for production of next 
generation aircraft.  
The aircraft characterized as promising projects have already been launched. UAC is 






projects of SSJ (SSJ-100 and successors), and the wide body short/medium range aircraft 
Tu- SМ. Considering technological, financial and market barriers, the implementation of 
promising projects presupposes the cooperation and alliances with foreign aircraft 
manufactures.  
For the new generation project, UAC is planning to create a solid basis for launching 
production of aircraft appealing to international market and develop a full family of 
product from 150 to 210 seats. Their actual plan is to produce the MS21. The cost of a 
modern civil aircraft project makes it impossible to implement, unless such project is intended to the world market. Therefore the most important element of the UAC s strategy 
will be attracting foreign partners to the MS21 on conditions that the Corporation reserves 
the role of the integrator. UAC may participate as a subcontractor in projects of foreign 
aircraft manufacturers.  
IX-2 The large Russian aircraft manufactures 
IX-2-1 Sukhoi 
 
Sukhoi is best known for its military fighter aircraft. The Sukhoi design office was created 
in 1939 under the name of its founder Pavel Sukhoi. It is now the Sukhoi Company, which 
includes the design office based in Moscow and manufacturing facilities in Novosibirsk, 
Komsomolsk-on-Amur and Irkutsk. Its current CEO Mikhail Pogosian. The production of 
Sukhoi military aircraft was, and is primarily for the domestic market. They are currently 
equipped with Sukhoi 24, 25, 27, 30. Sukhoi estimates that the market for this type of 
aircraft could reach 2000 units including export version to countries politically linked to 
Russia such as Algeria, India, China, Malaysia, Iraq, Syria, Vietnam, Korea Northern 
Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, Egypt, Iran, Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Venezuela, and Peru. Its 
latest aircraft, the SU 34, a two-seater fighter bomber, is intended to replace the SU 24 
fighter bomber and, in part the bomber Tupolev TU 22.  The latest addition to its combat 
aircraft, currently being tested, is a stealth fighter of 5th generation, the SU PAK FA (T 50) 
which first flight took place in January 2010. 






It had partnered with the Italian company  Finmeccanica and created the company "Sukhoi 
Civil Aircraft" (President Vladimir Prissiajniouk) which initial goal was the creation of the 
new family of Russian regional planes Sukhoi Superjet 100.  
The Sukhoi Company is developing three new programs: 
- A civil program, the Sukhoï Superjet 100 
- A military program, the Sukhoï T 50 
- In a marginal way, it also participates in the project of transport aircraft of short / 
medium haul MS 21, whose leader, within the UAC consortium is the Irkut company. 
 
Figure 114: Sukhoi Superjet 100 
 
The regional transport aircraft is offered in four different versions from 75 to 98-seat. A 
new version of 110 passengers is under consideration. Produced by Sukhoi, and Ilyushin in 
Komsomolsk-on-Amur, the aircraft made its first flight in 2008. 
A subsidiary of Finmeccanica, Aliena Aeronauticais is a 25% shareholder of the company. 
The engines are provided by a the collaboration between Russian NPO Saturn and Snecma 
Safran Group of France and Aircelle (France) for the nacelle.. Many other companies are 
participating including Thales (France) and Boeing, acting as a consultant. 






Component Partner, supplier 
Engine Snecma 
Engine Nacelle Aircelle 
Avionics Thales 
Control systems LEIBHERR 
Environmental control systems LEIBHERR 
Landing gear MESSIER DOWTY 
Fuel system  INTERTECHNIQUE (ZODIAC) 
Interior B / E AEROSPACE 
Security protection againt fire AUTRONIC (Curtiss Wright) 
Oxygen system B / E AEROSPACE 
APU HONEYWELL 
Seats IPECO 
Hydraulic system PARKER 
Electric system HAMILTON SUNDSTRAND 
Motor vibration detector VIBRO-METER 
Wheel and brake Goodrich 
 
The Superjet International Corporation, responsible of marketing, is owned by Alenia 
Aeronautica (51%) and by Sukhoi (49%). It is established in Venice, Italy and in 2009 
opened a branch in Washington D.C . It also has representations in Moscow and Toulouse. 
On October 2009, the Sukhoi Civil Aircraft Company and the airline VietJet signed a 






to buy the Sukhoi Superjet 100. Great efforts are made to promote export sales. The Sukhoi 
Superjet 100, will compete against the Bombardier CRJ900 and the Embraer 170 and 190. 
It also will compete, in its larger versions, against the A318, A319 and Boeing 737-600. 
Currently 200 units have been ordered: the majority is going towards Russian companies.  
Sukhoi T 50: 
The Russian multi-role stealth fighter of 5th generation developed by Sukhoi was launched 
in 2000. Its full name is PAK FA T 50. It is intended to replace the Mig 29 Fulcrum and SU 
27 Flanker. It inherited the technology of two projects developed by the Company, the Mig 
(Mig 1.44) and Sukhoi (SU 47). Over 100 Russian companies are involved in the program.  
 Russia s company NPO Saturn produces the new generation engine. The Society of Aircraft 
Production Komsomolsk-on-Amur in cooperation with the Society of Aircraft Production 
Chkalov Novosibirsk is producing the aircraft. It made its maiden flight in January 2010 and 
should enter service in the Russian Air Force in 2015. Partnerships are sought for a 
licensed production overseas. Statements in April 2009 suggesting a possible licensed 
production in Brazil have not materialized. A partnership with India is being discussed and 






common realization, by its qualities and its price should not only strengthen the power of 
the Russian and Indian Aircraft industry but also still have a great-deserved place on the world market.  
IX-2-2 Yakovlev 
 
The OKB (opytno konstruktorskoïé biouro - office and construction) Yakovlev was founded 
in 1934 by Alexander Sergeyevich Yakovlev. It became Yak by unification with the airplane 
factory in Smolensk in March 1992. These two entities, however, continue to be managed 
separately. The Yakovlev OKB has since been privatized and became the Society of Aviation 
Yak now part of UAC. 
Yakovlev was primarily a manufacturer of military aircraft that had a great reputation, 
especially during the Second World War for building interceptors and fighter-bombers. In 
the 1960s, its research department demonstrated its high scientific and technological 
capabilities through its work in the field of fighter aircraft with short and vertical takeoff. It 
has also produced some helicopters and aircraft for training. Yakolev design bureau, in 70 
years of existence, have produced as many as 70,000 aircraft Its production of civil 
transport aircraft has been limited to two models (Yak 40 and 42) and one project in the 
present time the future MS 21. 
MC 21: (or MS21) 







The MS21 is in its early stage of definition.  It is designed to compete directly with the 
CSeries, the A320 family, the 737 and the COMAC919. Yakovlev is a major participant in the 
project of the Irkut MS 21 designed by Irkut Corporation and the Yakovlev Research 
Bureau.  
The MS 21 is a twin-engine for short/medium haul derived from the Yak 42.. Its first flight 
is expected in 2014 for an entrée into service in 2016. Originally the MS21 had a 100 seater 
in the family that would have competed against the Superjet 100. The 100 seater version 




The top product objectives of the program include: 
-  - Uses 40% of composite materials, 
-  - Russian reactors for the Russian market, 
-  - Pratt and Whitney (Canada) and Rolls Royce  for the western market, 
-  - Avionics:  Avionika (Russia) and Rockwell Collins (USA), 
-  - For the control system of the aircraft: Aviapribor (Russia), Goodrich,   









Antonov latest product is the AN-148 .Its production has already started. Airlines of Russia, 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan have stated their intention to purchase approximately 100 AN-
148 aircraft. Contracts have already been signed with KrasAir, Polyot, SCAT, and Berkut 
airlines. 
 
Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Kyrgyz and Tajikistan leaders have expressed their 
interest in purchasing VIP-versions of the AN-148. 
The AN-148 program has been launched with risk sharing partners including . SE Kyiv 
Aviation Plant Aviant , Kharkov State Aircraft Manufacturing Company, )FC and Voronezh 
Joint Stock Aircraft Building Company . 
The main suppliers of the AN-148 are mostly Russian, to the exception of a very few 
western suppliers:  
 Ukraine: Motor Sich JSC, Juzhmach Plant, UKRNIIRA JSC, NII Buran, Aviacontrol JSC, 
KhADB, Ukranalit JC, STC Electroprylad JSC; 
 Russia: Aviapribor Holding JSC (Moscow), UDBP JSC (Ulyanovsk), Joint Avia 
Teploobmennik JSC (Nizhniy Novgorod), Aerosyla-Electromash JSC (Moscow), 
Techpribor JSC (Saint-Peters-burg), Rubin JS; 
 France: Deutch, Filotex, Thales, LIEBHERR; 







 USA: Rockwell Collins, ASCC; 
 England: Raychem, Dunlop Aircraft Tyres Limited. 
IX-2-4 Ilyushin 
 
Figure 116: Ilyushin Il-96M 
 
Ilyushin main civil aircraft program is the IL-96-300. The long range aircraft is shorter but 
similar to the Airbus A340. The Il-96M and Il-96T are propelled by Pratt & Whitney PW 
2337 engines. Its avionic system comes from Collins Digital Avionics. 
It was launched in 1985 and entered into service in 1993. The Il-96-300 can accommodate 
262 passengers. In August 2009, Russian Minister of Industry and Trade Viktor Khristenko 
announced that the Russian Aviation Industry would stop manufacturing Il-96-300. A 
future airplane development project Il-96MK is currently under study.  However, the future 
of the program is rather gloomy as airlines throughout the world are moving away from 4 
engine 300 seater aircraft to the A330, or future 787 and A350. Moreover, the IL-96 
operating cost are some 30% higher than the current western aircraft being delivered.  
As of June 2009, a total of 21 Ilyushin Il-96 airliners were in service with 12 more in order. 
Operators include Rossiya (four in service, one on order), Ilyushin Design Bureau (one in 
service), KrasAir (two in service), Iran Air (six on order), Atlant-Soyuz Airlines (two on 






order), Polet (two in service, one on order), Conviasa (two on order) and another Russian 









IX-3 Factors influencing the success of UAC entry into the commercial aircraft industry 
 
To achieve the ambitious plan, a number of external conditions to UAC plan would have to 
realize. These conditions are essentially: 
 Accelerate social and economic development of the country ensuring dynamic 
growth of disposable earnings and, as a result, transport mobility of population;  
 Government s stimulation of air freight and passenger operations in Russia,  
 Development of the aviation infrastructure in order to utilize domestic market;  
 Improvement of airport operations,  improve or build civil aerodromes of 
regional and local importance; 
 Upgrading military aircraft fleet of the Armed Forces of Russia;  
 Maintaining favorable investment climate in the high tech and strategic areas of the economy and implementation of the government s innovation policy.  
 
The necessary conditions, which are to be created inside the industry, are: 
 Providing competitive advantages (price and quality of the products, availability 
of after sale maintenance service, financial instruments for sales support) for 
products in selected market niches (product and market);  






 Conducting flexible international cooperation combining purchase of 
components with their possible localization by world leading manufacturers of 
aircraft systems and units, participation in technological process chains of 
foreign aircraft manufactures, entering into strategic alliances and joint projects 
with such companies;  
 Accelerate the development or adoption of critical aircraft manufacturing 
processes required for creating competitive products;  
 Accelerate upgrading, the productive system by importing latest production 
equipment and processes. 
  
The existing technology and positioning of the current products will not be able to achieve 
the stated UAC target by a long shot. UAC will have the difficult task to carry out the 
following projects to be successful: 
 Select priority projects of strategic importance by market segments and 
concentrate resources on such projects;  
 Accelerate formation of the scientific and technological capacity sufficient for 
development of competitive aircraft;  
 Form an integrated design and production environment making it possible to 
realize the created capacity into competitive products;  
 Stimulating the demand of Russian airlines by providing competitive products 
and for the foreign market, by getting international alliances.  
 
In order to develop a family of aircraft that will be successful in the world market, UAC will 
have to identify a few market niche and perform deep concept research, which would 
define future aircraft features that are shaped by future business environment such as the 
rapid growth of fuel prices, toughening of ecological requirements and the increase 
competition with other types of transport. The most challenging element of the UAC s 
Strategy is to organize its scientific research to provide state of the art manufacturing and 









The demand side of the large commercial aircraft is very competitive and requires products 
of high performance that are economical and efficient to operate as well as reliable. The 
demand for air travel and aircraft is shifting to Asia, but the trendsetter airlines continue to 
be in Europe and the US. Air travel growth is challenged by environmental sustainability 
factors that greatly influence innovation of the supply side. The need for technology 
innovation to be able to grow air travel and to maintain the incumbent leadership position 
through differentiation is pushing the incumbents  costs for new program introduction to 
new heights. At the same time, their product cash cows (A320 and 737) are reaching their 
economic life and are challenged by new entrants that are bringing new and more efficient 
aircraft to the market in the next five years. Although these new products are only step 
changes, the incumbent aircraft manufactures must respond by seeking new opportunities 
to reduce their costs through internationalization of their supply chain and product 
innovation.  Asia has become the world s largest market for commercial aircraft. As a result, the home 
market of China and India are now large enough to justify an indigenous civil aircraft in the 
70 to 90 seats capacity for India and 150 seats capacity for China and to enter the market 
with some success. As for the entry in the market of Airbus, Boeing and Douglas, the 
strategic importance of the commercial aircraft business is influencing government policy 
of the emerging countries. The strategic importance of the commercial aircraft comes from 
its impact on the national economy; export, employment, technology expertise, and 
innovation. In particular, aerospace innovation has a proven spillover in other industries. 
For China, aerospace is also a matter of national security and is part of a larger strategy to 
shift growth from consumer goods to  high-value-added industries. Governments in 
emerging parts of the world are planning and acting on increasing their knowledge base 






products and ensure competitiveness as their economy matures. Government support of 
the LCA industry has occupied many policymakers on both side of the Atlantic in the last 
twenty years. Given the comprehensive and aggressive plan, and the level of committed 
resources both in people and funds of the Chinese and Russian governments to develop 
their LCA industry, the debate will transfer from the Atlantic to the Pacific and within 
Europe at one point in time. It is actually surprising that so far, it has not been the source of 
much debate at the WTO.  
 However, it will take more than government support and their home market to make the 
Chinese and Russian LCA industry successful.  The key determinants of competitiveness 
involve many factors that are beyond their influences.  Among them, the most challenging 
for the new entrants will be the development of a coherent product development strategy, 
the market credibility of their products, the values proposition and differentiation of their 
products, the productivity, efficiency and flexibility of their productive system and the 
relationship with customers and suppliers.  
Most of these challenges can be overcome if China and Russia focuses on one single aspect: 
innovation. Their ability to innovate could transform the leadership in aviation. The 
challenge is big. The immense financial resources of Russia will still be not enough to 
develop an innovation network to the scale of Russia, notwithstanding to the scale of UAC. 
The credibility in the market place will be long to obtain. Given the magnitude of China s 
engagement, the credibility they have successfully built in other domains such as 
automobile and computers, their ability to innovate in aviation is real. Everything will be in 
the execution. The metric perfected for this research to assess the degree of readiness that 
China have reached in shaping its innovation system is based on four categories or domains 
of factors relating to innovation. These four factors are: (1) the business enterprises firms ,  the science and technology institutions,  the transfer and absorption of 
technology, knowledge and skills and (4) the surrounding environment. The fourth domain 
is of particular importance for emerging countries as it drives the range of opportunities 






and other conditions that exist regardless of any considerations of innovation. The metric 
has allowed this research to collect data using a practical framework.  
The Table 10: Evaluation of the innovative environment of the firm in emerging countries 
based on OECD framework give a summary of the assessment. 
In essence, the most challenging issues for the China s firms to innovate are essentially: 
 basic research linkage between firm 
 presence of experts 
 venture capital for technology start-up firms 
 management skills and experience for researchers 
 marketing research, market development skills  
 ease of industry access to public R&D capabilities 
 strategic research capabilities of the firms 
 capacity of combining all innovation dynamo factors of the innovative firm 
To be able to develop a game-changing aircraft, China would have to master all these skills. 
China has already launched a 150 seater commercial aircraft with the ambition to enter the 
market in 2015. Under this timing, it is expected to have a six year lead time between the 
end of the design phase and the first delivery.  It will be impossible for COMAC to be able to 
include game-changing technologies. (owever, the development of this transition aircraft  
will be critical even if it fails commercially to build experience in linking Chinese aerospace 
and international suppliers, to generate experts, to develop management skills and 
experience and build marketing expertise in an international environment. Boeing and 
Airbus anticipate delivering their game changing aircraft in the 2023-2025 timeframe. To 
be able to deliver a game-changing commercial aircraft timed to market  earlier or at the 
same time than its competitors, China would need to finish preliminary design of their 






challenging especially in the area of basic research, management skill and experience and 
combining the skills for innovation or be a sort of architect that integrate all the technology 
and discipline together. It will all depend on how the Chinese commercial aerospace 
organizes itself to reap the maximum benefit from the experience that will develop in the transition aircraft  launched last year.  
The cluster analysis has been tremendously useful in showing that China has hundred of 
thousand of qualified engineers and technician, and a strong aeronautic base. It also shows 
that in the helicopter business in China has successfully evolved from being an imitator to a 
partner, then a component supplier and finally an endogenous helicopter designer and 
manufacturer. On the negative side, the cluster analysis has shown a very inefficient cluster 
structure, with competing or overlapping programs. The number of engineers and 
technician is quite impressive but the collective low output of the aerospace sector in China 
raises the question of their efficiency. Finally the cluster analysis indicated that China is 
trying to develop the entire aircraft supply chain expertise in the different clusters rather 
than taking the internationalization route of its western competitors. This seems to be the 
result of the individual clusters developing their own isolated strategy rather than a 
comprehensive national strategy to cover the full supply chain. In any case, it does not 
seem to be the right strategy especially in building the credibility in the western world.  
The challenge is difficult but will most likely be overcome in making COMAC one of the top 
three LCA leaders. Innovation leading to unique value propositions of their product will in 
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The incumbent firms in the large commercial aircraft industry (LCA) oligopoly are faced with many 
short to medium term challenges that will shape their future competitiveness. The financial crisis 
has accelerated the market dynamics that are driving these challenges. Among them, the 
sustainable growth of air travel, the increasing costs of new programs and the threat of the new 
contenders entering the LCA top the list. For all the players and potential players, innovation and 
internationalization of the supply chain are key determinants of their future competitiveness. The 
main objective of the thesis is to assess the capacity of emerging countries to turn into innovation 
powerhouses and become  leaders in the large commercial aviation business.  
The research integrates the supply  (technology, structure of the firm, internationalization, strategy, 
government policy) and the demand side (effect of the airlines market and business strategy on the LCA manufacturers s  strategy . Most of the research in this field have concentrated on the supply 
side. The thesis focuses on understanding the reasons for the strategic importance of civil aviation 
in government policy, defining the key determinants of competitveness in the LCA industry, and 
analyzing the market entry of incumbent firms.  More importantly, the research proposes a metric 
and a cluster analysis to determine whether or not China has the ability to be innovative and to 
become a leader in the commercial aircraft business.  
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